Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Wong Sin Hoi (CA-A52NCvC-24-05/2022)

Content

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO: CA-A52NCvC-24-05/2022 ANTARA TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD (No. Syarikat: 199001009294/200866-W) …PLAINTIF DAN WONG SIN HOI (No. K/P: 740808-06-5143) …DEFENDAN

Preamble

Menurut TNB, disebabkan defendan tidak fasih dalam Bahasa Melayu, maka dokumen-dokumen yang dirujuk kepadanya tidak boleh diterima. [b] Ironinya dan walaupun dibekalkan dengan keadaan ini, TNB tidak menghiraukannya dan boleh pula pada masa yang sama menggunakan P-1 yang keseluruhannya di dalam Bahasa Inggeris, dikatakan ditandatangan oleh defendan dan menjadikannya sebagai asas untuk menuntut defendan membayar RM215,040.65. [c]

Preamble

Mengikut logik, keseluruhan P1 juga hendaklah ditolak kerana defendan jelas langsung tidak pandai berbahasa Inggeris. [d] Sedangkan apa yang berlaku semasa perbicaraan ketika dokumen-dokumen dirujuk kepada beliau, defendan hanya diminta untuk mencari namanya di dalam dokumen tersebut dan seterusnya menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah tandatangan beliau, tidak lebih dari itu. [e] P11 membuktikan defendan kenal dan tahu ejaan namanya. Selain itu, laporan polis yang dirujuk adalah jelas maksudnya dan tidak memerlukan keterangan lanjut dari defendan. [f] Defendan turut menegaskan tingkah laku (demeanor) fefendan semasa memberi keterangan menunjukkan beliau seorang yang jujur, naif dan tidak mempunyai pengetahuan mendalam tentang urusan permohonan bekalan elektrik. Apatah lagi untuk menandatangani DUA perjanjian penyewaan dan seterusnya memohon DUA akaun pembekalan elektrik dari Plaintif. Hujahan Balas Plaintif Beban Pembuktian [43] Defendan telah salah tafsir prinsip undang-undang tentang beban pembuktian bahawa tandatangan di Eksibit P1 adalah tandatangan defendan terletak di bahu TNB. [44] Dalam tindakan ini, TNB telah berjaya membebaskan bebannya dengan menunjukkan permohonan dimasukkan oleh defendan dan lantaran itu pembekalan elektrik dibuat dan didatarkan atas nama Pemohon oleh itu Pemohon bertanggungan untuk membayar. [45] Memandangkan TNB telah membuktikan secara kredibal bahawa permohonan P1 adalah dibuat oleh defendan, beban berpindah kepada defendan untuk membuktikan penegasannya yang kononya tandatangan tersebut bukan tandatangan beliau. Dengan rendah diri beban ini tidak berjaya dilepaskan oleh defendan (kes Mahkamah Tinggi Eon Bank Bhd v Hotel Flamingo And Another Case [2005] 1 MLJ 712 adalah dirujuk). Perbandingan Tandatangan [46] TNB seterusnya merujuk kepada Ikatan E yang mengandungi Borang Permohonan bagi premis no. B-34 Ground Floor 3/10 B.I.M Point Bandar Indera Mahkota, 25200 Kuantan, Pahang beserta dokumen sokongan iaitu perjanjian penyewaan. [47] Berdasarkan Ikatan Dokumen tersebut, TNB berhujah ia jelas menunjukkan pihak-pihak, terutama sekali defendan, tidak mempertikaikan kandungan dokumen dan kesahihan yang dirujuk di bawah Ikatan E tersebut. Ini jelas bermakna tandatangan defendan yang berada di dalam Borang Permohonan dan Perjanjian Penyewaan tersebut dalam Ikatan E telah diperakui oleh defendan. Tandatangan tersebut adalah tandatangan yang sama diturunkan dalam Eksibit P1 tindakan ini. [48] Sekiranya dipertikaikan oleh defendan, sewajarnya ditandakan sebaliknya. TNB kemudian merujuk kes Mahkamah Rayuan Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 845 di mana ia telah menyatakan seperti berikut: [43] Our construction of Order 34 Rule 2(2)(d) and (e) which is consonant with the dissenting judgment of Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JCA, is that Part A documents, which prescribe that both the authenticity and the contents of documents are agreed, must mean that the truth of the content of the documents are agreed upon between the parties. Otherwise they would simply be placed in Part B. [49] Sekiranya defendan ingin menafikan pengakuannya bahawa tandatangan di P1 bukan miliknya dan perbandingan tandatangan adalah untuk dilakukan secara fakta dan keadaan semasa, penafian yang dilakukan tidak disokong oleh sebarang keterangan atau bukti, selain dari pengataan kosong yang diberikan oleh defendan. Defendan juga telah memilih untuk tidak membuat laporan kimia mahupun laporan polis dalam menyokong pertikaian berkenaan tandatangan miliknya dan tandatangan pada P1. Oleh itu, penafian kosong yang diberikan oleh defendan tidak wajar dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah ini (kes Bespile Sdn Bhd v Asianshine Sdn Bhd & Ors [2010] MLJU 235 dirujuk). [50] Berkenaan permohonan defendan untuk Mahkamah membuat perbandingan tandatangan-tandatangan yang dikemukakan, TNB berhujah bahawa bantuan pakar dalam melakukan perbandingan tandatangan seharusnya dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini, selaras dengan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Tan Chin Soon (Rayuan Sivil No: CA- 12BNCVC-3-07/2023) yang telah memutuskan untuk bantuan pakar diperlukan dalam melakukan perbandingan tersebut. [51] Plaintif berpendirian bahawa perbandingan secara mata kasar hanya boleh dilakukan terhadap dokumendokumen yang telah diakui secara nyata keesahannya oleh pihak-pihak dan telah ditandakan sebagai Bahagian A. TNB telah merujuk kes Mahkamah Tinggi Jardine One Solution (2001) Sdn Bhd V. AINB Tech (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2011] CLJU 395 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi melakukan perbandingan tandatangan terhadap dokumen yang ditandakan sebagai Bahagian A, dan memutuskan bahawa tandatangan kelihatan sama. Alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi adalah seperti berikut: In any case, looking at the signature on the guarantee, I agree with the 4th Defendant that it does look like his signature. It certainly looks like the signatures found in the other documents in the agreed bundle of documents marked as Bundle A which the 4th Defendant has admitted are his. Sila rujuk Ikatan Otoriti Defendan, mukasurat 8 Keterangan SD1 [52] Menurut TNB, keterangan SD1 tidak disokong dengan sebarang dokumen. Ini adalah kerana perjanjian penyewaan di antara bapanya dan Chou Kong Yuen di muka surat 13 Ikatan D hanya ditanda sebagai IDD memandangkan pembuat dokumen iaitu bapa SD1, Encik Hoo Kat Lee tidak hadir bagi mengesahkan kandungan dokumen dan dokumen asal juga tidak dibawa dan dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. [53] SD1 juga tidak dapat mengemukakan sebarang dokumen sampingan contohnya bil air atau pembayaran penyewaan atau perjanjian jual beli untuk membuktikan kononnya dia adalah pemilik premis tersebut dan sememangnya premis tersebut kosong semasa tempoh tuntutan. [54] TNB juga meminta Mahkamah ini berhati-hati dengan keterangan ini kerana bagaimana defendan boleh membawa pemilik premis tersebut sedangkan defendan mengatakan kononnya dia tidak menyewa premis tersebut dan tidak mengetahui berkenaan premis tersebut. Keterangan SD2 [55] TNB berhujah bahawa defendan telah mengakui bahawa tandatangan yang terdapat di borang permohonan di Ikatan E merupakan miliknya apabila bersetuju untuk dokumen tersebut diklasifikasikan dalam Bahagian A. Dan tandatangan tersebut kelihatan sama dengan tandatangan dalam Eksibit P1. [56] Malah defendan tidak pernah membuat laporan polis dalam menafikan bahawa tandatangan di P1 adalah bukan miliknya. Oleh itu dakwaan defendan bahawa dia tidak pernah menandatangani P1 tersebut adalah dakwaan kosong. [57] TNB selanjutnya berhujah pertikaian terhadap kredibiliti SD2 adalah selanjutnya disokong di mana kononnya beliau mengatakan tidak fasih dan tidak memahami Bahasa Melayu mahupun Bahasa Inggeris, meskipun laporan polis yang dilaporkan oleh beliau merupakan sepenuhnya di dalam Bahasa Melayu tanpa sebarang penterjemahan dilakukan, dan kebolehan beliau untuk menyediakan permohonan yang dinyatakan di Ikatan E walaupun kandungan adalah di dalam Bahasa Inggeris. Dapat dilihat di sini di mana SD2 berupaya untuk memahami Bahasa Melayu dan Bahasa Inggeris, walaupun yang sama dinafikan. Penguasaan bahasa didalam Laporan polis juga adalah bahasa lengkap dan bukannya bahasa seperti yang digunakan di Mahkamah. SD2 juga memilih untuk tidak memberikan keterangan dalam Bahasa Cina. Keputusan Mahkamah [58] Ini adalah antara kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini yang melibatkan permohonan dan pembekalan elektrik berlaku ketika negara dilanda COVID 19. [59] Dalam kes ini, berbanding dengan kes-kes TNB yang lain di hadapan Mahkamah ini, plaintif tidak mempunyai kesukaran untuk membuat penandaan eksibit memandangkan peguam defendan memilih untuk bersetuju tetapi tertakluk kepada pemeriksaan balas. [60] Walaupun begitu, Mahkamah ini suka untuk memetik apa yang ditekankan oleh Richard Malanjum KH (Sabah dan Sarawak) (pada ketika itu) dalam satu kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Desa Samudra Sdn Bhd v Bandar Teknik Sdn Bhd & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 729- In the law governing documentary evidence, as in oral evidence, three matters come to mind — relevancy, admissibility, and weight. They must be considered in that order. Only evidence which is relevant ought to be admissible. Irrelevant evidence should be rendered as inadmissible and the matter ends there. Now, relevant evidence which is rendered admissible is still subject to the element of weight. The court can either attach due weight to the evidence, or some weight, little weight, or no weight at all. Due regard must be given to the authenticity of the evidence, its source, its contents, and more importantly, the surrounding circumstances of the case. This is where contemporaneous evidence would come in handy. [Penekanan dibuat oleh saya] [61] Lord Simmon of Glaisdale dalam kes Regina v Killbourne [1973] AC 729 (HL) menyatakan-Your Lordships have been concerned with four concepts in the law of evidence: (i) relevance; (ii) admissibility; (iii) corroboration; (iv) weight. The first two terms are frequently, and in many circumstances legitimately, used interchangeably; but I think it makes for clarity if they are kept separate, since some relevant evidence is inadmissible and some admissible evidence is irrelevant (in the senses that I shall shortly submit). Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter which requires proof. I do not pause to analyze what is involved in "logical probativeness," except to note that the term does not of itself express the element of experience which is so significant of its operation in law, and possibly elsewhere. It is sufficient to say, even at the risk of etymological tautology, that relevant (i.e., logically probative or disprobative) evidence is evidence which makes the matter which requires proof more or less probable. To link logical probativeness with relevance rather than admissibility (as was done in Sims) not only is, I hope, more appropriate conceptually, but also accords better with the explanation of Sims given in Harris v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1952] A.C. 694, 710. Evidence is admissible if it may be lawfully adduced at a trial. "Weight" of evidence is the degree of probability (both intrinsically and inferentially) which is attached to it by the tribunal of fact once it is established to be relevant and admissible in law (though its relevance may exceptionally, as will appear, be dependent on its evaluation by the tribunal of fact). [62] Oleh itu, walaupun TNB berjaya membuat penandaan eksibit kepada dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan termasuk dokumen dalam Ikatan E yang mana dipersetujui oleh kedua-dua pihak semasa hari perbicaraan untuk diklasifikasi sebagai dokumen di bahagian A, Mahkamah masih perlu memberi pertimbangan kepada keberatan keterangan (weight of evidence) kepada bukti-bukti tersebut bagi membuat keputusan berkenaan kebenaran bukti yang dikemukakan (truth of the content of the documents). [63] Klasifikasi dokumen-dokumen sebagai bahagian A atau bahagian B atau bahagian C boleh dilihat pada peruntukan di bawah Aturan 34 Kaedah 2(d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah, 2012. [64] Apakah implikasi-implikasi kepada klasifikasi tersebut, Mahkamah ini dipandu oleh penerangan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Yeo Ing King v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 609 seperti petikan berikut- [16] The procedure under Order 34 rule 2 is meant to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action or proceedings. Where so ordered by the court at the pre-trial case management, paragraph (d) of Order 34 rule 2 imposes on the parties an obligation to agree, as far as possible, on the contents of the documents. Once agreed, the documents are to be compiled and filed by the plaintiff and marked as “Part A”. It is only when there is no agreement on the contents of certain documents that the plaintiff is required by paragraph (e) to file separate bundles, to be marked “Part B” or “Part C” respectively. [17] Part B documents are documents that are only agreed as to the authenticity but not as to the contents. For this class of documents, the existence and authenticity of the documents need no formal proof but the contents still need to be proved as they are disputed. The dispute can be over the details or accuracy of the contents as they appear on the face of the documents. Cross-examination is allowed on these issues but not on the existence and authenticity of the documents. [18] Part C documents on the other hand are documents where both authenticity and contents are disputed and must therefore be strictly proved by calling the makers of the documents or those who can confirm their authenticity and contents. Contents And Truth Of Contents. [19] It is a misconception to think that for the documents in Part A, “everything is agreed”. Rule 2(d) of Order 34 only speaks of contents of the documents. It does not speak of the truth of the contents. The question is, what does the rule envisage when it requires agreement on the contents of the documents? Does it mean agreement on the truth of the contents, or does it only mean agreement on the fact that the documents contain what they purport to contain, i.e. the contents as they appear on the face of the documents? [20] There is of course a difference between agreeing on the contents of a document and agreeing on the truth of the contents. If I agree that a document contains a statement that is defamatory of me, it does not necessarily follow, as night follows day, that I agree to the truth of the statement. Our View On rule 2(d) [21] Having given careful consideration to the matter, we take the view that what rule (2)(d) envisages is only agreement on the contents of the documents and not the truth of the contents, unless agreed by the parties. In the present case there was no such agreement between the Page 5 of 13 Yeo Ing King v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 609 plaintiff and the defendant at the pre-trial case management. Therefore the agreement by the parties to place the documents in Part A of the BOD was only an agreement that the documents contained the impugned defamatory statements and not an agreement that the defamatory statements were true of the plaintiff. [22] It is true that it was the plaintiff itself who chose to include the three defamatory statements in Part A of the BOD, but it will be stretching the imagination to suggest that by doing so the plaintiff had admitted to the truth of the statements. That is wholly illogical and runs counter to the pleadings and the plaintiff’s object of filing the claim in the first place. [23] Order 34 rule 2 is not designed to be a trap for the unwary to fall into. It is designed to simplify the procedure in a civil trial and to expedite the disposal of cases. Whether the statements were defamatory and whether they were the truth were matters that the court had to decide. The flaw in the defendant’s argument is that it equates contents with truth. [24] It was strenuously argued that if the plaintiff disputed the truth of the defamatory statements, it should have included the documents in Part B and not in Part A of the BOD. There is force to the argument but as we said, contents and truth are two different things. Like paragraph (d), paragraph (e) of Order 34 rule 2 only speaks of contents and not truth of contents. [25] The irony is that if we were to follow the defendant’s argument to its logical conclusion, then, by placing the documents in Part B of the BOD as suggested by him, he would be deemed to have disputed the truth of the defamatory statements. That would demolish his own pleaded defence of justification as the falsity or untruthfulness of the statements would render the defence unsustainable in law. He would be estopped from denying that the defamatory statements were untrue and judgment would have to be entered against him without proceeding to trial. There is an old saying that we must be careful with what we wish for. [26] Thus, in the context of an action for defamation, it does not matter if the defamatory statements are included in Part A, Part B or Part C of the BOD. The truth of the defamatory statements would still have to be established by the party who bears the burden of proving the truth, unless it is agreed between the parties at any stage of the action, including by way of pleadings, that the defamatory statements are true or untrue as the case may be. [27] The distinction between contents and truth assumes particular importance in an action founded on defamation simply because the nature of the action is such that the truth or otherwise of the statements alleged to be defamatory almost always becomes an issue, hence the defence of justification which relies as its basis on the truth of the statements. [28] The defendant’s argument on the evidential status of the Part A documents is clearly out of alignment with the following precedents, which we consider to be still good law on “agreed documents” although they deal with the procedure before the coming into force of the present rules providing for Part A, Part B and Part C documents:

Lampiran

Lampiran A Pertuduhan yang diterima oleh defendan pada 27.5.2021 (Eksibit D10) Tandatangan defendan yang diturunkan ketika perbicaraan dan ditanda sebagai P11 [81] Pihak TNB tidak memilih untuk merujuk spesimen tandatangan tersebut kepada pakar bagi membuktikan kebenaran kandungan dokumen-dokumen tersebut i.e fakta bahawa penandatangan sebenar adalah sememangnya defendan di hadapan Mahkamah. [82] Tetapi TNB memilih untuk bergantung kepada keterangan SP1 semata-mata pada mulanya dan kemudian membuat perbandingan dengan Eksibit P11 (walaupun dalam masa yang sama TNB membantah perbandingan dibuat oleh defendan antara Eksibit P1 dan dokumen-dokumen yang lain yang sepatutnya dirujuk kepada pakar). [83] Perlu ditekankan di sini bahawa sememangnya Mahkamah mempunyai budibicara dan kuasa untuk membuat perbandingan tersebut di bawah seksyen 73 Akta Keterangan, 1950. Kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh pihak defendan mengesahkan kuasa tersebut dan saya tidak berniat untuk mengulangi berkenaan kes-kes yang sama. [84] Isu penggunaan seksyen 73 Akta Keterangan, 1950 sepatutnya tidak timbul kerana pihak TNB sendiri dalam hujahan balas mereka di perenggan 27-28 mencadangkan Mahkamah ini untuk membuat membuat perbandingan tandatangan dalam Eksibit P1 dengan dokumen di Ikatan E yang dikatakan lebih contemporaneous. [85] Dokumen dalam Ikatan E adalah satu lagi borang permohonan bekalan elektrik yang dikatakan telah dipohon oleh defendan bagi B-34 Ground Floor 3/10, B.I.M Point, Bandar Indera Mahkota, 25200 Kuantan, Pahang (“premis 2 tersebut”). [86] Dokumen dalam Ikatan E adalah dikemukakan oleh defendan bagi tujuan pengesahan bahawa dia bukanlah executant dokumen tersebut (sila lihat nota keterangan SD2). [87] Walaupun Dokumen dalam Ikatan E tersebut telah dipersetujui sebagai dokumen bahagian A, sekali lagi ingin saya tekankan bahawa tiada persetujuan pihak-pihak bahawa tandatangan tersebut adalah sebenar-benarnya tandatangan defendan. [88] Oleh itu, walaupun TNB ingin membandingkan tandatangan dalam Eksibit P1 dan dokumen dalam Ikatan E tersebut, ia masih bertanggungjawab untuk membuktikan kepada Mahkamah ini bahawa defendan adalah sebenarnya executant dokumen tersebut. [89] Berbalik kepada keterangan SP1. SP1 bukanlah pembuat Eksibit P1 tersebut. Dia adalah kakitangan TNB yang memberi borang permohonan untuk diisi pada 13.1.2021 dan menerima borang permohonan tersebut yang telah siap diisi dan memprosesnya pada 14.1.2021. Tiada keterangan bahawa SP1 melihat defendan menandatangani Eksibit P1 tersebut. [90] Persoalannya adalah-Adakah keterangan SP1 yang mengatakan, semasa pemeriksaan utama, bahawa dia telah melihat defendan mengambil borang pada 13.1.2021 dan menyerahkan borang yang telah siap diisi pada 14.1.2021, adalah mencukupi untuk membuktikan inherent probability kes plaintif? [91] Sebagaimana yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan sebelum ini, borang permohonan pembekalan elektrik dan sesalinan perjanjian penyewaan berkaitan premis tersebut sebagai dokumen sokongan kepada borang permohonan tersebut telah ditanda sebagai Eksibit P1 melalui keterangan SP1. Penandaan eksibit tersebut telah dibuat setelah peguam defendan menyatakan tiada bantahan namun tertakluk kepada pemeriksaan balas. [92] Mengulangi prinsip yang ditekankan dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Yeo Ing King v Melawangi Sdn Bhd, supra penandaan Eksibit P1 dan P11 menunjukkan persetujuan kedua-dua pihak bahawa kedua-dua dokumen tersebut mempunyai tandatangan yang didakwa adalah milik defendan. Ia bukanlah satu persetujuan bahawa tandatangan-tandatangan dalam kedua-dua eksibit tersebut adalah sememangnya milik defendan. Itulah perbezaan yang ditekankan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes tersebut. [93] Seksyen 67 Akta Keterangan, 1950 telah memperuntukkan-Jika sesuatu dokumen dikatakan telah ditandatangani atau telah ditulis keseluruhannya atau sebahagiannya oleh mana-mana orang, tandatangan atau tulisan tangan mengenai sekian banyak daripada dokumen itu yang dikatakan sebagai dalam tulisan tangan orang itu hendaklah dibuktikan sebagai dalam tulisan tangannya. (If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting shall be proved to be in his handwriting). [94] S C Sarkar dalam buku beliau Sarkar Law of Evidence in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia & Singapore1 telah menyatakan-The execution of a document cannot be deemed proved merely because it is proved in the sense of the definition of “proved”. That definition in s.3 must be read along with s.67 which requires that there must be specified evidence that the signature purporting to be that of the executant is in the handwriting of the executant. Until this is proved the court cannot proceed to consider whether execution is proved. In the other words s.67 makes proof of execution of a document something more difficult than proof of matter other than execution of a document.... 1 Malaysia Edition, Volume 2 Sections 56-117, Lexis Nexis (2016) di muka surat 1877 [95] Di muka surat sebelumnya di dalam buku yang sama, S C Sarkar ada menyatakan-The term “execution”is not defined in any statute. It means completion, ie, the last act or acts which complete a document and in English law this is known as “signing, sealing and delivering.” The ordinary meaning of executing a document is signing it as a consenting party thereto… [Penekanan dibuat] [96] Oleh itu, adakah SP1 di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah a consenting party dalam Eksibit P1 tersebut? Mahkamah ini menjawabnya dengan “TIDAK”. [97] Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah, jelas menunjukkan- (a) SP1 adalah kakitangan TNB yang memberi borang permohonan untuk diisi pada 13.1.2021 dan menerima borang permohonan tersebut yang telah siap diisi dan memprosesnya pada 14.1.2021. (b) SP1 bukanlah individu yang menandatangani dokumen tersebut. She is not the maker of the document. (c) SP1 juga bukanlah individu atau saksi yang melihat individu yang didakwa sebagai Wong Sin Hoi (yang dikatakan hadir di hadapannya pada 13.1.2021 untuk mengambil borang permohonan tersebut dan pada 14.1.2021 untuk menyerahkan borang permohonan tersebut bersama dokumen sokongan) menandatangani dokumen-dokumen tersebut. (d) Pengecaman SP1 ke atas defendan sebagai Wong Sin Hoi yang hadir di hadapannya pada kedua-dua tarikh tersebut juga amat meragukan. (e) Alasan-alasan keraguan tersebut adalah sebagaimana yang dihujahkan oleh pihak defendan dan Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan apa yang dikemukakan di atas. Dan Mahkamah ini tidak berniat untuk mengulanginya di perenggan ini. [98] Dengan itu, Mahkamah ini seterusnya berpendapat bahawa pihak TNB gagal membuktikan kes mereka atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa defendan adalah consenting party kepada kontrak pembekalan elektrik tersebut. Oleh itu, tiada pembuktian sebaliknya dipindahkan kepada pihak defendan. [99] Namun pun begitu, jika dapatan di atas adalah salah, Mahkamah ini masih kekal dengan keputusan bahawa kes defendan adalah more inherently probable dengan alasan-alasan di perenggan-perenggan berikutnya. [100] Seksyen 73A(1)(a)(i) Akta Keterangan, 1950- Adakah ia boleh digunapakai dengan keterangan SP1? [101] Dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi Alliedbank (M) Bhd v Yau Jiok Hua [1998] 6 MLJ 1 Augustine Paul PK (pada ketika itu) telah menyatakan seperti berikut berkenaan penggunaan peruntukan tersebut- This section is modelled on the Evidence Act 1938 of England which has been modified by the Civil Evidence Act 1968. The 1938 Act has been followed in the Australian jurisdictions. Thus English and Australian cases on their similar provisions would be of assistance in interpreting the section. Primarily, the section provides for the admissibility of a statement made in a document when the maker is called as a witness subject to satisfaction of the conditions enumerated therein. The section then goes on to provide for the admissibility of the statement when the maker is not called as a witness. In this regard the section creates a statutory exception to the rule against hearsay in two classes of case. The first is where the maker of the statement has personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement and is not called as a witness. The second is where the maker of the statement lacks personal knowledge of the facts stated therein because he made the statement which he produces in the performance of a duty to record information supplied to him by a person who had, or might reasonably be supposed to have, personal knowledge of those matters. [102] Sebagaimana yang dinyatakan sebelum ini, Mahkamah ini telah mendapati bahawa- (a) Peranan SP1 hanyalah memberi borang permohonan untuk diisi pada 13.1.2021 dan menerima borang permohonan tersebut yang telah siap diisi dan memprosesnya pada 14.1.2021. (b) SP1 bukanlah individu yang menandatangani Eksibit P1 tersebut. (c) Oleh itu, SP1 bukanlah pembuat Eksibit P1 tersebut (lihat Chong Kow v Kesavan Govindasamy [2009] 8 MLJ 41). (d) Walaupun SP1 adalah pihak yang bertanggungjawab memproses permohonan tersebut, SP1 tidak mempunyai pengetahuan peribadi akan data-data dan butiran-butiran dalam Eksibit P1 tersebut. Tiada keterangan bahawa SP1 telah membuat pengesahan berkenaan ketulenan dan kebenaran data-data yang dikemukakan. (e) Tiada apa-apa keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah ini menunjukkan bahawa SP1 pernah mengenali defendan atau individu yang didakwa sebagai Wong Sin Hoi sebelum kes ini atau lebih tepat sebelum pemprosesan Eksibit P1 tersebut. (f) Tiada apa-apa keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa SP1 pernah berurusan dengan defendan atau individu yang didakwa sebagai Wong Sin Hoi untuk mana-mana premis lain bagi tujuan bekalan elektrik sebelum kes ini atau lebih tepat sebelum pemprosesan Eksibit P1 tersebut. (g) Atas alasan tersebutlah kemungkinan besar benar apa yang dijawab oleh SP1 semasa pemeriksaan balas bahawa dia tidak pasti yang borang permohonan pembekalan memang diambil oleh defendan pada 13.1.2021 tersebut kerana borang tersebut boleh diambil oleh sesiapa sahaja, dia sebenarnya tidak ingat dia berjumpa dengan defendan atau tidak kerana perintah pemakaian pelitup muka dan kejadian telah lama serta setiap hari SP1 akan bertemu lebih kurang 30 orag berurusan dengan TNB. SP1 hanya bergantung kepada pengemukaan kad pengenalan sebagai identiti diri tanpa membuat pengesahan melalui wajah yang pada ketika itu yang sedang memakai pelitup muka. (h) Oleh itu, Seksyen 73A(1)(a)(i) Akta Keterangan, 1950 tidak boleh digunapakai dengan keterangan SP1. [103] Dalam satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi Lean Shing Pek v Anang b Basang & Ors [2012] MLJU 433, tuntutan plaintif ke atas defendan 1 hingga 41 adalah mereka adalah pemilik berdaftar dan/atau pentadbir kepada pemilik-pemilik tanah-tanah tersebut yang telah meninggal dunia. Atas kapasiti tersebut, plaintif mendakwa defendan 1-41 telah menjual tanah-tanah tersebut kepada beliau melalui perjanjian jual beli yang ditandatangani oleh plaintif dan defendan-defendan tersebut. Oleh itu, plaintif menuntut suatu perintah perlaksanaan spesifik akan perjanjian tersebut. [104] Setelah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi, Lee Heng Cheong PK (pada ketika itu) berpendapat bahawa tidak ada bukti yang boleh dipercayai bahawa perjanjian tersebut telah ditandatangani oleh defendan 1-41. Berikut adalah kenyataan Mahkamah berkenaan pembuktian sesuatu dokumen- [x]Based on the evidence adduced in the trial, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that PW1 attested the signatures as contended although PWTs signatures and rubber stamps may appear in the relevant documents. [xi]I find that the Plaintiff apart from relying on PW1's testimony, did not adduce any further evidence on the signatures of the 1st to 41st Defendants. I find that the law on signatures had been clearly laid down by his Lordship Dr.Haji Hamid Sultan Bin Abu Backer in RHB Bank Berhad v Dominance Timber Industries SdnBhd&Ors [2009] 7 CLJ 654 where he said: "Law relating to signatures" (1)Section 67 of Evidence Act 1950 states as follows: If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting shall be proved to be in his handwriting. Under this section there is a requirement not only to prove the existence of the document but also to prove the signature and or handwriting of the person concerned. Thus, a party who exhibits a document must also prove that the document was written or signed by the concerned person. Sections 67 to 73 deal with the mode of the proof of the execution of documents. If a document is alleged to be signed or written by any person, then the document must also be proved to be in his handwriting. Thus, producing a document by itself does not dispense with the need to prove the executant. The handwriting of a person may be proved in the following ways: (a) by the evidence of the writer himself (see s.60 and s.67); (b) by the evidence of another person who has seen him writing the document (see s.60 and s.68); (c) by the evidence of a person who is acquainted with the handwriting of a person by whom the writing in question is supposed to have been written and signed (s.47); (d) 5 by the evidence of handwriting expert (s.45); (e) comparison by the court, of the writing or signature in question with any others proved to the satisfaction of the court to be genuine (see s.73); (f) the court may direct the person who is alleged to have written the document to write any word or figure to enable the court to compare. o (2)Section 68 sets out the principle relating to proof of execution of a document which is required by law to be attested. The word "attested" is not defined in the Act. "Attested" means that a person has signed the document by way of testimony to the fact that he saw it executed. Under this provision when a document is required by law to be attested, then at least one attesting witness must be called toprove the execution of the document before the document is made admissible. If no attesting witness is available section 69 will apply.Attestation of a document in some cases is mere formality and not a requirement of law. However, in some cases it is mandatory. The object of attestation is only to afford proof of the genuineness of the document. This section is only applicable when documents need to be attested by law. Even when secondary evidence of a document is given, an attesting witness must be called. [Penekanan dibuat] [105] Adakah Mahkamah telah bertindak secara tidak adil ke atas TNB dengan meletakkan beban yang berlebihan untuk TNB membuktikan kebenaran kandungan Eksibit P1 tersebut apabila ianya adalah satu proses yang biasa dalam sesuatu permohonan bekalan elektrik dan tugas TNB adalah menerima permohonan tersebut dan memprosesnya sahaja? [106] Jawapan Mahkamah ini adalah tidak. [107] Kes ini adalah melibatkan kewujudan satu kontrak di mana status keesahannya adalah dipertikaikan. Ianya adalah kehendak undang-undang keterangan bagi pihak yang ingin mengemukakan sesuatu dokumen untuk mengemukakannya mengikut aturan yang telah ditetapkan. [108] Sebagaimana yang dinyatakan dalam otoriti di atas, producing a document by itself does not dispense with the need to prove the executant. [109] Kes RHB Bank Berhad v Dominance Timber Industries SdnBhd&Ors [2009] 7 CLJ 654 turut memberi jawapan yang sama. Dan kes tersebut juga telah dirujuk oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Mshudan Kamar & Ors v Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad [2023] CLJU 1709. [110] Dalam Kes RHB Bank Berhad v Dominance Timber Industries Sdn Bhd&Ors tersebut, keputusan adalah berkenaan defendan 3 yang merupakan penjamin kepada kemudahan oberderaf yang diberi kepada defendan 1. Isu utama dalam kes tersebut adalah sama ada tandatangan defendan 3 adalah tulen dan bukan rekapalsu. [111] Bagi membuktikan tuntutan tersebut, pihak RHB telah memanggil peguam (PW2) yang telah menjadi saksi kepada tandatangan defendan 3 dan En Harcharan Singh Tara, pakar tandatangan (PW3). [112] Setelah mendengar segala keterangan dan bukti-bukti yang dikemukakan, Hamid Sultan Abu Backer, HMT (pada ketika itu) telah membenarkan tuntutan plaintif dengan alasan-alasan berikut- (i) It is my finding that the plaintiffs' documentation from the letter of offer until the execution of the said guarantee, subscribes to regular procedure and documentation of banks. The relevant documents have not been executed in suspicious circumstance or manner to create doubt as to the genuineness of the transaction. In this case, notwithstanding the 3rd defendant is not a beneficiary of the overdraft facility, the 3rd defendant is closely connected with the 2nd and 4th defendants. This is not an odd case where the guarantor, unknown to the plaintiff and/or has no nexus to the principal debtor, complains that his signature was forged, provoking the court to question the proprietary of the transaction as a whole. The 2nd to 4th defendants are men of substantial repute. In this case, it was a fundamental term of the letter of offer that the 2nd to 4th defendants in sequence had to stand as guarantors. The joint and several guarantee has the name of the 2nd to 4th defendants in sequence and the 2nd and 4th defendants' signature are also in sequence witnessed by a solicitor who knows the 2nd to 4th defendants. (ii) There is no general requirement in law for agreements or guarantees to be witnessed or attested. At times the word attested is loosely used to describe witnessing of signatures. Documents only need to be attested when the law requires it to be done so. When a document is attested the attesting witness must be called for the purpose of proving its execution. In the instant case, there is no requirement, in law for the guarantees to be witnessed or attested. However, commercial prudence will dictate that it be signed and witnessed. It will be more prudent for financial institutions to obtain 'thumb print' in addition where money is not directly paid to the executant, for example in the case of guarantees, to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation which also adds to back-log of cases in court. In fact as 'thumb print' evidence is the best evidence in contrast to signatures, then financial institutions themselves ought to move for legislation to make it mandatory for guarantees or any other relevant financial documents to be executed with 'thumb print' impression of the executants. (iii) In this case, the evidence of PW2 was severely attacked without much legal basis. It is my finding that PW2 is a witness of truth. I do not think any solicitor will want to witness the signature of 2nd to 4th defendants who are prominent personalities without their instruction. It is not a sine qua non for witnessing of the signature for the executants to be physically present before witnessing a signature. It has been a long practice in witnessing of signatures that it can be done even in the absence. This is reflected in the form in the Power of Attorney Act 1949 which reads as follows: …/ …. (iv) Further, the law gives many options for the plaintiff to prove the signature. One such mode is that by the evidence of a person who is acquainted with the signature of the person who is supposed to have signed it. In this case, it cannot be doubted that PW2 was familiar with the signature of the 3rd defendant. This issue was not challenged. Further, the 3rd defendant being a busy corporate personality was quiet frank in saying that he cannot recall signing the guarantee. The guarantee was executed in 5 October 1994 but the 3rd defendant says he came to know only in early January 2000. In addition, the 3rd defendant has not instantly brought any action against the 4th defendant or for the matter PW2 notwithstanding the liability he is facing is a substantial amount. All this goes to show that the 3rd defendant in all honestly could not recall signing the guarantee and in consequence did not pursue productive remedy in law. Mere police report alone will not in all probability compensate his loss if true. It is only in civil action against the 4th defendant he could recover, notwithstanding there is some room for recovery under the law of guarantees after payment to the plaintiff. (See Elizabeth Chiew Yee Fung & Ors v. Leong Fook Ngen & Ors (supra)). (v) In addition, I have compared the signature in the guarantee and that of other signatures of the defendant. I am satisfied that it is the signature of the 3rd defendant. In consequence and on the facts of this case, it is not really necessary for me to consider the evidence of expert evidence in law. Further, in this case the expert opinion instead of helping the cause of justice, creates confusion. In such circumstance, I think the safer approach is to discard the opinions and decide the case on the basis of other evidence. (See Patel Harilal Mahanlal Jivani v. The State of Gujarat Cri LJ Noc 45). (vi) In the instant case, the 3rd defendant relied heavily on the opinion of their expert from India to establish forgery. I have gone through the report in detail and contrasted with the report of the plaintiff's expert opinion by Mr. Harcharan Sing Tara (PW3). I take the view that PW3, a Malaysian citizen is over qualified to give evidence as handwriting expert. This is so because the law even permits a person to give evidence as an expert in respect of handwriting even if he had acquired his knowledge as an amateur. I find PW3 as a truthful witness who has sufficiently laid down the proper methodology and the reasons for his views and given a fair presentation to assist the court. In contrast, the Indian expert has described it as a bungling forgery or freehand forgery and says it is copied through the process of simulation with a piecemeal and laboured execution. I disagree with his findings after having gone through the standard text in this subject and personally comparing the relevant signatures. I do not think it is necessary to bring to the court an expert from India if it is a case of bungled forgery or freehand forgery. It would have been much easier for the 3rd defendant to bring a person to the court who can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the signature of 3rd defendant can be easily forgered and that his signature was actually forged. The law does not prohibit the 3rd defendant from doing so. For example, the learned author Russel A. Gregory in his book "Identification of Disputed Documents, Fingerprints and Ballistics" 4th edn at p. 86 demonstrates the two types of forgery, which is reproduced below: Forgeries may be classed in two categories. 'Freehand' and 'Traced'. (Fig. 9.01). Freehand forgeries are those forgeries that are made freehand and copied from a model, whether real or imaginary. Traced forgeries are made by tracing the writing or signature from some model. (a) Image omitted. Please refer to Pdf version (b) Image omitted. Please refer to Pdf version (c) Image omitted. Please refer to Pdf version (d) Image omitted. Please refer to Pdf version (vii) The Indian experience of handwriting expert's opinion has been captivated by the learned author Sarkar on Evidence (14th edn.) vol. 1 at p 808 which reads as follows: Expert opinion must always be received with great caution, but perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of handwriting experts. These gentlemen stand in an impregnable fortress of their own and invariably give emphatic opinion. They talk in terms of pseudo science and try to create an impression by talking glibly of pen-pressure, pen-hold, pen-scope, pen-pause, pen-presentation, pen-lift, hand-movement, irregular movement, angle of pen, retouchings, joinings, change of pivot, under-stroke, cross-bar, loops of many kinds, embellishments, terminals and numerous other things not easily intelligible to laymen. Almost all of them have a favourite theory of their own which they tend to apply with a firm conviction. They are a type of remunerated witnesses and like others of that class have an unconscious bias in favour of the party engaging them. Moreover, their opinions are previously ascertained and they are brought only when they are favourable to the party calling. The fact that they know beforehand why they have been called and what the party calling wishes to be proved, detracts to a great extent from the weight to be given to their opinion. Some handwriting experts do not even hesitate to claim infallibility. (emphasis added) [113] Berdasarkan kes RHB di atas, sebagai pihak bank juga yang menerima permohonan setiap hari daripada pelanggan adalah turut bertanggungjawab untuk mengemukakan bukti berkenaan dokumen yang menjadi pertikaian. Dalam kes tersebut, identiti dan tandatangan defendan 3 adalah dipertikaikan. Dan Mahkamah berpuas hati dengan keterangan pihak yang menyaksikan defendan 3 menandatangani dokumen tersebut dan keterangan bahawa beliau adalah familiar dengan tandantangan defendan 3 tersebut di samping keterangan daripada pakar. [114] Berbalik kepada kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, dengan mengguna pakai kenyataan YA Hakim dalam kes RHB tersebut, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Eksibit P1 telah disediakan dan ditandatangani in suspicious circumstance or manner to create doubt as to the genuineness of the transaction berdasarkan keterangan SP1. [115] Dapatan bahawa Eksibit P1 telah disediakan dan ditandatangani in suspicious circumstance or manner to create doubt as to the genuineness of the transaction turut mendapat sokongan dengan keterangan saksi-saksi defendan iaitu SD1 dan SD2 sebagaimana yang telah dihujahkan oleh pihak defendan. [116] Mahkamah ini mempunyai kelebihan melihat perilaku (demeanor) saksi-saksi semasa memberi keterangan. [117] Dan daripada perilaku SD1 dan SD2, Mahkamah ini tidak nampak cubaan-cubaan saksi-saksi tersebut untuk merekapalsu (fabricate) sebarang keterangan walaupun setelah diperiksa balas oleh peguam TNB (mohon rujuk semula nota keterangan). [118] Ini adalah termasuk bagaimana SD2, defendan, mendapat maklumat berkenaan dengan pemilik premis tersebut. [119] Keterangan SD1 juga meyakinkan walaupun semasa pemeriksaan balas, apabila dia mengesahkan bahawa premis tersebut tidak pernah disewakan kepada sesiapa pada tarikh dan masa yang material. [120] Dan Mahkamah berpuashati bahawa SD1 adalah orang yang mempunyai pengetahuan peribadi berkenaan dengan premis tersebut memandangkan dia dan bapanya adalah pemilik premis tersebut. [121] Kesemua keterangan yang dikemukakan, baik di pihak TNB mahupun pihak defendan, telah menunjukkan suspicious circumstance or manner to create doubt as to the genuineness of the transaction terhadap perjanjian penyewaan premis tersebut dan seterusnya borang permohonan pembekalan di Eksibit P1. [122] Ini ditambah pula dengan keterangan SP2 berkenaan peningkatan yang mendadak dalam penggunaan elektrik di premis tersebut daripada kebiasaan RM150-RM200 sebulan kepada RM40,000.00. Kesimpulan [123] Kontrak yang melibatkan TNB dan defendan adalah kontrak pembekalan elektrik. [124] Oleh itu, bukti kewujudan kontrak pembekalan elektrik yang sah ke atas defendan adalah penting bagi memastikan terma-terma yang dinyatakan termasuk liabiliti untuk membayar bil dan segala tunggakan mengikat defendan. [125] Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah, pihak TNB gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa executant kepada Eksibit P1 adalah sebenarnya defendan atas imbangan kebarangkalian. [126] Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos sebagaimana skala di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah, 2012. 1. Pihak-Pihak Sarita Ashok Khandhar bagi pihak Plaintif (Tetuan Edorra Arfah Khandhar) 2. Aiman As' Ad Bin Mohd Ghani bagi pihak Defendan (Tetuan Irfan Aiman)