Plaintiff is an undischarged bankrupt. [24] To establish a good arguable case, the plaintiff is required to establish his case no greater than 50% chance of success. Nonetheless, the case should be more than just a mere possibility and capable of serious argument. In Lee Kai Wuen & Anor (supra), the Court of Appeal held – [61] As the learned judge quite rightly pointed out, in order to establish a good arguable case, it was not necessary that the applicant's case has to have a better than 50% chance of success, although it has to be more than barely capable of serious argument. In the words of Mustill J in Ninemia Maritime Corporation at p. 404 of the report above-cited, which was reiterated by the Federal Court in S & F International Limited at p. 64: .... I consider the right course is to adopt the tests of a good arguable case, in the sense of a case which is more than barely capable of serious argument, and yet not necessarily one which the judge believes to have a better than 50% chance of success. [62] In the decision of this court in Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 CLJ 754; [1998] 4 MLJ 1 at p. 759 (CLJ); p. 5 (MLJ), Haidar Mohd Noor JCA delivering the judgment of the court used the phrase, 'a fair chance' of success. This was how Haidar Mohd Noor JCA put it: What is a good arguable case is difficult to define. The respondents need not show that they have a case so strong as to warrant summary judgment nor even a strong prima facie case. It would generally be sufficient if the respondents can show on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that they will obtain judgment against the appellants (see Ninemia Maritime Corp v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG; The Niedersachsen [1984] 1 All ER 398, on appeal to CA [1984] 1 All ER 413; [1983] 1 WLR 1412). [25] Back to the instant case, upon perusal the cause papers, I find that the Plaintiff has successfully established a good arguable case. The reasons are as below. [26] It is crystal clear that the crux of the dispute in this action is on the status of Lots 6894 and 2960 which are now in the midst of being developed by the Defendant. The narrative of facts shows how these two lots were fraudulently transferred from Brumasi to the Defendant. It is not a bare allegation by the Plaintiff but the fraud was confirmed by the Johor Bahru High Court. Justice Murad Abdul Aziz in the Suit 258 clearly decided that the then Brumasi’s liquidator failed to comply with the provisions in the Companies Act and its rules when entering the Consent Judgment which resulted the ownership of the two lots shifted to the Defendant. Not only that, the documentary evidence exhibited by the Plaintiff also disclosed that the Winding-up Court on 10.4.2017 found that the then Brumasi’s liquidator was guilty of misconduct in handling the liquidation of Brumasi’s assets. [27] Based on the above observations, I have no doubt to hold that the Plaintiff’s case is more than barely capable of serious argument. [28] On the issue of res judicata raised by the Defendant, I find that there is no basis for the principle is applicable in the present action. The reason for the Plaintiff to narrate the chronology of events on Lots 6894 and 2960 here was not for this court to decide on the status of such lots but simply to explain on how these two lots fell into the Defendant’s hands and to injunct the Defendant from further dealing with the lots pending the decision of the Court of Appeal. Thus, there would be no multiplicity of decisions as advocated by the Defendant facts. [29] On the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff should have filed the application for Mareva injunction at the Court of Appeal, I find that the argument also is unfounded. I am of the view that as the power to grant a Mareva injunction is within the jurisdiction of this court, there is no hindrance for the Plaintiff to file such application here. At this point I find instructive the Federal Court case of S & F International Limited v. Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 where it was stated by Eusoffe Abdoolcader FJ in the following passage: We should perhaps also reiterate and stress the point that the discretion whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction is vested in the High Court Judge and not the appellate court whose function initially is one of review only, and it will not overrule the decision of the judge at first instance unless, broadly speaking, he has made an error of law or misconceived the facts, and except in those circumstances it must defer to the judge's exercise of his discretion and must not interfere with it merely upon the ground that the members of the appellate court would have exercised the discretion differently: Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs (6); Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton (7); Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board (8). These decisions of the House of Lords were referred to and applied by the English Court of Appeal in Ninemia Maritime Corporation [1983] 1 WLR at p. 1421; [1984) 1 All ER at p. 418) where Kerr, LJ, in delivering the judgment of the court stated that recent decisions of the House have emphasised the importance of appellate courts resisting the temptation to interfere with the exercise of judicial discretions other than in limited circumstances. [30] It is pertinent to note that because of the important to preserve an asset from being disposed or dealt, a Mareva injunction can be applied at any time when necessary. This is underscored in Metrowangsa Asset Management Sdn Bhd & Anor (supra), where it was held – Of pertinence would be this. That a Mareva injunction may be granted where it appears to the court that it is "just and convenient to do so" and it may even be granted at any time. According to Jessel MR in Day v. Brownrigg [1878] 10 Ch D 294 at 307 that the words "just or convenient" in the statutory provision must be read as "just, as well as convenient". It is also ideal to refer to the case of Beddow v. Beddow [1878] 9 Ch D 89 at 93. Moreover those words do not mean that the court can grant an injunction simply because it thinks that it is convenient to do so but rather those words mean that the court should grant an injunction for the protection of rights or the prevention of injury according to the legal principles (Aslatt v. Southampton Corpn [1880] 16 Ch D 143 at 148). [31] Regarding the Defendant’s argument that only Brumasi’s liquidator is entitled to commence and maintain this suit as the company was wound up, again I find this argument is misconceived. The Plaintiff had duly obtained the sanction from Brumasi’s liquidator vide a letter dated 24.7.2023. By having this sanction, the Plaintiff is competent to commence this action. This is fortified by the Federal Court case of Lai King Lung & Anor v. Merais Sdn Bhd [2020] 9 CLJ 449 where Vernon Ong Lam Kiat FCJ when delivering the judgment of the court said – [20] Similarly, if a company is wound up by an order of court, the board of directors becomes functus officio. The management of the company is vested in the liquidator. Only the liquidator has the power under the 2016 Act to bring or defend any action or other legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company. A creditor or contributory cannot commence or continue with any action in the name of the wound-up company. Accordingly, if a creditor or contributory of the wound up company wishes to bring or proceed with an action, the creditor or contributory must apply to the liquidator for his sanction to do so. In order to ensure that the defendant is not prejudiced in the event that the wound-up company's action is dismissed, the liquidators usually impose conditions (such as indemnities and guarantees) which must be satisfied by the creditor or contributory, as the case may be, before the sanction is given. [21] At the outset, it is important to appreciate that there are two different and distinct fact situations under which leave of the court or sanction of the liquidator is required. The first is in respect of action or proceeding against a wound-up company. This situation is governed by s. 226(3) of the 1965 Act /s. 471(1) of the 2016 Act which provides that leave of court is necessary in order for any action or proceeding proceeded with or commenced against a wound-up company. The second scenario is where action or proceeding is taken by a wound-up company: s. 236(2)(a) & 236(3) of the 1965 Act /s. 486 of the 2016 Act read together with Part I of the Twelfth Schedule which requires the sanction of the liquidator to be obtained. The factual matrix in this appeal falls under the latter scenario. [32] Likewise, the status of the Plaintiff as an undischarged bankrupt. This does not affect the Plaintiff’s locus standi since the Insolvency Department had given its sanction to him via its letter dated 19.7.2023. Whether the Defendant has assets within the jurisdiction and whether there is a real risk that the assets would be dissipated [33] Regarding the second criteria for the Mareva injunction to remain, there is no doubt that the Land which comprises of Lots 6894 and 2960 is now owned by the Defendant and within the jurisdiction of this court. [34] On the third criteria i.e. that there is a real risk that the assets would be dissipated, I find that the following important facts: