(a) and 68 charges (total 146 charges) for offences under section 4(1) (b) of the Act. [10] The Appellant claimed trial to all 146 charges and on 6.2.2018 the Appellant filed this NOM to have all 146 charges against him which were pending trial in the Sessions Court be dismissed or quashed under the inherent power and / or general supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. [11] On 20.3.2018, the learned High Court Judge dismissed the said NOM. Hence, this appeal before us. Appeal [12] The Appellant listed 11 grounds of appeal in his amended petition of appeal. However, during the hearing of this appeal, the learned counsel for the Appellant summarized the 11 grounds into 4 main grounds which are as follows: a) The learned High Court Judge was wrong to have found that the Public Prosecutor’s (PP) power cannot be challenged in Court; 6 b) The learned HCJ erred in law when she failed to consider that the setting aside NOM was based on High Court’s Common Law inherent jurisdiction and the said Constitutional NOM for Federal Court are different in nature; c) The Respondent’s conduct is mala fide, is oppressive and is an abuse of criminal process; and d) The learned HCJ failed to consider the Respondent’s conduct had breached the doctrine of estoppel. [13] The gist of the submission before us by the learned counsel for the Appellant is that the learned High Court Judge had erred when her Ladyship ruled that the PP’s power cannot be challenged in court. According to the learned counsel, the PP’s prosecutorial power can be challenged in Court as the PP and his deputies do not enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity. In appropriate cases, where the exercise of the prosecutorial power is unconstitutional, or done mala fide, or when the power is abused, the Court can intervene and redress that wrong. Learned counsel for the Appellant referred us to a string of authorities and amongst them are Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor M9791 1 MLJ 50 where Lord Diplock in giving the advice of the Privy Council had alluded to the fact that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion can be questioned when it had been exercised unlawfully or based on irrelevant consideration. If the PP as the custodian of prosecutorial power exercises his prosecutorial discretion for other than its constitutional purpose or exercises it based on some irrelevant consideration or exercises his discretion unlawfully or the prosecutorial power is abused for some improper purpose, then that decision can become justiciable and the courts have a duty to render assistance to an individual who has been 7 aggrieved by that decision. The High Court is clothed with common law power to hear and grant an order to set aside / quash criminal charges. Learned counsel referred us to Federal Court case of Ahmad Zubair @ Ahmad Zubir bin Hj Murshid v Public Prosecutor [2014] 6 MLJ 831 and Karpal Singh & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 MLJ 544. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the learned High Court Judge was wrong when her Ladyship held that the Public Prosecutor’s choice to prosecute or not cannot be challenged in court. [14] It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the action of the PP is mala fide, oppressive and an abuse of criminal proceeding when he decided to first prefer civil forfeiture proceedings and thereafter instituted the said 146 charges against the Appellant because: a) 141 of which overlap with the subject matter in the forfeiture proceeding; b) There was express representation by DPP that “Pendakwa Raya memutuskan tiada pendakwaan”; and c) The Appellant is not liable to any prosecution pursuant to Section 30(7) of MACC Act 2009. [15] The Appellant is also contending that there was affirmative representation by the PP that there would be no prosecution against the Appellant under the Act and the Appellant had relied on this assurance by giving his statements to MACC. This had given rise to a reasonable and legitimate expectation that there would be no charge preferred against the Appellant. Thus, estoppel is applicable against the PP. Learned counsel 8 cited section 115 Evidence Act 1950 and several civil cases like Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Kah Motor Co Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ 10; V Veeriah v General Manager, Keretapi Tanah Melayu [1974] 1 MLJ 201 which deal with section 115 Evidence Act 1950 to support his contention. [16] The learned DPP, in his submission before us, conceded that the Court may exercise its power under the law to check or to act against abuse or unconstitutional exercise of prosecutorial power. However, in exercising this power, first, it must be shown to the Court that there was an abuse of the prosecutorial power by the PP. In this case, the Appellant did not adduce any such evidence. [17] The learned DPP further submitted that the PP’s decision to prefer the 146 charges under the Act against the Appellant despite there were forfeiture proceedings taken against the property did not amount to mala fide on the part of the PP. The application for forfeiture of property under section 56(1) of the Act does not prohibit the PP from exercising his prosecutorial power against an individual and the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in criminal proceedings. Our deliberation and decision [18] After scrutinizing the cause papers, and having heard the submission by both parties, we are of the considered view that cases such as Long Samat & Ors v. PP [1974] 1 LNS 80; [1974] 2 MLJ 152 (FC) and Johnson Tan Han Seng v. PP & Other Appeals [1977] 1 LNS 38; [1977] 2 MLJ 66 (FC) had established that the PP’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in respect of his decision to prosecute, or not to prosecute, or to discontinue prosecution, or his decision to amend a charge, or to prefer a 9 charge for a less serious offence when there is evidence of a more serious offence, is not justifiable or subject to judicial oversight. These decisions were made in the context of the PP’s powers under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and section 376(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, we are of the view, in the context of PP’s power under Article 145(3) Federal Constitution and section 376(i) of CPC, her Ladyship had not erred when her Ladyship held that the Public Prosecutor’s choice to prosecute or not to prosecute cannot be challenged in Court. However, in exercising his prosecutorial discretion, the PP must act according to law and must exercise it in good faith. The exercise of the prosecutorial discretion may be subjected to judicial review in two situations: first, where the prosecutorial power is abused, i.e. where it is exercised in bad faith for an extraneous purpose, and second, where its exercise contravenes constitutional protection and right. [See Singapore case; Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR 239] [19] Close at home, we have the Privy Council case of Teh Cheng Poh v. PP [1978] 1 LNS 202; [1979] 1 MLJ 50, which alluded to the principle that the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion by the PP can be questioned when it had been exercised unlawfully or based on irrelevant consideration. Lord Diplock in giving the advice of the Privy Council had said: “Under the common law system of administration of criminal justice a prosecuting authority has a discretion whether to institute proceedings at all and, if so, with what offence to charge the accused. Such a discretion is conferred upon the Attorney General of Malaysia by Article 145(3) of the Constitution, viz: The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for 10 an offence, other than proceedings before a Muslim court, a native court or a court-martial. There are many factors which a prosecuting authority may properly take into account in exercising its discretion as to whether to charge a person at all, or, where the information available to it discloses the ingredients of a greater as well as a lesser offence, as to whether to charge the accused with the greater or the lesser. The existence of those factors to which the prosecuting authority may properly have regard and the relative weight to be attached to each of them may vary enormously between one case and another. All that equality before the law requires, is that the cases of all potential defendants to criminal charges shall be given unbiased consideration by the prosecuting authority and that the decisions whether or not to prosecute in a particular offence should not be dictated by some irregular consideration.” [Emphasis added] [20] Reverting to this appeal, we are of the considered view, the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion by PP may be questioned and subjected to judicial oversight if it is shown that the prosecutorial power was exercised in bad faith for an extraneous purpose or where its exercise contravenes constitutional protection and right. Thus, the question before us is whether the Appellant had shown bad faith on the part of the PP in instituting the 146 charges or it contravenes the Appellant’s constitutional protection and right. [21] Going through the cause papers especially the affidavit affirmed by the Appellant (Enclosure 10) in support of his application, we find there is nothing to support the Appellant’s allegation of bad faith or an abuse of Court process on the part of the PP in instituting the 146 charges. On the issue of mala fide and abuse of the Court process, the 11 gist of his averment in his affidavit in support is that he was made to believe by the MCC officers that only forfeiture proceeding against the properties would be taken and no criminal charge would be instituted against him. Counsel for the appellant argued that a letter issued by MACC to the Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri and carbon copied to the Appellant’s counsel which stated that in the event they are successful in the forfeiture proceeding, the MACC is agreeable for the proceeds of the forfeited property be used to settle the tax assessed against the Appellant, had misled the Appellant into believing that the MACC will make good on their promises not to prosecute. This according to the Appellant amount to mala fide on the part of PP. This mala fide, according to Appellant, was further demonstrated by the fact that the said 146 charges were filed in Court on the same day the High Court delivered its decision ordering the forfeiture of the properties. [22] In our considered view, these allegations fall short of establishing abuse of the prosecutorial power or bad faith on the part of the PP. It is incumbent on the Appellant to adduce the evidence of an abuse of the prosecutorial power or bad faith on the part of the PP, but the Appellant had failed to do so in this case. [23] The fact that there were forfeiture proceedings initiated against the properties before the 146 charges against the Appellant were filed, by itself, would not, in our considered view, amount to bad faith on the part of the PP. The forfeiture proceedings were made under section 56 of the Act against properties, and the PP has to make the application within 12 months from the date of seizure, whereas all the 146 charges against the Appellant were under Section 4(1) of the Act 12 which was a prosecution against individual and not against the property. [24] An application of forfeiture of property under the Act is a standalone action. [See COA decision in Azmi Osman v PP Appeal (2015) 9 CLJ 845]. Neither the Act nor the MACC Act 2009 prohibits an action of forfeiture of property be taken before any charge is made under section 4(1) of the Act or any offence under the MACC Act 2009 for that matter. The application of section 56 (1) of the Act does not prohibit the PP from exercising its prosecutorial power against an individual. [25] For the above-said reason we are of the view there is no evidence to support the Appellant’s allegation that the PP was motivated by bad faith in deciding to institute the 146 charges against the Appellant. Hence the learned High Court Judge is right in refusing to have the 146 charges against the Appellant be quash/set aside. When there is no evidence that the filing of the 146 charges was made in bad faith for an extraneous purpose, the PP’s decision to initiate the 146 charges is not justifiable or subject to judicial oversight. [26] Regarding the issue of the representation by the DPP, the Appellant contended that DPP Mohd Fares bin Rahmah had filed affidavit in Forfeiture Proceeding against land and cash, where he stated that “setelah kertas siasatan ini diteliti Pendakwa Raya memutuskan tiada pendakwaan terhadap Respondent di atas mana-mana kesalahan di bawah akta AMLATFPUAA 2011/ Akta SPRM 2009”. This, according to the Appellant, had given rise to reasonable and legitimate expectation that there would be no charge preferred against him which in turn had induced him to reveal information in his affidavit opposing the forfeiture proceedings taken against 13 him. Thus, according to learned counsel for the Appellant, by virtue of section 115 Evidence Act 1950, PP is estopped from filing the 146 charges. Further, he is entitled to protection under section 30(7) of the MACC Act 2009. [27] The learned counsel referred to section 115 of the Evidence Act 1950 and Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Kah Motor Co Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ to support his contention that PP is estopped from initiating the 146 charges against the Appellant. In the said Court of Appeal case, his Lordship Abdul Malik Ishak JCA relied on the dicta by Mohamed Azmi J (later SCJ) in Veeriah v General Manager, Keretapi Tanah Melayu [ 9741] 1 MLJ 20l regarding the scope of estoppel under section 115 of the Evidence Act 1950 as follows: “ [49] Mohamed Azmi J (later SCJ) in Veeriah v General Manager, Keretapi Tanah Melayu [1974] 1 MLJ 201 at p 202, in the course of His Lordship's judgment had this to say in regard to the scope of estoppel ins 115 of the Evidence Act 1950: Sarkar on Evidence (12th Ed) at p 1033 states that there are seven prerequisites to bring a case within the scope of estoppel as defined in s. 115. It was contended by the defence that all these prerequisites had been fulfilled, namely: