through Zaki Tun Azmi PCA (as he then was): [104] The other issue which I think is the crux of this case is the interpretation of the word “precepts” in Item 1 of List II (the State List) of the Federal Constitution. The State Enactments, AIRA 1986, AIRA 2001 and SCOT as well as SLAT derive their validity and powers originally from the Federal Constitution. In particular, the legislative power of the State Assemblies is provided for under art. 74 of the Federal Constitution. Again, the relevant paragraph of the Second List in the Ninth Schedule is para 1 relating to Islamic law and personal and family law of persons professing the religion of Islam. In particular, the meaning of the word “precepts” from the text quoted earlier ie, “… creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against the precepts of that religion except in regard to matters included in the Federal List …” is relevant to the issue before us. [105] If the precepts of Islam, as contended by the petitioner, are only the five pillars of Islam, then all the other previous arguments by the respondent will all crumble. This court is not an expert in Islamic law. It therefore has to rely on opinions given by experts in this field. In our present case, three experts have given their opinions. They are Tan Sri Sheikh Ghazali bin Haji Abdul Rahman, Professor Dr. Mohd. Kamal bin Hassan and Professor Muhammad Hashim Kamali. Their curriculum vitae are spelt out in detail in the judgment of my learned Chief Justice. All the three, in principle, unanimously agree that the term “precepts of Islam” includes the teachings in the Al Quran and As Sunnah. The Chief Justice has also gone at great length in his judgment to discuss and come to a conclusion why he holds that the precepts of Islam go beyond the mere five pillars of Islam. I agree with their opinions and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Chief Justice and I have nothing to add on this issue.”. The long and short of the Federal Court’s judgment was that the “term percepts of Islam” was not merely confined to the basic tenets, i.e. the 23 6 12 18 24 30 five pillars of Islam, but had a much more wider meaning that includes the teachings in the Al Quran, the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam (i.e. his teachings and traditions), the consensus of the religious scholars (ijma’) and the authoritative rulings (fatwas) of legitimate religious authorities, for the purpose of ensuring, preserving and/or promoting right beliefs, right attitudes, right actions and right conduct amongst the followers of Islam. [28] The decision in Sulaiman Takrib was subsequently reaffirmed by the Federal Court in the case of Fathul Bari Mat Jahya & Anor v Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Sembilan & Ors [2012] 4 CLJ 717 where Arifin Zakaria, CJ held that the term “precepts of Islam” must be given a wide and liberal interpretation and stated as follows: [20] Further, we are of the view that the term precepts of Islam must be accorded a wide and liberal meaning. This is in line with the authorities on the interpretation of the heads or fields of the legislation as appearing in the legislative lists of the Federal Constitution. As was observed by Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in the case of Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor (supra) as follows: “It is a well settled principle of constitutional interpretation that every entry in each Legislative List must be given its widest significance and that its scope cannot be curtailed save to the extent necessary to give effect to other legislative entries: State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai AIR 1951 SC 69. In JC Waghmare & Ors v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 Bom 119 at p 137, Tulzapurkar Ag CJ, when delivering the judgment of a strongly 24 6 12 18 24 constituted Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, after a review of the leading authorities upon the subject, summarized the applicable principles as follows: From the above discussion, the following general principles would be clearly deducible: (a) entries in the three Lists are merely legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate legislatures can operate; (b) allocation of subjects in the Lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but is a mere enumeration of broad and comprehensive categories; dictionary meaning of the words used, though helpful, is not decisive; (c) entries should be interpreted broadly and liberally, widest amplitude being given to the words employed, because few words of an entry are intended to confer vast and plenary powers; (d) entries being heads of legislation, none of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow and restricted sense but should be read broadly so as to cover or extend to all cognate, subsidiary, ancillary or incidental matters, which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it; (e) since the specific entries in the three Lists between them exhaust all conceivable subjects of legislation, every matter dealt with by an enactment should as far as possible be allocated to one or the other of the Entries in the Lists and the residuary Entry 97 in List I should be resorted to as the last refuge; and (f) if entries either from different Lists or from the same List overlap or appear to conflict with each other, every effort is to be made to reconcile and bring out harmony between them by recourse to known methods of reconciliation. It is also well settled that the phrase ‘with respect to’ appearing in art. 74(1) and (2) of the Federal Constitution – the provision conferring legislative power upon the Federal and State Governments respectively – is an expression of wide import. As observed by Latham CJ in Bank of New South Wales v. The Commonwealth [1948] 76 CLR 1 at p 186, in relation to the identical phrase appearing in s. 51 of the Australian Constitution which confers Federal legislative authority: 25 6 12 18 24 30 A power to make laws ‘with respect to’ a specific subject is as wide a legislative power as can be created. No form of words has been suggested which would give a wider power. The power conferred upon a Parliament by such words in an Imperial statute is plenary – as wide as that of the Imperial Parliament itself: R v. Burah (1878) 3 App Cas 889; Hodge v. R (1883) 9 App Cas 117. But the power is plenary only with respect to the specified subject. Although Latham CJ was dissenting on that occasion, we are unable to see any criticism in the majority judgments in relation to what was said in the foregoing passage. Indeed, a reading of all the judgments in that case reveals that there was no disagreement between their Honours upon the applicable interpretative principles. Where the majority parted company with the learned Chief Justice was only with regard to the consequence that resulted on an application of those principles to the particular statute that was the subject of challenge.”. [29] The principle of constitutional interpretation that every entry in each Legislative List must be given its widest significance, which was applied by the Federal Court in Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, is explained in N.S. Bindra Interpretation Of Statute (10th Ed.) at pages 1297, 1298 and 1302 as follows:- “The function of lists is not to confer power, they merely demarcate the legislative fields, and so must, as far as possible, be given a broad and comprehensive interpretation. The doctrine of “liberal interpretation” has a special application in interpreting the ambit of the various entries in the legislative lists included in Sch VII of our Constitution. None of the items in the lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense. Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters, which can be fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. It is, therefore, clear that in construing an entry in a list conferring legislative powers, the widest possible 26 6 12 18 24 construction according to their ordinary meaning must be put upon the words used therein.” ..... Entries to the legislative lists are not sources of legislative power but are merely topics or fields of legislation and must receive a liberal construction, inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in narrow and pedantic sense. The expression ‘with respect to’ in art 246 brings in the doctrine of ‘pith and substance’ in the understanding of the exertion of the legislature power, and wherever the question of legislative competence is raised, the test is whether the legislation looked as a whole is substantially ‘with respect to’ the particular topic of the legislation. If the legislation has a substantial and not merely a remote connection with the entry, the matter may well be taken to be a legislation on the topic.” [30] The afore stated ‘pith and substance’ rule was first applied by the Supreme Court in Mamat Daud & Ors. v. The Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 197 in interpreting the Federal Constitution. In that case, it was contended by the petitioners that section 298A of the Penal Code was ultra vires the Constitution in that it “is null and void because in pith and substance it is a law on the subject of religion on which Parliament is not competent to legislate”. On the other hand, it was contended by the Government that “Parliament has the necessary constitutional competence to enact the law since the subject matter is not in fact “religion”, but “Public Order” under Item 3(a) [of the Federal List]”. By a majority consisting of Mohd. Azmi SCJ, George Seah SCJ and Salleh Abas LP (concurring), the Supreme Court agreed with the contention of the petitioners. What is of relevance in Mamat Daud’s case 27 6 12 18 24 is its exposition of the ‘pith and substance’ rule. Both Mohd. Azmi SCJ (in the majority) and Eusoffe Abdoolcader SCJ (dissenting) provide an elegant illustration of the nature and application of the rule:- “In determining whether s. 298A in pith and substance falls within the class of subject matter of "religion " or " public order ", it is the substance and not the form or outward appearance of the impugned legislation which must be considered. The impugned statute may even declare itself as dealing with religion, but if on investigation of the legislation as a whole, it is in fact not so, the Court must so declare. Conversely, it is not sufficient for the impugned legislation to declare itself as dealing with public order, if in substance, it seeks to deal directly or indirectly with religion or religious law, doctrine or precept, for no amount of cosmetics used in the legislative make-up can save it from being struck down for pretending to be what it is not. The object, purpose and design of the impugned section must therefore be investigated for the purpose of ascertaining the true character and substance of the legislation and the class of subject matter of legislation to which it really belongs. But the Court should not be concerned with the motives which induced the legislature to exercise its power, nor should the Court be concerned with the draconian nature of the legislation…” (per Mohd. Azmi SCJ, at p. 200b – d) “This rule envisages the examination of the legislation in question as a whole to ascertain its true nature and character in order to determine into what List it falls. … The doctrine of pith and substance introduces a degree of flexibility into the otherwise rigid scheme of distribution of powers, the raison d'etre underlying the rule being that if every legislation were to be invalid, however slight or incidental the encroachment on to the other field, then the power of each legislature would be drastically circumscribed to deal effectively with the subjects entrusted to it. 28 6 12 18 24 30 … The categories of legislative power specified in the Federal and State Lists must in some circumstances inevitably overlap, and therefore a challenged law with features of meaning relevant to both Federal and State categories of laws has to be classified by that feature of it deemed most important for purposes of the division of legislative powers designated in the Constitution.” (per Eusoffe Abdoolcader SCJ, at pp. 209i – 210a, 210b – c & 210h) [31] Applying the above principles of constitutional interpretation, I find that in pith and substance, section 97(2) of the ARIE is related to the regulation of mosques, i.e. places used by Muslims for Friday prayers and other prayers and activities which are enjoined, required, recommended, or approved by religion of Islam. And of course the obligatory prayers are one of the five pillars of Islam. Hence, I find that the offence created by section 97(2), i.e. the contravention of the restriction on establishment of mosques in Selangor without the prior written permission of the Majlis Agama Islam Selangor, is in substance an offence that is against the “precepts of Islam”, for worship or prayers is a fundamental tenet of the religion, and the regulating of places of worship is necessary for the purpose of ensuring, preserving and/or promoting right beliefs, right attitudes, right actions and right conduct amongst the followers of Islam. [32] In this respect, further regard may be had to Salleh Abas LP’s majority pronouncement in Mamat Daud & Ors v The Government of 29 6 12 18 Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119 SC to the effect that under Article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution, the States are empowered to make laws to regulate the practice of Islam, which would in my opinion include the control and regulation of mosques. And in this regard, Salleh Abas LP said: “I accept that to allow any Muslim or groups of Muslims to adopt divergent practices and entertain differing concepts of Islamic religion may well be dangerous and could lead to disunity among Muslims and, therefore, could affect public order in the states. But the power to legislate in order to control or stop such practices is given to states as could be seen from Articles 11, Clause (4): “(4) State law and, in respect of the Federal Territory, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among peoples professing the religion of Islam” It is they alone which can say what should be the proper belief, rule and concept of Islamic religion or what should not be its interpretation and what should be the rule in a particular given situation or case. Clause (4) is a power which enables states to pass a law to protect the religion of Islam from being exposed to the influences of the tenets, precepts and practices of other religions or even of certain schools of thoughts and opinions within the Islamic religion itself. [33] And further by virtue of the interpretation of the word “precepts of Islam” by the Federal Court in Sulaiman Takrib and Fathul Bari, and Item 9 (read together with the sub-matter “mosques or any Islamic public places of worship” in Item 1) of the State List in the Federal Constitution and section 2 of Act 355, I find that the Syariah Courts in the State of 30 6 12 18 24 Selangor do have jurisdiction in respect of the offence in subsection 97(2) of the ARIE, if such an offence is committed by a Muslim. Hence, I find that subsection 97(2) is consistent with Item I of the State List, Ninth Schedule, Federal Constitution, and therefore constitutional. Thus, my answer to Question 1 is in the negative. The Second Question/Issue [34] Issue 2: If the above is answered in the negative: In light of ‘Fatwa Tentang Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ gazetted as Jil. 51, No. 20, Sel. P.U. 15 on 24-9-1998, ‘Pindaan Fatwa Tentang Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ gazetted as Jil 53, No. 17, Sel. P.U. 36 on 17.8.2000 and Article 11 (read together with Item 1 of the State List) of the Federal Constitution, whether the Syariah Courts in the State of Selangor do not have jurisdiction over members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at religious group (translated in English as the ‘Ahmadiyya Muslim Community’) including the Applicants. [35] The crux of Question 2 is: In light of the excommunication of Ahmadis from the fold of the state sanctioned Muslim religion in Malaysia by the relevant Islamic religious authorities, whether the Syariah Courts have jurisdiction over such persons. I have answered Question 2 in the affirmative, i.e. that the Syariah Courts do not have jurisdiction over the Ahmadis. My reasons for doing so are as follows. 31 6 12 18 [36] In order to answer Question 2, it would be imperative to take a look at the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at and their historical presence in Malaysia, particularly in light of the right to freedom of religion enshrined in Article 11 of the Federal Constitution. [37] In 1889, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at religious group (“the Jama’at”) was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, Punjab, India. Members of the Jama’at refer to themselves as Ahmadis or Ahmadi Muslims. Ahmadis are sometimes referred to as “Qadiani” (in reference to the birthplace of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad). It has become a worldwide religious movement, and the official headquarters of the Jama’at today is in London, England. [38] Due to crucial theological doctrinal differences, some Islamic religious authorities consider Ahmadis apostates, whilst some consider them “kafir” or unbelievers, and have by decree or fatwa excommunicated them from main stream or orthodox Islam. [39] Historical records show that Ahmadis have lived in British Malaya and Singapore since the turn of the last century. This is confirmed by Farish A. Noor in his book ‘Islam on the Move’ (Amsterdam University Press, 2012): “The Ahmadis first came to British Malaya in 1906, and almost all of them were members of the Indian diaspora who had migrated to British Malaya to 32 6 12 18 seek out new career opportunities as functionaries in the colonial civil service and security forces, or to establish their own commercial enterprises in the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. ... In British Malaya, most were of the Qadiani branch. ... Efforts by the Qadianis to spread their teachings and gain followers were fruitless, and up to Malaya’s independence in 1957, the Qadianis were largely regarded as outsiders who were alien both in terms of their origins as well as their beliefs. ... Despite the difficulties faced by 1949, the first Jama’at of the Qadianis in British Malaya was set up in Jeram, Selangor... Soon after, the Qadianis built their first mosque in the area and in 1954 they were given their own burial ground. ... Shortly after Malaya gained independence in 1957, the small Qadiani settlement in Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur found themselves surrounded by Malay-Muslim settlers who demanded that they be evicted on the grounds that they were not Muslims. In 1959 the newly independent Malayan government under the first prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman tried to settle the dispute by awarding the Qadianis eight new lots of land in hitherto unused and undeveloped area around Kampung Nakhoda. It was in 1963 that the Qadianis were re-located there and their first mosque set up. [Emphasis added] [40] Following the resettlement of the Ahmadiyya community in 1963 to Kampung Nakhoda, Batu Caves, they have carried out their religious activities on the several plots of land that was given to them by the Malaysian government of the day. Presently, the Jama’at is based in the same locality, i.e. in a 3 storey building at No. 11A, Jalan Nakhoda Kanan, Kampung Nakhoda, 68100 Batu Caves, Selangor. The Ahmadis refer to this building as ‘Bait-us-Salam’, which before 24.4.2009 was used by them as a temporary place of worship. Since 24.4.2009, the 33 6 12 18 24 Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (“MAIS”) had prohibited the Ahmadis from using the ‘Bait-us-Salam’ as their place of worship, as Friday and daily obligatory prayers were conducted at the premises, and was thus considered a mosque by MAIS. [41] The doctrinal beliefs of the Ahmadis came for consideration by the Singapore High Court in Meeran Lebbaik Maullim & Anor. v J. Mohamed Ismail Marican and the Straits Printing Works [1926] 2 MC 85, HC. In that case, the plaintiffs, who say they are Mohamedan Tamils, claimed for damages for libel which the defendants published concerning them as Ahmadis in the Tamil language, which was distributed in Singapore in May 1925. It was alleged that the words of the libel represent the plaintiffs to be “disseminators of false doctrines, deceivers, misguided illiterate fools, hypocrites, liars and unbelievers behind whom it is unlawful in Mohamedan law for any Muslim to pray, to whom no Muslim woman should be joined in marriage, from whom any Muslim married to them is de facto divorced and whose bodies should not be interred in any Muslim burial ground” (at p. 86H – I). Deane J, in finding for the plaintiffs, stated:- “In view therefore of these circumstances and bearing in mind that Mirza was born and lived his life in India remote from Singapore can the plaintiffs fairly be saddled with the heresies imputed to him? Whether as a matter of fact the Ahmediyas are Kafirs or not does not really seem to me to be material in this 34 6 12 18 case, if necessary, to decide the question I should have no hesitation in deciding it as it was decided and on the same grounds as it was decided in the case of Narantakatt Avallah v Purakkal Mamu. The overwhelming evidence in this case is that the fundamentals of Mohammedanism are believed in by the Ahmediyas who are therefore entitled to be called Mohammedans and not Kafirs and that the points on which they differ from the orthodox are on the traditions which have never been considered fundamental.” (at pp. 102 – 103) [42] The case of Narantakath Avullah v Parakkal Mammu and others AIR 1923 Madras 171, referred to by the Singapore High Court in Meeran Lebbaik Maullim, concerned section 494 of the Indian Penal Code which makes bigamy an offence. In that case, a petition for criminal revision was filed to determine if the petitioner’s acceptance of the Jama’at’s doctrines made him an apostate from Mahomedanism (the proper term is Islam), resulting in a dissolution of his Muslim marriage and thus becoming a defence to the petitioner’s wife who had remarried thereafter (at p. 171). In determining that a Muslim does not become an apostate by merely accepting the doctrines of the Jama’at, and that Ahmadis are merely a sect of Muslims (p. 176), the High Court held:- “Turning now to the question of apostasy raised, it is undoubtedly a question of Mahomedan theology to say what deviation from the recognized doctrines of Mahomedanism would amount to apostasy; but as civil rights and legal statuses of parties are based on its decisions, we must decide it ourselves. The accused has called 3 witnesses of the orthodox party who assert themselves to be men learned in Mahomedan theology and who say that the adoption by a Mahomedan of the tenets of Gulam Ahamed Mirza, the founder 35 6 12 18 24 of the sect of Ahamadiyans amounts to apostasy under that law; but we cannot accept their opinion as settling the question as argued for the accused, particularly as they are interested as orthodox Mahomedans in denouncing the members of the new sect as unbelievers and as they have not given satisfactory reasons for their opinions. …[W]e must therefore consider the doctrines of Ahamadiyans and see whether their adoption by Mahomedans would amount to heresy and make them apostates or murtads and put them outside the pale of Mahomedanism. …[I]in doing this we must take the doctrines as propounded by Ahamad himself and accepted by his followers and not the distorted version of them as given by their opponent. …It begins by saying: “We are Muslims by the Grace of God, Mustapha (the Holy Prophet of Arabia) is our leader and guide……The wine of our spiritual knowledge is from the cup of the book of God which is called the Quran.” A perusal of what is stated in the pamphlet shows clearly that the Ahamadiyans subscribe to the Kalma that there is no God but one God and Mahomed is His Prophet and unreservedly accept the prophethood of Mahomed and the supreme authority of the Quran. In fact it would seem that they differ from the orthodox Mahomedans only in some six points which are set out in the pamphlet and also by the learned Judge in his judgment. I agree with my learned brother in thinking that these differences are not sufficient to justify us in holding that that the Ahamadees are not Mahomedans but apostates. As already stated, they accept the Kalma, the prophethood of Mahomed and the authority of the Koran. These undoubtedly are the essential conditions for a person to be a Mahomedan, and they are complied with by the Ahamadees. That would seem to make them Moslems governed by the Mahomedan Law. Mr. Ameer Ali says in his book on Mahomedan Law, 4th Edition, Vol II, page 36 that: “As any person who professes the religion of Islam, in other words, accepts the unity of God and the prophetic character of Mahomed is, a Moslem subject and is subject to the Musalman Law. So long as the 36 6 12 18 24 30 individual pronounces the Kalma of Tauhid. the creed of Islam, it is not necessary for him or her to observe any of the rights and ceremonies or to believe in particular doctrines which imply Imam or belief,” and again on page 112:- “Every person who acknowledges the Divine Unity and the messengership of the Arabian prophet is regarded as within the pale of Islam; nothing more is required.” To the same effect is the opinion of Sir Abdur Rahim in his Mahomedan Jurisprudence, page 249 where he says the Islamic faith consists in acknowledging the authority of one God and Law-giver and the truth of Mahomed’s mission as his prophet. …[T]he learned Counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice one recent decision in which the very question raised before us as to the status of Ahamadees seems to have been raised, viz., the case of Khalil Ahmed v. Malik Istafi (1917) 2 Pat. L.J. 108. It was expressly ruled there that the sect known as Ahamadees are Mahomedans notwithstanding their pronounced dissent on several important matters of doctrine from the orthodox Mahomedan faith. In view of these authorities which I accept it follows that a Mahomadan does not become an apostate by merely accepting the doctrine of Ahamadees. The Ahamadiyans are in my view only a reformed sect of Mahomedans.” (at pp. 175 – 176) [43] Thus, in both Meeran Lebbaik Maullim and Narantakath Avullah the the Singapore and Madras High Courts had both opined that the Ahmadis are Muslims notwithstanding their pronounced dissent on several important matters of doctrine from the orthodox Islamic faith. [44] However, this position did not find favour or acceptance by the dominant followers of orthodox Islam in British Malaya, and on 15.12.1953, after a hearing conducted before His Royal Highness the 37 6 12 18 24 Sultan of Selangor in the Palace at Kuala Lumpur, it was determined by the Islamic Religious Affairs Department of Selangor (Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor) that Ahmadis were “kafir” (“disbelievers”) and thus were not Muslims. [45] Flowing therefrom, post independence and the formation of the Federation of Malaya, the Chief Minister of Selangor had on two separate occasions, i.e. on 14.3.1959 and 19.11.1970, respectively caused for two (2) plots of state land to be reserved as a burial ground for the interment of Ahmadis to the exclusion of Muslims within the State of Selangor. The Selangor Government Gazette dated 2.4.1959 containing the proclamation in that regard dated 14.3.1959 reads: In the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Ruler in Council by section 24(i) of the Land Code and delegated to him, the Menteri Besar, Selangor, hereby proclaims that parcel land situate in the mukim of Jeram, described in the Schedule hereto, and delineated upon revenue survey plan No. 21,491, deposited in the office of the Chief Surveyor, Selangor, to be a reserve for the purpose of a site for a Qadiani Burial Ground to be maintained by the following members of the Ahmadiyyah Sect: Syed Abdul Rahman bin Syed Alwi Moon bin Haron Talib bin Sulong Lebai Ahmad bin Muhamed Atan bin Hitam 38 6 12 18 And the subsequent Selangor Government Gazette dated 17.12.1970 containing the proclamation dated 19.11.1970 reads: In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 62 of the National Land Code and delegated to him by His Highness the Ruler in Council vide Sl. P.U. 14 dated 24th March, 1966, the Menteri Besar, Selangor, hereby proclaims that parcel of land situate in the Mukim of Kuala Lumpur described in the Schedule hereto and delineated upon Revenue Survey Plan No. 25,055, deposited in the office of the Chief Surveyor, Selangor, to be a reserve for the purpose of a site for the burial ground to be under the control of the Trustees of Juma’ah Ahmadiyah, Kuala Lumpur.[Emphasis added] Hence, whilst having declared the Ahmadis as non-Muslims, the State of Selangor recognized them as a religious denomination removed from Islam and had allowed them live on the land. And the continued existence of the Ahmadiyya community in Selangor was recognized by the reservation of state land for the interment of their dead separate and distinct from the Muslim burial grounds in which the Ahmadis were not allowed to bury their dead. This evidences the excommunication of the Ahmadis from the dominant orthodox Muslim community in the State of Selangor. They were allowed to live apart from the main stream followers of Islam in the State. [46] Subsequently, on 18.6.1975, the Conference of Rulers in its 101st Meeting discussed a paper presented by the Majlis Kebangsaan bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam (“MHEAI”) titled “Fatwa mengenai Ajaran 39 6 12 18 Kadiyani/Ahmadiah”. And at that meeting it was resolved that the MHEAI shall take the necessary action to convey the decision of the Conference of Rulers concerning the Jama'at be adopted and declared by the respective State governments. The federal and state religious authorities acted on that recommendation. [47] Two years later, on 11.4.1997, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong made the following determination for the Federal Territories pursuant to section 41 of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952, which was published in His Majesty’s Government Gazette on 28.4.1997:- The following determination by the Duli Yang Maha Mulia Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong of a question referred to him under section 41 of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment of the State of Selangor, as modified by the Federal Territory (Modification of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment) Order 1974, is published as directed by him pursuant to section 42 (3) of the Enactment: “Bahawa ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadyani yang direka oleh Mirza Ghulam Ahmad itu bukan daripada ajaran Islam. Dengan ini orang yang mengikut ajaran ini bukanlah orang Islam.” [Emphasis added] [48] On 29.4.1981, His Royal Highness the Sultan of Kedah directed the publication of the following Notification in the Kedah Gazette pursuant to section 38(2) of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1962, which was gazetted in the Government of Kedah Gazette on 4.6.1981:- 40 6 12 18