it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be. [9] Permohonan Defendan ini disokong afidavit Khairullina Caroline Abdullah yang menyatakan peranan Plaintif dalam kes Guaman 2017 adalah sebagai peguamcara yang menyediakan Construction Agreement dalam kes guaman tersebut selain menghujahkan pembelaan defendan. ISU PERTAMA : SAMA ADA PLAINTIF BOLEH MENUNTUT SEMULA PEMBAYARAN EXCESS FEE DARI DEFENDAN [10] Pembayaran excess fee bagi tuntutan pertama kes Defendan terhadap Plaintif seharusnya dituntut Plaintif semasa kes tuntutan tersebut kerana bayaran tersebut adalah untuk Plaintif diwakili peguam bagi tuntutan pertama tersebut. Namun demikian, Plaintif tidak membangkitkan apa-apa isu berkaitan pembayaran excess fee tersebut semasa kes tuntutan pertama tersebut yang mana Plaintif dinamakan sebagai Defendan Ketiga dalam kes tersebut. [10] Mahkamah merujuk kes FJI Lead Sdn Bhd [Previously Known As Falsafah Jaya Industri Sdn Bhd & Ors V. Thirumaran Sinnahiah [2023] 1 LNS 1165 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan seperti berikut:- “… [7] Although the Courts are very reluctant to summarily strike out an action under O. 18 r. 19 on grounds relating to the substantive merits of the claims and disputes in the action, the Courts do not have reluctance in summarily striking out the action on the grounds which do not relate to the substantive merits of the action. Such grounds which do not relate to the substantive merits of the action and upon which the Court are ready to summarily strike out an action include, but are not necessarily limited to, lack of locus standi, want of jurisdiction, expiry of limitation period, premature action, wrong party cited as the defendant, and res judicata. [8]Res judicata as a valid ground for striking out a court suit under O. 18 r. 18 has been recognised by various decisions of the appellate courts including Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v. Sim Kie Chon (No. 2) [1986] CLJ Rep 256; [1986] 1 MLJ 494 (Supreme Court); Yat Tung Investment v. Dao Heng Bank [1975] AC 581 (Pricy Council); Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v. Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783; [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (Supreme Court). [9] In Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. QL Endau Marine Products Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 908 the Federal Court explained the doctrine of res judicata as propounded by the Supreme Court in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v. Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783; [1995] 3 MLJ 189 as follows: "What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that, it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation - interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action - nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. [Emphasis added]. [43] However, as res judicata developed over the years, the application of the said doctrine has been expanded and is not limited to the matters adjudged, but also to 'every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation', as taken from the locus classicus of "the wider sense of res judicata" in the judgment of Wigram VC in Henderson v. Henderson [1843] 67 ER 313 as follows: In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to pen the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. [Emphasis added]. … [44] The wider sense of res judicata is further elaborated in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255 as follows: …res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. [Emphasis added]. [46] In the Court of Appeal in the case of Dato' Sivananthan a/l Shanmugam v. Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 1062; [2016] 3 MLJ 122 it was held as follows: [29] We would further add at this point that, even if there has been no actual decision as to the issues involved in the instant action, but if the respondent did not raise these issues in the earlier proceedings which it could and should have done so, in our view the plea of this doctrine of res judicata in its amplified and wider sense is available to the appellant to prevent an abuse of process of the court. [Emphasis added]. [49] In the Court of Appeal case of Chee Pok Choy & Ors v. Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 CLJ 321; [2001] 4 MLJ 346, His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) propounded the wider sense of res judicata as follows: In its wider sense, it encompasses issues and causes of action that could justly and fairly have been equally adjudicated in the earlier suit or proceeding. This wider operation of the doctrine is sometimes referred to 'constructive res judicata'. It houses the twin concepts of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. Like the tree of which they form the branches, they are designed to ensure that there is finality in litigation. [Emphasis added].” [11] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan bahawa tindakan Plaintif dalam kes di Mahkamah ini adalah dihalang (estopped) oleh prinsip res judicata dan kos RM 5,000 telahpun diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah semasa penarikan balik kes oleh Defendan bagi tuntutan pertama tersebut. ISU KEDUA: SAMA ADA TUNTUTAN PLAINTIF ADALAH MENGAIBKAN, REMEH ATAU MENYUSAHKAN KERANA TUNTUTAN TELAH MELEBIHI 6 TAHUN [12] Setelah mahkamah meneliti Notis Permohonan tersebut, mahkamah memutuskan untuk membenarkan Notis Permohonan untuk membatalkan tindakan Plaintif oleh Defendan atas sebab kelewatan Plaintif dalam memfailkan tuntutan terhadap Defendan. Sungguhpun Plaintif menyatakan bahawa tindakan memfailkan writ adalah bermula dari tarikh penarikan balik kes oleh Defendan dalam kes pertama iaitu pada 23 Julai 2018, namun demikian, Plaintif hanya memfailkan writ saman pada saat-saat akhir iaitu pada 22 Julai 2024 jam 11.48 malam, beberapa minit sebelum berakhirnya tempoh 6 tahun seperti diperuntukkan dalam Akta Had Masa 1953. [13] Selain itu, writ yang difailkan juga terdapat kesilapan dan hanya pada 26 Julai 2024 writ saman terpinda dan pernyataan tuntutan difailkan oleh Plaintif. Justeru writ saman yang difailkan pada 22 Julai 2024 tersebut hanyalah difailkan untuk memanjangkan tempoh keesahan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan di mana pada pandangan Mahkamah adalah satu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah (abuse process of Court). Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif berkenaan tuntutan bayaran excess fee ini adalah bermula pada tarikh pertama pembayaran excess fee oleh Plaintif tersebut iaitu pada 17 Ogos 2017 dan bukan pada 22 Julai 2018 semasa Defendan tarik balik tuntutan kes pertama terhadap Plaintif. [14] Mahkamah merujuk kes Shiva Kumar Day v. Allianz Life Insurance Malaysia Bhd and Anor [2021] CLJU 684; [2021] 1 LNS 684; [2021] MLJU 823 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes tersebut menyatakan seperti berikut:- “…A recent discussion on the definition of cause of action is to be found in the judgment of the Federal Court in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Kamarstone Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 CLJ 207; [2014] 2 MLJ 749, where all the leading cases on the definition of cause of action have been helpfully set out in the judgment. As such, I have reproduced several passages from that case which elucidate the law on this point, [12] In Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232, at pp. 242-243, Lord Diplock defined a 'cause of action' as 'a factual situation the existence of which entitled one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another', which definition was adopted in Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Leong Yew Chin [1987] CLJ Rep 126; [1987] 1 MLJ 230, where Abdul Hamid Ag LP, as he then was, appended that 'there must be a cause of action before a plaintiff can claim a relief in an action'. In Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang United Engineers (M) Berhad v. Lim Kit Siang [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 63; [1988] 2 MLJ 12 at p. 19, the Supreme Court per Salleh Abbas CJ, expounded that to make up 'a cause of action', first, the plaintiff has a right at law or by statue and secondly, the right has been affected by the act of the defendant: A cause of action is a statement of facts alleging that a plaintiff's right, either at law or by statute, has, in some way or another, been adversely affected or prejudiced by the act of a defendant in an action. Lord Diplock in Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 at p. 242 defined 'a cause of action' to mean 'a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person'. In my view the factual situation spoken of by Lord Diplock must consist of a statement alleging that, first, the respondent/plaintiff has a right either at law or by statute and that, secondly, such right has been affected or prejudiced by the appellant/defendant's act. [14] Other authorities, inter alia, Tuan Haji Ishak bin Ismail & Ors v. Leong Hup Holdings Bhd and other appeals [1996] 1 CLJ 393; [1996] 1 MLJ 661, Mohamed Yusop bin Abdul Wahab v. American Express (M) Sdn Bhd [2002] 7 CLJ 81; [2002] 6 MLJ 507, Goh Joon v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Ors [1999] 5 CLJ 335; [1998] 7 MLJ 621, applied the following definition found in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (5th Ed) at p. 378: A 'cause of action' is the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment (per Esher MR, Read v. Brown [1988] 22 QBD 128; this case was applied in Bennett v. White [1910] 2 KB 643). [15] In Nasri v. Mesah [1970] CLJU 85; [1970] 1 LNS 85; [1971] 1 MLJ 32, the Federal Court per Gill FJ, as he then was, depicted 'a cause of action' as follows: A 'cause of action' is the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment (per Lord Esher MR in Read v. Brown [1888] 22 QBD 128 at p. 131). In Reeves v. Butcher [1891] 2 QB 590 at p 511 Lindley LJ said: [16] Gill FJ, then thus enunciated on 'the date of accrual' in the case of a debt: This expression, 'cause of action', has been repeatedly the subject of decision, and it has been held, particularly in Hemp v. Garland LR 4 QB 509 at p. 511, decided in 1843, that the cause of action arises at the time when the debt could first have been recovered by action. The right to bring an action may arise on various events; but it has always been held that the statute runs from the earliest time at which an action could be brought. In Board of Trade v. Cayzer, Irvine & Co [1927] AC 610 617. Viscount Dunedin described 'cause of action' as that which makes action possible. Now, what makes possible an action founded on a contract is its breach. In other words, a cause of action founded on a contract accrues on the date of its breach. [17] And Nasri v. Mesah, we observe, is still good law (see the Federal Court cases of Loh Wai Lian v. SEA Housing Corporation Sdn Bhd [1984] 1 CLJ Rep 223; [1984] 2 MLJ 280, Insun Development Sdn Bhd v. Azali bin Bakar [1996] 2 CLJ 753; [1996] 2 MLJ 188, and The Great Eastern Life Assurance Co Ltd v. Indra Janardhana Menon (representing the estate of the deceased, NVJ Menon) [2005] 4 CLJ 717; [2006] 2 MLJ 209, which followed Nasri v. Mesah) which we readily endorse. A cause of action founded on a contract accrues on the date of its breach, and in the case of a debt, the cause of action arises at the time when the debt could first have been recovered by action. (see pp. 757 to 759 of the judgment)” [15] Dalam tuntutan Plaintif di Mahkamah ini, Mahkamah percaya bahawa Plaintif seharusnya menuntut pembayaran excess fee tersebut semasa Defendan menarik balik kes dalam tuntutan pertama tersebut dan tidak menunggu sehingga tamat tempoh 6 tahun barulah Plaintif bertindak untuk menuntut excess fee tersebut daripada Defendan. Plaintif yang merupakan sebuah firma guaman juga seharusnya lebih peka berkenaan had masa ini berbanding orang awam. KESIMPULAN [16] Mahkamah menggunapakai peruntukan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 kerana pemfailan Writ saman Terpinda dan Penyataan Tuntutan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif telah melebihi tempoh masa 6 tahun sepertimana diperuntukkan bawah Seksyen 6 Akta Had Masa 1953. Ia adalah satu abuse of the process of the Court dan kerana tuntutan plaintif telah time-barred dan merupakan suatu tuntutan yang mengaibkan, remeh dan menyusahkan selain suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah seperti yang digariskan dalam Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1) KKM 2012. [17] Tindakan Plaintif yang sleeps on their case telah merugikan Plaintif sendiri dalam menuntut excess fee dari Defendan. Justeru permohonan Defendan untuk membatalkan tindakan ini dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM2,000.00 dibayar oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan mengikut Aturan 59 kaedah 20 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. BERTARIKH PADA 24 MAC 2025 Disediakan oleh ..........................T.T............................ ZUR AZUREEN BINTI ZAINALKEFLI MAJISTRET MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET 5 SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN Kaunsel Bagi pihak Plaintif/Perayu Tetuan Khamdan & Co Wisma Khamdan, No. 27, Jalan Keluli AM 7/AM, Pusat Perniagaan Bukit Raja, Seksyen 7, 40000 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan. [Ref. No.: L/3484/24/KC/Civ-WAD/MF] Bagi pihak Defendan/Responden Tetuan Preakas & Partners No. A-32-05, Dataran 3 Two Square, Jalan 19/1,Seksyen 19, 46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor