Tetuan Khana & Co v Saling Bin Lau Bee Chiang & 70 Ors (Rayuan Sivil No.: J-02(W)-219-02/2017 & 7 Lagi Kes Berkaitan)

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: J-02(W)-219-02/2017 TETUAN KHANA & CO RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: J-02(W)-220-02/2017 RAMLAN BIN ADONG & 12 LAGI …. PERAYU-PERAYU 2 RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: J-02(W)-221-02/2017 DINESH KANAVAJI A/L KANAWAGI RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: J-02(W)-224-02/2017 VIRGIN PROPERTIES SDN BHD LINGGIU VALLEY ORANG ASLI (JAKUNS)TRUST …RESPONDEN 3 RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: J-02(W)-225-02/2017 KU AZHAR BIN KU ABDUL RAZAK RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: J-02(W)-226-02/2017 TETUAN KHANA & CO 4 RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: J-02(W)-227-02/2017 RIZA MAHKZAN ARIFIN & 1 LAGI … PERAYU-PERAYU RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: J-02(W)-228-02/2017 DINESH KANAVAJI A/L KANAWAGI 5 [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim,Malaysia Guaman Sivil No: 23NCVC-106-07/2012 Antara Linggiu Valley Orang Asli (Jakuns) Trust … Plaintif (Bertindak melalui Penerima dan Pengurus yang dilantik Ng Eng Kiat (No. K/P: 531016-10-5919)) Dan

1. Virgin Properties Sdn. Bhd. … Defendan-Defendan (No. Syarikat: 768453-X)

2. Ku Azhar bin Ku Abdul Razak (No. K/P.: 700305-02-5493)

3. Dinesh Kanavaji a/l Kanawagi (No. K/P.: 781121-07-5119) 6

4. Kanawagi a/l Seprumaniam (No. K/P.: 450112-07-5241

5. Tetuan Khana & Co (didakwa sebagai firma)

6. Riza Makhzan Ariffin (No. K/P.: 730201-03-5221) (Mengamal sebagai Peguambela & Peguamcara di bawah nama dan gelaran Tetuan Sharifah & Associates)

7. Puteri Intan Nurul Arzian binti Abdul Aziz (No. K/P.: 730201-03-5221) (Mengamal sebagai Peguambela & Peguamcara di bawah nama dan gelaran Tetuan Sharifah & Associates)

8. Mampu Jaya Sdn. Bhd. (Dalam Pengulungan) (No. Syarikat:128556-D) 7 Digabungkan dengan kes di bawah ini atas Perintah Mahkamah Rayuan Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim,Malaysia Guaman Sivil No: 22-228-2009 Antara Saling bin Lau Bee Chiang Dan 77 lagi (No.KP:6607-01-5857) …..….Plaintif-Plaintif Dan

(ii) Tok Batin Adong bin Kuwau (No. KP: 470613-01-5595)

3. Tok Batin Daud bin Kadir (No.KP: 450210-01-5349) 8 4.Tetuan Khana & Co. (Disaman sebagai firma) ] (An appeal against the decision of YA Samsudin Hassan, High Court Judge,High Court at Johor Bahru on 22.12.2017) CORAM IDRUS BIN HARUN, JCA HASNAH BINTI DATO’ MOHAMMED HASHIM, JCA YEOH WEE SIAM, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT [1] There are a total of 8 appeals emanating from two separate judgments but based on common facts. Two suits were filed in the High Court, civil suit no. 22-228-2009 (“suit 228”) and civil suit 23NCVC-106-07/2012 (“suit 106 ”). Both the suits were ordered to be consolidated. The appeals by the appellants (the defendants in the High Court) are against the decision of the High Court dated 22.12.2016 after a full trial, which allowed the plaintiffs’ 9 claim against the defendants. The appeals were ordered to be heard together. The appeals are: Suit 228:

(ii) Civil Appeal no. J-02(W) -220-02/2017 (“220”); and

(iii) Civil Appeal no. J-02(W) -221-02/2017 (“221”). Suit 106:

(iv) Civil Appeal no. J-02(NCVC)(W) -224-02/2017(“224”);

(vi) Civil Appeal no. J-02(NCVC)(W) -226-02/2017(“226”);

(vii) Civil Appeal no. J-02(NCVC)(W) - 227-02/2017(“227); and

(viii) Civil Appeal no. J-02(NCVC)(W) - 228-02/2017(“228”). [2] Appeals 219,220 and 221 are appeals against the decision of the learned High Court Judge in suit 228 whereas appeals 224,225,226,227 and 228 are the appeals against the decision of the High Court in suit 106. 10 [3] At the commencement of the hearing of the appeals on 26.2.2018 learned counsels for the appellants informed the Court that they wish to raise two preliminary issues. The preliminary issues are:

(ii) that suit 228 and suit 106 were proceeded in contravention of section 54(3) Anti Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (“the AMLA”) as the plaintiffs failed to get the prior written consent of the Public Prosecutor (“PP”) and as such the decision of the two suits are a nullity and ought to be set aside. [4] We heard the arguments on the preliminary issues and after hearing submissions from learned counsels for the appellants and the respondents, we unanimously dismissed both the preliminary issues. We now give our reasons for deciding so. 11 [5] For ease of reference, in this judgment, the parties will be referred to as they were in the High Court.The background facts of this appeal are important to understand the context in which these appeals and the preliminary issues were brought. Background Facts The Land Acquisition [6] Sometime in early 1990s the State Government of Johor acquired 53,272 hectares of land in the Linggui Valley located in the Kota Tinggi District, Johor (“the Land”) for the purposes of the construction of a dam to supply water pursuant to an agreement with the Government of the Republic of Singapore. The acquisition of the Land affected mainly three Orang Asli villages:

(ii) a declaration that the defendants jointly or severally pay to the plaintiffs all the compensation received by them from the Government of the Republic of Singapore or a sum deemed just by the Court. [8] One Hamzah Mohd Tahir (“Hamzah”) led the negotiation on behalf of the Orang Asli with the Johor State Government. However, the negotiations failed. Hamzah then introduced the three Tok Batins (“the village headmen”) to the 1st defendant in suit 228 (“Kanawagi”). [9] The three Tok Batins were:

(ii) Daud bin Kadir , the Tok Batin for Kampung Semanggar, the 3rd Defendant in suit 228 (“Tok Batin Daud”); and

(iii) Abdul Rahman bin Abdullah of Kampung Pasir Intan who was however, not a Tok Batin (“Abdul Rahman”). [10] The 52 Orang Asli appointed Kanawagi of Messers Khana & Co., the 4th defendant, in the same suit to represent them in suit 828.Kanawagi,through his law firm, Khana & Co., acted for the 52 Orang Asli in their claim for compensation in suit 828. On 19.12.1995 the learned High Court Judge allowed the plaintiffs’ claim and declared that the State Government of Johor pay the plaintiffs the compensation received by them from the Government of the Republic of Singapore or a sum deemed just by the Court. The High Court ordered the sum of RM26,500,000,00 as compensation (“the Compensation Sum”) to be paid to the 52 Orang Asli (“the Compensation Order”). [11] Dissatisfied with the High Court‘s decision, the Johor State Government appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was, however, dismissed with costs by the Court of Appeal on 19.11.1997. The matter was subsequently remitted to the Johor Bahru High Court to decide on the mechanics of the distribution of the payment of the Compensation Sum to the 52 Orang Asli. 14 Khana & Co on behalf of the 52 Orang Asli filed an Originating Summons for an order for the management and distribution of the said Compensation Sum awarded (“the OS”). [12] Pursuant to the OS the Johor Bahru High Court on 5.6.2000 ordered as follows:

(ii) the duration of the Trust shall be 25 years;

(iii) Tok Batin Adong (Tok Batin for the community in Kampung Pasir Assam (Pasir Intan), Abdul Rahman (for the community in Sayong Pinang) and Kanawagi be appointed as the first trustees, and who shall execute the Trust Deed; 15

(iv) the Director General of Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli, Malaysia, (“DGJHEOA”) for the time being shall be appointed the additional trustee of the Trust;

(vi) the balance of the Compensation Sum inclusive of the accrued interest (other than the said sum of RM22,000,000.00 and accrued interest thereon shall be paid to Khana & Co. to be distributed to the 52 Orang Asli after the deduction and payment of all legal fees, costs, consultation fees and expenses incurred for the purpose of, and in connection with, the prosecution of the OS and all subsequent and related proceedings; and

(vii) the Trustees shall have liberty to apply in relation to the implementation of the Trust and the performance of their duties under the said Trust. (“the Trust Order”). [13] By the Trust Order, the Trust Deed dated 5.6.2000 was created governing the terms relating to the judgment sum, the subject matter of the 16 Trust under the management and control of the Trustees so named. The High Court retained control and supervision of the Trust. On 5.7.2000 the Johor State Government paid RM22,000,000.00 directly to the Trustees. On 13.7.2000 the Johor State Government paid the balance sum of RM16,554,111.92 directly to Khana & Co. The Deed of Trust (“the Trust Deed”) [14] The salient terms of the Trust as embodied in the Trust Deed are:

(ii) the Compensation Sum of RM 22,000,000.00 is kept in trust for the 52 Orang Asli and their descendants but no child descendant shall be entitled to any share or distribution of the assets or income during the lifetime of his or her parent (Re: Clause 2 of the Trust Deed);

(iii) the number of Trustees shall not exceed four and shall comprise:

(iv) the first Trustee shall be: a) Adong bin Kuwau,Tok Batin of Kampung Pasir Assam (Pasir Intan); b) Abdul Rahman representing the community in Sayong Pinang; and c) Kanawagi. (Re: Clause 3.2 of the Trust Deed);

(vi) the Trustee shall stand possessed of the income of the Trust Fund in every financial year upon trust to apply or set aside the same or any parts thereof to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries (Re: Clause 4.1 of the Trust Deed); 18

(vii) the Trustees to maintain proper accounts (Re: Clause 8 of the Trust Deed). The disbursement of the Compensation Sum [15] On or about 5.7.2000 the Johor State Government paid the Compensation Sum of RM22,000,000.00 directly to the legal firm, Khana & Co. On 13.7.2000 the State Government of Johor paid a further sum of RM16,554,111.92 to Khana & Co. in accordance with the terms of the Trust Order. Pursuant to the High Court Order dated 5.6.2000 the following payments, inter alia were made:

(ii) RM1,900,000.00 and RM 3,000,000.00 were paid to Messers R. Rajasingam & Co.;

(iii) RM500,000.00 was paid to Messers RR Sethu; and

(iv) the sums of RM500,000.00 and RM4,054,222.93 were paid to Messers Khana & Co as legal fees. [16] The Trustees then placed the Compensation Sum of RM22,000,000.00 in a Fixed Deposit and through the two Tok Batins paid the RM900.00 per month including any monthly interest balance to the beneficiaries as 19 stipulated under clause 5 of the Trust Deed from October 2000 until March 2009. [17] By a Court Order dated 4.4.2006 (JB Suit 24-197-2006) Kanawagi and Messers Khana & Co. were ordered to provide a financial statement of the Trust certified by a qualified public accountant.However,through their solicitors, Messrs Sharifah & Associates, the defendants instead submitted unaudited/uncertified financial statements for the years 2000 to 2006 which in essence was in violation of the said Court Order.Thus,the plaintiffs contended that by doing so the defendants are in breach of clause 8.1 of the Trust Deed which stipulates: “In each financial year the trustees shall have prepared by a certified public accountant authorized to practise in Malaysia financial statements, including a profit and loss account and balance sheet as at and of each financial year certified by such accountant to be true and proper statement of the affairs of the trust setting out all:

(ii) unlawfully and fraudulently procuring and entering into a Management Agreement (MA) with onerous and unfair terms to benefit themselves;

(iii) utilising the plaintiff’s asset namely, the 27 condominium units, to earn secret profits and failing to render any accounts or information as to the same;

(iv) utilising the Trust to increase the paid up capital of the 1st defendant, Virgin Properties Sdn. Bhd.(“Virgin”), by issuing shares with respect to such increase to the 2nd and 3rd defendants, namely Ku Azhar bin Ku Abdul Razak and Dinesh and making cash advances therefore to the 2nd and 3rd defendants; 27

(vi) purchasing additional 30 condominium units with the assistance of the Trust Fund and/or its assets;

(vii) the 1st- 7th defendants have breached their fiduciaries duties to the Trust and also their contractual duties and statutory obligations;

(viii) the 1st-7th defendants have failed and refused to render accounts with regards to the use of the sum RM7,000,000.00 the monies collected and expended under the MA and the assets of the plaintiff; and

(ix) the 6th and 7th defendants have breach their legal and professional duties owed to the plaintiffs for failing to ensure the completion of the SPA of the 27 condominium units with the plaintiffs as rightful owner and was negligence to release the RM7,000,000.00 sum. [30] The defendants named in the 106 suit are:

(ii) Ku Azhar bin Ku Abdul Razak

(iii) Dinesh Kanavaji a/l Kanawagi

(iv) Kanawagi a/l Seperumaniam 28

(vi) Riza Makhzan Arifin

(vii) Puteri Nurul Intan Arzian Abdul Aziz

(viii) Mampu Jaya Sdn. Bhd. [31] Having set out the background of the case, we shall now consider the two preliminary issues raised by the defendants. The 1st Preliminary Issue Whether the two civil suits (228 and 106) filed in the High Court at Johor Bahru can only be brought by the Attorney General or with his consent under section 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 (GPA) and as such the decision by the High Court in both suits are a nullity and ought to be set aside. [32] Learned counsel for the defendants argued in submission that the appeals are in violation of section 9 of the GPA which reads: “9. (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust for public, religious, social or charitable purposes, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the 29 administration of any such trust, the Attorney General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Attorney General, may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public for the purpose of—

(2) No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with that subsection.” 30 [33] The subject matter of both the suits is the Trust Deed created pursuant to an Order of the Court for the benefit of the Orang Asli. It is the submission of learned counsels for the defendants that the Trust in question is a public or charitable trust as opposed to a private trust because it satisfies the three essentials laid down in Income Tax Special Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 53 where Lord Macnaghten described charitable trust as follows: “ ‘Charity’ in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity that deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly.’There is also a requirement that the trust's purposes benefit the public (or some section of the public), and not simply a group of private individuals.” 31 [34] The four heads of charity as laid down in Pemsel are in respect:

(ii) the advancement of education

(iii) the advancement of religion; or

(iv) other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of t preceding heads. [35] It was strenuously argued by learned counsel for the defendants that the Trust is undoubtedly a charitable trust, and it is for the public benefit. The Trust provided for the advancement of education as well as other purposes beneficial to the Orang Asli community named in the Trust Deed. Therefore, section 9 of the GPA is applicable. [36] Pursuant to aforesaid section, therefore the plaintiffs must obtain the written consent of the Attorney General in order to institute the suit or the Attorney General must be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the Government or the public for the purpose of the Trust. Thus, there was an obvious total failure by the plaintiffs to comply with the expressed requirements of section 9 of the GPA. Since there is no prior written consent of the Attorney General as required under the said provision the court has 32 no jurisdiction to consider the dispute. On this ground alone this action is wholly misconceived and should fail. [37] With respect, we do not agree with the submissions of learned counsels for the defendants. The Trust was created pursuant to a Court Order dated 5.6.2006 for the benefit of the 52 plaintiffs who are named in the First Schedule. By the Compensation Order, the sum of RM26,500,000.00 was awarded by the Court to the 52 plaintiffs for the deprivation of use of their rights to derive income and earn their livelihood at the forest reserve and state land at the Linggui Valley, near Kota Tinggi, Johore. [38] Lord Simonds in the case of Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd: HL 13 Dec 1950 said: “The question is whether that class of persons can be regarded as such a ‘section of the community’ as to satisfy the test of public benefit. These words ‘section of the community’ have no special sanctity, but they conveniently indicate first, that the possible (I emphasize the word ‘possible’) beneficiaries must not be numerically negligible, and secondly, that the quality which distinguishes them from other members of the community, so that they form by themselves a section 33 of it, must be a quality which does not depend on their relationship to a particular individual. It is for this reason that a trust for the education of members of a family or, as in In re Compton [1945] Ch 123, of a number of families cannot be regarded as charitable. A group of persons may be numerous but, if the nexus between them is their personal relationship to a single propositus or to several propositi, they are neither the community nor a section of the community for charitable purposes.” [39] His Lordship remarked that whilst the law of charity is pervaded with illogicalities: “ It must not, I think, be forgotten that charitable institutions enjoy rare and increasing privileges, and that the claim to come within that privileged class should be clearly established.” [40] The 52 plaintiffs are heads of families representing the Orang Asli living around the Sungai Linggiu catchment area and it is expressly provided under clause 2 of the Trust Deed that the beneficiaries of the Trust are the 52 plaintiffs and “…their direct lineal descendants but no child-descendant shall be entitled to any share of the distribution of the assets or income during the 34 lifetime of his or her parent.” These words reflected the crystal clear intention of the purpose of the creation of the said Trust to create a trust for specific group of persons in the Orang Asli community and intended for private purpose. Where the beneficiaries are defined by reference to a personal nexus as in the case before us, the Trust, as a matter of law, cannot be charitable. [41] We find that there is absolutely no element of public interest and /or that the Trust is for public purpose. The Trust does not fall under any of the categories of charities as described in the Pemsel ‘s case. It was not created for the purpose for relief of poverty. It is a Trust created to safeguard and manage the Trust Fund pursuant to the Order of the High Court to ensure that the 52 plaintiffs, as the beneficiaries, will be given their rightful share of the compensation as ordered by the High Court. [42] Based on the Court Order dated 5.6.2000, the Trust Deed and all other relevant documents relating to the Trust, we are of the considered view that the Trust is clearly not a public trust nor is it a charitable trust. There is no element of a public trust – that it is a Trust for charitable or education purposes. The terms of the Trust Deed are articulately defined - the purpose, 35 from the moment of its conception, is a private trust as ordered by the High Court. The Trust created specifically for the benefit of the 52 plaintiffs and limited to their direct lineal descendants. No child-descendant shall be entitled to any share of the distribution of the assets or income during the lifetime of his or her parent. [43] That being the case, therefore, there is no requirement for the plaintiffs to obtain the consent in writing of the Attorney-General in order to institute this proceeding, or for the Attorney-General to be joined as a party to this proceeding. We,therefore, hold that the Trust is not a public trust, but is a private trust specifically created for the plaintiffs. The 2nd Preliminary Issue The 2 civil suits 228 and 106 were proceeded in contravention of section 54(3) of the AMLA as the Plaintiff failed to get the prior written consent of the Public Prosecutor as such the decision of the two suits are a nullity and ought to be set aside. [44] The 2nd preliminary issue is in respect of the 27 condominium units located in Gurney Heights, Setapak, Kuala Lumpur. The 27 condominium 36 units were purchased utilising the Trust Fund by Kanawagi and his son, Dinesh. Sometime in 2008, Kanawagi purchased the 27 condominium units purportedly on behalf of the Trust. Kanawagi is named as the purchaser in the SPA. Kanawagi then entered into MA with Virgin, a company owned and controlled by Kanawagi and his son, Dinesh. [45] Learned counsel for the plaintiffs highlighted to this court in their submission that the injunctions as ordered by the High Court of Johor Bahru on 17.4.2009 and 5.5.2009 still remain in force. Kanawagi, Dinesh and Khana & Co. by the injunctions were not only ordered to deliver possession, custody and control of the 27 condominium units but were restrained from dealing with the said units. By the said High Court Order their powers of managing the said 27 condominium units were transferred to the R&M and under the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. [46] On 6.8.2012 the PP seized the 27 condominium units pursuant to section 51(1)(a) the AMLA as they were the subject matter of an offence under section 4(1) of the same Act. Similar to the Injunctions ordered by the High Court in 2009, the Notice of Seizure dated 6.8.2012, Kanawagi was 37 prohibited from dealing with the property. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued that on the date of the seizure, the 27 condominium units effectively did not belong to Kanawagi either in law or in equity as the properties were under the purview and management of the R&M, and in law were not Kanawagi’s personal assets. Thus, the Notice of Seizure covers only in respect of Kanawagi’s assets but not the assets under the Trust. [47] In response, it was submitted by learned counsels for the defendants that the two suits had effectively come to an end on 22.12.2016 despite that being the case, the trial judge proceeded to hear in contravention of section 54(3) of the AMLA. No action, suit or other proceedings of a civil nature can be instituted in respect of the property which has been seized. The trial of the both the suits was therefore a nullity. [48] Where any immovable property is seized under section 51(1) of the AMLA the seizure shall be effected by the following actions taken: “(1) Where the Public Prosecutor is satisfied on information given to him by an investigating officer that any immovable property is the subject-matter of an offence under subsection 4(1) or evidence of the commission 38 of such offence, such property may be seized, and the seizure shall be effected-

(1) shall immediately upon being served with a Notice of Seizure under that subsection endorse the terms of the Notice of Seizure on the document of title in respect of the immovable property in the Register at his office. “ [51] For so long as the seizure remains in force any dealings remain null and void. This is provided under section 54(1) of the AMLA: “(1) Where any property has been seized under this Act, and so long as such seizure remains in force, any dealing effected by any person 40 or between any persons in respect of such property, except any dealing effected under this Act by an officer of a public body in his capacity as such officer, or otherwise by or on behalf of the Federal Government, or the Government of a State, or a local authority or other statutory authority, shall be null and void, and shall not be registered or otherwise be given effect to by any person or authority.

(2) Subsection (1) shall be in addition to and not in derogation of subsections 51(3) and (4).

(3) For so long as a seizure of any property under this Act remains in force, no action, suit or other proceedings of a civil nature shall be instituted, or if it is pending immediately before such seizure, be maintained or continued in any court or before any other authority in respect of the property which has been so seized, and no attachment, execution or other similar process shall be commenced, or if any such process is pending immediately before such seizure, be maintained or continued, in respect of such property on account of any claim, judgement or decree, regardless whether such claim was made, or such judgement or decree was given, before or after such seizure was effected, except at the instance of the Federal Government or the Government of a State, or at the instance of a local authority or other 41 statutory authority, or except with the prior consent in writing of the Public Prosecutor.” [52] We agree with the submissions of learned counsels for the defendants that the provisions under the AMLA are crystal clear – where an endorsement of a Notice of Seizure has been made, it shall have the effect of prohibiting all dealings in respect of the immovable property. After such endorsement has been made, no dealing in respect of the immovable property shall be registered, regardless whether it was effected before or after the issue of such Notice or the making of such endorsement. [53] However, in the instant appeals before us, the properties in question, i.e. the 27 condominium units do not belong to Kanawagi but belong to the Trust, and the said 27 condominium units are the subject matter of the injunctions ordered by the High Court which still remain in force. As such, the 27 condominium units do not fall within the ambit of the Notice of Seizure issued to Kanawagi. [54] The AMLA is a legislation to provide for the offence of money laundering, the measures to be taken for the prevention of money 42 laundering and terrorism financing offences. The Act empowers the relevant authority to forfeit property involved in or derived from money laundering and terrorism financing offences, as well as terrorist property, proceeds of an unlawful activity and instrumentalities of an offence and for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith. [55] Section 17 A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 167 (Consolidated and Revised 1989) (“the Interpretation Acts”) provides: “In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.” [56] Since the 27 condominium units were purportedly purchased by Kanawagi as a Trustee to the Trust, to invest on behalf of the beneficiaries, they cannot fall within the scope of the Notice of Seizure issued. The 27 condominium units are also the subject of the injunctions which have not been lifted, set aside or varied and therefore remain enforceable. As we have stated earlier the purpose of the AMLA is to provide for measures to be 43 taken for the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing offences - to prevent an accused from dealing with assets or property procured through money laundering or unlawful activities.The appeals before us involve the enforcement of the Trust and the allegation of mismanagement of the Trust by the Trustees. [57] Thus, regarding the 2nd preliminary issue we are of the opinion that based on a reasonable and purposive interpretation of section 54 (3) of the AMLA, read together with section 17A of the Interpretation Acts the provision of section 54(3) of the AMLA cannot be interpreted the way that the defendants want it to be, that is, the plaintiffs are barred from continuing with the suitn228 and suit 106 in the light of the Notice of Seizure issued. In our view, we must interpret the relevant provisions of the AMLA to be in line with its purpose and objective as defined in the Preamble to the said Act. [58] Therefore, we are of the considered view that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear both suit 228 and suit 106. 44 Conclusion [59] Having considered both the written as well as oral submissions of learned counsels on the two preliminary issues and having perused the Appeal Records we find no merits in the two preliminary issues raised by the defendants. [60] Accordingly, we dismissed the two preliminary issues. The parties are ordered to proceed with the hearing of the appeals. sgd HASNAH BINTI DATO’ MOHAMMED HASHIM Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Putrajaya Date:12th September 2018 45 Counsels for the Appellants J-02(W)-219-02/2017 Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram Dato Nagarajan Periasmay Vinoshini Narayanasamy David Yii Messers T Ananthasivam Unit 236, 2nd, Menara Mutiara Majestic Pj, No. 15, Jalan Othman, Section 3, 46000 Petaling Jaya, Selangor J-02(W)-220-02/2017 Ranjan Chandran Manjeet Singh Shopna Rani Shoba Veera Velary Velaythan Messers Hakem Arabi & Associates Suite No: 8-15-3, Menara Mutiara Bangsar, Jalan Liku, Bangsar, 59100 Kuala Lumpur 46 J-02(W)-221-02/2017 Dato Bastian Vendargon Gene Anand Verdagon Messers Shopna Rani Malakar & Co. Block B-9-3A, Level 11, Menara Uncang Emas, 85, Jalan Loke Yew, 55200 Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan J-02(W)-224-02/2017 VS Viswanthan G Nadesh Velary Velayathan Messers Malek, Paulian & Gan B-03-03, Gateway Corporate Suites, Gateway Kiaramas, No. 1, Jalan Desa Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan J-02(W)-225-02/2017 Dinesh Athinarayanan Sathayananthan Sinnappan Messers Azri, Lee Swee Seng & Co. Unit 210, Level 2, Block A, Pusat Dagangan Phileo Damansara 2, Jalan 16/11, Off Jalan Damansara, 46350 Petaling Jaya, Selangor 47 J-02(W)-226-02/2017 Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram TA Sivam David Yii Messers T Ananthasivam Unit 236, 2nd, Menara Mutiara Majestic Pj, No. 15, Jalan Othman, Section 3, 46000 Petaling Jaya, Selangor J-02(W)-227-02/2017 Annou Xavier Yong Jia Wei Messers Azri, Lee Swee Seng & Co. Unit 210, Level 2, Block A, Pusat Dagangan Phileo Damansara 2, Jalan 16/11, Off Jalan Damansara, 46350 Petaling Jaya, Selangor 48 J-02(W)-228-02/2017 Dato Wong Rhen Yen Ahmad Ezmeel Tarmizi Messers Shopna Rani Malakar & Co. Block B-9-3A, Level 11, Menara Uncang Emas, 85, Jalan Loke Yew 55200 Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan Counsels for the Respondents J-02(W)-219-02/2017 J-02(W)-220-02/2017 J-02(W)-221-02/2017 Tommy Thomas Ragumaren Gopal Kenneth Koh MV Nathan (26th Respondent) Gengeys Vijay (26th Respondent) Messers G Ragumaren & Co 56-1, Rga Chambers, Jalan Telawi, Bangsar Baru, 59100 Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan 49 J-02(W)-224-02/2017 J-02(W)-225-02/2017 J-02(W)-226-02/2017 J-02(W)-227-02/2017 J-02(W)-228-02/2017 Prakash Menon Renu Zechariah Cheryl Kwan TT Ng Gengys Vijay Messers Rosley Zechariah 17-5, 17th Floor, Oval Tower @ Damansara, (Menara Permata Damansara), 685 Jalan Damansara, 60000 Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan