Lampiran
Lampiran 128, Lampiran 132 dan Perbicaraan Penuh yang dijadualkan pada 29 & 30 April serta 13 & 14 Mei 2025. ii) Satu Majistret baru setelah itu perlu dilantik bagi mendengar segala tindakan-tindakan di dalam guaman sedia ada ini. 28/05/2025 15:47:11 WA-A72NCvC-4758-11/2022 Kand. 184 iii) Bahawa segala prosiding bagi Lampiran 128, Lampiran 132 dan Perbicaraan Penuh yang dijadualkan pada 29 & 30 April serta 13 & 14 Mei 2025 ditangguhkan terlebih dahulu sehingga permohonan ini didengar juga dilupuskan sepenuhnya. iv) Semua relif lain dan/atau selanjutnya yang Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini anggap patut dan suai manfaat. 2) Sebagai permulaan, saya telah mengambil panduan daripada kes “CHE MINAH REMELI v. PENTADBIR TANAH, PEJABAT TANAH BESUT, TERENGGANU & ORS” dimana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan: “[35] In the common law world over the past decade there is rooted in our legal system the fundamental belief that judges who adjudicate must always do so without bias or prejudice and it must be perceived to be so. It is a correct assertion to say and I so say that a judge must be impartial and it is his impartiality that forms the core attribute of the judiciary. The presumption of impartiality of a judge must be upheld. It is the cornerstone of the judiciary. No one should carelessly argue that a particular judge is biased because the credibility of the judge depends on the presumption of his impartiality. And that presumption is deeply rooted in our legal system. That being the case, the burden is on the party arguing for a disqualification to establish that the circumstances justify the finding that the judge must be disqualified.” DAPATAN MAHKAMAH 3) Mahkamah ini, setelah meneliti affidavit-afidavit kedua-dua pihak serta hujahan-hujahan yang difailkan oleh pihak-pihak berkaitan Lampiran 141 ini, memutuskan untuk menolak Lampiran 141 dengan kos RM 1,500.00 bersandarkan kepada alasan-alasan sepertimana di bawah. Alasan Pertama: Tarikh Bicara yang ditetapkan pada 29 dan 30 April serta 13 dan 14 Mei 2025 telah dilapangkan. 4) Pertama, pada hemat saya, permohonan Defendan khususnya pada item (i) yang memohon saya untuk mengundurkan diri dari mendengar dan mempersidangkan pendengaran Lampiran 128, Lampiran 132 dan Perbicaraan Penuh yang dijadualkan pada 29 dan 30 April serta 13 dan 14 Mei 2025 telah bersifat akademik. Ini adalah kerana: i) Lampiran 128 telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini pada 21 April 2025 yang lalu. ii) Tarikh Bicara pada 29 & 30 April serta 13 & 14 Mei 2025 yang dinyatakan di dalam permohonan Defendan telah pun dilapangkan oleh Mahkamah ini sebelum ini. Oleh itu, secara teknikalnya, saya tidak mendengar dan mempersidangkan perbicaraan yang telah dilapangkan pada tarikh-tarikh tersebut dan tiada keperluan untuk saya mengundurkan diri dari mendengar dan mempersidangkan perbicaraan pada tarikh-tarikh yang telah dilapangkan tersebut. iii) Lampiran 132 juga telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini pada 13 Mei 2025. Alasan Kedua: Tiada “real danger of bias” 5) Kedua, tiada sebarang alasan atau fakta kukuh bahawa terdapatnya “real danger of bias” yang berjaya ditunjukkan oleh Defendan bagi membolehkan saya mengundurkan diri dari meneruskan perbicaraan bagi tindakan ini. Saya mengambil panduan daripada kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu “PP v. TENGKU ADNAN TENGKU MANSOR [2020] 9 CLJ 30” yang menyatakan: “[11] It is important to reiterate at this juncture that both tiers of the courts below, with respect, correctly relied on the law in relation to bias. It is in the application of the test to the facts and circumstances of the case that both parties arrived at diametrically opposing conclusions. [12] The governing law in this country applies the test laid down in Regina v. Gough [1993] AC 646 and is summarily stated to be a 'real danger of bias'. The test was first adopted in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Berkerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 CLJ 65; [1999] 3 MLJ 1 by Edgar Joseph J in a judicial review case, reiterated in Mohamed Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v. Ketua Polis Negara [2001] 4 CLJ 701; [2002] 1 MLJ 321, the only criminal case dealing with bias in the context of a habeas corpus application and Dato' Tan Heng Chew v. Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal [2006] 1 CLJ 577; [2006] 2 MLJ 293, another civil matter relating to striking out under O. 18 r. 19 RHC. [13] In all these cases, the question before the court, as it is in this case is whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the learned trial judge when he heard the case involving the respondent? …………………… [15] In Sungai Gelugor Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ explained that with this test, the opinion of the court substituted that of the reasonable man. Secondly, the real danger test he said, was a reasonable compromise between the 'reasonable suspicion' and 'real likelihood' of bias test meaning that the court was contemplating a lower standard than that a likelihood or probability of bias. It required a 'real possibility of bias'. It is important to comprehend that this court did not state that it was imposing a 'very low' threshold.” 6) Untuk rekod, Pengurusan Kes secara fizikal bertarikh 10 Oktober 2024 telah diadakan yang telah dihadiri oleh Peguam Plaintif dan Peguam Defendan. Bertitik tolak daripada sesi pengurusan kes tersebut, Defendan mendakwa saya telah bertindak secara tidak neutral dan telah memihak. 7) Defendan mendakwa saya telah bertindak di luar batasan dengan mencadangkan supaya Plaintif menarik balik permohonan pindaan pliding dengan memfailkan semula oleh deponen yang berbeza memandangkan Defendan membantah deponen asal tersebut. 8) Pada hemat saya, tiada sebarang tindakan memihak yang dilakukan oleh saya. Plaintif bertindak menarik balik permohonan tersebut tanpa sebarang paksaan atau perintah oleh Mahkamah ini dan juga bukan berasaskan kepada cadangan Mahkamah ini. Plaintif bertindak berdasarkan kepada keperluan kes Plaintif dan arahan anak guam Plaintif. 9) Pernyataan dan komen yang didakwa dibuat oleh saya hanyalah untuk menunjukkan kedudukan realiti semasa kepada pihak-pihak. Pada pandangan saya, bantahan Defendan di dalam Lampiran 44 dan Lampiran 63 asasnya berkisar kepada bantahan terhadap individu deponen yang mengikrarkan affidavit tersebut dan bukannya kandungan affidavit tersebut walaupun terdapat isu “dominus litis” yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan. Pada hemat saya, sekiranya Plaintif menukar deponen, maka secara hakikatnya dan secara teknikalnya, bantahan Defendan sudah tidak relevan dan akan menjimatkan masa Mahkamah dan semua pihak. 10) Mahkamah ini berpegang kepada Aturan 34 kaedah 1 (1)(b) yang menyatakan Mahkamah boleh memberikan sebarang arahan atau perintah dimana arahan sedemikian boleh diberikan untuk kausa tindakan masa hadapan sebagaimana ternyata disesuaikan sebaiknya untuk menjamin penyelesaian yang adil, cepat dan ekonomi. 11) Di dalam kes “HONG LEONG FINANCE BHD v. LOW THIAM HOE & ANOTHER APPEAL [2015] 8 CLJ 1”, Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan: ““The civil procedure has since then changed with the introduction of the pre-trial case management in the year 2000 under O. 34 of the RHC 1980 (w.e.f. 22 September 2000) and now under O. 34 of the RC 2012 (w.e.f. 1 August 2012). Nowadays the court recognises especially under the new case management regime that a different approach needs to be taken to prevent delay in the progress of a case to trial and for its completion. The progress of the case is no longer left in the hands of the litigants but with the court in the driver's seat.” 12) Di dalam kes “NEWLAKE DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD v. ZENITH DELIGHT SDN BHD & ORS [2017] CLJU 527”, Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan: “37. In considering this appeal, we are mindful of the fact that under the new Rules of Court 2012, the Court plays a proactive role in moving the pace for litigation. The Courts no longer leave it to the litigants to decide the same.” 13) Saya juga merujuk kepada penghakiman di dalam kes “MCGIRVANMEDIA (ASIA) SDN BHD v. HSS INTEGRATED SDN BHD [2023] 10 CLJ 977” dimana Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur menyatakan: “[39] Comments made on the nature of the cases that come before the courts during case managements are not unusual. I agree with the assertion of learned counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff's contention if accepted, would mean that a judge can no longer discuss any issues in a case with the parties' counsel until the day of the decision (even though the discussion is so that the parties can focus on the material issues as identified by the judge) - "this is dangerous, farcical and will be detrimental to the smooth administration of justice". 14) Saya juga telah meneliti kes “DELEUM PRIMERA SDN BHD v. MAZRIN RAMLI & ORS [2021] CLJU 488” di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan: “[69] The second ground relied upon to justify their Recusal Applications is the fact that this Court had, during the Ex Parte E-Review Hearing, referred learned counsel for the Plaintiff to a few cases not cited by the Plaintiff in its Written Submissions. The Court had referred to these English cases with the view for learned counsel for the Plaintiff to address the Court on the legal issues that these cases may pose to the Plaintiff's Ex Parte Applications. The Defendants' complaint in this regard is that by so doing, the Court is perceived as 'assisting' the Plaintiff in its Ex Parte Applications. [70] In addition, learned counsel for the Defendants also contended that this Court was actively involved in 'correcting and/or repairing' the Plaintiff's Ex Parte Applications at the Ex-parte E-Review Hearing and the Ex Parte Zoom Hearing which the Defendants claimed had given rise to a real danger of bias, again suggesting that by so doing, the Court is perceived as 'assisting' the Plaintiff in its Ex Parte Applications. …………………………………. [74] As far as I could remember in my experience as a litigator prior to my appointment to the bench, it is a common practice for a judge to raise any issues that may be troubling him to the counsel appearing before him when considering an application. This is so whether the application is in the nature of an ex parte proceeding or otherwise. This practice has never been a source of complaint let alone a reason to recuse the judge. By raising issues seeking clarifications from counsel, the judge is merely discharging his judicial function to satisfy himself that all legal issues which, in his opinion, are relevant to the application before him are being addressed to enable him to determine the application. [75] A passage on this practice cited in Ang Sue Khoon v. Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang & Anor [2016] MLJU 1342 is instructive. At paragraph 84 of the judgment, this was what is stated: "84.8... In modern legal proceedings, a judge or adjudicator does not sit silently through a hearing, keeping his views and thoughts to himself; and expressing them, for the first time and with finality, only in his judgment. The opposite is, indeed, encouraged. Most counsels appreciate being alerted to the matters, of fact or law, which may be troubling a judge during a proceeding; because they can then do their best to address the judge's concerns. If a judge sits silently throughout a hearing, counsels will only discover for the first time what has been troubling him, when the judge's views emerge as final conclusions in his judgment; by which time it will be too late for a counsel to address the same. 84.9... The apex court of Australia, in Johnson v. Johnson [2000] 74 ALJR 1380 @ 1382, para [13]; describes the modern practice to which I have just referred, and highlights the need to take a practical view of matters in the context of ordinary judicial practice: "Whilst the fictional observer...... is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice. The rules and conventions governing such practice are not frozen in time. They develop to take account of the exigencies of modern litigation. At the trial level, modern judges...... intervene in the conduct of cases to an extent that may surprise a person who came to court expecting a judge to remain, until the moment of pronouncement of judgement, as inscrutable as the Sphinx........ Judges are not expected to wait until the end of a case before they start thinking about the issues, or to sit mute while evidence is advanced and arguments are presented. On the contrary, they will often form tentative opinions on matters in issue, and counsel are usually assisted by hearing those opinions, and being given an opportunity to deal with them." [78] Further, in Residence Hotel (supra) one of the contentions was that the judge had 'advised' the defendant to reconsider its position as to whether to proceed with the counterclaim. In rejecting such contention, it was held that the judge had merely inquired whether the defendant would reconsider its position. Such observation did not necessarily mean that the Court had made a finding on the merits of the defendant's counterclaim. 15) Selanjutnya, di dalam kes “DATO' SRI ANDREW KAM TAI YEOW v. HOONG BEE YOOK [2019] CLJU 1298”, Mahkamah Tinggi juga memutuskan: “[34] Further, both the remarks were made during case management when it is not unusual for judges to make judicial comments or express preliminary views on the issues before them with counsel for the parties. Such comments and or preliminary views can by no means suggest that the judge has 'prejudged' the issues. Indeed, there is absolutely nothing in this case that shows that the learned Session Court Judge had determined that there was no case for contempt and or that her mind was so closed to the matter that even if a formal application for committal were to be made, she would be completely closed to any persuasion by counsel on the issue.” 16) Saya juga telah merujuk kepada kes “NAJ GLOBAL NETWORK SDN BHD v. UNIVERSITI MALAYA & ANOR [2011] 8 CLJ 658” yang menyatakan: “[2] On the morning of the hearing, the plaintiff filed an application for the Judicial Commissioner ("JC") to recuse herself from proceeding to hear this case. There were two main grounds for the application, namely: i. That there were elements of bias as the JC had a direct link with the 1st defendant, having graduated with a degree from the 1st defendant; and ii. That the JC had made several remarks during case management which were regarded as biased. ……………………………….. [8] Similarly, I was of the view that the second ground for the application was without basis. Comments made in the course of case management, after due perusal of the pleadings, bundles of documents and witness statements, and directions to parties to review their own cases cannot give rise to an apprehension of bias. In the final analysis, a case will only be determined after hearing all the witnesses and considering their evidence.”. 17) Oleh itu, setelah mengambil panduan daripada nas-nas dan otoriti yang dikemukakan di atas, saya berpegang teguh bahawa tiada sebarang ketidakadilan, tindakan memihak, kecenderungan yang nyata serta “real danger of bias” yang telah dilakukan oleh saya. 18) Pernyataan dan komen yang dibuat oleh saya semasa sesi Pengurusan Kes tersebut tidak lebih sekadar pandangan adil dan munasabah yang dibuat setelah melihat permohonan-permohonan pihak-pihak di dalam Lampiran 40 dan juga Lampiran 44 dan Lampiran 63 (oleh Defendan) boleh dilupuskan dengan adil, cepat dan ekonomi tanpa keperluan menggangu kelancaran prosiding di Mahkamah sekiranya asas bantahan Defendan berkaitan individu deponen kepada affidavit Plaintif diselesaikan lebih awal. Saya juga tidak melihat atau menyentuh kepada kandungan affidavit tersebut dan tiada sebarang isu atau pandangan berkaitan merit kandungan affidavit dibangkitkan oleh Mahkamah kepada pihak-pihak. Alasan Ketiga: Kelewatan Defendan di dalam memfailkan permohonan ini 19) Untuk rekod, saya telah membenarkan permohonan Plaintif untuk menarik balik Notis Permohonan Plaintif (Lampiran 40) pada 14 Oktober 2024. Namun demikian, hanya pada Mac 2025, iaitu setelah hampir 6 bulan, barulah Defendan memfailkan Notis Permohonan Lampiran 141 ini) untuk saya menarik diri daripada mengendalikan dan mendengar tuntutan Plaintif ini. 20) Apa yang lebih menariknya, ialah Notis Permohonan ini hanya difailkan oleh Defendan setelah beberapa Notis Permohonan lain difailkan oleh Defendan dan telah diputuskan oleh saya sebelum ini. Tiada juga sebarang bantahan dibangkitkan oleh Defendan bagi membantah saya daripada meneruskan pengendalian dan pendegaran tindakan ini semasa beberapa sesi Pengurusan Kes Secara e-Review yang telah diadakan sebelum ini. 21) Mahkamah ini juga telah merujuk kepada kes “NEWLAKE DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD v. ZENITH DELIGHT SDN BHD & ORS [2017] CLJU 527” berkaitan permohonan Plaintif untuk menarik balik permohonan di dalam Lampiran 40 dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula. Alasan Keempat: Teguran dan Nasihat diberikan secara umum kepada pihak-pihak 22) Dakwaan Defendan bahawa terdapat kecenderungan saya tidak akan bertindak secara adil dan saksama adalah bersifat pandangan peribadi yang tidak berasas oleh Defendan. 23) Sebarang teguran atau peringatan yang diberikan adalah bersifat umum kepada pihak-pihak bagi memastikan kelancaran pengurusan kes dan bagi menghormati prosiding Mahkamah. Laras bahasa nasihat, teguran dan peringatan yang digunakan oleh saya juga adalah tertib dan tidak bersifat merendah-rendahkan (condescending) kepada mana-mana pihak. 24) Mahkamah ini telah memberikan peringatan berikut: i) “5) Pihak-pihak diingatkan untuk sentiasa mematuhi arahan Mahkamah dan tidak menjadikan medan CM ini medan untuk betelingkah atau membuat ugutan tidak sewajarnya.”; dan ii) “7) Berbeza pandangan tiada masalah. Namun, adab dalam berbeza perlu dititik beratkan.” 25) Pada hemat saya, tiada sebarang niat buruk atau prejudis bilamana peringatan dan nasihat ini diberikan kepada pihak-pihak, dan bukannya hanya kepada pihak Defendan sahaja. Peringatan sebegini adalah penting bagi menjamin kelancaran pengurusan dan pengendalian prosiding di Mahkamah. 26) Harus dinyatakan bahawa saya hanya menjalankan tugas dengan memberi peringatan, nasihat serta teguran kepada pihak-pihak supaya menghormati prosiding Mahkamah. Dalam apa jua keadaan, saya hanya bertanggungjawab terhadap apa yang saya ucapkan, dan bukannya terhadap apa yang difahami secara salah oleh pihak-pihak, sekiranya ada. 27) Selain itu, semua keputusan Mahkamah telah diputuskan setelah Mahkamah ini meneliti segala affidavit dan hujahan pihak-pihak. Alasan ringkas (broad ground) juga akan diberikan semasa sesuatu keputusan bagi setiap permohonan diputuskan oleh saya. Pastinya, semua isu dibangkitkan termasuk isu dominus litis yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan juga telah diteliti dengan baik oleh Mahkamah sebelum sebarang keputusan dibuat. Alasan Kelima: Dakwaan defendan bahawa arahan dan keputusan saya hanya mengikut hati nurani dan bukannya undang-undang adalah tuduhan yang sangat tidak wajar dan tidak disokong 28) Dakwaan Defendan di perenggan 18 Afidavit Balasan (Lampiran 155) adalah sangat tidak wajar, tidak relevan dan bersifat tuduhan Defendan semata-mata. yang tidak bersandarkan kepada mana-mana fakta dan sokongan lain. 29) Sepanjang Pengurusan Kes dijalankan bersama pihak-pihak, tiada pernah sekali pun frasa Key Performance Indicator (KPI) ada dibangkitkan oleh saya kepada pihak-pihak. Bahkan, saya tidak pernah menafikan hak pihak-pihak untuk memfailkan apa jua permohonan interlokutori. Arahan seadilnya serta tempoh masa pemfailan afidavit dan hujahan bagi setiap permohonan yang mencukupi telah diberikan kepada pihak-pihak. 30) Saya juga telah beberapa kali melapangkan dan menjadualkan semula tarikh perbicaraan bagi menunggu keputusan terhadap rayuan-rayuan yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi oleh pihak-pihak walaupun secara asasnya, pemfailan rayuan bukanlah secara automatik menjadikan sesuatu perbicaraan perlu ditangguhkan. 31) Dalam apa jua keadaan, semua keputusan saya adalah diputuskan bersandarkan kepada undang-undang dan nas-nas otoroti yang ada dan matan. Sekiranya saya hanya bertindak mengikut hati nurani sahaja, maka tiadalah sebarang alasan diberikan semasa memutuskan sesuatu permohonan dan tiada rujukan kepada nas undang akan dibuat oleh saya. 32) Namun, setiap keputusan saya, pasti akan ada dapatan fakta dan undang-undang serta alasan dikemukakan dan bersandarkan kepada undang-undang dan nas yang sahih dan mengikat. Sama ada keputusan saya itu betul atau tidak, pihak-pihak masih boleh merayu kepada Mahkamah yang lebih tinggi dan bukannya dengan mengkritik tanpa asas sebegini. Namun, untuk menyatakan bahawa saya memutuskan sesuatu isu atau permohonan berdasarkan kepada hati nurani sahaja, dakwaan ini sangat tidak adil dan wajar. 33) Saya merujuk kepada penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes “WONG KIE CHIE v. KATHRYN MA WAI FONG & ANOR AND OTHER APPEALS [2017] 5 CLJ 707” yang memutuskan bahawa: “…………….. If the application for recusal was allowed freely, it would encourage tactical applications by litigants seeking another judge to hear their case. A judge's decision which did not favour a litigant could not be used as an instrument to recuse the judge or to remove the case to another court. Preconceived opinion by a judge did not constitute such a real bias so as to justify the recusal of the judge as the decision of the court in a pending matter would still be based and decided on the evidence and material before the court. Similarly, in Comsa Farms Bhd v. Malaysian Assurance Alliance Bhd [2012] 3 CLJ 724, the High Court held that a judge's findings made according to law in a particular suit could not be a ground for recusal applications in other suits.” 34) Saya yakin dan percaya bahawa alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan bagi mengundurkan saya daripada meneruskan pengendalian dan perbicaraan ini adalah tidak relevan, tidak kukuh, tidak wajar dan bersifat tuduhan kosong semata-mata serta tiada sebarang “real danger of bias” telah dibuktikan oleh pihak Defendan. 35) Saya ingin menegaskan bahawa saya masih mempunyai nilai iman dan integriti yang kukuh berpaksikan kepada prinsip kehakiman untuk saya meneruskan amanah sebagai seorang yang dipertanggunjawabkan sebagai seorang Majistret khususnya bagi tindakan guaman ini. Saya berpegang teguh kepada prinsip yang digariskan di dalam kes Wong Kie Chie (supra) iaitu: “[41] Accordingly, judges should balance properly their competing duties as judges when recusal applications fall to be decided by them. Settled principles dictate that judges have a duty to sit and adjudicate on cases allotted to them, displaced only when there are objectively justifiable grounds for recusal, that litigants cannot judge-shop and judges cannot case-shop and that the administration of justice is served as much by a fearless and confident judiciary as by a fair judiciary (Inappropriate Recusals (supra) ).” KESIMPULAN 36) Kesimpulannya, dinyatakan sekali lagi bahawa Mahkamah ini telah meneliti afidavit-afidavit serta hujahan-hujahan yang difailkan oleh pihak-pihak berkaitan Lampiran 141 ini dan memutuskan untuk menolak Lampiran 141 dengan kos RM 1,500.00. Bertarikh 13 Mei 2025 MUHAMMAD NAJIB BIN ISMAIL Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Sivil (9) Kuala Lumpur