(ii) if the property seized consists of prohibited goods, such goods or the amount secured under paragraph 115(1)(a) or (b) or the amount realized by sale under paragraph 115(1)(c), as the case may be, shall be forfeited: Provided that where the prohibition is conditional upon a licence being issued, a senior officer of customs may release such goods if a licence is issued by any relevant authority within thirty days from the date such sum of money is paid. In the present case, the vehicles were legally seized under section 114(1) for committing an offence under sections 78, 133 and 135, and validly detained under section 131 of the Act and until customs duty payable is paid. Further, the Applicant had appealed to the Minister for the release of the vehicles, and the Minister had set a condition for the release of the vehicles, namely, that the payment of additional taxes and duties be settled by the Applicant. The 16 Applicant had failed to pay these additional taxes and duties. The Applicant also failed to produce valid APs for the importation of these vehicles. Hence, I find that the forfeiture of the vehicles is in accordance to law and well within the statutory powers under the Act. [22] Now, in respect of Case No. 5, my findings and decision are as follows. The Applicant contends that the duties and taxes raised in the 15 separate bills of claim have already been paid when the vehicles went through customs clearance, and that this claim for additional duties and taxes is unlawful. The Respondents contend otherwise. The Respondents state that these 15 bills of claim arise from under declaration in respect of the value of the said vehicles made by the Applicant at the time of timportation, which had resulted in lesser duties and taxes being levied in the first place. The 15 bills of claim are based on the revised actual value of these vehicles, which shows the actual duties and taxes payable. The Respondents have the power to do so under section 17(1) of the Customs Act 1967, section 30 of the Sales Tax Act 1972 and section 15(1) of the Excise Act 1976. The Applicant had settled payment of all these 15 revised claims for duties and taxes, without any protestation. And in fact, the Applicant in its appeal letter to the Minister does not refute that it had under-declared the value of these 15 vehicles. Hence, I find that the 17 action taken by the Respondents in this regard is well within their powers accorded by law. [23] A further point of fundamental importance has been raised by learned counsel for the Respondents and it merits consideration. The learned Senior Federal Counsel has correctly stated that matters pertaining to compounding of criminal offences are not administrative decisions that are susceptible to judicial review. Under section 131 of the Customs Act, the power to compound and the amount of compound are discretionary powers which are exercisable by the appropriate officer of customs. The Respondents had carried out investigations and concluded that certain offences under the Act had been committed and offered to compound these offences as is provided in section 133 of the Act. [24] It is well settled that matters pertaining to an offer of compounding offences are part and parcel of enforcement of criminal law, which is beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. The Federal Court had reemphasized this principle in Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang & Another Case [1988] 1 CLJ 219; [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 63; [1988] 2 MLJ 12 FC where it was held that criminal law should not be enforced by means of civil proceedings. 18 [25] Similarly, in City Growth Sdn Bhd & Anor v. The Government of Malaysia [2005] 7 CLJ 422; [2006] 1 MLJ 581, in construing whether an Order of seizure of property made by a deputy public prosecutor pursuant to section 50 of the Anti Money Laundering Act 2000, was amendable to judicial review, Raus Sharif J (as he then was) had stated that: Looking at the order of the Deputy Public Prosecutor as well as the provision of s. 50(1) of AMLA, I am of the view that the order of the Deputy Public Prosecutor is not reviewable under O. 53 of the RHC. To me, s. 50(1) of AMLA is part and parcel of the investigation process into an offence under s. 4(1) of AMLA. It appears that in order to facilitate the investigation into the offence of money laundering, the law has provided with the Public Prosecutor the power to assist the investigating officer. Clearly, s. 50(1) of AMLA was enacted to enable the Public Prosecutor or his Deputy to make an order of seizure of movable properties in the possession of the financial institutions by ordering the financial institutions not to part, deal in, or otherwise dispose of such property or any part of it until the order is revoked or varied. Thus, by issuing the said orders the Deputy Public Prosecutor was merely exercising a function under AMLA. It has been said before that not all decisions and action of a public officer is reviewable by the court. In R v. Sloan [1990] 1 NZLR 474, Justice Hardie Boys said: ... it is not every decision made under statutory authority that is subject to judicial review. A decision must go beyond what is merely administrative or procedural... or the exercise of a function rather than a power... Quite plainly, the conclusions reached by the inspector here are of this kind and so are not reviewable. To hold otherwise would, as Mr Neave submitted, open up the investigation process of all law enforcement agencies to constant judicial review; and that cannot have been the intention of Parliament. 19 Similarly, in Haji Ahmad Azam bin Mohamed Salleh dan 5 Lagi lwn. Jabatan Pembangunan Koperasi Malaysia dan 2 Lagi [2004] 4 MLJ p. 86 I held that the public officers exercising a function under the Cooperative Societies Act 1993, is not reviewable under O. 53 of the RHC. Likewise in this case, the order of the Deputy Public Prosecutor under s. 50(1) of AMLA is also not reviewable. This must be so, otherwise if all decisions and action of public authority of this nature are amendable to court's review, then the government machinery may not be able to function smoothly. The investigation process of all law enforcement agencies will be open to constant judicial review. To borrow the words of Justice Hardie Boys in R v. Sloan (supra) 'that cannot have been the intention of Parliament.' Hence, applying these principles of law to the present set of factual circumstances, I find that the decision of the Respondents in respect of the seizure of the vehicles, the offer to compound the offences, the imposition of revised duties/taxes and the forfeiture of the vehicles are not administrative decisions, but are decisions made in the course of criminal investigations and forms part and parcel of criminal proceedings. Hence, the appropriate forum for the Applicant to challenge these decisions would be within the criminal jurisdiction of the appropriate courts. [26] A civil court cannot interfere and set aside the compound paid by the Applicant in respect of criminal offences said to have been committed by the Applicant, as these would have arisen in the course of enforcement of criminal law. If indeed the Applicant was under undue influence or duress in accepting 20 the offer to compound the offences and making payment of the compound, the Applicant ought to have availed itself of the procedures contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, and criminal law generally, to exercise its rights and apply to set aside the seizure, compounds, forfeiture and defend the charges against the Applicant. Thus, to that extent, I agree with submissions of learned Senior Federal Counsel that the impugned decisions sought to be challenged in this proceedings are not amenable to judicial review. [27] Wherefore, I dismissed this application for judicial review. Dated 31st this day of October 2018. Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera Judge High Court in Malaya Shah Alam 21 Peguamcara Pemohon Tetuan Raziyan Rahim & Associates 4-02, Jalan Suria 18, Taman Putra 8110 Johor Bahru, Johor Tel : 07 3328188 Fax: 07 3358188 Ruj : RR/CUS 1075/02-16 Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan Tingkat 4, Podium Utara Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah 40512 Shah Alam No. Tel : 03 55447191 Fax : 03 55101775