Theeban A/L Panir Selvam (JA-62D-289-06/2026)

BACKGROUND [1] The Appellant, THEEBAN A/L PANIR SELVAM ("the Appellant"), was charged before this Court as follows: "Bahawa kamu pada 21.12.2025 jam lebih kurang 12.01 pagi bertempat di Pejabat Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik IPD Kulai, di dalam Daerah Kulai di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, telah memberikan kepada diri kamu sendiri dadah berbahaya jenis Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine dan kamu juga mempunyai S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA satu sabitan terdahulu di bawah seksyen 39C(1)(b) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 iaitu pada:

06.07.2021 di Mahkamah Sesyen Jenayah (1) Johor Bahru, Johor nombor kes JA-62D-100-06/2020 dimana kamu telah dijatuhkan hukuman 5 tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap, 1 kali sebatan dan 2 tahun pengawasan. Dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39C(2) Akta yang sama." [2] On 23 June 2026, the Charge was read and explained to the Appellant in open court. After the Charge had been read and explained to him, the Appellant confirmed that he understood the nature of the Charge, the consequences of his plea and the punishment prescribed by law. The Appellant thereafter pleaded guilty to the Charge. Having satisfied itself that the plea was unequivocal, voluntary and informed, this Court accepted the Appellant's plea of guilty. [3] Following the Appellant's plea of guilty, the Prosecution tendered the Facts of the Case, which was marked as Exhibit P1 and read to the Appellant. The Facts of the Case disclosed that the Appellant's urine sample was analysed by the Drug Laboratory, Department of Pathology, Hospital Sultanah Aminah, Johor Bahru, and that the pathology report dated 27 March 2026 confirmed that the Appellant's urine contained Amphetamine and S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA Methamphetamine. The Facts of the Case further disclosed that the Appellant had previously been convicted of an offence under section 39C(1)(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 on 6 July 2021. After the Facts of the Case had been read to him, the Appellant admitted without qualification that the Appellant confirmed without qualification that the Facts of the Case were true. [4] Following the Appellant's admission to the Facts of the Case, the Prosecution tendered the documentary exhibits in support of the Charge, all of which were shown to the Appellant for identification and admitted without objection. Having considered the Appellant's unequivocal plea of guilty, his admission to the Facts of the Case and the documentary exhibits tendered by the Prosecution, this Court was satisfied that the plea had been properly accepted and that the Facts of the Case disclosed the commission of the offence charged. The Appellant was accordingly convicted upon his plea of guilty, following which this Court proceeded to hear submissions on sentence. [5] In its submissions on sentence, the Prosecution invited this Court to impose an appropriate sentence having regard to the Appellant's previous conviction under section 39C(1)(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. The S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA Prosecution further informed this Court that the Appellant was, at the material time, serving custodial sentences in three separate cases before the Magistrates' Court at Kulai, and accordingly urged this Court to order that the sentence of imprisonment commence from the date of conviction. When invited to mitigate, the Appellant did not seek any reduction in the custodial sentence. His sole request was that the sentence of imprisonment commence from the date of his arrest. [6] Having considered the circumstances of the case together with the respective submissions of the Prosecution and the Appellant, this Court sentenced the Appellant to seven (7) years' imprisonment commencing from the date of conviction, together with three (3) strokes of the cane. Pursuant to section 38B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, this Court further ordered that, upon completion of the custodial sentence, the Appellant be placed under the supervision of the National Anti-Drugs Agency for a period of two

years. [7] The Appellant has since appealed against the sentence imposed by this Court. The appeal, however, is confined to a single issue. The Appellant does not challenge his conviction upon the plea of guilty, nor does he dispute the legality or quantum of the sentence imposed. The only complaint S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA concerns this Court's order directing that the sentence of imprisonment commence from the date of conviction rather than the date of arrest. These Grounds of Judgment are therefore confined to explaining the basis upon which this Court exercised its discretion in making that order.

THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES [8] The issue arising in the present appeal is governed principally by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code regulating the commencement of custodial sentences, read together with the sentencing provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 under which the Appellant was convicted. [9] The Appellant was convicted of an offence under section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 and sentenced under section 39C(2) of the same Act. Section 39C(2) prescribes the punishment for a repeat offender convicted of self-administration of dangerous drugs, whilst section 38B empowers the Court to order a period of supervision upon completion of the custodial sentence. The legality of the conviction, the sentence imposed and the supervision order is not in issue. The sole question concerns the commencement date of the custodial sentence. S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA [10] The statutory provision directly governing the commencement of imprisonment is section 282(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides: "every sentence of imprisonment shall take effect from the date on which it was passed unless the Court passing the sentence otherwise directs." Section 282(d) establishes the general rule that a sentence of imprisonment takes effect from the date on which it is imposed. At the same time, it preserves the Court's discretion to direct otherwise where the circumstances of the particular case justify such an order. [11] Where an offender is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, section 292(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code assumes particular significance. It provides: "When a person who is an escaped convict or is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment, such imprisonment shall commence either immediately or at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, as the court awarding the sentence may direct." S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA Section 292(3) further provides: "Nothing in subsection (1) shall be held to excuse any person from any part of the punishment to which he is liable upon his former or subsequent conviction." Read together, sections 282(d) and 292 establish a coherent statutory scheme. Section 282(d) lays down the general rule governing the commencement of imprisonment, whilst section 292 provides the specific regime applicable where an offender is already undergoing imprisonment. The discretion conferred by those provisions is necessarily broad, but it must always be exercised judicially and consistently with established sentencing principles. [12] The interaction between sections 282(d) and 292 was authoritatively explained by the Court of Appeal in Bachik bin Abdul Rahman v Public Prosecutor [2004] 2 MLJ 534. Augustine Paul JCA observed: "Section 282(d) prescribes the general rule that a sentence of imprisonment shall take effect from the date on which it was passed unless the court passing the sentence otherwise directs. Section 292 is a specific provision dealing with the date of commencement of a sentence of imprisonment of a person who is already undergoing imprisonment. Under this section, the court may order the imprisonment to commence either immediately or at S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced." His Lordship continued: "The combined effect of s 282 and s 292 is that unless the court imposing a sentence says anything to the contrary, the sentence runs from the date on which it was passed." These passages make clear that commencement of imprisonment from the date of sentence is the statutory norm. Whilst the Court retains a discretion to direct otherwise, that discretion must be exercised within the framework prescribed by sections 282(d) and 292, and not independently of it. [13] The Court of Appeal further explained the nature of that discretion in the following terms: "The exercise of the discretion to determine the date of commencement of the sentence of imprisonment is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. In deciding whether the terms of imprisonment should be consecutive or commence at another date, the court will be guided by the one transaction rule and the totality principle." Although those observations were made in the context of an offender already serving another custodial sentence, the broader principle emerging from S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA Bachik, and which is directly applicable here, is that the commencement date of imprisonment is not governed by any rigid or automatic rule. Rather, it is a matter entrusted to the sentencing court's judicial discretion, to be exercised after considering the facts and circumstances of the particular case. [14] The same approach has subsequently been adopted in later Malaysian authorities. In Shafruddin bin Selengka v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 MLJ 750, the High Court recognised that section 292 confers a discretion upon the sentencing court in determining the commencement of imprisonment where an offender is already serving another custodial sentence. More recently, in Public Prosecutor v Mohamad Khairi bin Bahauddin [2015] 9 MLJ 656, the High Court reaffirmed the principles articulated in Bachik, observing that the commencement of imprisonment continues to be governed by sections 282(d) and 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the discretion conferred by those provisions must be exercised judicially and consistently with the principles established by the Court of Appeal. [15] Against that legal framework, I now turn to consider whether, in the circumstances of the present case, this Court properly exercised the discretion conferred by sections 282(d) and 292 of the Criminal Procedure S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA Code when it directed that the Appellant's sentence of imprisonment commence from the date of conviction.

ANALYSIS AND REASONS FOR THE COURT’S DECISION [16] The exercise of the discretion conferred by sections 282(d) and 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code necessarily depended upon the particular facts and circumstances of the present case. It was therefore incumbent upon this Court to consider the Appellant's custodial status at the time sentence was imposed, the relationship, if any, between the present offence and the offences for which he was already serving sentences of imprisonment, and whether those circumstances justified a departure from the general rule that a sentence of imprisonment commences from the date on which it is passed. [17] The evidence before this Court established that, when sentence was imposed on 23 June 2026, the Appellant was already undergoing custodial sentences imposed by the Magistrates' Court, Kulai in three separate criminal proceedings. The prison warrants produced by the Prosecution disclosed the following: S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA

Criminal Case No. JF-83D-68-01/2026 – conviction under section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 on 16 January 2026, with a sentence of eight (8) months' imprisonment commencing from 16 January 2026, followed by two (2) years' supervision by AADK;

Criminal Case No. JF-83-791-12/2025 – conviction under sections 323 and 326A of the Penal Code on 27 January 2026, with a sentence of seven (7) months' imprisonment commencing from the date of arrest, namely 20 December 2025; and

Criminal Case No. JF-83D-722-10/2025 – conviction under section 12(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 on 16 January 2026, with a sentence of seven (7) months' imprisonment commencing from 16 January 2026. [18] The chronology is equally significant. The offence giving rise to the present proceedings was committed on 21 December 2025 at about 12.01 a.m. at the Narcotics Criminal Investigation Division, Kulai District Police Headquarters, where the Appellant's urine sample tested positive for Methamphetamine before laboratory analysis subsequently confirmed the presence of Amphetamine and Methamphetamine. Sentence in the present S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA case was imposed only on 23 June 2026, by which time the Appellant was already serving the custodial sentences referred to above.

3.1 Whether the offences formed part of the same transaction [19] Before determining the appropriate commencement date of the present sentence, this Court considered whether the present offence formed part of the same transaction or the same series of events as any of the three offences for which the Appellant had previously been convicted by the Magistrates' Court, Kulai. That inquiry was material because, as explained by the Court of Appeal in Bachik bin Abdul Rahman v Public Prosecutor, the exercise of the Court's discretion under sections 282(d) and 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code is guided, where appropriate, by the one transaction rule and the totality principle. [20] Having carefully considered the documentary evidence, I found no evidential basis for concluding that the present offence and the three earlier offences formed part of the same transaction or the same series of events. Although one of the Magistrates' Court sentences commenced from the Appellant's arrest on 20 December 2025 and the present offence was detected shortly thereafter whilst he remained in police custody, chronology alone is insufficient to establish a single transaction. As the Court of Appeal S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA observed in Bachik, the inquiry extends beyond temporal proximity and requires consideration of the continuity of time, place, action and criminal purpose. [21] The evidence before this Court did not establish those elements. The prison warrants merely identified the offences, the convictions and the sentences imposed. They did not disclose the factual circumstances in which the earlier offences were committed or establish any factual nexus between those offences and the present offence. Likewise, the agreed Facts of the Case in the present proceedings established only that the Appellant's urine tested positive whilst he was at the Kulai District Police Headquarters. They did not demonstrate that the offences formed part of one continuous criminal episode or a common criminal design. [22] Indeed, the available evidence pointed in the opposite direction. The previous convictions comprised two separate offences under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 and one offence under sections 323 and 326A of the Penal Code. Each offence was prosecuted under a separate charge, culminated in a separate conviction, and attracted a separate sentence. More significantly, the offence under sections 323 and 326A of the Penal Code is an offence against the person, the gravamen of which is the unlawful causing of hurt, S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA with section 326A prescribing enhanced punishment in the circumstances specified by Parliament. By contrast, the present offence under section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 criminalises the self-administration of dangerous drugs and is directed towards protecting the public from the misuse of dangerous drugs and addressing drug dependency and abuse. The constituent elements of the two offences are therefore entirely different, each requiring proof of distinct factual ingredients and protecting different legal interests. Neither offence is dependent upon, incidental to, or a necessary component of the other. Accordingly, the fact that the Appellant happened to be in police custody when the present offence was detected did not, without more, transform two legally and factually distinct offences into one transaction or the same series of events. [23] This conclusion is entirely consistent with Public Prosecutor v Mohamad Khairi bin Bahauddin [2015] 9 MLJ 656, where the High Court emphasised that all the constituent elements of the one transaction rule must be present before separate offences may properly be treated as one transaction. Equally, the present case is plainly distinguishable from Ooi Sim Yim v Public Prosecutor [1990] 1 MLJ 88, where the offences were found to arise from one and the same transaction and one charge was merely subsidiary to the other. No comparable relationship has been established in S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA the present case. On the contrary, both the evidence and the legal character of the respective offences demonstrate that they were separate and independent criminal acts, each giving rise to its own distinct penal consequences. [24] I therefore found that the present offence did not arise from the same transaction or the same series of events as the three offences for which the Appellant had previously been convicted by the Magistrates' Court, Kulai. That finding is central to the present appeal because it determines the legal framework within which this Court's discretion was required to be exercised.

3.2 The exercise of the Court's discretion [25] Having reached that conclusion, section 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code became directly applicable. At the time sentence was imposed, the Appellant was unquestionably "undergoing a sentence of imprisonment" within the meaning of section 292(1). This Court was therefore required to determine whether the present sentence should commence immediately or only upon the expiration of the existing custodial sentences. [26] Applying the principles articulated by the Court of Appeal in Bachik, I was satisfied that there was no legal or factual basis for directing that the present sentence commence from the date of the Appellant's arrest. Such S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA an order would necessarily have caused the present seven-year sentence to operate retrospectively during a period when the Appellant was already serving sentences imposed in three separate criminal proceedings. Those earlier sentences related to offences which, as already explained, were not shown to form part of the same transaction as the present offence. [27] More importantly, such an order would have failed to preserve the independent punitive effect of the present conviction. Section 292(3) expressly provides that nothing in subsection (1) shall excuse an offender from any part of the punishment to which he is liable upon a former or subsequent conviction. That statutory safeguard reflects Parliament's intention that each conviction should retain its own penal consequence unless the law otherwise permits. [28] At the same time, this Court did not adopt the most severe course available under section 292(1). The Court could have directed that the present sentence commence only after the expiration of all three existing custodial sentences. Instead, after considering the Appellant's custodial status, the chronology of the offences, the absence of any factual nexus between the present offence and the earlier offences, and the governing statutory framework, this Court directed that the sentence commence S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA immediately from the date of conviction. The effect of that order was to permit prospective overlap with any unexpired portion of the earlier custodial sentences while avoiding the legally impermissible consequence of retrospectively commencing the sentence before conviction. [29] I also considered the totality principle referred to in Bachik. The Appellant had already received the statutory minimum sentence of seven years' imprisonment and three strokes of the cane prescribed by section 39C(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. Directing that the sentence commences from the date of conviction appropriately moderated the aggregate custodial effect without undermining the distinct punishment attributable to the present offence. [30] Ultimately, the Appellant's request rested solely on the fact that he had remained in custody from the date of his arrest. In my judgment, that fact alone was insufficient. The relevant inquiry was not merely when the Appellant first entered custody, but the legal basis upon which he remained in custody throughout the period for which retrospective credit was sought. The evidence demonstrated that his continued detention was attributable to three separate custodial sentences imposed in other criminal proceedings. S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA [31] Accordingly, having considered the Appellant's custodial status, the chronology of events, the absence of any factual or legal nexus between the present offence and the earlier offences, the statutory framework contained in sections 282(d) and 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the principles established in Bachik, Shafruddin and Mohamad Khairi, I was satisfied that there was no proper basis for departing from the general rule that the present sentence should commence from the date on which it was imposed. The order directing that the sentence commence from 23 June 2026 therefore represented a proper, principled and judicial exercise of the discretion conferred by law.

CONCLUSION [32] For the reasons set out above, this Court was satisfied that the discretion conferred by sections 282(d) and 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code was properly exercisable in the circumstances of the present case. In exercising that discretion, this Court took into account the Appellant's custodial status at the time sentence was imposed, the fact that he was already serving three separate custodial sentences, the chronology of the relevant events, the absence of any factual or legal nexus between the S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA present offence and the earlier offences, and the applicable statutory provisions and judicial authorities governing the commencement of custodial sentences. [33] This Court further found that the present offence did not arise out of the same transaction or the same series of events as the three offences for which the Appellant had previously been convicted and sentenced by the Magistrates' Court, Kulai. Accordingly, there was no legal or factual basis for directing that the present sentence retrospectively commence during a period when the Appellant was already serving sentences imposed for separate and distinct offences. In those circumstances, sections 282(d) and 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code governed the commencement of the present sentence. [This space is intentionally left blank.] S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA [34] Having considered all the relevant facts, the applicable statutory provisions and the principles established by the authorities discussed in these Grounds of Judgment, this Court was satisfied that directing the Appellant's sentence of imprisonment to commence from the date of conviction, namely 23 June 2026, represented a lawful, principled and proportionate exercise of the discretion conferred by law. __________________________ Mohd Zamir Suhaimee Judge Sessions Court, Johor Baharu Date: 15 July 2026 S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA

Bachik bin Abdul Rahman v Public Prosecutor [2004] 2 MLJ 534 (Court of Appeal)

Shafruddin bin Selengka v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 MLJ 750 (High Court)

Public Prosecutor v Mohamad Khairi bin Bahauddin [2015] 9 MLJ 656 (High Court)

Ooi Sim Yim v Public Prosecutor [1990] 1 MLJ 88 (Supreme Court) PARTIES

For the Appellant Unrepresented.

For the Respondent Puan Siti Fatimah binti Mamu Deputy Public Prosecutor Aras 2, Bangunan Dato' Jaafar Muhammad, Kota Iskandar, Johor, 79000, 79100 Iskandar Puteri, Johor Darul Ta'zim S/N ldAQOjNUvEubjyqjMVp3eA