Thiano Limo Holding Sdn Bhd v Ng Kwok Weng & 8 Lagi (W-01(NCVC)(W)-89-03/2016)

NG KWOK WENG (No. K/P: 540412-01-5581)

NG KWOK SENG (No. K/P: 581106-03-5235)

4.

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA NG THIM LENG (No. K/P: 560105-10-5753)

RIZAL & HAFEZ (Didakwa sebagai firma)

HONG LEONG BANK BERHAD (No. Syarikat: 97141-X)

NG MEI LING 30 (No. K/P: 500121-01-5008) … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [Dalam perkara mengenai Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur (Bahagian Sivil)

NG KWOK WENG (No. K/P: 540412-01-5581)

NG KWOK SENG (No. K/P: 581106-03-5235) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF 2

2.

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA NG THIM LENG 10 (No. K/P: 560105-10-5753)

RIZAL & HAFEZ (Didakwa sebagai firma)

THIANO LIMO HOLDINGS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 432044-W)

HONG LEONG BANK BERHAD (No. Syarikat : 97141-X)

NG MEI LING (No. K/P: 500121-01-5008) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 20 CORUM HAMID SULTAN ABU BACKER, JCA HANIPAH FARIKULLAH, JCA 25 KAMALUDIN MD SAID, JCA GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 30 [1] We heard the Appellant’s appeal and the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ cross-appeal. [2] The 3rd and 4th Respondents represent the Federal Land Registry. 35 They have not appealed the finding of the High Court. The 5th Respondent did not appear at the trial and a Judgment in Default has been obtained against him. The claim against the 6th and 7th Respondents was struck out by the High Court. They are 3 therefore no longer parties in this Appeal. The 8th Respondents 5 are the Appellant’s financiers of the property in question, purchased by the Appellant from the 5th Respondent. The 9th Respondent is the sister of the 1st and 2nd Respondents. She has been named as a nominal Defendant. 10 [3] Both parties in the appeal and cross-appeal had presented their oral submissions and also relied on their written submissions respectively. We also read the High Court Judge’s grounds of judgment and the records of appeal. 15 Salient facts [4] The learned High Court judge (the learned judge) found the evidence produced by the Plaintiffs (the 1st and 2nd Respondents) established that the 3rd Defendant (the 5th Respondent) by 20 fraudulent means had registered himself as owner of the piece of land in Bukit Bintang, Kuala Lumpur (‘the Land”) which belonged to the Plaintiffs’ late farther Ng Cheong Choy (the deceased). The 3rd Defendant transferred the Land to the 6th Defendant (the Appellant) through the use of false and void instruments. The 25 Land was registered in the name of the 6th Defendant and later charged the Land in favor of the 7th Defendant (the 8th Respondent). The fraudster was the 3rd Defendant and he has disappeared. The current registered owner of the Land is the 6th Defendant. The position of the 6th Defendant under s. 340 of the 30 4 National Land Code 1965 (NLC) was an issue which was fully 5 discussed including whether his title to the Land becomes indefeasible and the protection under s. 340 (3) of the NLC. The Court held that a fraudster like the 3rd Defendant cannot be deemed to be an immediate purchaser. What this means is that it is the 6th Defendant is deemed to be the immediate purchaser 10 and as such its title is defeasible under s. 340 (2) of the NLC. It follows that the 7th Defendant’s charge on the Land also suffers the same. There is also clear evidence that the 1st Defendant (the 3rd Respondent) is negligent in registering the 3rd Defendant as owner of the Land. The 1st Defendant therefore is liable to 15 indemnify the 6th Defendant and 7th Defendant for their losses when the learned judge decided that the Land be restored back to the deceased. The 2nd Defendant (the 4th Respondent) is vicariously liable for the act of the 1st Defendant. 20 [5] The parties had agreed that the trial is for determination of issue of liability only and that order as to damages is made thereafter based on the court’s decision on liability. On the issue of damages, the learned judge ordered that the assessment of damages be heard and decided by the Registrar in respect of the 25 6th and 7th Defendants’ claim for contribution and indemnity against the 1st and 2nd Defendants. [6] The 6th Defendant appeal against part of the decision of the learned judge in finding that the Appellant is deemed to be an 30 5 immediate purchaser of the Land and as such, the Appellant’s title 5 to the Land is defeasible under s.340(2) (b) of the NLC. [7] The Plaintiffs filed a Cross-Appeal that the learned judge ought to have allowed recovery of all rentals received by the 6th Defendant; that the 6th Defendant was actually not a bona fide purchaser; and 10 that the value of the Land ought to have been assessed at the date of Judgment and not the date of acquisition. The main appeal 15 [8] In deciding that the 6th Defendant (the Appellant) is deemed to be the immediate purchaser and as such its title is defeasible under s. 340 (2) of the NLC, the learned judge relied on the judgment of the Federal Court in Kamarulzaman Bin Omar & 2 Ors v Yakub Bin Husin & 6 Ors [2014] 1 AMR 493. The learned judge 20 then said as follows- “…it can be seen from the decision in the Kamarulzaman’s case (supra) that the Federal Court did not give any acknowledgment or recognition to the fraudster, i.e. the 1st to 25 4th respondents, as registered owners and vendors of the share to two plots. This is because, according to the Federal Court, they were imposters of those entitled to the estates of the deceased and they therefore had no title to pass to the 5th and 6th respondents, and in so far as the 1st to the 4th 30 6 respondents were concerned, the nemo dat quod non habet 5 was applicable i.e. you cannot give a title that you don’t have. And by this rationale, the Federal Court held that the 5th and 6th respondents were deemed to be the immediate purchasers and/or transferees of the said share to the two plots, and being an immediate purchasers they were not entitled to rely on the 10 proviso to s. 340 (3) of the NLC. It seems to me the Federal Court by this decision has further widened the scope of s.

of the NLC” [9] The Appellant grounded his appeal on the premise that the 15 learned judge misconstrued Kamarulzaman’s case (supra). [10] The Appellants understanding of the said case is that the 1st to 4th respondents were imposters pretending to be the beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate and were each vested with 1/12 undivided 20 share in the 2 plots of lands as beneficiaries of the deceased. The 1st to 4th respondents, being ‘beneficiaries’, were not immediate purchasers of the 2 plots of land. However, in the present case, the 5th Respondent (the 3rd Defendant) purchased the Land from Ng Cheong Choy, the deceased then became the registered 25 owner of the Land. As such, the 5th Respondent is an immediate purchaser and/or transferee of the Land, albeit by fraudulent means and the Appellant, the current registered proprietor of the Land whom purchased the Land from the 5th Respondent i.e. the immediate transferee, is the subsequent purchaser and/or 30 7 transferee of the Land. Therefore, the Appellant can rely on the 5 protection of the provision to section 340(3) of the NLC. Relying on a subsequent transferee in the illustration given in the case of Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 CLJ 269, the Appellant contended that he is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration. The learned Judge misconstrued the gist and 10 essence of Kamarulzaman’s Case and misdirected herself on the law and/or fact when she found that the 5th Respondent, being a fraudster, cannot be deemed as an immediate purchaser. The learned Judge ought to have held that, even if the Land was transferred from the Deceased to the 5th Respondent via void 15 instruments and the 5th Respondent himself does not possess an indefeasible title to the Land, the 5th Respondent may still give an indefeasible title of the Land to the Appellant, the subsequent transferee. 20 [11] Further, the learned Judge misdirected herself when she failed to appreciate that the Register Document of Title which bears the name of the Appellant as the registered proprietor of the Land is, pursuant to section 89 of the NLC, conclusive evidence that the Appellant is the registered proprietor of the Land for the time 25 being. [12] The learned Judge was also wrong when she held that, with regards to the Appellant’s claim for contribution and indemnity against the 3rd Respondent, the Appellant is only entitled to be 30 8 reimbursed with whatever actual expense and costs that the 5 Appellant has incurred at the time when the Land was acquired from the 5th Respondent, namely the purchase price of the Land and all the incidental and related costs. [13] In the premises, it was submitted that the learned Judge 10 misunderstood the law and/or misconceived the facts and/or failed to assess and weigh all the evidence tendered and/or misapplied the relevant principles and consequently reached a decision that was not supported by the weight of authorities and the evidence before her Ladyship. 15 [14] The Appellant prays for an order that the Appeal be allowed with costs. [15] The 1st and 2nd Respondents in response supported the learned 20 judge’s decision that the Appellant’s title to the Land was defeasible and ought to be set aside based on the Federal Court decision in Kamarulzaman’s case and by virtue of the nemo dat doctrine. On the damages issue, it was pointed out that the relevant Orders made by the judge ought to be set aside and that 25 the assessment of damages be left to the Registrar to decide after appropriate submissions are made on the applicable law involved as agreed by parties at the trial. 9 [16] The critical question to be determined in this case is whether the 5 Appellant’s interest as registered proprietor whose name is in the Register Document of Title of the Land is indefeasible under section 340 of the NLC. Following decision in Kamarulzaman’s case the issue is whether the Appellant is an “immediate transferee” or “subsequent transferee” of the title to the Land 10 under the provisions of section 340 of the NLC. The other issue is whether the Order of the learned judge on damages ought to be set aside. Our view 15 [17] It was established that the 5th Respondent (3rd Defendant) is a fraudster and a judgment of default was entered against him and he did not attend the trial and had disappeared. The case went for full trial and parties called their respective witnesses to give 20 evidence in Court. The learned judge had analysed the evidence of witnesses and made her finding of facts. In fact, it cannot be disputed that the Land was transferred to the Appellant by fraudulent means i.e. by false and void instruments. On that basis, the decision of the learned judge cannot be said as plainly 25 wrong. [18] It was also a finding of fact that the Original Issue Document in Title (IDT) of the Land was always in the possession and custody of SP4, the lawyer acting for her client i.e. SP7 (the 9th 30 10 Respondent) who is the sisters of the 1st and 2nd Respondents. In 5 other words the IDT was never parted away from the “beneficiaries’’ care and possession. In this context, how is it then the Land was transferred to the Appellant when the Original IDT is still with the “beneficiaries’’ possession if not by way of fraud. 10 [19] Be that as it may, the Appellant’s defence averred that it has purchased the Land from the 5th Respondent as a bona fide purchaser and with valuable consideration. Although the current registered owner is the Appellant, its title was challenged by the 1st and 2nd Respondents who are the beneficiaries of the original 15 owner, i.e. the deceased. Following the Federal Court in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd v Boonsom Boonyanit [2001] 2 CLJ 133, a fraudster has personated the true owner of the land, Boonsom, and by used of fraudulent means sold and transferred the land to an innocent bona fide purchaser for value, i.e. Adorna. When 20 Boonsom discovered the fraud, he sued Adorna for recovery of the said land. The interpretation of s. 340 of the NLC was deliberated. It was held that Adorna being a purchaser in good faith for value was protected by the proviso to sub-section (3) of s. 340 of the NLC. In other words, the case fits into the Appellant’s 25 case that even when the instrument of transfer was forged, the Appellant like Adorna nevertheless obtained an indefeasible title to the land. However, that was the decision then before the long awaited decision by the apex court in Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian 11 San & Ors [2010] 2 CLJ 269 that declared and ruled that Adorna 5 Properties (supra) was erroneously decided. [20] The similarity between Adorna Properties (supra) and Tan Ying Hong (supra) is that in both cases, the transfers of the land albeit by fraudulent means, the fraudster never became a registered 10 owner. The different is that although in Adorna Properties, a purchaser in good faith for value is protected by the proviso to sub-section (3) of s. 340 of the NLC in situations under sub-section (2) of the NLC, but in Tan Ying Hong, the Federal Court ruled that the proviso is only applicable to sub-section (3) and not 15 sub-section (2) of the NLC. Therefore, the learned judge had correctly stated that a person or a body in the position of Adorna in the Adorna Properties therefore, could not take advantage or protection of the proviso to avoid its title or interest in the land from being impeached since Adorna was an immediate 20 transferee. [21] Then, the Appellant argued that its position is consistent with that of ‘C’ in the illustration given by Zaki Azmi CJ in Tan Ying Hong that the third instance where B’s title or interest could be defeated 25 is where it was unlawfully acquired through the exercise of any power or authority conferred by any law. S. 340 (2) (c) of the NLC deals with one who was for example acting in his capacity as an agent to power of attorney. Even if C is in the same position as B, sub-s (3) also does not give protection to C unless he can show 30 12 that he had acquired the title or interest in good faith and for 5 valuable consideration. Any title or interest gained by any person thereafter is also liable to be set aside unless it could be shown that he had acquired it in good faith and for valuable consideration. This is what is called deferred indefeasibility of title. If his title is challenged on similar grounds, the burden of proving 10 there was valuable consideration and good faith lies on him. [22] In our view, the decision by Zaki Azmi FCJ (as he then was) is very clear that the proviso to sub-s (3) of s. 340 of the NLC was never applicable. The learned judge was correct to hold that the 15 title of the Land that was being challenged was that of the immediate transferee. In our present case however the fraudster i.e. the 5th Respondent had managed to register his name as the registered owner of the said Land and thereafter transferred it to the Appellant. In such a case, it is the Appellant the same as “C” 20 in the illustration given by Zaki Azmi FCJ (as he was then). [23] In our view, to make clearer, then came the Federal Court case of Kamarulzaman (supra). The facts of the case are as stated by the learned judge in her grounds of judgment. The deceased was 25 the owner of a share in two plots of land. He died in 1941. The 1st Respondent, after some 13 years later, applied and obtained an order under the Small Estates Distribution Ordinance 1955 to distribute the deceased’s share in the two plots to himself, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Respondents. Subsequently, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th 30 13 Respondents sold and transferred their share in the two plots to 5 the 5th and 6th Respondents. As it turned out, the 1st to 4th Respondents were actually not the beneficiaries of the deceased and that they have fraudulently and falsely misrepresented themselves when acquiring the deceased’s share to the two plots. The 1st to 4th Respondents did not defend the suit by the true 10 beneficiaries of the deceased to set aside the distribution order and for the recovery of the deceased’s share to the two plots and judgment in default was entered against them. The High Court and the Court of Appeal held that the 1st to 4th Respondents have committed fraud and the order of distribution ought to be set 15 aside, however, found that the 5th and 6th Respondents have acquired indefeasible title and protected by the proviso of s.

of the NLC. The Federal Court however reversed the decision of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal. 20 [24] We needed to cite the relevant words of the Federal Court which said that the mere fact that the 5th and 6th Respondents were bona fide purchasers could not give a shield of indefeasibility. The 5th and 6th Respondent would only acquire an indefeasible title if they were bona fide subsequent purchasers. And for the 5th and 25 6th Respondents to be bona fide subsequent purchasers they must be an immediate purchaser. On the facts, the 1st to 4th Respondents from whom the 5th and 6th Respondents obtained title were not immediate purchasers. As such when the fraudulent title of the 1st to 4th Respondents was set aside by the default 30 14 judgment, the defeasible title of the 5th to 6th Respondents was 5 also defeated. As the 5th and 6th Respondent were immediate purchasers, they were not protected by the proviso to s. 340 (3) of the NLC. [25] The important principle established in Kamarulzaman’s case is 10 that the nemo dat quod non habet doctrine was applicable i.e. you cannot give a title that you don’t have. The 1st to 4th Respondents were imposters of those entitled to the estate of the deceased and they therefore had no title to pass to the 5th and 6th Respondents. By this rationale, the Federal Court held that the 5th and 6th 15 Respondents were deemed to be the immediate purchasers and/or transferees of the said share to the two plots and being an immediate purchasers they were not entitled to rely on the proviso to s. 340 (3) of the NLC. 20 [26] By the same reason, we were also of the same view with that of the learned judge that on the similar facts as to the present facts, the position of the Appellant is the same as that of the 5th and 6th Respondents in Kamarulzaman’s case and that the 5th Respondent in the present case is the same as the 1st to 4th 25 Respondent. Just like the 1st to 4th Respondent, the 5th Respondent was the fraudster who became registered owner of the Land by fraudulent means. No recognition or acknowledgment can be given to his status as a vendor in the sale of the Land to the Appellant. Similarly, a default judgment has been entered 30 15 against the fraudster i.e. the 5th Respondent and a fraudster 5 cannot be deemed to be an immediate purchaser. Therefore, now that the Appellant being an immediate purchaser or transferee of the Land the Appellant cannot rely on the protection of the proviso under s. 340 (3) of the NLC. Its title to the Land, even if it is a bona fide purchaser, is still liable to be set aside. The learned 10 judge ruled that the Appellant’s title to the Land is to be set aside, the 8th Respondent’s charge on the Land also suffers the same fate. We found there is no appealable error in the learned judge’s decision. Kamarulzaman’s case was rightly construed by the learned judge. 15 [27] In the result of the decision, the learned judge held that the issue whether the Appellant was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration of the Land becomes relevant if the proviso to s. 340 (3) of the NLC is applicable. We hold the same view of the 20 learned judge and firmly state our opinion that in the present case the protection of the proviso under s. 340 (3) of the NLC does not apply to the Appellant. The Appellant was indeed an ‘immediate purchaser’. The proviso to section 340(3) NLC is not applicable to an immediate purchaser. S. 340 (3) (a) refers to “whom it may 25 subsequently be transferred” which means that the intended purchaser is the subsequent purchaser and not the immediate purchaser (Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 4 CLJ 526 CA). 30 16 [28] The learned judge in her judgment, despite finding that s. 340 (3) 5 of the NLC does not apply to the Appellant went on to enquire whether the Appellant is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration of the Land. The detailed discussion can be found from paragraph 19 to 22 at pages 54 to 61 of the record of appeal (Vol. 1) part A. Although in the end, based on the evidence, she 10 found most likely, the Appellant was bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration of the Land, in our view the finding does not have any bearing on her judgment or decision that s. 340 (3) of the NLC does not apply to the Appellant. An attempt by the Appellant to construe such finding would have found in favor of 15 the Appellant i.e. the subsequent acquirer/transferee of the Land protected by the proviso the section 340(3) of the NLC is misconceived and should fail. [29] It was also argued by the Appellant that the Register Document of 20 Title which bears the name of the Appellant as the registered proprietor of the Land, pursuant to section 89 of the NLC is conclusive evidence that the Appellant is the registered proprietor of the land for the time being. S.89 of the NLC in our view is provision which declares or recognized the registered proprietor 25 of the land for the time being. In other words, the Appellant was the registered owner of the Land by virtue of s.89 of the NLC because its name is described therein as the owner in the title to the land for the time being. The words “for the time being” found in s. 89 of the NLC is significant. S. 89 of the NLC also clearly 30 17 provides that “shall, subject to the provisions of this Act”. In our 5 view s. 89 of the NLC must also be read with other provisions in the NLC. [30] In the present case, s. 340 (1) of the NLC is related provision which is referred to which says that the title and interest of any 10 person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land or whose name is for the time being registered be indefeasible. Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 4 CLJ 526 explained that the phrase “for the time being” identifies the point 15 in time at which indefeasibility of proprietorship is to be ascertained, namely, when action is filed to impeach the registered proprietor’s title. His Lordship further said that even if the registered proprietor acquired his title unlawfully, that is to say, in breach of written law, he may nevertheless assert it 20 against the whole world until proceedings are brought to remove him from the register. In this Appeal, the 1st and 2nd Respondents began an action to recover title whilst the Appellant was the registered proprietor “for the time being”. In other words, the Appellants name was on the register. The Appellants title would 25 remain secure if no action had been brought. [31] In our view, the words “for the time being” and “shall, subject to the provisions of this Act” in s. 89 and the words “for the time being” and “subject to the provisions of this section” in s. 340 of 30 18 the NLC, are for certain purpose. For example, in interpreting the 5 meaning of in one section of the Act, sometimes it requires reading other sections of the Act or within the section itself if it is subject to the provision of the section. S.340 of the NLC that provides that the title or interest is subject to the provisions of this section means, the indefeasibility of the title is subject to sub- 10 sections (2), (3) and (4) of s.340 of the NLC of which is the subject matter of discussion in the present case. S. 89 of the NLC is not a stand-alone provision as the Appellant expected it to be or an attempt to say that once its name is registered in the title, therefore, the title and interest is not subject to challenge at all or 15 a non-starter. The argument is misconceived, without merit and should fail. The Cross-appeal 20 [32] The Plaintiffs filed a Cross-Appeal that the learned judge ought to have allowed recovery of all rentals received by the Appellant; that the Appellant was actually not a bona fide purchaser and that the value of the Land ought to have been assessed at the date of Judgment and not the date of acquisition. 25 [33] We had alluded to earlier that the finding of the learned judge that the Appellant is most likely a bona fide purchaser cannot changed the position that s. 340 (3) of the NLC does not apply to the Appellant because the Appellant being an immediate purchaser or 30 19 transferee of the Land, the Appellant cannot rely on the protection 5 of the proviso under s. 340 (3) of the NLC. Its title to the Land, even if it is a bona fide purchaser, is still liable to be set aside. The said finding is based on the evidence which the learned judge had considered and it is not plainly wrong decision therefore, the issue raised that the Appellant was actually not a bona fide 10 purchaser above must fail. [34] It was submitted that on record, prior to the beginning of the trial in the High Court, that the issue to be decided by the learned judge was in relation to liability. The assessment of damages 15 thereafter was to be left to the Registrar. The learned judge however placed restrictions on the manner and form the assessment of damages was to take place by raising certain fetters on the potential claims of both the Appellant and the 1st and 2nd Respondents. It is for this reason both the Appellant and 20 the 1st and 2nd Respondents were consensus on this issue. What is of paramount importance is the fact that the learned judge delivered decisions in relation to damages without the benefit of counsel’s submissions. 25 [35] Therefore the 1st and 2nd Respondents argued that the relevant Orders made by the judge ought to be set aside and that the assessment of damages be left to the Registrar to decide after appropriate submissions are made on the applicable law involved. 30 20 [36] Having referred to paragraph 38 of the learned judge’s grounds of 5 judgment, it stated therein that parties have agreed that the trial for determination of issue of liability only and that any order as to damages is to be made thereafter based on the court’s decision on liability. On the issue of damages, she ordered that the assessment of damages be heard and decided by the Registrar in 10 respect of the Appellant and the 8th Respondent’s claim for contribution and indemnity against the 3rd and 4th Respondents. She was also of the view that the 3rd, 4th, the Appellant and 8th Respondent should not be made liable to pay any damages to the 1st and 2nd Respondent (the Plaintiffs). 15 [37] On record, it may look as if the learned judge already pre-empted what the damages should have been or had directly disallowed damages to be imposed on the 3rd, 4th, the Appellant and 8th Respondent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents (in the cross-appeal). 20 We agreed with the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ submission and found merit in the complaint. The learned judge had placed restrictions on the manner and form the assessment of damages was to take place by raising certain fetters on the potential claims of both the Appellant and the 1st and 2nd Respondents i.e. the 25 value of investment on the Land or the current market value of the Land without the benefit of counsel’s submissions. The order made by the learned judge stated at paragraph 39 that she ordered that the assessment of damages, including the rate of interests on the amount awarded be heard and made by the 30 21 Registrar, in our view contradicts with her earlier decision at 5 paragraph 37 that the 3rd, 4th, the Appellant and 8th Respondent should not be made liable to pay any damages to the to the 1st and 2nd Respondents and went against consensus that the trial for determination of issue of liability only and that any order as to damages is to be made thereafter based on the court’s decision 10 on liability. [38] In the circumstances, we agreed that the following Order made by the learned judge be set aside:- 15 “…That the assessment of damages, which is to be heard and decided by the Registrar of the High Court Kuala Lumpur, be limited to the expenses and actual costs incurred by the 6th and 7th Defendants [Appellant and their financiers (8th Respondent) respectively] at the time the property was 20 acquired from the 3rd Defendants (5th Respondent) which is the purchase price and all associated costs only”. And substituted with an Order that damages suffered by the Appellant, the 1st and 2nd Respondents and the 8th Respondent, 25 be assessed by the Registrar of the High Court Kuala Lumpur. Conclusion [39] In the result, we found no merit in the Appellant’s appeal but 30 found some merit in the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ cross-appeal. It 22 is our unanimous decision that the Appellant’s appeal is 5 dismissed with Costs of RM10,000.00 subject to allocator and allowed part of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ cross-appeal with no order as to Cost. Dated this 24 August, 2020 10 sgd KAMALUDIN MD. SAID JUDGE 15 COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA PUTRAJAYA Parties 20

Teo Cheng Wee, Yong Juk Chee and Toh Seng Wee for the Appellants (Messrs Wilson Wong & Tan) 25

Rozielawaty Abd Ghani and Natassa Zaini for the 3rd and 4th Respondent (Jabatan Peguam Negara Cawangan Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur) 30

For the 1st and 2nd Respondent (Messrs Americk Sidhu)