Thiyagarajan A/L Mpl Yegappan v Kerajaan Malaysia (KA-24NCvC-165-06/2025)

DIRECTOR GENERAL INSOLVENCY

DATO ROBERT TEO KHENG TUAN (LIQUIDATOR) De facto Chargor HOSBA 01/03/2026 11:42:29

CIMB BANK BERHAD (Comp. Reg No. 197201001799 (13491-P) HEARD TOGETHER ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO : KA-24NCvC-165-06/2025

MENTERI UNDANG-UNDANG & REFORMASI

CIMB BANK BERHAD (No. Syarikat 13491-P

Dato Robert Teo Kheng Tuan (Pelikuidasi)

Pendaftar hakmilik, Pejabat Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Kedah Darulaman DEFENDANTS

The cases to which this judgment relates have long antecedents, which I shall briefly allude to below. Suffice it to say at the outset that efforts aimed at enforcing a security given for loans. The Plaintiff, acting in person, has instituted proceedings against various parties; yet at the heart of the matter lies his singular objective to preserve the lands from being auctioned. These cases chronicle both the use

The details of the cases are:

ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO : KA-24NCvC-133-04/2025 OS 133 ). The Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

That an interim stay of the proceeding in Originating Summons No. KA-24NCvC-94-03/2025 that was filed by the Defendant on 16.3.2025 at the Alor Setar High Court be granted until the disposal of this Suit;

(ii) That a restraining order against the Defendant be given to stop further defamation and harassment of the Plaintiff vide deceitful means in respect of matters directly, indirectly and / or incidental to the piece of land held under Title No. HS(D) 504/95 Lot No. PT1137, Mukim Hosba, Daerah Kubang Pasu (hereinafter referred to as LAND), pursuant legal rights to seek justice as a lawful guarantor of loans procured from the Defendant in respect of the LAND;

(iii) An Order that the Defendant be restrained from seeking any Order of Court on behalf of Dato Robert Teo Kheng Tuan (NRIC No. 500504-08-6225) who it proposed on 23.4.2013 vide a Notice of Motion to be the Liquidator of Hosba Valley Resort Sdn Bhd (Co. No. 261210-P) that owns the said LAND, in any legal proceeding that will clearly constitute a breach of the duties of the Liquidator who was sworn to be fair and just to all creditors of Hosba Valley Resort Sdn Bhd by Order of the Alor Setar High Court when he was appointed and where application to annul bankruptcy depends on the satisfaction of identical creditor debts that have also been lodged in his Bankruptcy Estate BN 29-632-2008;

(iv) An Order that the Defendant be restrained from any form of collusion with the Liquidator who is an Officer of the Alor Setar High Court entrusted to act justly and independently, that will harass the Plaintiff and be restrained from instituting any further legal proceedings in any Court against the Plaintiff in respect of all matters directly, indirectly and/or incidental to the said LAND without first obtaining prior leave of the High Court;

An Order that the Plaintiff is free to institute any proceeding against the Defendant and Liquidator without obtaining the prior leave of Court based on legal interests as a guarantor of loans for the said LAND that was enshrined after due legal proceeding at the Alor Setar High Court by YA Dato Abu Bakar Katar on 25.11.2015 despite bankruptcy;

(vi) An Order that the said LAND that is charged under Section 256 and 257 of the National Land Code 1965 cannot be sold by Private Treaty by the Liquidator Dato Robert Teo Kheng Tuan despite the discontinuance of Saman Pemula No. 24-1441-1999 / Pelaksanaan No. 38-719-2009 on 2.11.2020 that was simultaneously discontinued with 3 other suits before the Honorable Judge YA Dr Arik Sanusi bin Yeop Johari based on the necessity of a situation but without any prejudice to the existing legal charges on the LAND;

ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO : KA-24NCvC-217-07/2025 217 The Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

A declaration that there has been a failure in duty, responsibility and obligation by Director General Insolvency Malaysia (1st Defendant) as Official Receiver between 26.12.2012 and 11.11.2015, by Liquidator Dato Robert Teo Kheng Tuan (2nd Defendant) who replaced Director General Insolvency between 11.11.2015 to present time and by the Chargee CIMB Bank Berhad (3rd Defendant), pursuant to sections 250 and 251 of the National Land Code 1965 to keep the land, buildings and infrastructure in good and acceptable condition upon the Title held under Title HS(D) 504/95 PT 1137, Mukim Hosba, Daerah Kubang Pasu, Kedah Darul Aman (hereinafter referred to as TITLE), owned by Hosba Valley Resort Sdn Bhd (Co No. 261210-P) hereinafter referred to as the COMPANY, following a Alor Setar High Court Winding-up Order of the COMPANY dated 26.09.2012 applied for by CIMB Bank Berhad (3rd Defendant) despite the pendency of an Order for Sale of the said TITLE dated 10.08.2000 that should have been exhausted and despite ongoing operations and excellent maintenance of assets and environment by trained staff of the Plaintiff, who as Director and Shareholder of Hosba Valley Resort Sdn Bhd had guaranteed RM12,500,000.00 loans procured from the 3rd Defendant for the COMPANY in 3 tranches over October 1995 and August 1996 on a joint and several basis with his wife and son who had also acted as directors and shareholders who need relief from the debt through annulment of bankruptcy because they too invested RM10,000,000.00 of their own funds;

(ii) A declaration that further to the said failure in duty, responsibility and obligation by Defendants 1, 2 and 3 from 26.09.2012 in whatever combination, the COMPANY, which had already suffered from accrued interest caused by languishing operations during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the unsolicited ensuing Bank Mergers (2000 and 2006) that had led the Plaintiff and the COMPANY to the 3rd Defendant (Chargee by way of assignment), unjustly further gallant attempts to restore and maintain physical integrity of the said TITLE after 26.09.2012, against the background of controversial court procedures involving Director General Insolvency as Official Receiver and other Defendants to wind up the COMPANY through an unjust low reserve price of the TITLE and other assets of the COMPANY;

(iii) A declaration that between 23.09.2013 and 5.03.2014 amidst the Plaintiff bankruptcy and the availability of finance from ancestral land sales, the 3rd Defendant had in desperation applied to the Water Authority of Kedah Darulaman to reconnect water supply to the TITLE on the basis that Plaintiff will pay the costs, despite pumelling the Company into Winding-up on 26.09.2012, which is tantamount to a dependence upon the Plaintiff to safeguard the TITLE analogous to the Director General Insolvency himself declaring, as Official Receiver, on 30.10.2013, that the TITLE needed upkeep but expected the 3rd Defendant as Chargee to do so, at a meeting that included the Plaintiff and his wife as shareholders and guarantors;

(iv) second gallant attempt to restore and maintain physical integrity between 2017 and 2018, that elicited the Liquidator (2nd Defendant) to aggressively place his security on the said TITLE between 20.08.2018 to 19.11.2019, without concern for the deterioration that would take place, while prioritizing his Alor Setar High Court 15 month validation proceeding of a RM8,600,000.00 Private Treaty Sale of the TITLE, which unquestionably had been valued by the Government (Ministry of Finance) at RM34,000,000.00 on 24.08.2015, and whose further increment in value would have been bol efforts, was in breach of the Liquidator the benefit of creditors;

were not objected to by the 3rd Defendant as Chargee or by Director General Insolvency who had abided by the Alor Setar High Court instructions to seek a valuation from Jabatan Penilaian dan Perkhidmatan Harta (Ministry of Finance) which was confirmed at RM34,000,000.00 on

24.08.2015 and who by then had also claimed to be a shareholder of COMPANY shares by virtue of the Company Act, are clear evidence of condonation and collusion;

(vi) A declaration that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Defendants are restrained from further asserting their respective roles as Shareholder, Liquidator, and Chargee either directly or indirectly upon the said TITLE and to agree aim to articulate a suitable and holistic conclusion for the said TITLE that has value and other attributes to settle the outstanding parts of the original loan of RM12,500,000.00 and the accrued interest therefrom which up to now totals RM29,441,400.02 caused by languished operations originating from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and bank mergers prior to the winding-up order dated 26.09.2012 and subsequently remained unsettled due to the curtailment of all operations post-winding-up;

(vii) A declaration that the Plaintiff, who possesses a Alor Setar High Court decision issued by YA Dato Abu Bakar Katar on 25.11.2015 said TITLE in a court proceeding that involved the 1st and the 3rd Defendants as Chargor and Chargee respectively, is the most suitable person to commence the restoration of the physical integrity of the said TITLE that has suffered gross neglect, without any further encumbrance in any form, written, physical or otherwise from Defendant 1, 2 and 3 and should be empowered by a Court Order that would be consistent with the aim to restore the physical integrity of the TITLE, followed by redevelopment of the TITLE to settle the COMPANY Debt vis-à- personal guarantees including settlement of debts to non-secured creditors;

(viii) A declaration that, in view of the inordinate delays and obstacles experienced by the Plaintiff over 25 years, his effort should be protected by a moratorium that should not be less than 3 years with a commitment from the Plaintiff to provide quarterly reports to the Honorable Alor Setar High Court and the said Defendants on the status of commencement of restoration, status of other progress in legal applications pertaining to personal bankruptcy, COMPANY winding-up and status of capital investment to generally about any issue that concerns the TITLE and settlement of debt;

(ix)

19.01.2018, regarding statutory restrictions to any sale of the TITLE, that awaits a full evaluation in a Court proceedings but unanswered by all 3 Defendants and the Land Registry that issued the defective TITLE, should be sufficient to lead to a consent judgment to correct the TITLE for defectiveness before any sale but should not hinder the of physical integrity of the TITLE.

ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO : KA-24NCvC-165-06/2025 165 The Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

An order that section 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 should not be applicable against an undischarged bankrupt (vis-à-vis the ambiguity of the word previous) for any action and pursuant to its other inherent ambiguities that leads to its incompetence as a Law, requiring amendments by the Legislature.

(ii) An order that section 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967, subsequent to amendments, should not also be invoked against an undischarged bankrupt when the bankrupt includes Director General Insolvency as a respondent either singly or collectively with other respondents in any court action.

(iii) An order that section 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967, subsequent to amendments, should not also be invoked in any action by an undischarged bankrupt who is faced with the responsibility of paying to do all that he can pursuant to section 27(2) of the Insolvency Act 1967.

(iv) An order that section 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967, subsequent to amendments, should not also be invoked against an undischarged bankrupt who possesses a court ordained legal interest pertaining to protection of existing value of existing property as a guarantor of its loan whose value can be enhanced through the discovery of attributes of the property pursuant to section 27 and its sub-sections of the Insolvency Act 1967.

Having studied the cause papers, I directed for the cases to be heard together. Whilst the papers filed seem to give the impression that they raised pertinent points, as the Plaintiff was at pains to point out, to my mind the issue is rather a short one which deal with the competency of a bankrupt in maintaining an action.

The Plaintiff was a director and shareholder of Hosba Valley Resort Sdn Bhd (Hosba Valley Resort). It borrowed from CIMB Bank Berhad. A piece of land under HS(D) 504/95 No PT 1137, Mukim Hosba, Daerah Kubang Pasu, State of Kedah Darul Aman (the Land) owned by Hosba Valley Resort was charged to CIMB as security for the loans. The Plaintiff stood as a guarantor for the loans. As Hosba Valley Resort defaulted on the repayment obligations under the loan CIMB took action to obtain order for sale and an order dated

10.1.2000 in Originating Summons No. 24-1441- eclosure Suit) was made.

Hosba Valley Resort was later wound up by the Court on 26.9.2012 and the Director General Insolvency Malaysia (DGI) was appointed as Official Liquidator from 26.12.2012 to 11.11.2015 and was later replaced by a private liquidator, (Liquidator) who was duly appointed on 11.11.2015.

For convenience, it is appropriate at this stage to take stock of the parties. CIMB Bank is the Defendant in OS 133, the 3rd Defendant in OS 217, and the 5th Defendant in OS 165. The Director General of Insolvency (DGI) appears as the 1st Defendant in OS 217 and the 4th Defendant in OS 165, while the Liquidator is named as the 2nd Defendant in OS 217 and the 6th Defendant in OS 165. The basis for naming the 1st to 3rd Defendants in OS 165 remains unclear; apart from dramatic effect, such inclusion serves no discernible legal or practical purpose.

The Plaintiff was adjudged bankrupt on 4 July 2013 and remains an undischarged bankrupt to this day.

As noted earlier, once an order for sale was obtained, CIMB Bank commenced the auction process. These efforts met with no success. At every stage, the Plaintiff sought to delay and, in fact, succeeded in obstructing the process by filing numerous applications and actions.

The Plaintiff had instituted various legal proceedings in Court against the Bank and/or the Liquidator amongst others in Originating Summons No. KA-24NCvC-341-08/2021 (OS 341), Originating Summons No. KA-24NCvC-358-09/2021 (OS 358), Originating Summons No. KA-24NCvC-543-11/2024 (OS 543).

OS 341 and OS 358 were later struck out by the High Court due to the s failure to obtain the requisite sanction from the DGI before the commencement thereof.

Having been at the receiving end in having to defend multiple suits instituted by the Plaintiff, CIMB Bank then changed tact and went on the offensive. It then commenced proceeding against the Plaintiff by way of Originating Summons No. KA-24NCvC-94-03/2025 (OS 94) and sought the following reliefs:

To declare the Defendant in that proceeding (the Plaintiff in these proceedings) as a vexatious litigant in respect of all matters directly, indirectly and/or incidental to the Land and the exercise of the right as a lawful charge in respect of the said Land.

(ii) An order that the Defendant be restrained from instituting any legal proceedings in any Court against CIMB Bank and/or the Liquidator, in respect of all matters directly, indirectly and/or incidental to the said Land, without first obtaining the prior leave of the High Court.

(iii) Consequently, if prayer (i) and (ii) above is granted, an order be granted for the OS 543 to be struck out against the CIMB Bank and the Liquidator.

(iv) That any application for leave pursuant to Prayer (ii) above must not be made ex-parte and must be served on the CIMB Bank at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing.

That any Suit and/or application filed by the Plaintiff against the CIMB Bank and/or the Liquidator relating to the Land in anyway whatsoever, without obtaining the prior leave of the High Court pursuant to paragraph (iii) above, is to be forthwith struck out by the Court, without the need for a striking out application to be filed into Court.

(vi) That a copy of this Order is to be published in the gazette.

to have the Plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant, the Plaintiff instituted OS 133 with the aim of restraining those proceedings. However, as OS 94 having been heard and determined first, the proceedings, thereby rendering his bid to stay OS 94 ineffective.

Ultimately, in OS 94 the Court granted the CIMB Bank prayer, declaring that the Defendant (who is the Plaintiff in the present suit) as a vexatious litigant in respect of the Land.

The Court in OS 94 further directed that the order shall take effect from 28 August 2025 and extend to all future proceedings in respect of matters directly, indirectly, or incidentally connected to the Land.

Arising from the facts outline above the issues that came to be in focus are as follows: - In OS 133, the issues are:

Whether the Plaintiff having instituted the proceeding without first obtaining the requisite sanction of the Director General of Insolvency acts in contravention of section 38(1)(a) of the

Whether by filing an application founded upon causes of action in defamation, harassment against the Plaintiff through deceitful means whether directly, indirectly, and/or collaterally in relation to the Land action amounts to an exception to the sanction requirement under section 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967? In OS 217, the issues are:

Whether the Plaintiff could institute the present action without first obtaining sanction from the DGI?

Whether sanction is required in an action where the DGI is sued for failure in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities while acting as Official Assignee of Hosba Valley Resort?

Whether the present action against the Liquidator is caught by the doctrine of res judicata for one of sanction as the issue has been raised and decided previously in Originating Summons No. KA-24NCvC-341-08/2021 (OS 341) and Originating Summons No. KA-24NCvC-543-11/2024 (OS 543)? In OS 165, the issue are:

The absence of sanction-whether it bars the present action?

Whether section 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act, in its current form, imposes undue hardship upon undischarged bankrupts. Legislative reform is warranted to ensure fairness and justice in its application?

Whether, by naming the Director General of Insolvency Malaysia as a party to the proceedings, the requirement of obtaining sanction from the Director General of Insolvency Malaysia is thereby dispensed with?

CIMB Bank, the Liquidators, the DGI as well as the Defendants 1-3 in OS 65 have given notice of preliminary objection which is common: without a prior sanction from the DGI. Hence these actions being a nonstarter must be struck out.

Parties have then filed written submission on this issue. The Plaintiff too have filed a lengthy submission as well as submissions in reply all of which I have considered.

The matter that must be decided is whether the Plaintiff being an undischarged bankrupt, a fact which is not disputed could commence each of these actions without the prior sanction of the DGI. We thus began with Section 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 (Act 360) which stipulates as follows: t to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect to an injury to his person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of

The scope and ambit of section 38(1) (a) have come to be examined in a catena of cases. It is unnecessary to refer to each of them. Suffices for the present to refer to refer to the exposition by the Federal Court in Akira Sales & Service (M) Sdn Bhd v. Nadiah Zee Abdullah & Another Appeal [2018] 1 ILR 433 which stated the following:- [16] On the making of a bankruptcy order, "all the property of the bankrupt shall become divisible among his creditors and shall vest in the Director General of Insolvency and the Director General of Insolvency shall be the receiver, manager, administrator and trustee of all properties of the bankrupt" (s. 8(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1967 (Act) (the former Bankruptcy Act 1967). Since all property of the bankrupt shall vest with the DGI, "where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge, the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to his person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency" (s. 38(1)(a) of the Act). "... the words 'maintain any action'... are wide enough to cover both the bringing or continuing of an action already brought" (K Ismail Ganey Rowther and Company v. MA Abdul Kader, the Official Assignee of the Property of KP Peer Mohamed, A Bankrupt [1932] 1 LNS 30; [1933] 2 MLJ 98 per Thorne Ag CJ (Prichard and Gerahty JJ in agreement) on s. 33(i)(a) of the Bankruptcy Enactment 1912, "which section was virtually identical to s. 38(1)(a) of the Act " (Goh Eng Hwa v. Laksamana Realty per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA, as he then was). [17] Section 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA) defines 'action' as "a civil proceeding commenced by writ or in such other manner as is prescribed by Rules of Court, but does not include a criminal proceeding". The Act itself does not define 'action'. In Re Chua Tin Hong Ex Parte Castrol (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 174, it was held that the plain meaning of 'action' is civil action. That judicial definition of 'action' was refined in Ho Ken Seng v. Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd, where the Federal Court per Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah and Sarawak), delivering the judgment of the court, said that the word 'action' does not apply to the action upon which the bankruptcy was secured.

In the case of K Ismail Ganey Rowther and Company V. M A Abdul Kader The Official Assignee of the Property of KP Peer Mohamed, A Bankrupt [1932] CLJU 30 the following was stated : In my view, and it is my view only, what the section means is this: With regard to any property which is left in the bankrupt after his bankruptcy, the bankrupt is incompetent to sue unless he first obtains the sanction of the Official Assignee. Instances of this are:

the tools of his trade and the necessary wearing appeal and bedding of the bankrupt, his wife, and family;

after-acquired property until such time as the Official Assignee intervenes;

a contract made by the bankrupt after the bankruptcy;

damages for breach after bankruptcy of a contract for personal service made before and remaining unexecuted at the date of the bankruptcy; and

property vested of the bankrupt but of which he is a trustee. This is not exhaustive but in these instances the bankrupt is incompetent to sue unless he first of all goes to the Official Assignee, and gets the Official Assignee to say that he has no objection to the bankrupt bringing the action. To my mind this is all the section means. From this interpretation of the section it will appear that in so far as the bankrupt claims to have a cause of action to recover damages to his reputation, he is entitled to sue without the sanction of the Official Assignee, but that so far as it is sought to recover property vested in the Official Assignee, the bankrupt has no cause of action. He is not the owner of the property which is vested in the Official Assignee.

In K Ismail Ganey Rowther, the Court elucidated on the operation of the equipollent provision and the precursor to Section 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act. It is evident that once a person has been declared bankrupt, sanction must be obtained before any action may be initiated by the bankrupt in respect of claims for damages or for the recovery of property vested in the Official Receiver.

Re Chua Tin Hong Ex Parte Castrol (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 174, where the Court held that its plain meaning under s.38(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act is limited to civil proceedings in court, and does not extend to transactions involving the conveyance of property.

Reference may also be had to Section 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 prescribed by Rules of Court but does not include a criminal proceeding

To my mind, the authorities make it plain that Section 38(1) of the Act leaves no room for ambiguity: an undischarged bankrupt is legally incapacitated from commencing proceedings absent the prior sanction of the Director General of Insolvency. The sole statutory exception is confined to claims for damages in respect injury to his person.

The principle underlying the requirement for sanction was stated in the case of Lai King Lung & Anor v. Merais Sdn Bhd [2020] 9 CLJ 449; [17] In the case of an undischarged bankrupt, the sanction of the Director General of Insolvency (DGI) is required in order for the bankrupt to maintain any action or proceeding (other than an action for damages in personal injury claims) s. 38(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967. This rule restricting the conduct of an undischarged bankrupt is meant for the protection of his creditor's interest and those dealing with him so as to maintain the commercial morality of his dealings. The underlying rationale for in Malaysia, 2nd edn. at p. 1: When a person becomes a bankrupt, he obtains protection from legal proceedings by his creditors subject to certain exceptions. However, he is subject to certain disabilities and disqualifications primarily aimed at preventing him from incurring further debts ... The objective of the bankruptcy process is that, since the debtor is unable to satisfy all his debts, his assets should be shared fairly and equitably among his creditors .... [18] In Tan Wee Hun v. lnchape Equatron (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 5 CLJ 769, the court observed that: The object of the Bankruptcy Act is to protect the public from irresponsible businessmen who transact business when they know they do not have the financial capacity to meet their payment obligations. [19] More importantly, the underlying principle for the requirement of a sanction is that if a bankrupt is allowed to continue with an action, he would not be able to pay costs should his action be dismissed. This would leave the defendant in a disadvantaged position; in that the defendant being compelled to claim is dismissed.

preliminary objection, the Plaintiff has sought to rely on prayers framed in terms of defamation and harassment, contending that such claims require no sanction from the Director General of Insolvency. In my view, however, there is no incantation or formula that can, ex facie, bring a plaintiff within the exception contemplated under Section 38(1)(a), as the Plaintiff seeks to do. The Court must, as a matter of both fact and law, determine whether the action truly involves injury On the facts of the present proceedings, none of these actions could amount to being categorised as an action sold to third party vide the auction process. It is quest for preservation of a property right which is not classified as an injury to his person. The Plaintiff thought by mere use of words and by bringing an action against the DGI and other parties he could cleverly circumvent the requirement of sanction. The Court must emphasize that such a view is plainly untenable. This Court cannot condone attempts at deception or subterfuge, nor will it permit the process to be manipulated in that manner.

It stands beyond dispute in the present case that the Plaintiff did not secure the sanction of the Director General of Insolvency prior to commencing the originating summons. Having regard to the statutory framework and the authorities relied upon, the Plaintiff is incompetent in law in commencing these actions. For the foregoing reasons the actions are not maintainable.

I therefore hold that the preliminary objections are well founded. In summonses are hereby struck out. Dated: 30th January 2026 (Mohd Aimi Zaini Bin Mohd Azhar) Judicial Commissioner High Court Malaya Alor Setar Kedah Darul Aman Plaintiff: In person Solicitors for the Defendant in OS 133, 3rd Defendant in OS 217 and 5th Defendant in OS 165: Nur Ainnabila Rosdi Messrs FirozJulian Solicitors for the 1st Defendant OS 217 and 4th Defendant in Qatrin Nada binti Harun (Suhaimi bin Remli bersama) Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Negeri Kedah Solicitors for the 1st Defendant, 2nd Defendant, 3rd Defendant, 4th Defendant in OS 165: Zairani binti Tugiran Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Jabatan Peguam Negara Solicitors for the 2nd Defendant OS 217 and 6th Defendant in Mah Dick Son Messrs Shaikh David & Co Solicitors for the 7th Defendant Nurul Liyana Binti Mohd Nasir Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kedah