Tht Technology Sdn Bhd v Plasma Matrik Sdn Bhd (BA-12BNCC-9-05/2025)

This is the Grounds of Judgment in respect of the appeal by the Plaintiff in the Sessions Court, Plasma Matrik Sdn Bhd (“the Plaintiff”), against my decision delivered on 6 February 2026 at the High Court at Shah Alam, whereby I allowed the Defendant’s appeal, set aside the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge, and dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim for the sum of RM615,872.40 together with costs of RM15,000.00 for both the Sessions Court and the High Court.

The Plaintiff has since appealed to the Court of Appeal. These Grounds are therefore prepared to set out fully the reasons which led me to that decision. For convenience and consistency, I shall continue to refer to the parties as they were described before the Sessions Court.

The Plaintiff’s claim before the Sessions Court was for the price of goods allegedly supplied to the Defendant between 2016 and

The Plaintiff contended that, pursuant to an established course of dealings, it had supplied and delivered electrical and electronic components to the Defendant, invoices were issued in respect of those supplies, and the Defendant failed to make payment for the goods received.

The Defendant denied liability. Although the Defendant did not dispute that there had been prior commercial dealings between the parties, it denied that the goods forming the subject matter of the present claim had in fact been delivered to and received by it. The Defendant further challenged the reliability, authenticity and probative value of the Plaintiff’s documentary records.

The dispute, though narrow in formulation, turned entirely on proof. The essential question was whether the Plaintiff had established, on a balance of probabilities, that the goods now claimed were in fact delivered to and received by the Defendant. If that foundational fact was proven, the Plaintiff’s claim could stand. If it was not, the claim necessarily failed.

Having carefully reconsidered the whole of the evidence, I was satisfied that the Plaintiff had failed to discharge that burden. I was further satisfied that the judgment of the learned Sessions Court Judge could not safely stand because material admissions made by the Plaintiff’s own witnesses were not sufficiently confronted, critical deficiencies in the documentary evidence were not properly analysed, and the burden of proof was, in substance, treated too lightly. This was therefore a proper case for appellate intervention.

The principal issue for determination in the appeal before this Court was whether the Plaintiff had proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the goods particularised in its claim were delivered to and received by the Defendant.

Arising from that central issue were the following subsidiary questions:

whether the Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders, invoices and internally generated summaries relied upon by the Plaintiff constituted reliable proof of delivery and receipt;

whether the oral evidence of SP1, SP2 and SP3 supported or undermined the Plaintiff’s case on delivery;

whether the learned Sessions Court Judge had properly evaluated the documentary and oral evidence;

whether the Defendant’s failure to call further witnesses justified an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the

whether this was a proper case for appellate intervention. THE APPELLATE APPROACH OF THIS COURT

In hearing the appeal from the Sessions Court, I reminded myself of the settled principles governing appellate intervention.

An appellate court does not lightly disturb findings of fact made by a trial court. The trial judge has the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, and that advantage must be accorded due weight. An appellate court is not entitled to interfere merely because it might itself have reached a different conclusion on the same evidence.

However, appellate restraint does not mean appellate passivity. In Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, the Federal Court held that appellate intervention is justified where the trial court’s findings are against the weight of evidence or where there has been a misapprehension of the evidence.

The present case is not one of mere disagreement. It is a case where material admissions, documentary deficiencies, and inconsistencies were not adequately addressed. This engages the principles in Gan Yook Chin.

Where the findings of the trial court are against the weight of the evidence, where material evidence has not been considered, where there has been a failure to address important admissions, where the reasoning discloses a material misapprehension of the evidence, or where the burden and standard of proof have not been properly applied, appellate intervention is justified.

This Court was therefore required not merely to ask whether another conclusion was possible, but whether the conclusion reached by the learned Sessions Court Judge could safely stand upon the evidence actually recorded.

The Plaintiff’s case rested substantially on documentary records, namely Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders, invoices and internally generated summaries, including reconciliation records and Excel-type listings said to reflect the movement of goods and the outstanding sums due from the Defendant.

The Plaintiff contended that these documents, when read together with the oral evidence of its witnesses, established that the relevant goods had been supplied and delivered to the Defendant in the ordinary course of business. The Plaintiff further relied on what it described as an existing course of dealings between the parties, arguing that the commercial relationship between them was such that the absence of perfect documentation in every instance did not detract from the reality of delivery.

The Plaintiff’s explanation for the documentary gaps was that, in actual practice, deliveries were not always accompanied by formal acknowledgment, and that there were occasions when deliveries took place even when the Defendant’s office was closed. The Plaintiff also contended that Purchase Orders might only be generated after delivery, once the goods had been checked and accepted by the Defendant.

The Defendant’s case was that the Plaintiff had failed to prove the specific deliveries forming the subject matter of the claim. The Defendant challenged the Plaintiff’s documents as unreliable and defective, pointing in particular to the absence of signatures, company stamps, acknowledgment of receipt, and clear identification of any person said to have received the goods on the Defendant’s behalf. The Defendant also relied on inconsistencies between Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders and invoices, including discrepancies in quantities and descriptions.

Through DW1, the Defendant maintained that its ordinary business practice was to operate on the basis of proper Purchase Orders and that goods would not ordinarily be accepted without the necessary supporting documentation. THE EVIDENCE OF THE WITNESSES The Evidence of SP1 20. The evidence of SP1 assumed significance because SP1 was called to speak to the Plaintiff’s process of supply and delivery.

SP1 stated that there were occasions when deliveries were made while the Defendant’s office was closed. The relevant evidence recorded in the Notes of Proceedings was: “Ada kadang hantar awal kan office sudah tutup…”

This explanation was plainly advanced to account for the absence of acknowledgment on some of the Delivery Notes relied upon by the Plaintiff. However, that explanation did not strengthen the Plaintiff’s case. It gave rise to a more fundamental difficulty. If the Defendant’s premises were closed, by whom were the goods received? There was no coherent evidence identifying the receiving party, no evidence of a consistent alternative receiving arrangement, and no satisfactory explanation as to how the quantity and nature of the goods were verified in the absence of any receiving personnel.

More significantly, SP1 accepted under cross-examination the following proposition: “barang yang dihantar bukan dihantar kepada

This was not a minor inconsistency. It was a direct admission going to the very heart of the Plaintiff’s case. The central issue in the case was whether the goods had been delivered to the Defendant. An admission by the Plaintiff’s own witness that the goods were not delivered to the Defendant was plainly material and required direct judicial engagement.

That admission could not simply be overlooked. If it were to be treated as a mistake or misunderstanding, the surrounding evidence would have to show clearly why it should not be taken at face value. No such convincing clarification emerged from the record. On the contrary, the admission was consistent with the other weaknesses in the Plaintiff’s case, particularly the uncertainty surrounding acknowledgment and actual receipt.

The law is clear that admissions against interest must be given full weight. In Fulcrum Capital Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Samsudin Abu Hasan & 2 Ors [2001] CLJU 514, the court held that admissions made under cross-examination are highly probative and cannot be disregarded without explanation.

The learned Sessions Court Judge did not confront this admission. That omission is material.

I was therefore unable to regard SP1’s evidence as supportive of the Plaintiff’s case on the issue of delivery. Rather, SP1’s evidence materially undermined it.

SP2 was called to support the Plaintiff’s documentary and accounting position. However, SP2’s evidence also revealed substantial difficulty in the Plaintiff’s attempt to prove delivery through internal records.

SP2 confirmed that the Plaintiff relied on internally generated summaries and records in support of the claim. Such records may, in an appropriate case, assist in showing the internal state of accounts maintained by the Plaintiff. But their evidential value depends on whether they are linked to reliable proof that the goods recorded therein were in fact received by the opposing party.

SP2 also accepted that the Delivery Notes were not generated through a tightly controlled or externally verified process. The Notes of Proceedings recorded the following: “Delivery Notes maksudnya driver berhak isi sendiri…”

This evidence was important. It showed that the Delivery Notes were not necessarily documents completed under conditions ensuring independent verification by the Defendant. Instead, they could be completed by the Plaintiff’s own delivery personnel.

SP2 further accepted that the Plaintiff’s internally generated summaries were not acknowledged by the Defendant and were not independently verified by the Defendant. That concession established that these records remained unilateral documents generated within the Plaintiff’s own system. They were not jointly adopted records, nor were they documents whose contents had been accepted by the Defendant.

That distinction is critical. A claimant cannot prove delivery merely by producing documents generated within its own control, unless those documents are supported by credible independent evidence connecting them to actual receipt by the Defendant. Without such support, internal summaries remain no more than an internal account of what the claimant says occurred.

SP2’s evidence confirms the absence of such reliability. SP2’s evidence did not cure the Plaintiff’s problem. There was no satisfactory explanation as to how the internal records were matched against acknowledged deliveries, nor was there evidence showing that the Defendant had ever accepted those summaries as reflecting goods actually received. SP2’s testimony therefore confirmed, rather than repaired, the unilateral and unverified character of an important part of the Plaintiff’s documentary case.

SP3, being the Managing Director of the Plaintiff, was a central witness. His evidence addressed the Plaintiff’s internal system, the creation of the documents, and the manner in which the Plaintiff contended the parties conducted their transactions.

SP3 made some of the most significant admissions in the case.

First, SP3 accepted in terms: “Kalau tak ada acknowledgement dekat sini ialah betullah… tiada acknowledgement received.”

This was, in my judgment, a crucial admission. The Plaintiff placed heavy reliance on Delivery Notes as proof of delivery. Yet SP3 himself accepted that, where acknowledgment was absent, no acknowledgment of receipt had in fact been obtained. Once that is accepted, such Delivery Notes cannot be treated as self-sufficient proof that the Defendant received the goods.

A Delivery Note without acknowledgment remains, at best, evidence that the supplier recorded a purported delivery. It does not establish that the buyer, or any authorised representative of the buyer, actually received the goods. In a claim for the price of goods sold and delivered, that distinction is fundamental.

Second, SP3 described a sequence of dealings in which goods were allegedly delivered first, Delivery Notes were then issued, and Purchase Orders were only later generated by the Defendant after the goods had been checked and found to be without problem. The relevant evidence was as follows: “Selepas kita sudah hantar kita ada Delivery Notes… lepas THT check benda tak ada problem… mereka akan prepare PO…”

That sequence is commercially unusual. In the ordinary course of supply transactions, a Purchase Order precedes delivery and provides the commercial basis for subsequent supply and invoicing. It is not impossible for parties to operate differently. However, where a party seeks to rely on an arrangement which departs from ordinary commercial practice, especially in a dispute concerning proof of delivery, the court must require convincing evidence that both parties in fact operated on that basis.

SP3 made the most significant admissions. First: “Kalau tak ada acknowledgement dekat sini ialah betullah… tiada acknowledgement received.” This admission is decisive. The Plaintiff’s case relies on Delivery Notes, yet acknowledgment—the clearest proof of receipt—is absent. Second: “Selepas kita sudah hantar kita ada Delivery Notes… lepas THT check benda tak ada problem… mereka akan prepare PO…” This alleged sequence reverses ordinary commercial practice. Purchase Orders typically precede delivery. In Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2014] 4 MLJ 147, the court emphasised that commercial probability is a relevant consideration in evaluating evidence. An unusual arrangement requires cogent proof. No such proof exists here. Third: “tiada apa-apa acknowledgement received… tiada apa-apa bukti yang boleh tunjukkan bahawa memang semua excel file ini telah dihantar dan telah disemak oleh pihak Defendant…” This confirms that the Plaintiff’s internal summaries are unverified. No such convincing independent evidence was shown here. The alleged arrangement rested largely on the Plaintiff’s own witnesses, whose evidence was already weakened by contradictions and documentary deficiencies. I was therefore unable to accept the alleged sequence as a satisfactory explanation for the evidential weaknesses in the Plaintiff’s case.

This concession further demonstrated that even the Plaintiff’s reconciliation material remained unilateral in nature.

Taken as a whole, SP3’s evidence exposed the fragility of the Plaintiff’s documentary foundation. Far from curing the deficiencies in the Plaintiff’s proof, it revealed that the Plaintiff’s case depended substantially on internally generated and unverified records lacking independent acknowledgment by the Defendant.

The Defendant’s case was presented through DW1. DW1 testified that the Defendant operated through proper Purchase Orders and that goods would not ordinarily be accepted without the usual supporting documentation. DW1 denied that the goods in dispute had been received and challenged the reliability of the Plaintiff’s documents.

I found DW1’s evidence to be commercially coherent and consistent with ordinary business practice. The Defendant’s position that goods were received through proper ordering and documentation procedures was neither strained nor implausible. More importantly, DW1’s evidence aligned with the weaknesses already apparent in the Plaintiff’s case. The absence of acknowledgment, the lack of reliable receiving identification, and the inconsistencies within the Plaintiff’s documents sat more comfortably with the Defendant’s denial than with the Plaintiff’s assertion of proven delivery.

The Defendant was not required to prove a positive alternative version of each disputed transaction. Its case was fundamentally one of denial. DW1’s role was to challenge the sufficiency and reliability of the Plaintiff’s evidence and to deny receipt of the goods now claimed. In the context of the burden of proof, that was entirely proper.

In Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lin Wen-Chih & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 293, the Federal Court reaffirmed that the burden lies on the claimant and does not shift merely because the defendant denies the claim.

I found DW1 to be a credible witness. His evidence did not suffer from the kind of internal contradiction that marked the Plaintiff’s evidence, and it remained consistent with the Defendant’s pleaded case and with ordinary commercial probability.

The documentary evidence formed the backbone of the Plaintiff’s claim. It must therefore be examined with care.

The Plaintiff relied on Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders, invoices and internal summaries. At first sight, the existence of such documents may suggest commercial activity between the parties. However, the true question was not whether documents existed. The real question was whether those documents proved the disputed deliveries.

A substantial number of Delivery Notes lacked signatures, company stamps, names of receiving personnel, or any reliable indication that the Defendant had in fact received the goods. Some documents bore markings or signatures of uncertain origin, but there was no satisfactory evidence linking those markings to identified employees or authorised representatives of the Defendant.

That is not a technical complaint. In a claim for the price of goods allegedly delivered, acknowledgment of receipt is often the clearest and most immediate proof that the goods reached the buyer. Where acknowledgment is absent, the court must look for other reliable evidence to bridge the gap. Here, no such reliable alternative proof was satisfactorily shown.

There were also inconsistencies between Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders and invoices. Quantities did not always correspond. Descriptions were not always aligned. The documentary chain was incomplete and, in material respects, incoherent. These inconsistencies were not adequately explained by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff’s accounting position was also not stable. Different figures appeared at different stages, including figures in the demand letter, in the alleged balance confirmation material and in the amount ultimately pursued. It is true that accounting figures may vary for legitimate reasons, such as reconciliation, payments, credits or adjustments. But where figures fluctuate in a case already marked by documentary weakness, a satisfactory explanation is required if the court is to retain confidence in the reliability of the claim. No such satisfactory explanation emerged on the evidence.

In Live Capital Sdn Bhd v Pioneer Conglomerate Sdn Bhd. [2025] 4 MLJ 420, the Federal Court emphasised that marking a document as an exhibit does not prove the truth of its contents.

Similarly, in Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229, it was held that documentary evidence must be internally consistent and credible.

In the final analysis, the documentary evidence showed no more than an internal documentary trail generated by the Plaintiff. It did not satisfactorily establish that the Defendant had actually received the goods now claimed.

Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 places the burden of proof on the party who asserts the existence of a fact. In the present case, it was the Plaintiff who asserted that it had delivered goods to the Defendant and that payment was therefore due. The burden of proving those facts rested throughout on the Plaintiff.

The applicable standard is proof on a balance of probabilities. However, that standard still requires the court to be satisfied that the evidence is reliable, credible and sufficient. A Plaintiff does not prove delivery merely by producing invoices or internally generated delivery documents. The court must still be satisfied that the goods were in fact delivered to and received by the Defendant.

The burden did not shift merely because the Plaintiff produced documents suggestive of transactions. The Defendant was entitled to challenge the authenticity, reliability and sufficiency of those documents. The Defendant was entitled to insist that the Plaintiff prove actual receipt of the goods. The Defendant was under no legal obligation to disprove delivery unless and until the Plaintiff first established its own case.

As to adverse inference, section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 permits the court, in an appropriate case, to draw an adverse inference where evidence expected to be produced is withheld. However, the principle does not arise automatically, and it does not relieve the party bearing the burden of proof from first establishing a prima facie case. GROUNDS RAISED IN THE NOTICE OF APPEAL AND THIS

Although the notice and complaints may be expressed in several ways, the substance of the Plaintiff’s challenge was that this Court erred in reversing the judgment of the learned Sessions Court Judge, failed to give due weight to the documentary evidence and course of dealings between the parties, and wrongly rejected the Plaintiff’s case on delivery. The Plaintiff also maintained that insufficient weight was given to the Defendant’s failure to call further witnesses.

These are my considered justifications for my decision.

To the extent that the Plaintiff contended that the Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders and invoices were sufficient to establish delivery, I rejected that contention. The Plaintiff’s own evidence showed that acknowledgment of receipt was absent in material instances. The Plaintiff’s own witnesses also accepted that Delivery Notes could be completed by drivers and that the internal summaries were not verified by the Defendant.

In those circumstances, the documents could not be treated as self-proving. The learned Sessions Court Judge gave them a weight which they could not properly bear. My intervention on appeal was therefore justified.

To the extent that the Plaintiff relied on prior dealings between the parties, I did not disregard the existence of previous commercial relations. However, the existence of prior dealings does not relieve the Plaintiff of proving the specific deliveries now claimed. A course of dealings cannot by itself prove receipt of disputed goods where the underlying documentation is materially deficient and the oral evidence is internally inconsistent.

I, therefore rejected the submission that proof of a general commercial relationship was sufficient to sustain the present claim.

To the extent that the Plaintiff contended that the oral evidence of SP1, SP2 and SP3 supported the claim, I was unable to accept that submission. SP1’s admission that the goods were not delivered to the Defendant was a direct admission on the decisive issue. SP2 and SP3 confirmed the unilateral character of the Plaintiff’s documents and the absence of acknowledgment. Those matters materially weakened the Plaintiff’s case.

The learned Sessions Court Judge did not sufficiently address those admissions and concessions. That omission rendered the conclusion below unsafe.

To the extent that the Plaintiff contended that an adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the Defendant, I rejected that submission. The Plaintiff did not first establish a prima facie case of delivery. The Defendant’s case was one of denial, and the Defendant was entitled to rely on the weakness of the Plaintiff’s case. The absence of additional defence witnesses could not be used to fill the evidential gaps in the Plaintiff’s proof.

(E) Ground Relating to the Appellate Restraint

To the extent that the Plaintiff suggested this Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of the learned Sessions Court Judge, I rejected that contention. This was not a case of mere difference of view. This was a case where critical admissions were not addressed, the legal effect of unacknowledged documents was not properly analysed, documentary inconsistencies were not sufficiently examined, and the burden of proof was diluted in substance. In such circumstances, appellate intervention was warranted.

Having considered the judgment below, I was satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge accepted the Plaintiff’s claim principally on three bases. First, the learned Judge appears to have treated the Delivery Notes as proof of delivery and acceptance. Second, the learned Judge accepted that the course of dealings between the parties supported the Plaintiff’s claim. Third, the learned Judge considered that the documentary evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient notwithstanding the absence of acknowledgment on some of the documents.

With respect, those conclusions could not safely be sustained on the evidence.

The first difficulty lies in the treatment of the documentary evidence. The judgment below appears to proceed on the footing that because the Plaintiff had produced Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders and invoices, delivery had thereby been established.

That approach failed to confront the critical evidence that many Delivery Notes were not acknowledged at all. Once SP3 accepted that acknowledgment of receipt was absent, the legal consequence of that admission had to be faced. A Delivery Note without acknowledgment is not proof of receipt. It remains a unilateral record. Its existence does not establish the truth of its contents.

The learned Sessions Court Judge did not sufficiently address this distinction. In doing so, the judgment below accorded the Plaintiff’s documents a probative value which they could not properly bear.

The second major difficulty was the failure to engage with the admissions made by the Plaintiff’s own witnesses.

SP1’s admission that the goods were not delivered to the Defendant was plainly material. The judgment below did not sufficiently address that admission or explain why it did not affect the outcome. That omission was serious because the admission went directly to the central issue in dispute.

Likewise, SP2’s evidence that the internal summaries were not verified by the Defendant, and SP3’s admissions regarding the absence of acknowledgment and the manner in which Delivery Notes were prepared, were central to the reliability of the Plaintiff’s proof. Yet the judgment below proceeded substantially as though the Plaintiff’s evidential foundation remained intact.

In my judgment, that amounted to a material misapprehension of the evidence.

The learned Sessions Court Judge also accepted the Plaintiff’s explanation that goods were delivered first and Purchase Orders were only generated later. With respect, that explanation was accepted too readily.

Where a party relies on a commercial arrangement which departs from ordinary business practice, particularly in a dispute about proof of delivery, the court should require convincing evidence that both parties in fact operated on that basis. No such convincing independent evidence was shown here. The only support came from the Plaintiff’s own witnesses, whose evidence was already weakened by contradictions and documentary deficiencies.

The acceptance of this explanation without proper scrutiny was, in my judgment, an error in the evaluation of commercial probability.

The learned Sessions Court Judge appears to have treated the absence of acknowledgment as a practical irregularity which could be explained by the realities of the parties’ dealings. With respect, that analysis was insufficient.

The absence of acknowledgment was not isolated. It was recurrent. It affected a substantial number of the documents relied upon by the Plaintiff. The explanation that deliveries were sometimes made while the office was closed did not resolve the problem. It deepened it, because it raised obvious unanswered questions as to by whom the goods were received and how receipt was verified.

The judgment below did not sufficiently analyse the absence of acknowledgment as a systemic weakness in the Plaintiff’s case. Instead, the defect was effectively discounted in light of the broader course of dealings. In my judgment, that gave insufficient weight to the significance of acknowledgment in a claim of this nature.

(E) Failure to Address Documentary Inconsistencies

The Defendant had pointed to discrepancies in quantities, descriptions and the relationship between Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders and invoices. Those discrepancies were not adequately resolved in the judgment below.

It is true that minor documentary discrepancies do not necessarily defeat a claim. But where the claim is already weakened by the absence of acknowledgment, uncertainty in the delivery process and contradictions in the Plaintiff’s own oral evidence, such discrepancies assume greater significance. They compound existing weakness and cannot simply be brushed aside.

The judgment below did not give those inconsistencies the weight they deserved.

(F) Dilution of the Burden of Proof

Finally, I was satisfied that the burden of proof was, in substance, diluted. Although the learned Sessions Court Judge did not expressly state that the Defendant bore the burden of disproving delivery, the reasoning proceeded as though the Plaintiff’s documents were sufficient unless the Defendant could disprove them.

That was not correct. The burden remained on the Plaintiff throughout. The Defendant was entitled to insist on strict proof of delivery and receipt. The Defendant is not required to disprove delivery.

In Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd v Lin Wen-Chih [2009] 6 MLJ 293, the Federal Court made clear that the burden remains on the plaintiff throughout.

By effectively treating defective documents as sufficient unless displaced, the judgment below lowered the Plaintiff’s burden. That was a material error.

Upon a full reconsideration of the evidence and the reasoning of the learned Sessions Court Judge, I made the following findings.

The Plaintiff did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the goods now claimed were delivered to and received by the Defendant. The absence of acknowledgment on the Delivery Notes, taken together with SP3’s admission and the lack of reliable independent verification, was fatal to the claim.

SP1’s evidence concerning deliveries made while the office was closed, coupled with the admission that the goods were not delivered to the Defendant, was fundamentally inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s case. SP2 and SP3 did not repair that weakness. Rather, their evidence reinforced the absence of verification and the unilateral nature of the Plaintiff’s records.

The Delivery Notes, Delivery Orders, invoices and internal summaries did not form a coherent and reliable documentary chain proving receipt by the Defendant. They were marked by absent acknowledgment, uncertain recipient identity, internal inconsistency and unstable accounting figures.

The Plaintiff’s assertion that goods were delivered first and Purchase Orders were later issued was commercially unusual and not supported by convincing independent evidence. I therefore rejected that alleged procedure as a reliable basis for accepting the Plaintiff’s case.

In the context of this claim, acknowledgment of receipt was not a minor procedural detail. It was central to proof of delivery. The Plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory evidential substitute for that missing acknowledgment.

The overall impression arising from the evidence was that the Plaintiff’s claim had been assembled from internal records and summaries rather than proven by reliable contemporaneous documents acknowledged by the Defendant. That does not necessarily imply dishonesty, but it does mean that the claim was not proven to the standard required by law.

The Plaintiff contended that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the Defendant for not calling certain witnesses said to have been involved in receiving goods or handling procurement matters.

I rejected that contention.

The Plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of delivery. Its own evidence disclosed serious weaknesses: the absence of acknowledgment, reliance on unilateral records, contradictions in witness testimony, and a direct admission inconsistent with delivery to the Defendant. In such circumstances, there was no proper evidential platform from which an adverse inference could be invoked to rescue the claim.

The Defendant’s case was one of denial. The Defendant did not advance a positive case requiring extensive corroboration. The Defendant simply denied receipt and challenged the sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s evidence. In those circumstances, the Defendant was entitled to rely on the weakness of the Plaintiff’s case.

The Plaintiff also failed to identify with sufficient precision what evidence the allegedly missing witnesses would have given, why such evidence was exclusively within the Defendant’s knowledge, and how their absence caused prejudice in light of the Plaintiff’s own failure of proof.

To accept the Plaintiff’s submission would effectively invert the burden of proof. It would mean that once a Plaintiff produces defective or unverified documents, the Defendant must call further witnesses to disprove the claim. That is not the law.

In Pannir Selvam a/l Sinnaiyah & Anor v Tan Chia Foo & Ors [2021] 7 MLJ 1699, it was held that adverse inference arises only after a prima facie case is established.

Here, no prima facie case exists. The Plaintiff cannot rely on adverse inference to fill evidential gaps. I, therefore found that no adverse inference arose against the Defendant. WHETHER THIS WAS A PROPER CASE FOR APPELLATE

This was not a case of mere disagreement with the trial court on matters of impression or preference. The evidential defects in the Plaintiff’s case were serious, cumulative and went to the very root of the claim.

The learned Sessions Court Judge did not sufficiently address:

the legal consequence of unacknowledged Delivery

the admission by SP1 inconsistent with delivery to the

the unilateral character of the Plaintiff’s internal summaries;

the unusual and unproven transactional sequence relied upon by the Plaintiff;

the documentary inconsistencies identified by the

the continuing burden resting on the Plaintiff to prove delivery and receipt.

Taken together, those matters rendered the conclusion in favour of the Plaintiff unsafe. In such circumstances, appellate intervention was not only permissible but necessary. The decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge cannot safely stand and falls within the principles in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ

1.

After a full re-evaluation of the evidence, I remained satisfied that the Plaintiff failed to discharge its burden of proof on a balance of probabilities.

The Plaintiff did not prove that the goods now claimed were delivered to and received by the Defendant. The Delivery Notes and related documents did not constitute reliable proof of receipt. The Plaintiff’s own witnesses made material admissions and gave evidence which weakened, rather than strengthened, the Plaintiff’s case. The alleged course of dealings and standard operating procedure relied upon by the Plaintiff were not established by convincing independent evidence. The Plaintiff’s internal summaries and accounting records remained unilateral documents and could not fill the evidential gap created by the absence of acknowledgment of receipt. The Plaintiff’s argument on adverse inference was misconceived and did not assist it.

For all those reasons, I was satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge’s decision could not safely stand. The appeal before me was therefore properly allowed, the decision of the Sessions Court was set aside, and the Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed.

The Defendant’s appeal is allowed.

The decision of the Sessions Court is set aside.

The Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.

The Plaintiff shall pay costs in the sum of RM15,000.00 for both the Sessions Court and the High Court. Dated 14 April 2026 -sgd-DATO’ ANITA BINTI HARUN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN To the parties’ solicitors: For the Appellant : Alan Kang Wei Luen & Lee Peggie (Messrs Alan Kang & Co.) For the Respondent: Emily Chong Pei Yen (Messrs Othman Hashim & Co.)