(iii) Whether a stay of the Award pending the disposal of the substantive judicial review ought to be granted on an ex parte basis or, alternatively, whether the prayer for a stay should be directed to be heard inter partes. D. LEGAL FRAMEWORK D.1 Amenability of awards of the Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna to judicial review [17] The Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna is a statutory body constituted under Part XII of the Consumer Protection Act 1999 (Act 599). By section 116 of the Act, an award of the Tribunal is final and binding and is deemed to be an order of a Magistrates' Court. Section 117 precludes any appeal from an award of the Tribunal. [18] The absence of a statutory right of appeal does not exclude the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court conferred by section 25(2) read with paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. As the Federal Court reaffirmed in R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145, the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court extends to the correction of errors of law made by inferior tribunals, including those made within jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal in Teh Guat Hong v Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional [2015] MLJU 2039 reaffirmed that decisions of a statutory body taken in the exercise of a public function on a public-law matter are amenable to judicial review. D.2 The threshold for leave under Order 53 rule 3 [19] It is well settled that the threshold for the grant of leave for judicial review is a low one. At the leave stage, the Court does not undertake a detailed examination of the merits. The function of the Court is to filter out applications that are frivolous or vexatious and to permit only those that disclose an arguable case to proceed to substantive determination. The governing authority is WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 296 (Federal Court). Suriyadi FCJ, delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, formulated the threshold in the following terms— "... leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though ie unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged." [21] That formulation was applied by the Court of Appeal in Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 5 MLJ 60, where the Court emphasised that, at the leave stage, the Court is not to go into the merits of the application; its role is to ascertain whether the application is frivolous, and whether the subject matter of the proposed review is justiciable. The same approach was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Jerry Wa Dusing & Anor v Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [2014] 9 CLJ 321, where it was reiterated that the threshold for leave is "very low" and that the inquiry is confined to whether the applicant has an arguable case that is not frivolous. The same principles were reaffirmed in Teh Guat Hong (supra). [22] This Court therefore approaches the present application on the footing that the threshold is whether the application is not frivolous and discloses an arguable case fit to be examined at the substantive stage. The merits proper are matters for the substantive hearing on full material and with the benefit of argument from all parties. D.3 Locus standi: the "adversely affected" test [23] Order 53 rule 2(4) of the Rules of Court 2012 confers standing on "any person who is adversely affected by the decision of any public authority". The test of standing is therefore a single test applicable to all the prerogative remedies, and is one of being "adversely affected". [24] In QSR Brands Bhd v Suruhanjaya Sekuriti & Anor [2006] 3 MLJ 164, the Court of Appeal explained that the phrase "adversely affected" calls for a flexible approach, with the applicant being required only to show that he falls within the factual spectrum covered by those words. The Federal Court in Malaysian Trade Union Congress & Ors v Menteri Tenaga, Air dan Komunikasi & Anor [2014] 3 MLJ 145 clarified that to satisfy the "adversely affected" test, the applicant need not establish infringement of a private right or special damage; it suffices that the applicant has a real and genuine interest in the subject matter of the impugned decision. D.4 The grounds of judicial review [25] The grounds upon which the supervisory jurisdiction may be invoked are classically formulated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (House of Lords) as illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. That tripartite classification has been received into Malaysian law and applied at the highest level in R Rama Chandran (supra) and Petroliam Nasional Bhd v Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2004] 2 MLJ 288 (Federal Court). [26] Of particular relevance to the present application is the principle stated by the Court of Appeal in Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers' Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317, that an inferior tribunal commits a jurisdictional error reviewable on certiorari if it asks itself the wrong question, takes into account irrelevant considerations, fails to take into account relevant considerations, or arrives at a decision that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could have reached. The cognate duty of a statutory decision-maker to consider all relevant matters before it was emphasised by the Federal Court in Ahmad Jefri Mohd Jahri v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor [2010] 3 MLJ 145. D.5 The power to stay [27] The Court's power to stay the impugned decision pending the substantive determination of judicial review is conferred by Order 53 rule 3(8) of the Rules of Court 2012. The grant of a stay is discretionary, the relevant considerations being whether there are special circumstances justifying a stay, whether the substantive review would be rendered nugatory in the absence of a stay, and the balance of convenience between the parties: Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 (Federal Court); Subashini Rajasingam v Saravanan Thangathoray [2008] 2 MLJ 147 (Federal Court). E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION E.1 Issue (i): Amenability [28] The first issue admits of a short answer. The Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna is a creature of statute discharging an adjudicative function of a public-law character. Its awards bind parties to consumer disputes within the financial limits prescribed by Part XII of the Consumer Protection Act 1999. The deeming provision in section 116, and the preclusion of appeal in section 117, do not — and on settled principle cannot — oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. [29] On the principles in R Rama Chandran (supra) and Teh Guat Hong (supra), the impugned Award is amenable to judicial review by this Court. Issue (i) is answered in the affirmative. E.2 Issue (ii): The leave threshold [30] The Court must consider four discrete matters under this head: locus standi, timeliness, justiciability and arguability. [31] Locus standi. The Award imposes a direct monetary liability of RM12,959.80 on the Applicant. The Applicant plainly has a real and genuine interest in the subject matter of the impugned decision, and indeed the interest is of the most direct kind imaginable that of the party against whom the order is made. Applying the test in QSR Brands (supra) and Malaysian Trade Union Congress (supra), the Applicant is a person "adversely affected" within Order 53 rule 2(4) of the Rules of Court 2012. [32] Timeliness. The impugned Award was issued on 10 December 2025. The present application was filed on 4 March 2026, well within the three-month period prescribed by Order 53 rule 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012. [33] Justiciability. As determined under Issue (i) above, awards of the Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna are amenable to judicial review. [34] Arguability. The Court now turns to whether the Statement, read with the Supporting Affidavit, discloses an arguable case fit to proceed to the substantive stage. In the Court's assessment, three matters in combination plainly cross the WRP Asia Pacific threshold. [35] First the Recorded Agreement of 28 August 2025. Paragraph 28 of the Supporting Affidavit deposes that, at the Second Hearing, an agreement was recorded before the Tribunal limiting the Applicant's liability to the costs of repair attributable to the absorber and the air-conditioning system, and that the First Respondent consented to that limitation. If those averments are made good at the substantive hearing, the question whether the Tribunal was nevertheless entitled to make an Award imposing the full repair cost of RM12,959.80 in apparent departure from the limitation it had itself recorded is properly arguable. The argument squarely engages Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd (supra): a tribunal that disregards its own recorded settlement, or that takes a course inconsistent with material it has accepted, may be said to have asked itself the wrong question or to have failed to take into account relevant considerations. [36] Secondly the evidence of Mr Henry Yap Hian Li. Paragraph 32 of the Supporting Affidavit deposes that the witness from Toyota Service Centre, Melaka, who attended the Fourth Hearing on 17 November 2025, confirmed that the portion of the Toyota Invoice referable to the absorber and airconditioning system was RM5,998.50, and gave evidence that no warranty is conventionally given against ordinary "wear and tear". The contention that the Tribunal's ultimate Award of RM12,959.80 is at odds with the evidence so given, and that no reasons appear to have been provided for the departure, is arguable under the head of irrationality and, potentially, procedural impropriety. [37] Thirdly the contractual terms in the Delivery Order of 23 July 2024. The Delivery Order (Exhibit "D") recorded that no warranty was given save in writing. The oral one-month warranty for "wear and tear" is said to have lapsed on 25 August 2024. Whether the Tribunal had proper regard to those contractual terms in imposing liability for repairs carried out many months after the lapse of the oral warranty is, on the material before the Court, also arguable. [38] It is necessary to emphasise, with all deliberation, what this Court is not deciding. The Court expresses no view on whether the impugned Award is in fact tainted by illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. Those are matters reserved for the substantive hearing, on full material including the Tribunal's notes of proceedings and on argument from all parties. The Court holds only that, on the material presently before it, the application is not frivolous and discloses an arguable case fit to proceed. [39] That conclusion is reinforced though not determined by the position of the Attorney General's Chambers, communicated by its letter dated 11 March 2026, that there is no objection to the grant of leave. The Court has, however, formed its conclusion on the leave threshold by independent assessment of the material in Enclosures 1, 2, 3 and 7 and the authorities in Enclosure 8. [40] Issue (ii) is accordingly answered in the affirmative. E.3 Issue (iii): The prayer for a stay [41] By prayer 3 of the Notice of Application, the Applicant seeks a stay of the impugned Award pending the disposal of the substantive judicial review. The Written Submission filed on 21 May 2026 prays for an order in terms of Enclosure 1, which on its face includes the stay prayer. The Attorney General's Chambers has, however, expressly objected to a stay being granted on an ex parte basis, requesting instead that the stay prayer be heard inter partes with the attendance of the First Respondent. [42] In the Court's judgment, that request must be acceded to, for three reasons. [43] First. The effect of a stay would be to suspend the First Respondent's entitlement to enforce a monetary order made in his favour. The First Respondent has, accordingly, a direct and substantial interest in resisting any such order. The audi alteram partem principle, which lies at the foundation of the very supervisory jurisdiction that the Applicant invokes, requires that the First Respondent be heard before any order is made that would suspend his rights under the Award. [44] Secondly. The discretionary considerations governing the grant of a stay special circumstances, the risk that the substantive review will be rendered nugatory in the absence of a stay, and the balance of convenience cannot fairly be assessed on the Applicant's affidavit alone. They are, by their nature, matters on which both sides must be heard. To determine them ex parte would be to pre-empt the balance of convenience inquiry before the other side of the balance has even been placed on the scales. [45] Thirdly. The Attorney General's Chambers has, in its letter of 11 March 2026, expressly clarified that it does not represent the First Respondent. The First Respondent's interest in resisting a stay will therefore not be represented at the leave stage unless he is given a separate opportunity to be heard. To grant an ex parte stay in such circumstances would, in the Court's view, be inconsistent with the principles of natural justice. [46] The Court therefore declines to grant a stay of the Award on an ex parte basis. Prayer 3 of the Notice of Application shall stand over to be heard inter partes, with the Applicant to issue and serve the appropriate notice on the First Respondent and the Second Respondent. [47] Issue (iii) is answered accordingly. F. CONCLUSION [48] The Court is satisfied that the impugned Award of the Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna dated 10 December 2025 in Claim No. TTPM-M-(P)-147-2025 is amenable to judicial review, that the Applicant has locus standi as a person adversely affected by the Award, that the application has been brought within time, and that the application is neither frivolous nor vexatious. The leave threshold under Order 53 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012, as authoritatively stated in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 296 (Federal Court) and applied in Tang Kwor Ham (supra), Jerry Wa Dusing (supra) and Teh Guat Hong (supra), is satisfied. [49] Nothing in this judgment is to be taken as expressing any view on the substantive merits of the grounds advanced. Those grounds remain to be examined at the substantive hearing, on full material including the record of proceedings before the Tribunal, and with the benefit of argument from all parties. [50] The prayer for a stay of the impugned Award is to be heard inter partes, for the reasons stated in Paragraphs [42] to [46] above. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [51] The Court accordingly orders as follows一