Subparagraph
(ii) if leave is granted, whether the Court should, in the exercise of its discretion, stay execution of the impugned awards pending the substantive disposal of the judicial review. D. Statutory and Legal Framework Jurisdiction and the leave threshold [12] The judicial review jurisdiction of this Court is sourced in section 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 read with paragraph 1 of the Schedule thereto, and is exercised in the manner provided by Order 53 of the ROC 2012. Leave is the gateway. By Order 53 rule 3(1), no application for judicial review may be made unless leave has first been granted in accordance with that rule. [13] The threshold for the grant of leave is settled. The Federal Court in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 296 (Federal Court) held that leave should be granted unless the application is "frivolous" meaning that the applicant must demonstrate an arguable case fit for full investigation. The function of the Court at the leave stage is one of filtration: to weed out plainly hopeless or vexatious applications, not to anticipate the substantive determination. [14] The threshold is a low one. The Court at this stage neither embarks on a detailed examination of the merits nor makes findings on contested questions of law and fact. It satisfies itself only that the proposed grounds disclose a case fit for full argument; Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 927 (Court of Appeal) The Strata Management Tribunal [15] The Tribunal is constituted by section 102 of Act 757. Its jurisdiction is defined and circumscribed by the Fourth Schedule to that Act. The procedural framework for the filing and hearing of claims is set out in the 2015 Regulations made under Act 757. Section 121 of Act 757 and the related provisions preserve the supervisory role of the High Court over awards by the Tribunal where judicial review lies on grounds known to public law. [16] A central plank of the proposed challenge concerns the Tribunal's treatment of service of Borang 1. The Federal Court in Goh Teng Whoo & Anor v Ample Objectives Sdn Bhd [2021] 3 MLJ 159 (Federal Court) held, in the context of section 12 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act 388), that despatch of a document by AR registered post does not, of itself, constitute conclusive proof of service. Where the post is shown not to have been delivered for instance, by being returned to the sender service in fact has not been effected and any presumption of service is displaced. Maintenance charges, share units and Borang 3 [17] Sections 8 and 23 of Act 663, and sections 8(1), 21, 23 and 25 of Act 757, prescribe the basis on which maintenance charges may lawfully be imposed by a joint management body. The lawful basis is the share unit allocated to each parcel; not floor area. The Court of Appeal in Muhamad Nazri bin Muhamad v JMB Menara Rajawali & Anor [2020] 3 MLJ 645 (Court of Appeal) held that a joint management body must determine and impose only one rate of maintenance charge for parcels of a like description, calculated by reference to allocated share units. The Court of Appeal in Ekuiti Setegap Sdn Bhd v Plaza 393 Management Corporation [2019] 2 CLJ 592 (Court of Appeal) and Perbadanan Pengurusan Endah Parade v Magnificent Diagraph Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 881 (Court of Appeal) reinforce the proposition that a strata management body, being a creature of statute, may charge only what statute permits. The same principle was applied by this Court in Chee Wooi Chi v Badan Pengurusan Bersama Kondominium RBC & Anor [2025] MLJU 1205 (High Court) in respect of the same RBC and the same First Respondent. [18] Borang 3 under the Second Schedule to the 2015 Regulations is the prescribed instrument by which the share units of each parcel in a strata development are recorded for the purposes of maintenance charges. It must be properly mandated, signed by members of the Joint Management Committee with the requisite mandate of the joint management body, and lodged with the Commissioner of Buildings. Multiplicity of proceedings [19] The principle that proceedings between the same parties on the same or substantially overlapping issues should be brought forward in one action, rather than litigated successively, is of long standing. Sir James Wigram VC stated the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at 114-115, that a party is required to bring forward its whole case and may not, save in special circumstances, reopen the same subject of litigation in successive proceedings — whether the matters at issue were in fact raised in the earlier action or could and should have been raised. The rule was reformulated by the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC1 (House of Lords) as a broad, meritsbased assessment of whether subsequent proceedings amount to an abuse of process. In Malaysia, the rule in Henderson v Henderson and the underlying public policy that there should be finality in litigation interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium were authoritatively adopted by the Federal Court in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (Federal Court), Peh Swee Chin FCJ holding that the doctrine extends to all matters that should have been litigated in the earlier action but were not, whether by deliberate choice or by inadvertence. Stay pending judicial review [20] The discretion to stay execution of an inferior tribunal's award pending judicial review is well established at common law and is preserved by the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The principles governing the exercise of that discretion were set out by the Federal Court in Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 1 (Federal Court): the applicant must demonstrate special circumstances, of which prima facie errors of law on the face of the impugned decision, and a real risk that any successful challenge would be rendered nugatory, are recognised examples. E. Analysis and Determination Standing and limitation [21] Standing is plainly made out. The Applicant is the registered proprietor of unit 405 against whom the impugned awards have been entered, and is therefore adversely affected within the meaning of Order 53 rule 2(4) of the ROC 2012. [22] The application is brought within the three-month period prescribed by Order 53 rule 3(6). The later of the impugned awards was made on 27 November 2025; the present application was filed on 16 January 2026, well within time. [23] The threshold question is whether the grounds advanced are arguable, or so plainly unsustainable that leave ought to be refused at this preliminary stage. To that question the Court now turns, taking the principal grounds in turn. Ground 1: Service of Borang 1 [24] The foremost complaint advanced is that the default award of 9 October 2025 was entered against the Applicant in circumstances where Borang 1 the notice that initiates a Tribunal claim had not in fact been served on it. The factual premise is twofold. First, it is deposed at paragraph 62(d) of the supporting affidavit, on the deponent's personal knowledge as the Applicant's director who attended the hearing on 27 November 2025, that the First Respondent itself acknowledged at that hearing that the ARposted Borang 1 had been returned to it. Second, no objection (written or otherwise) was placed on the Tribunal record by the First Respondent in answer to the application to set aside. [25] Should those factual matters be established at the substantive hearing, the legal question that arises is squarely controlled by Goh Teng Whoo & Anor v Ample Objectives Sdn Bhd [2021] 3 MLJ 159 (Federal Court). The Federal Court there rejected the proposition that registered AR posting is, in itself, conclusive proof of service. Where the posting has been returned, service has not been effected, and any presumption of service is displaced. [26] The Tribunal's recorded reason for declining to set aside the default award that "Borang 1 telah disampaikan" is, on the affidavit case advanced, made in the teeth of the First Respondent's own concession that the registered post had been returned. Whether the Tribunal in fact had material before it that could properly displace the Goh Teng Whoo principle cannot be resolved on the present materials. The point is plainly arguable. [27] Service of process underlies the audi alteram partem principle. A respondent who has had no notice of the claim has had no opportunity to defend it. If the Applicant's factual premise is made out, the consequence is not technical: the award would have been entered without the procedural foundation which alone could justify its entry against a non-attending party. That is, on any view, a serious arguable ground. Ground 2: Refusal to set aside in the face of an unopposed application [28] Closely allied to Ground 1 is the complaint that the Tribunal declined to set aside the default award notwithstanding that the First Respondent had filed no objection to the setting-aside application and had, on the deponent's account, conceded the very factual matter (non-delivery of Borang 1) that would have grounded the application. [29] The principle of audi alteram partem, recognised in this jurisdiction as a facet of the rules of natural justice, requires not only that a party be heard but that, having been heard, the tribunal's reasons engage with the matters actually placed before it. A reasoned tribunal decision ought not to refuse to hear a respondent on a footing that the moving party has not contested, and on a factual premise that the moving party appears to have conceded. Whether the Tribunal so erred is plainly arguable on the affidavit material. Ground 3: Maintenance charges calculated on a square-foot basis [30] The third complaint, set out in paragraphs 63 to 75 of the supporting affidavit, is that the underlying maintenance charges allowed by the Tribunal were calculated on a square-foot basis rather than by reference to the share units allocated to each parcel. [31] The legal position is not at large. Sections 8(2)(a) and 23(2) of Act 663, and sections 21(2)(a), 23 and 25(3) of Act 757 read with section 8(1) of the same, prescribe a share-unit basis. The Court of Appeal in Muhamad Nazri bin Muhamad v JMB Menara Rajawali & Anor [2020] 3 MLJ 645 held that only one rate of maintenance charge is permissible for parcels of a like description, and that the rate must be referable to share units. This Court itself, on a closely related question concerning the same RBC, held in Chee Wooi Chi v Badan Pengurusan Bersama Kondominium RBC & Anor [2025] MLJU 1205 (High Court) that the imposition of maintenance charges by the First Respondent on a square-foot basis is unlawful. [32] That being the established legal position in this jurisdiction, whether the present award has allowed charges on a basis inconsistent with statute is a question fit for full argument. The threshold for leave is comfortably met on this ground. Ground 4: Inclusion of charges said to be outside the First Respondent's statutory mandate [33] It is further contended in paragraphs 90 to 91 of the supporting affidavit that the sum of RM45,175.29 allowed by the Tribunal, drawn from a statement of account dating from 1 August 2008, contains charges not properly within the First Respondent's statutory mandate to impose: charges for water and electricity, quit rent, the strata title application, air-conditioning, insurance, and late-payment interest computed on those charges. The First Respondent is, as the Court of Appeal in Prestaharta Sdn Bhd v Badan Pengurusan Bersama Riviera Bay Condominium [Civil Appeal No. M-02(W)-1513-09/2015] (Court of Appeal) put it, a "creature of statute" it may charge only what statute authorises. [34] Whether each component of the impugned account is properly characterised as a statutorily authorised charge is a question of substance, which the Court does not undertake at this stage. It suffices that the complaint, supported by reference to specific entries in a statement of account and by a body of decided authority, is plainly arguable. Ground 5: Borang 3 and the 22 accessory parcels [35] The fifth complaint is that the First Respondent has, in calculating maintenance charges, proceeded on the footing that there are 550 parcels in RBC, when on the binding determinations of the Court of Appeal in Prestaharta Sdn Bhd v Badan Pengurusan Bersama Riviera Bay Condominium [Civil Appeal No. M02(W)-1513-09/2015] (Court of Appeal), there are 22 accessory parcels owned by Prestaharta which must be brought into account. [36] The Court of Appeal having so determined, and this Court in Chee Wooi Chi v Badan Pengurusan Bersama Kondominium RBC & Anor [2025] MLJU 1205 (High Court) having directed that Borang 3 be updated to take account of those 22 accessory parcels, the contention that the present award proceeds on a Borang 3 inconsistent with binding appellate authority and lacking the requisite mandate of the joint management body is not capable of summary dismissal. Ground 6: The First Respondent's resolution of 27 November 2022 [37] It is further deposed at paragraph 55 of the supporting affidavit, with reference to Eksibit "TKH-16", that the First Respondent itself passed a resolution at its annual general meeting of 27 November 2022 acknowledging that the maintenance rate applied since 1 August 2008 was wrong and was to be cancelled. If the resolution is in the terms deposed, the First Respondent's pursuit before the Tribunal of arrears computed on the very rate it had itself accepted to be wrong calls for explanation. Whether the Tribunal erred in allowing such a claim without engaging with the resolution is at the least arguable. Ground 7: Multiplicity of proceedings [38] Finally, reliance is placed on the existence of pending appeals in the Court of Appeal and decided cases in this Court (including Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman No. MA-25-9-05/2023, MA-25- 14-09/2023 and Civil Suit No. MA-22NCvC-9-02/2024, the appeals from the latter being M-01(A)-198-04/2025, M-01(A)-202 04/2025 and M-02(IM)(NCvC)-627-04/2025) which raise issues materially overlapping with those underlying the present claim. Reliance is placed on Orange Business Services (Network) Sdn Bhd v Dealtel (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Another Suit [2019] MLJU 477 (Court of Appeal) for the proposition that multiplicity of proceedings is liable to be treated as an abuse of process tending to inconsistent results. [39] Whether multiplicity exists in the strict sense, and what consequences flow from it, are questions for substantive determination. It is sufficient at this stage to note that the existence of overlapping appellate proceedings is itself a factor weighing in favour of the grant of leave so that the issues may be considered with the benefit of full argument. Disposal of the leave question [40] Taking the grounds in the round, the Applicant has comfortably crossed the WRP Asia Pacific threshold. The proposed application is not frivolous. It raises arguable points — most plainly on the service of Borang 1, on the share-unit/square-foot dichotomy, and on the inclusion of charges said to lie outside the First Respondent's statutory mandate — properly the subject of full argument before this Court. [41] The Applicant separately seeks an order staying execution of the impugned awards pending the substantive disposal of the judicial review. The principles in Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 1 (Federal Court) require special circumstances. Three matters, taken cumulatively, satisfy that requirement. [42] First, prima facie errors of law on the face of the awards. The matters canvassed above most strikingly, the Tribunal's apparent treatment of registered AR post as conclusive of service, in the teeth of the First Respondent's recorded concession that the post had been returned are sufficient at this preliminary stage to amount to a prima facie case of error of law. [43] Second, that judicial review would be rendered nugatory if the Applicant were required to satisfy the awards before the substantive challenge has been determined. The risk of recovery in the event of a successful challenge is, where the underlying respondent is a body that holds funds for the joint benefit of all proprietors, not negligible; and the Applicant deposes (at paragraph 96(c) of the supporting affidavit) to a likelihood of difficulty in recovery. [44] Third, the existence of ongoing appellate proceedings on substantially overlapping issues. To compel payment now, on a footing which may shortly be displaced by the Court of Appeal, would be unsatisfactory. [45] Taken together, these matters constitute special circumstances within the meaning of Kosma Palm Oil Mill. Any stay must, however, be limited and proportionate — confined to execution of the impugned awards and operative only until the disposal of the substantive judicial review or further order of this Court. F. CONCLUSION [46] The Applicant has discharged the onus upon it at the leave stage; the requirements of standing, of timeliness, and of an arguable case are each made out on the affidavit and exhibits filed. [47] Special circumstances of the kind contemplated by the authorities have been demonstrated; an interim stay is appropriate, on terms. [48] Nothing in this judgment is to be taken as expressing any concluded view on the merits of the proposed grounds. Those merits remain open for full argument before the Court at the substantive hearing, when the Court will have the benefit of the First Respondent's evidence and submissions in full. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [49] For the reasons set out above, the Court orders as follows: