Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd (B-02(W)-310-02/2017)

(i) the makers of documents are required to be present at trial to be cross-examined on the authenticity and contents of documents; and

(a) a letter dated 25 June 2008 (‘the letter’); and

(b) an email dated 13 October 2008 (‘the email’). [4] In the High Court the learned Judicial Commissioner (‘JC’) found that the defendant did not defame the plaintiff in the letter, because there was no evidence that the defendant issued the letter and he denied doing so. However, the defendant did not deny sending the email. Accordingly the learned JC held that on a balance of probabilities, the defendant was the person who had sent the said email. [5] The learned JC further held that the defendant defamed the plaintiff in the email. [6] The defendant’s appeal before us is therefore confined to the learned JC’s findings in relation to the email and not the letter. The facts are not in dispute and are set out below. The salient facts [7] The plaintiff company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Amcorp Group Berhad and the developer of a piece of commercial property known as the Amcorp Trade Centre (‘ATC’). [8] ATC comprises the PJ Tower, Amcorp Tower, Melawangi Tower (Menara Melawangi) and Amcorp Mall. The PJ Tower, Amcorp Tower and Amcorp Mall were completed sometime in the year 1997 while Melawangi Tower was completed sometime in the year 2006. 4 [9] ATC was initially managed by an agent, a company known as Jones Lang Wootton. On or around 17 July 2002, the plaintiff took over the management of ATC. [10] The defendant is an individual who is currently an Executive Director of Euratech Industries Sdn Bhd. His late wife, Madam Kam Yew Ling, purchased Unit SS19-19 in Melawangi Tower (‘the unit’) sometime in 2003. The construction of Melawangi Tower was completed in 2006. [11] Sometime in 2008, the defendant became a joint owner of the unit together with his wife. He then sought registration as and became a committee member of the Amcorp Trade Centre Owners and Tenants Association (‘ATCOTA’). ATCOTA is an association registered with the Registrar of Societies on 4 June 2004. [12] Since it was registered, ATCOTA raised many issues and complaints relating to the alleged mismanagement by the plaintiff of ATC but was ignored. [13] At the time the PJ Tower, Amcorp Tower and Amcorp Mall were completed, the relevant statutory legislation were the Strata Titles Act 1985 and the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 which essentially gave developers of stratified property the right to manage the same. [14] In April 2007, the Building and Common Property (Maintenance and Management) Act 2007 came into force. In accordance with this Act, the Joint Management Body (‘JMB’) of ATC 5 was established on 8 April 2008 to maintain the common property of ATC. Its first Annual General Meeting (‘the 1st AGM’) was held on the same day to elect office holders of the JMB. [15] The defendant was dissatisfied with the allegedly improper manner in which the 1st AGM was conducted and claimed that the chairman of the meeting, Yeoh Chong Keat, was clearly in cahoots with the plaintiff. [16] First, the letter dated 25 June 2008 titled “Complaint on the conduct of AGM on 08/04/2008 and Request for EGM” was published and distributed. The contents of the said letter are reproduced below: “Dear Owners, Re: Complaint on the conduct of AGM on 08/04/2008 and Request for EGM The above said AGM proceeded despite numerous protests from owners present at the meeting. Any reasonable person reviewing the video recording of the AGM will agree that it was not proper as the concerns and objections were not adequately addressed. It was also clear that many of the attendees [estimated more than 50%] at the AGM were staff (including plumbers electricians and clerical staff) and business associates of Melawangi Sdn Bhd who somehow managed to obtain proxy rights. Many did not even know whom they were representing. They were only follow blindly the hand of Azlan Baqee, The Executive Director of Developer (Melawangi) who was somehow allowed to sit at the stage. It gives the impression that many of those voted into the JMC by staff and business associates of Melawangi Sdn Bhd are WELL connected to the latter either in personal capacity or through organizations which they have influenced. The AGM, instead of being a property owners meeting became a developer’s staff and business associates versus owners meeting. What is surprising is that 6 Melawangi Sdn Bhd’s management and the Chair (who was from BDO) felt it was morally and professionally right to proceed with the AGM. Now, the suspicions of the owners start to reveal ……. The statement of income and Expenses for the year ended 31st March 2007, we suffered a loss of (RM2,458,303). The summarized Income statements as at 31st March 2008, we suffered another “unaudited” Loss of (RM2,548,155). The summarized Income statement as at 31st March 2008, also shows a Cumulative Losses of …. (RM10,796,365) Now, you know WHY the Developer was working so hard to make sure the Candidates of their choice be selected by their “controlled” proxies (more than 50%) influenced by Azlan Baqee, the Executive Director of Melawangi/Developer. (When his hand is up, the Candidate is Selected……. MAGIC HAND!) BIG QUESTION! Does the Developer/Azlan Baqee has the Right to Vote at the 1st meeting of AGM? Do YOU want a Manager who is “Capable” of Incurring Cumulative Losses of (10.8mil)? THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE ABOVE PROBLEMS IS EGM. Our main Objective is to Increase Income and cut UNREASONABLE AND EXORBITANT EXPENSES. We are confident to turn the 2 years deficits of RM2.5mil each year, (2007 & 2008) into a PROFITABLE YEAR (2009). We must select a group of Dedicated and Committed Candidates who have NO conflict of Interest to form the JMC. You are welcome to offer yourself if you are willing to serve with total commitment and sacrifice. YOUR ATTENDANCE AND SELECTION OF CANDIDATES in the EGM is UTMOST IMPORTANT! We will provide the information to you to make the Right Choice of the Candidates. Please support by signing the letter to request for EGM. (We need 228 signatures, 25% of 910 owners) 7 Please contact us if you need any clarifications Jimmy Teo, 012-2211955, Ng Suet Hoh 019-2854299, Tan 013-3527209, Yeo 012-3918199, Calvin 012-2398018 We propose the new JMC to work closely with Amcorp Trade Centre Owners and Tenants Association. (ATCOTA) We strongly encourage YOU to join ATCOTA to safeguard your Interest.” [17] ATCOTA lodged an official complaint with the Petaling Jaya City Council and the Commissioner of Buildings. The Commissioner of Buildings called for an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of the JMB to be convened on 19 October 2008. The plaintiff attempted to have the EGM postponed. When the Petaling Jaya City Council did not postpone the EGM, the plaintiff filed a judicial review action of the decision to call for the EGM as stated in the Petaling Jaya City Council’s letter dated 23 September 2008. On 16 October 2008, the Shah Alam High Court granted an injunction restraining the EGM until the outcome of the judicial review application. [18] During this period, one “Jimmy Teo” sent an email dated 13 October 2008 titled “Amcorpmall Amended Letters”, the content of which is set out below: “All Purchasers of Amcorp Trade Centre Vote to Protect Your Own Interest at EGM On 19-10-2008 at 2pm at PJ Club

(a) The legal effect or consequence of including the email in Part A of the bundle of documents; and

(b) The adducing of further allegedly defamatory statements at trial which were not pleaded in the amended statement of claim The legal effect or consequence of including the email in Part A of the bundle of documents [24] This is the primary ground of the appeal. It relates to the adjectival position in law in relation to the classification of documents into separate categories, now usually described in practice as Parts A, B and C. Of particular concern here is the meaning to be ascribed to, and the legal consequences of placing documents in Part A. [25] In this context, it is not in dispute that the the litigating parties agreed to place the email in Part A of the Agreed Bundle of Documents. As a consequence, it was marked in the course of evidence without reservation and admitted into evidence. [26] As it was so marked learned counsel for the defendant maintained that it amounted in effect to the plaintiff admitting or conceding that:

(i) the email existed and was not therefore fabricated; 11

(a)…..

(b)…….

(c) the period within which the parties are to file a bundle of all documents that will be relied on or referred to in the course of the trial by any party, including documents referred to in the witness statement of a witness;

(d) the contents of the bundle of the documents referred to in subparagraph (c) shall be agreed on between all parties as far as possible and this bundle of agreed documents shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as Part A; 14

(e) if the parties are unable to agree on certain documents, those documents on which agreement cannot be reached shall be included in separate bundles and each bundle shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as follows:

(i) Part B – documents where the authenticity is not disputed but the contents are disputed;

(a) agreement on the contents of the documents; and

(b) the truth of the contents of the documents. [41] In other words that agreement as to the contents of documents was different from agreement on the truth of the contents of the documents. 16 [42] It was further held that the truth of the contents of the documents had to be expressly further agreed upon by the parties, by reason of the words “shall be agreed on between all parties as far as possible..” in Order 34 Rule 2(2)(d). The construction that was placed on the said rule therefore was that with respect to Part A documents, parties had to agree on the documents as far as possible and had to separately and specifically agree that the truth of the contents of the documents was also agreed upon. [43] Our construction of Order 34 Rule 2(2)(d) and (e) which is consonant with the dissenting judgment of Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JCA, is that Part A documents, which prescribe that both the authenticity and the contents of documents are agreed, must mean that the truth of the content of the documents are agreed upon between the parties. Otherwise they would simply be placed in Part B. [44] This begs the question as to whether there is any distinction between agreement on the contents of a document and the truth of the contents of that document. This is perhaps best answered or illustrated by way of an example. Let us say that the document in question contains the following statement: “I saw Mr X at the meeting on the 5 April 2018 and I heard him state that the profits of the company for the previous year amounted to RM12 million.” [45] If the document were to be placed in Part A then that would mean that the person who authored the document need not be called to testify as the authenticity of the document is not in question. 17 [46] If the parties agree as to content, then it means that the party producing the document and the opposing party both agree that the content of the document is not in dispute. [47] What then is not in dispute? It can only mean that the statement that “I saw Mr X at the meeting on 5 April 2018 and I heard him state that the profits of the company for the previous year amounted to RM12 million.” is agreed or not disputed. [48] That in turn can only mean that the parties agree or do not dispute that the author of the document saw Mr X at the meeting on 5 April 2018 and heard him state that the profits for the previous year amounted to RM12 million. [49] If the opposing party agrees or accepts this content, then it must follow that the fact of the matters stated in the document are accepted and agreed. If the fact of the matters stated there are accepted and agreed this means that the truth of the contents has also been accepted. [50] In other words, there is no tangible or discernible distinction between agreement or a lack of dispute as to the contents of the document, and the truth of the contents of the document. [51] Accordingly a Part A document necessarily refers to agreement not only on authenticity but on the truth of the content of the document. [52] We are fortified in our conclusion on this issue by a consideration of Practice Direction Number 2 of 2014 relating to pre 18 trial case management in accordance with Order 34 of the Rules of Court 2012. With reference to Rule 2(2) and the bundling of documents there is an express provision for Part A, B and C documents. With respect to documents falling within the category of Part A, the Practice Direction states as follows: “Bahagian A: Dokumen yang keesahan dan kandungannya di persetujui” [53] This translates to “Documents where the authenticity and contents are agreed”. [54] Following from our analysis and conclusion that there is no real distinction between agreement on the contents of documents and the truth of the contents of documents, we are of the view that Part A documents refer to documents where the authenticity and the truth of the contents of the documents are not in dispute. [55] Malaysian Civil Procedure 2018, Volume 1 states, inter alia, as follows in its commentary on Order 34 Rule 2 in relation to Part A documents: “Part A documents – When a document is placed in Part A, the parties agree to the truth of its contents. In other words, the parties agree that the document correctly states the facts contained in it……” [56] We respectfully concur with the opinion of the writer in the commentary. As further pointed out there, it is important when reading the older cases on agreed and non-agreed bundles, care has to be taken to consider the manner in which documents were bundled at 19 that time. Bundles were generally divided into “agreed” and “non-agreed” categories. [57] For example Practice Note No 1 of 1948 on Documentary Evidence provided as follows: “In Civil Suits in the Supreme Court, where an Advocate and Solicitor is engaged on either side, it is his duty to assist the Court by presenting documentary evidence in the most convenient possible manner. In most cases it is possible to agree with the majority of documents which will be required in evidence. In every such case they should be so agreed and copies should be made and bound……. In all cases where documents cannot be agreed copies must be available and can conveniently be bound and paged in another bundle” [58] There were thus only two categories of documents – agreed and non-agreed bundles. There was no separate categorisation between documents where the authenticity and contents were not in dispute and documents where the authenticity was not in dispute but the contents were. In other words, there was no sub-categorisation of the agreed bundle into Part A and Part B as is currently the practice. [59] Similarly with Practice Note No. 2 of 1977 which provided: “Bundle of Documents Immediately after the affidavits of documents from both sides have been filed, whether as the result of due compliance by the solicitors or under an order of court, and after such inspection of the documents as is deemed necessary, the solicitor having the conduct of the case, generally the solicitor for the plaintiff, shall request the co-operation of the other side and prepare and file the relevant Bundle or Bundles of Documents. All documents agreed 20 by either side as not to require proof of their existence will be put in a bundle in order of date and Bundle marked “Bundle of Documents Agreed”. All other documents are to be put in another bundle, similarly in chronological order and marked “Bundle of Documents not agreed”. [60] Again there were only two sets of documents envisaged, and no distinction drawn between Part A and Part B documents. [61] This issue is of importance in considering and citing case-law relating to what was agreed between the parties during that era and the present times. Cases such as Jaafar Shaari & Siti Jama Hashim v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1977] 4 CLJ 509 which is often cited to explain how an agreed bundle of documents is to be considered has been discussed both in the majority and dissenting judgments in Yeo Ing King. However at that time there was no distinction between Part A and Part B documents as currently subsists. In other words there were only two bundles, namely the agreed and the non-agreed bundles. Currently the practice is to categorise documents into three bundles namely Parts A, B and C. So when Peh Swee Chin FCJ stated inter alia that: “First and foremost, the agreed bundle of documents means that the documents therein are authentic and they do exist, therefore they require no proof of their authenticity by calling example their makers. Secondly the truth of contents of any of the documents in the agreed bundle of documents is always not admitted unless the contrary is indicated directly or indirectly and such truth of such contents is liable to be challenged in court at the instance of either of the parties.” 21 [62] This part of the judgment has to be read in the context of the categorization of documents in two parts only – the agreed and the non-agreed bundles only. As such it would indeed follow that only authenticity is dispensed with in an agreed bundle while there has to be express agreement between the solicitors that the truth of the contents is also not disputed. Otherwise the contents are taken as being in dispute. [63] However with the further sub-categorisation of an agreed bundle into Part A and B, the need to specifically agree that the truth of the contents of the documents becomes nugatory. This is because Part A deals with both authenticity and content. Once the content is agreed it follows that the truth of the content cannot be in dispute, as explained earlier. So the application of those statements in the judgment ought not to be applied in the present context in light of our current practice as stipulated in Order 34 Rule 2(2)(d) and (e) and Practice Direction No. 2 of 2014. [64] Similarly with the dicta of Gopal Sri Ram JCA in the case of Jaafar Shaari (above) and the case of Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 377 as well as Red and Yellow Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd & Anor v Chuah Lay Boon [1993] 2 CLJ 480. [65] We would again reiterate that we concur, respectfully with the comprehensive dissenting judgment in Yeo Ing King as well as another decision of this Court in Melawangi Sdn Bhd v Lim Kian Hian (Shah Alam High Court Suit No. 22-1946-2008) (‘Lim’s suit’). 22 [66] In Lim’s suit the learned High Court Judge followed the established line of authorities as well as practice and held, inter alia that Part A documents that are admitted into evidence are agreed as to their authenticity and truth of the contents. Consequently, as the defamatory document had been placed in Part A of the Agreed Bundle of Documents and admitted into evidence, the defamatory statements were justified. [67] On appeal, this Court unanimously upheld the learned trial court’s judgment and dismissed the appeal. By so doing there was effectively agreement with the dissenting judgment in Yeo Ing King and disagreement with the majority judgment. [68] We would concur with learned counsel for the appellant in the instant case that the preponderance of authorities confirm that Part A documents that are admitted into evidence are agreed as to their authenticity and truth of the contents. As stated by learned counsel, as far back as 2008, this Court in Raja Lob Sharuddin Raja Ahmad Terzali & Ors v Sri Seltra Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 CLJ 284 held: “It is a well accepted practice in the Civil Division of the High Court in Kuala Lumpur that Bundle of Documents B are categories of documents where both parties have, before the commencement of hearing, agreed to its production without the need to call the maker …….And if a document is put in Bundle A, where the parties have agreed to its production and content, no party would be allowed to ask any question at all on that document………..” [69] And in Amgeneral Insurance Bhd v Sharul Ahmad & Anor [2015] 1 CLJ 532 at pages 538 – 539 the Court stated: 23 “[29] it is trite that documents in Part A cannot be disputed as to their content and authenticity…….. [31] By admitting these agreed documents as Part A documents the Respondent/Plaintiff had admitted not only their authenticity but also to the truth of the contents.” [70] In CB Land Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Perumahan Negara Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 753 the Court held that: “[1] All the documents relied on by the parties are to be found in two volumes marked as CBD1 and 2. These documents are all agreed in terms of authenticity and contents; what is generally understood as Part A type of documents”. [71] The learned JC who determined this case at the High Court level held as follows in Bidari Ehsan Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) v Inai Tropika Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 714: “[24] Furthermore, the parties, particularly the Defendant has already admitted to both the authenticity and the content of the July Agreement as the July agreement was marked as a Part A document. And the law is trite in this respect. In that, a document marked as Part A document cannot be put under scrutiny or be asked any question on……” [72] For all the reasons enunciated above, we are of the considered view that when litigating parties place their documents in bundles marked as Part A, as opposed to Parts B or C, they are expressly acknowledging and accepting that: 24

(i) The authenticity of the document/s in question are not in dispute. This means the existence of the document is accepted. It is not a fabricated or fictitious document;

(a) To assist the court by presenting documentary evidence in the most convenient possible matter as stated in Practice note No. 1 of 1948; 25

(b) To make available to the court all relevant documentary evidence that is likely to be utilised in the course of the trial;

(c) To enable the opposing party to prepare to meet his adversary’s case adequately and efficiently at trial so that he is not taken by surprise;

(d) The placing of the documentary evidence in three parts enables the judge at the pre-trial case to assess the nature of the case, the likely time to be expended on the case and to ascertain the issues that are likely to be the focus of the trial;

(e) To enable litigating parties to assess accurately the precise number of witnesses they have to call to establish their individual cases;

(f) The placement of documents in these categories may well facilitate even the adjudication or determination of issues of fact and law, thereby ensuring an expeditious trial;

(g) To facilitate a smooth trial and to enable witnesses to have ready and easy access to relevant documents;

(h) It can promote mediation and settlement before trial. [76] For the reasons cited above, we conclude that the learned judge erred in holding that the documents in Part A required proof of the truth of the contents of the documents. As we have concluded that no such proof is necessary, it follows that the defence of justification is made out. In other words the categorisation of the email in Part A effectively means that the contents are not in dispute or are agreed. As the contents are agreed to by the plaintiff he effectively accepts what is stated in the email. Agreeing and accepting the contents of the email 26 means that the plaintiff accepts the truth of the same. This in turn can only lead to the legal consequence that justification is made out. The adducing of further allegedly defamatory statements at trial which were not pleaded in the amended statement of claim [77] The second issue that arose for consideration is whether the plaintiff could lead evidence on allegedly defamatory statements at trial which had not been specifically pleaded. [78] In this context, the defendant submitted that initially, the plaintiff pleaded in its Statement of Claim that only one statement in the email is defamatory, namely: “5) The developer presented an account that showed an unusually huge loss of RM10.8 million which was considered unreasonable by the COB…” [79] However, during the trial, the plaintiff had in its sole witness’ statement, WSPW1, attempted to introduce further alleged defamatory statements. In Q&A 9, PW1 attempted to suggest that 4 other statements in the email are defamatory of the plaintiff, namely: 1) The existing air-conditioning contract was awarded at an unusually expensive rate at RM350,000.00 per month to a company for a period of 10 years, one of its directors is the JMC Chairman. 27 2) One of the developer’s employees awarded an outdoor advertising contract to another employee of the developer company. 3) The 4th JMC meeting approved the use of the sinking fund as a TNB deposit without the permission of Amcorp Trade Centre’s owners. 4) JMC appointed the developer company as the managing agent, which is illegal. 5) The developer presented an account that showed an unusually huge loss of RM10,8 million which was considered unreasonable by the COB. 6) Building Maintenance Fund has not been set up causing all monies to continue to be channelled to the developer’s account. This is a serious offence. [80] After the trial, the plaintiff attempted to raise even more alleged defamatory statements in the email. In paragraphs 41 – 61 of the plaintiff’s written submissions, it was submitted that there were 8 defamatory statements in the email. The additional allegedly defamatory statements are: 1) The existing air-conditioning contract was awarded at an unusually expensive rate at RM350,000.00 per month to a company for a period of 10 years, one of its directors is the JMC Chairman. 28 2) One of the developer’s employees awarded an outdoor advertising contract to another employee of the developer company. 3) The 4th JMC meeting approved the use of the sinking fund as a TNB deposit without the permission of Amcorp Trade Centre’s owners. 4) JMC appointed the developer company as the managing agent, which is illegal. 5) The developer presented an account that showed an unusually huge loss of RM10.8 million which was considered unreasonable by the COB. 6) Building Maintenance Fund has not been set up causing all monies to continue to be channelled to the developer’s account. This is a serious offence. 7) The Joint Management Body of Amcorp Trade Centre Budget for the year ended 31.3.2009 places JMC in an estimated debt of RM2.955 million. JMC did not act prudently in adopting the Budget. 8) It is doubtful whether the JMC was formed legally because the developer used a lot of proxies to appoint own employees to attend the AGM, which formed the JMC. [81] The High Court JC agreed with the submission of the plaintiff’s counsel that the plaintiff’s pleaded case is not limited and confined to 29 only one allegedly defamatory statement in the said email, for two reasons. The learned JC considered that first, the further allegedly defamatory statements were not derived from other publications but from the same impugned email. Secondly, His Lordship opined that the defendant would not suffer any prejudice because he is fully aware of the whole contents of the impugned email and was not caught by surprise. [82] With respect, we differ from the learned JC’s conclusion for the following reasons:

(a) As submitted by learned counsel for the defendant, the law in relation to pleadings in a defamation case is clear. The allegedly defamatory words should be set out in verbatim in the particulars of claim and usually in the form of a quotation. A description or summary of the content, purport or effect is insufficient. (See Gatley on Libel and Slander 11th ed. at paragraph 28.11.);

(b) This is borne out by the decision of this Court in Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia v SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 6 CLJ 129: “….the very words complained of, whether stated orally or published, are the facts on which the action is grounded. In other words these are material facts which must be pleaded so that the defendant knows the precise charge against him and is then able to defend himself against it…….It is essential to set out the actual words used so that the court can then decide, as a matter of law, whether the said words whether 30 oral or published give rise to the defamatory imputations alleged……..”;

(c) In the instant case there was only one allegedly defamatory statement pleaded in verbatim and in the form of a quotation. [83] Accordingly it follows that any other defamatory statements other than that specifically pleaded ought not to be considered or adjudicated upon. The learned JC in this regard erred in allowing the plaintiff to adduce additional alleged defamatory statements in verbatim and in the form of quotations mid trial and even after trial. This amounts to a breach of natural justice as the defendant was not able to meet the case of the plaintiff which was being litigated in stages and which caught the defendant off guard. This occasioned prejudice to the defendant. The fact that the learned JC considered all the additional allegedly defamatory statements and found them to be defamatory compounded matters further, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. We are therefore constrained to intervene in an appellate capacity. [84] The trial of the matter ought to have been confined to the single allegedly defamatory statement pleaded in the Statement of Claim. Conclusion [85] In these circumstances we are of the unanimous view that the emplacement of the email in Part A of the bundle of documents 31 resulted in the defence of justification being made out, as explained in extenso earlier. [86] On the pleadings point, we also agree with the appellant/defendant that the respondent/plaintiff could not raise the other defamatory statements which were not pleaded. [87] The appeal is therefore allowed with costs of RM60,000-00 here and below, subject to allocatur. The order of the High Court is set aside. The deposit is refunded. Nallini Pathmanathan Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated : 4th July 2018 For the Appellant : Douglas Yee (Ong Chern Yii with him) Tetuan Douglas Yee Peguambela & Peguamcara No. 31 (Tingkat 1) Jalan 21/1 46300 Petaling Jaya Selangor For the Respondent : Dato’ Dhanaraj (Devandra and Kalai Selvi) Tetuan Kamil Hashim Raj & Lim Peguambela & Peguamcara No. 2 Jalan 14/7 Seksyen 14 46100 Petaling Jaya Selangor Signed