would be rendered 155 meaningless. Such an interpretation would offend the settled principle that a statute must be construed so that every word and provision is given effect and none is treated as redundant. 160 [8] This interpretation is further supported by a consistent line of authorities that recognise that statutory provisions must be read harmoniously, not in isolation. [9] In Benjamin William Hawkes v PP [2020] 5 MLRA 615; 165 [2020] 5 MLJ 417; [2020] 8 CLJ 267, the Federal Court held that the use of the word “shall” does not automatically render a provision mandatory. The true effect of the provision, whether it is mandatory or directory, depends on the intention of Parliament. That is to be gathered from the 170 overall scope and scheme of the statute. Her Ladyship Zabariah Mohd Yusof FCJ, delivering the judgment of the court states: “Applying the principles as enunciated in the aforesaid 175 cases, whether the word ‘shall’ in a particular legislation is mandatory or directory depends upon the intention of the Legislature in question which is ascertained by looking at the whole scope of the statute to be construed. The use of the word ‘shall’ would not by itself make a 180 provision of the Act mandatory. It is to be construed with reference to the scheme of the statute and the context in which it is used.” 185 [10] Similarly, in Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad v Mohd Afrizan Husain [2022] 4 CLJ 657; [2022] 3 MLJ 450; [2022] 4 MLRA 547, the Federal Court reaffirmed that the word “shall” may be interpreted as directory when read in the context of the statutory purpose and public interest. The 190 Federal Court states: “[71] The use of the word "shall" does not always mean that it is being used mandatorily, as expressly elucidated in the case - law above. There are numerous instances where the word "shall" is used in a way that does not 195 denote a mandatory legal obligation. (As Bryan Garner, the legal writing scholar and editor of Black's Law Dictionary noted - "In most legal instruments, shall violates the presumption of consistency... which is why shall is among the most heavily litigated words in the 200 English language.").” “[97]…This means that the word "shall" is not mandatory in nature but is directory, meaning that Bursa may de-list the listed corporation after taking into consideration the relevant interests as outlined in the CMSA and the 205 AMLR, at an appropriate time, and not immediately upon pronouncement of the winding-up order.” [11] The same approach was adopted in Tee Kim Tin v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang; West Coast Expressway 210 Sdn Bhd (Interested Party) [2025] MLRHU 14; [2025] MLJU 25; [2025] CLJU 21, where the High Court held that the court must examine the subject matter and the general object of the legislation before concluding whether the word “shall” in a statute is mandatory. 215 [12] Likewise, in Syamsul Fazwan Abdul Aziz v PP [2020] MLRHU 1875; [2020] MLJU 2383; [2020] 1 CLJU 2201, the court held that although the word “shall” ordinarily suggest a mandatory obligation, its construction ultimately 220 depends on the legislative intention and whether the object of the law would be defeated by non-compliance. [13] The same principle was recognised in R v Soneji [2005] UKHL 49; [2006] 1 AC 340, a landmark decision of the 225 House of Lords, which held that the use of the word “shall” does not automatically make a provision mandatory; the court must examine the legislative purpose and the consequences of non-compliance. Whether a rigid interpretation would lead to an unjust result that Parliament 230 did not intend. Lord Steyn states: “15… This was an important and influential dictum. It led to the adoption of a more flexible approach of focusing intensely on the consequences of non- 235 compliance, and posing the question, taking into account those consequences, whether Parliament intended the outcome to be total invalidity…” The House of Lords further stated: 240 “23. …Instead, as held in Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 1999), the emphasis ought to be on the consequences of non-compliance, and posing the question whether Parliament can fairly be taken to have intended total invalidity.” 245 [14] Having regard to the cases referred to above, I agree with the reasoning of Justice Hazlina Hussain in Sierra Solutions Sdn Bhd (supra). In exercising this discretion, the court must undertake a balancing exercise between the 250 need for public safety and deterrence on the one hand, and the accused’s commercial interests and proportionality on the other. This principle is well-established in PP v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256; [1976] CLJU 102; [1976] 1 MLRH 23, where the court emphasised that “the correct 255 approach is to strike a balance, as far as possible, between the interests of the public and the interests of the accused”. [15] In the context of the Land Public Transport Act 2010, although overloading offences may damage roads and 260 public infrastructure and pose risks to road users, the punishment imposed should not be harsher than what is reasonably necessary to deter such offences and ensure compliance with the law. 265 [16] In the present case, the appellant is a first-time offender. The fine of RM35,000.00 is substantial and serves as a sufficient deterrent. This court finds that the additional order of forfeiture of the semitrailer, which is a key commercial asset to the appellant, imposes a "crushing 270 effect" on the company's ability to operate. To deprive a commercial entity of its primary means of livelihood for a first-time overloading offence, where no accident or fatality occurred, is manifestly excessive. 275 [17] Following the appellate principle in Khoo Tam Seng v PP [1970] 1 MLJ 5; [1969] CLJU 68; [1969] 1 MLRH 473, a forfeiture order must not be disproportionate to the gravity of the offence committed. In that case, the accused was fined RM200 or one month imprisonment for transporting 280 toddy, and the Magistrate further ordered the confiscation of the lorry used in the offence on the mistaken view that forfeiture was mandatory under sections 61(i) and 67 of the Excise Enactment. The High Court held that the learned Magistrate had misinterpreted the statutory 285 provisions and clarified that forfeiture was discretionary rather than mandatory. Having regard to the quantity of toddy involved and the fine already imposed, the High Court found that the forfeiture order was manifestly excessive and accordingly quashed it. 290 [18] In the present case, the appellant is a first-time offender. The fine of RM35,000 imposed by the learned Magistrate is already substantial and sufficient to serve the purpose of deterrence. The further order forfeiting the semitrailer, 295 which is an important commercial asset of the appellant’s business, would have a serious impact on the company’s operations and livelihood. This court is of the view that for a first overloading offence, particularly where no accident, injury, or loss of life was caused, the additional punishment 300 of forfeiture would be excessive and disproportionate to the gravity of the offence committed. [19] Further, this court notes that the learned Magistrate imposed a fine which is relatively low when compared to 305 the maximum fine of RM500,000 provided under the Act. This indicates that the offence was not treated as being among the most serious category of offences under the legislation. If the vehicle is additionally forfeited, the overall punishment imposed on the appellant would 310 become far more severe than what was contemplated by the fine itself. In the circumstances of this case, such a combined punishment would be manifestly excessive and disproportionate to the gravity of the offence. Accordingly, this court is justified in interfering with the order of 315 forfeiture imposed by the learned Magistrate. [20] The decision in Khoo Tam Seng v PP (supra) is instructive. The court in that case held that a forfeiture order should not be disproportionate to the seriousness of 320 the offence committed. In the present case, the fine imposed has already achieved the objectives of punishment and deterrence. Thus, the forfeiting of the vehicle would go beyond what is necessary. 325 [21] The prosecution argues that the present case differs from Sierra Solutions Sdn Bhd (supra), as that case involved procedural delay. While that may be correct, the interpretation of section 80(3) LPTA in that case remains relevant. It confirms that the court has the power to release 330 the vehicle where forfeiture would lead to an unjust or disproportionate result with crushing effect. CONCLUSION 335 [22] For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The order of forfeiture of the semitrailer KEJ9915/T/A8496 is set aside. The vehicle is ordered to be released to the appellant forthwith. The fine of RM35,000.00 is maintained. 340 Dated : May 2026 345 [MOSES SUSAYAN] JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT IPOH, PERAK 350 Counsel : For the Appellant : Keshvinder Singh 355 (together with Teeban Kumar) Advocates and Solicitors [Messrs Kesh, Dave & Partners] Kampar, Perak 360 For the Respondent : Geetha Jora Singh Deputy Public Prosecutor Prosecution Unit [Perak State Legal Adviser’s Office] 365 Ipoh, Perak (Notice: This Grounds of Decision is subject to official editorial revision) 370 Headnotes: ROAD TRANSPORT AND PUBLIC TRANSPORT: Overloading offence – Forfeiture of semitrailer – Appeal against forfeiture order – Whether forfeiture under section 80(4) Land Public 375 Transport Act 2010 mandatory or discretionary – Interpretation of sections 80(3) and 80(4) – Whether word “shall” automatically renders forfeiture mandatory – Whether statutory provisions must be read harmoniously and not in isolation – Whether court retains discretion to order forfeiture or release – Whether 380 forfeiture disproportionate to gravity of offence – Fine of RM35,000 imposed on a First-time offender against maximum fine of RM500,000 – Whether forfeiture imposed constitutes a “crushing effect” on appellant’s business operations – Whether punishment manifestly excessive – Whether appellate 385 intervention justified.