Trudy Ranjini Ganendra v 1. ) Dato' Dennis Ganendra (WA-24NCC-551-12/2021)

DATO’ DENNIS GANENDRA (No. K/P: 651230-07-5497)

MINCONSULT SDN BHD (No. K/P: 58835-P)

DATO WAN RAZALI BIN WAN MUDA (No. K/P: 531006-11-5013)

DATO SRI ROSLAN BIN MUHAMMAD TAHAR (No. K/P: 590316-04-5145) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 222)

This was the Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 222 seeking leave to file a further affidavit to adduce additional documentary evidence in relation to alleged financial irregularities concerning an overpayment by the 2nd Defendant S/N H69fBMkTWEuBlaHidnfjog Page 3 of 10 (“Minco”) to Ganendra Ahmad & Associates Sdn Bhd (“GAASB”) in the sum of RM6,500,000.00.

By the time Enclosure 222 was filed on 7.10.2024, approximately 35 to 40 affidavits had already been filed and exchanged between the parties in this Originating Summons.

The Plaintiff contends that the further affidavit is necessary to support her claim of oppression and financial mismanagement under section 346 of the Companies Act 2016. She also sought consequential relief to vacate the hearing dates fixed for cross-examination of deponents of affidavits.

Having heard the parties and considered the affidavits and written submissions, I dismissed Enclosure 222 with costs. These are my reasons.

The Plaintiff had previously filed an earlier application for leave to file a further affidavit in Enclosure 164, raising substantially similar grounds and matters. That application was dismissed by this Court on 3.10.2023. Although an appeal was initially lodged, the Plaintiff subsequently withdrew the appeal, rendering the dismissal of Enclosure 164 final.

The present application (Enclosure 222) was filed more than 8 months after affidavits were deemed closed (15.2.2023) and barely 2 weeks before the scheduled hearing dates for cross-examination of the Plaintiff and Defendants’ affidavits on

21.10.2024 to 23.10.2024. These dates were mutually agreed upon by the parties, both in relation to the right to cross-examine the deponents of the parties’ affidavits as well as the dates fixed for hearing.

The proposed affidavit seeks to adduce financial documents and audited accounts of Minco from 2013 to 2023 to show that the alleged overpayment to GAASB was not properly accounted for.

The Plaintiff submitted that the principles in Ladd v. Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745, which is applicable in the context of an appeal, should not apply strictly to interlocutory proceedings before the High Court. It was contended that this Court retains a broad discretion under Order 3 rule 5 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 to permit the filing of further affidavits whenever justice so requires, and that the Court should exercise such discretion liberally since the substantive hearing of the Originating Summons has not been concluded.

Having considered the parties’ submissions, I find that the Ladd v. Marshall principle does not apply to the present application. The decision in Ladd v. Marshall was formulated in the appellate context to govern the admission of fresh evidence after the conclusion of trial proceedings. It does not extend to interlocutory applications at first instance where the exchange of affidavits remains within the Court’s control. The present application (Enclosure 222) therefore falls to be S/N H69fBMkTWEuBlaHidnfjog Page 5 of 10 considered only under the Court’s inherent powers and the discretionary jurisdiction preserved by Orders 3 and 92 of the Rules of Court 2012.

In considering whether to allow or dismiss an application for leave to file a further affidavit, the Courts are guided by several key factors. The case of Pannir Selvam a/l Perianan & Anor v. ALH Industries Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2019] MLJU 1146 sets out three principal considerations: i) The extent of the delay in filing the application to adduce the further affidavit; ii) Whether there are cogent and credible reasons for the applicant’s failure to file the affidavit within the prescribed timeframe; and iii) The degree of prejudice or injustice that may be occasioned to the opposing party should the Court exercise its discretion in granting leave.

Applying the above principle, I find no merits or grounds to justify the exercise of the Court’s discretion. The materials sought to be introduced are not new, and there is no adequate explanation for the inordinate delay or for why these documents were not exhibited earlier.

The Court’s inherent powers cannot be invoked to circumvent procedural finality or to allow piecemeal supplementation of the record at the Plaintiff’s convenience. The discretion to reopen evidence must be exercised sparingly, and only where the interests of justice plainly demand it. That threshold has not been met here.

Even if Ladd v. Marshall were to apply, the Plaintiff has not satisfied any of its requirements in that: i) the evidence could, with reasonable diligence, have been obtained and produced earlier. ii) the documents would not have an important or material influence on the outcome of the case, as the alleged transactions are already addressed in existing affidavits and financial statements before the Court. iii) the proposed evidence has not been shown to be credible or necessary in light of the Plaintiff’s own position as a director and shareholder with prior access to the same materials.

On each of the above limbs, the Plaintiff falls short.

Finally, even if some limited probative value could be attributed to the proposed affidavit, the prejudice to the Defendants far outweighs any potential benefit.

Allowing the application at this late stage would: i) necessitate the filing of further affidavits; ii) cause the hearing of the cross-examination of deponents of affidavits to be postponed and delayed. It already took several weeks to fix parties’ common hearing dates; iii) complicate the cross-examination process, as it may involve additional affidavits and l deponents; iv) cause consequential delay to proceedings that have already advanced substantially.

It would also undermine the principles of the economical use of the Court’s time and the finality of litigation. The balance of justice therefore militates decisively against the grant of leave.

Having considered this submission, I find no merits or grounds to allow the application under the Court’s general discretionary powers. The discretion under Orders 3 and 92 of the Rules of Court 2012 must be exercised judiciously and consistently with the overriding objective of ensuring finality, expedition, and economy in proceedings.

In this case, the Plaintiff has not shown any exceptional or compelling circumstances to justify departing from the ordinary rule that affidavit evidence, once closed, ought not to be S/N H69fBMkTWEuBlaHidnfjog Page 8 of 10 re‑opened. It must be emphasised that approximately 35 to 40 affidavits had already been filed and exchanged.

For the reasons I have stated, this application in Enclosure 222 is dismissed with costs in favour of all the Defendants. Dated this 15th day of October, 2025 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, (COMMERCIAL DIVISION (NCC 3)) HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA S/N H69fBMkTWEuBlaHidnfjog Page 9 of 10 PLAINTIFF : Vasanthi A/P V. Sathasivam (Sugumaran A/L Kumareson and Subathra A/P K Sathianathan together with her) Messrs K. Sugu & Associates No. 63-2, Petaling Utama Avenue, Jalan PJS 1/50, Taman Petaling Utama, 46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Tel: 03-77724346 Email: ksuguassociates@yahoo.com 1ST DEFENDANT : Arthur Ng Wei Meng (Nom Chelvan (pupil-in-chambers) together with him) Messrs Christopher & Lee Ong Level 22, Axiata Tower, No. 9, Jalan Stesen Sentral 5, Kuala Lumpur Sentral, 50470 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-22731919 Email: CLO-info@christopherleeong.com 2ND DEFENDANT : Saritha Devi Kirupalani (Nur Ainnabila Rosdi together with her) Messrs Firoz Julian Level 19, Menara Milenium, Jalan Damanlela, Pusat Bandar Damansara, 50490 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-20879999 Emaill: info@ziclegal.com S/N H69fBMkTWEuBlaHidnfjog Page 10 of 10 3RD & 4TH DEFENDANTS : Lim Wei Jiet (Nevyn Vinosh Venudran together with him) Messrs Lim Wei Jiet Suite 8.01A, Level 8, Wisma E&C, Damansara Heights, 50490 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-27328226 Emaill: limweijiet91@gmail.com LEGISLATION / RULES CITED Companies Act 2016 ▪ Section 346 Rules of Court 2012 ▪ Order 3 rule 5 ▪ Order 92 rule 4

Ladd v. Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745

Pannir Selvam a/l Perianan & Anor v. ALH Industries Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2019] MLJU 1146