Ttdi Kl Metropolis Sdn Bhd v China Construction Yangtze River (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (WA-24C-204-12/2025)

These two Originating Summons being heard together are connected by an Adjudication Decision dated 27.11.2025 in Adjudication Reference No: AIAC/D/ADJ-5990-2025 ("Adjudication Decision") that China Construction Yangtze River (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd ("CCYR") had obtained against TTDI KL Metropolis Sdn Bhd ("TTDI") under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 ("Act").

By Originating Summons No: WA-24C-192-12/2025 ("OS 192"), CCYR is applying under section 28 of the Act to enforce the Adjudication Decision against TTDI.

By Originating Summons No: WA-24C-204-12/2025 ("OS 204"), TTDI is applying under sections 15(b) and 15(d) of the Act to set the Adjudication Decision aside.

By an application in Enclosure 25 in OS 204 ("Interim Stay Application”), TTDI is further applying under section 16(1)(a) of the Act to stay the Adjudication Decision pending the disposal of OS 204.

As a matter of prudence, I decided to hear both Originating Summonses together, and issued directions for that. I will decide OS 204 first, i.e. whether TTDI has made a case for setting the Adjudication Decision aside under sections 15(b) and 15(d) of the Act. After all, if the Adjudication Decision is set aside, then there will be nothing left to enforce or stay.

If I decide OS 204 against TTDI and dismiss it, I will then decide OS 192. There will be no need to decide the Interim Stay Application, as the need to do so would have passed with having already dismissed OS 204.

Interestingly, in paragraph 6.3 of TTDI's Afidavit Jawapan Defendan affirmed on 19.1.2026 to opposing OS 192, TTDI had mentioned having issued to CCYR a Notice of Arbitration dated 16.1.2026 to refer their disputes (including the disputes in the Adjudication Proceedings) to arbitration. However, TTDI did not file any corresponding application to stay the Adjudication Decision under section 16(1)(b) of the Act pending the final determination of that arbitration.

This means that the Court is thereby left to decide whether the Adjudication Decision ought to be set aside, or whether it should be enforced, which I will now proceed to do.

But first, the salient facts. Salient facts

By a Letter of Award dated 10.11.2017 ("LOA"), the Agreement and Conditions of PAM Contract 2006 (With Quantities) ("Conditions of Contract") and other documents forming the contract (collectively, "Contract"), TTDI had appointed CCYR as the main contractor for the construction works ("Works") for the project known as "CADANGAN PEMBANGUNAN BERCAMPUR 59 TINGKAT YANG MENGANDUNGI 1 BLOK 616 UNIT PANGSAPURI 51 TINGKAT BERSERTA 1 TINGKAT KEMUDAHAN, 1 BLOK MENARA PEJABAT 24 TINGKAT BERSERTA 1 TINGKAT KEMUDAHAN, 1 BLOK MENARA PEJABAT 23 TINGKAT, SEBUAH KELAB EKSEKUTIF DUA TINGKAT, DI ATAS 8 TINGKAT PODIUM YANG MENGANDUNGI 6 TINGKAT TEMPAT LETAK KERETA PODIUM DAN 2 TINGKAT RUANG PERNIAGAAN DI ATAS 2 $ \frac{1}{2} $ TINGKAT TEMPAT LETAK KERETA BESMEN DI ATAS PT26885 (PLOT 7B2), MUKIM BATU DAERAH KUALA LUMPUR WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN" ("Project"). The contract sum was RM620,869,686.86.

TTDI alleges that the Contract was superseded and replaced by a Tripartite Agreement dated 15.08.2018 ("Tripartite Agreement"), between TTDI, CCYR and a company called China Construction Third Bureau First Engineering Co. Ltd ("CCTB").

By a Payment Claim dated 28.5.2025, CCYR had claimed from TTDI the sum of RM29,004,724.20. This consisted of:

RM10,756,198.53 being the sums due under the Interim Certificates No 68-84 (after taking into account the sum of RM2,584,118.22 due to third parties);

(ii) RM15,521,742.17 being the first half of the retention sum; and

(iii) RM2,726,783.50 being the sums wrongly deducted from the sums due to the Claimant.

When TTDI did not respond to the Payment Claim, CCYR proceeded to institute adjudication proceedings under the Act against TTDI ("Adjudication Proceedings").

In the Adjudication Proceedings, the parties had submitted the following to the Adjudicator, to each of which was annexed documents:

CCYR's Payment Claim dated 28.5.2025 ("Payment Claim");

(ii) CCYR's Adjudication Claim dated 1.8.2025 ("Adjudication Claim");

(iii) TTDI's Adjudication Response dated 22.8.2025 ("Adjudication Response"); and

(iv) CCYR's Adjudication Reply dated 9.9.2025 ("Adjudication Reply") (collectively, "Adjudication Cause Papers").

In the Adjudication Response, apart from disputing CCYR's entire claims, TTDI had essentially raised the following grounds:

its jurisdictional challenge and/or preliminary objection to on the Adjudicator's jurisdiction to adjudicate CCYR's claims; and

(ii) the following counterclaims / set-off:

RM168,507,945.77 being the liquidated ascertained damages that Naza is entitled to impose against CCYR;

RM10,008,000.00 being the costs for defect rectification works;

RM3,506,743.64 being the additional costs arising from the appointment of third-party contractors to complete the balance of uncompleted works under the Project; and

Costs.

In paragraphs 167 and 168 of the Adjudication Decision, the Adjudicator said: "167. After having considered all documents provided to me by the parties, I hereby determine that:-

The Claimant is entitled to the following:-

RM1,539,375.92 being the Unpaid Certified Sum due and owing to the Claimant by the Respondent;

(ii) RM15,521,742.17 being the First Half of the Retention Sum due and payable to the Claimant by the Respondent;

(iii) RM2,726,783.50 being the Wrongly Deducted Sums due and payable to the Claimant by the Respondent (hereinafter referred to as "Adjudicated Sums")

The Respondent shall pay the Claimant interests based on the Maybank Base Lending Rate of 6.40% per annum plus one (1) percent :-

on RM1,539,375.92 being the Unpaid Certified Sum due and owing to the Claimant by the Respondent from 11.6.2025 until full and final settlement;

(ii) on RM15,521,742.17 being the First Half of the Retention Sum due and payable to the Claimant by the Respondent from 26.11.2024 until full and final settlement;

The Respondent shall pay the Claimant party to party costs in the sum of RM80,000.00;

The Respondent shall pay the total costs of adjudication in the sum of RM116,641.04;

The Respondent shall pay the Adjudicated Sum together with interests and costs as set out above by way of cheque, bank draft or electronic transfer to the Claimant within 14 days from the receipt of this Adjudication Decision;"

It is therefore clear from the Adjudication Decision that the Adjudicator had:

only partly allowed CCYR's claims under the alleged outstanding Interim Certificates (i.e. RM1,539,375.92 out of the sum of RM10,756,198.53 claimed;

(ii) allowed CCYR's claims for the first half of the retention sum and the sums wrongly deducted; and

(iii) dismissed TTDI's counterclaims / set-off.

As I had said earlier, by a Notice of Arbitration dated 16.1.2026 to refer their disputes (including the disputes in the Adjudication Proceedings) to arbitration.

CCYR filed OS 192 on 15.12.2025, and TTDI filed OS 204 on 29.12.2025.

TTDI has not paid any of the sums under the Adjudication Decision to CCYR. OS204 Preliminary issue - invalidating an adjudication decision

Before dealing with the merits of OS 204, there is a preliminary issue which I believe it necessary to deal with, that somehow crops up now and again.

Even though for OS 204 TTDI clearly invokes sections 15(b) and (d) of the Act, in prayers 1(a) and (b) of OS 204, TTDI is seeking the following relief: "(a) Deklarasi bahawa Keputusan Adjudikasi tersebut adalah tidak sah dan dibatalkan (void);

Perintah bahawa Keputusan Adjudikasi tersebut diketepikan dan/atau diiktiraf sebagai tidak sah;"

However, neither the Act nor section 15 of the Act provide for any declaration or order that an adjudication decision is "tidak sah dan dibatalkan" or "diiktiraf sebagai tidak sah".

The operative section of the Act for challenging an adjudication decision is section 15. Under section 15 of the Act, the Court's powers for interfering with an adjudication decision are confined to setting it aside, under any one or more of the four instances set out in limbs (a), (b), (c) and (d) thereof. Section 15 of the Act provides: "15. Improperly procured adjudication decision An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds:

the adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery;

there has been a denial of natural justice;

the adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or

the adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction."

As the Court's power is confined to setting an adjudication decision aside and not declaring it invalid, null and void, I dismiss prayer (a) and a part of prayer (b) of prayer 1 of OS 204, and will confine the assessment of OS 204 to determining whether TTDI had established any grounds for setting it aside. Limbs (b) and (d) of section 15 of the Act

Though an applicant may apply to set an adjudication decision aside under more than one of those limbs of section 15, each limb is distinct and separate, with their own characteristics and requirements. Suffice to say that none of them are synonymous or interchangeable.

It is thus incumbent on a party invoking section 15 of the Act to be clear which limb it is invoking and the reasons why. It is insufficient for an applicant to simply make allegations and cite one or more limb, and expect the Court to make out which limb the allegations fall under.

It is further incumbent on the applicant to set out those grounds in its affidavit in support of the setting aside application. See Order 69A rule 3 (1) and (2) of the Rules of Court, 2012. Applications of this nature usually involve three affidavit, namely:

the applicant's affidavit in support of the application, detailing the grounds for the application;

(ii) the respondent's affidavit in reply to the applicant's said affidavit, detailing the reasons why those grounds do not justify setting the adjudication decision aside; and

(iii) the applicant's affidavit rebutting those reasons advanced by the respondent.

From that, it is clear that an applicant cannot be raising new grounds to set the adjudication in its rebuttal affidavit.

As I had said at the outset, TTDI is applying to set the Adjudication Decision aside under limbs (b) and (d) of section 15 of the Act, i.e. that there has been a denial of natural justice or that the Adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction. As a starting point of the analysis, it may be therefore be expedient to set out what making a case under that those limbs (b) and (d) entail. Limb (b): allegation of a denial of natural justice

In Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 35, Tengku Maimun JCA (later CJ) said: "There are two limbs of the rules of natural justice, the first is that a man should not be the judge in his own cause (rule against bias) and the second is that the judge must hear both sides of the dispute (rule of audi alteram partem/right to be heard). Here we were concerned with the second limb which requires that both parties be accorded the opportunity to advance their case. In the context of section 15(b) of the CIPAA, the function of the court is to look at the manner in which the adjudicator conducted the hearing and whether he had accorded procedural fairness to the appellant."

In ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522, David Wong Dak Wah JCA (later CJ Sabah & Sarawak) said of natural justice: "When one speaks of natural justice, it is nothing more than what we call the concept of "procedural fairness" which needs to be accorded to the parties in a dispute of a hearing..."

In Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd and another case [2017] 7 MLJ 732, Lee Swee Seng J (now FCJ) said (in paragraph [57] of his Judgment: "From this and other cases, I conclude as follows in relation to breaches of natural justice in adjudication cases:

It must first be established that the Adjudicator failed to apply the rules of natural justice;

Any breach of the rules must be more than peripheral; they must be material breaches;

Breaches of the rules will be material in cases where the adjudicator has failed to bring to the attention of the parties a point or issue which they ought to be given the opportunity to comment upon if it is one which is either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome of the resolution of the dispute and is not peripheral or irrelevant;

Whether the issue is decisive or of considerable potential importance or is peripheral or irrelevant obviously involves a question of degree which must be assessed by any judge in a case such as this. It is only if the adjudicator goes off on a frolic of his own, that is wishing to decide a case upon a factual or legal basis which has not been argued or put forward by either side, without giving the parties an opportunity to comment or, where relevant put in further evidence, that the type of breach of the rules of natural justice with which the case of Balfour Beatty Construction Company Ltd v The Camden Borough of Lambeth was concerned comes into play. It follows that, if either party has argued a particular point and the other party does not come back on the point, there is no beach of the rules of natural justice in relation thereto."

It is clear from these cases that an allegation of denial of natural justice cannot be founded on the mere dissatisfaction or disagreement with an adjudication decision. An allegation of denial of natural justice requires more. Limb (d): Allegation that adjudicator had acted in excess of jurisdiction

By section 27 of the Act, an adjudicator derives his/her jurisdiction from the matters referred to in the payment claim and the payment response that are filed pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of the Act respectively. Section 27 subsections (1) and (2) of the Act provide: "27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator

Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator's jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6.

The parties to adjudication may at any time by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to decide on any other matter not referred to the adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6."

In paragraphs [70] - [76] of his Judgment in Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd v Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2017] MLJU 242, Lee Swee Seng J (now FCJ) classified jurisdiction under section 15(d) of the Act as falling into three categories, namely core jurisdiction, competence jurisdiction, and contingent jurisdiction. He said: "In the application of our CIPAA, we are free from the shackles of the language of administrative law and judicial review. The word "jurisdiction" is used in section 15(d) as in the Adjudicator having acted in "excess of his jurisdiction" as a ground for setting aside an Adjudication Decision. It is also used in section 27(1) with respect to an Adjudicator's jurisdiction being limited to the matters raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. Then there is a reference to it in section 27(2) with respect to extending his jurisdiction by way of agreement in writing to deal with matters not specifically raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Response. Finally there is the reference to a "jurisdictional" challenge, which when raised, does not prevent the Adjudicator from proceeding and completing the Adjudication without prejudice to the rights of any party to set it aside under Section 15 or to oppose its enforcement under Section 28. There are many senses in which the word "jurisdiction" may be understood. We need only to differentiate between core jurisdiction, competence jurisdiction and contingent jurisdiction. Core jurisdiction would be the question of whether the subject matter of the dispute is one which the Act has conferred on the Adjudicator. Thus, if a contract is not a construction contract, but a shipping or mining contract or a contract for legal fees with respect to advice given in construction contract, or that the contract is with respect to construction of a dwelling house for a natural person, then this Court will interfere if the Adjudicator got it wrong. It is a case where the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction to begin with. So too if the construction contract is carried out wholly outside Malaysia. If it is a question of the competence of the Adjudicator as in he has not been properly appointed in that what purported to be a Payment Claim, is not on the face of it a Payment Claim or that the Payment Claim was not served or that it was not expressly stated as a claim made under CIPAA, then this Court would be at liberty to set aside the Adjudication Decision on ground of excess of jurisdiction. This is not only because the Adjudicator cannot decide on his own competence or capacity to adjudicate when the very validity of his appointment is questioned but also that it is part of the legislative intent that if there is non-compliance with a basic and essential requirement of CIPAA with respect to a Payment Claim under Section 5, then the Adjudication Proceedings and the Decision made would be a nullity. In a case of contingent jurisdiction, it would be a case where for there to be jurisdiction, there must be further compliance with the requirements of the Act as in that the dispute must be one falling within the matters raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response as provided for under section 27(1) CIPAA. In that example the word "jurisdiction" is used in the sense of the scope of the dispute that is before the Adjudicator for decision. So for example an Adjudicator may not be able to decide on the defence of set-off arising out of costs of rectifying defective works if this has not been raised in the Payment Response. If he so decides, then this Court may set it aside as been made in excess of jurisdiction. Issues as to whether there is a valid cause of action, does not go towards jurisdiction but rather to the merits of the claim which in our system of statutory Adjudication, is not a matter for the Court to interfere unless the grounds under Section 15 CIPAA apply. So long as the cause of action disclosed in the Payment Claim complies with the outward requirement, it is then for the Adjudicator to descend into the merits of the claim and to decide whether there is a complete cause of action or for some reasons, the cause of action has been postponed until for example there is a final account prepared after the completion of the Project. The question of the lack of a proper cause of action has nothing to do with the validity of the Adjudicator's appointment as in his competence to hear the dispute but at most, it has to do with the exercise of his jurisdiction with respect to the validity of his Decision."

In View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 222, Zulkefli FCJ said: "The principle that jurisdiction is about subject-matter applies to every statute. Thus, the CIPAA applies only to 'construction contracts' as defined under the Act (see ss 2, 3 and 4) and that the 'payment dispute' must arise under a construction contract. These are fundamental jurisdictional premises for the CIPAA to apply. Sections 5 and 6 of the CIPAA relate to this. Section 5 of the CIPAA speaks of a 'payment pursuant to a construction contract'. By s 4 of the CIPAA, 'payment' is defined as 'payment for work done ... under the express terms of a construction contract'. The response under s 6 of the CIPAA has to be in relation to the 'payment' claim under ss 4 and 5 of the CIPAA as to whether it is admitted or disputed. By s 27(1) of the CIPAA, the arbitrator's jurisdiction 'is limited to the matter referred to adjudication' pursuant to ss 5 and 6 of the CIPAA. It refers to the 'identification of the cause of action' in relation to the construction contract as required under s 5(2)(b) of the CIPAA. In turn, the payment response under s 6 of the CIPAA is defined and limited by the claim under s 5 of the CIPAA."

In Anas Construction Sdn Bhd v JKP Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2024] MLJU 53, Nordin Hassan FCJ said: "The plain meaning of section 27(1) of CIPAA is that the jurisdiction of an Adjudicator is limited to matters referred to by parties to the Adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of the same Act. Section 5 relates to the Payment Claim whilst section 6 relates to the Payment Response."

In WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1236, Mary Lim J (later FCJ) said: "Subsection 27(1) restricts the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to the matters found in sections 5 and 6. In short, the Adjudicator takes jurisdiction from the payment claim and the payment response; not from the adjudication claim, adjudication response or even the adjudication reply. This is materially significant and important as this brings to bear the whole scheme of CIPAA 2012; that the adjudication proceedings is to deal with or resolve a payment dispute. ... The Adjudicator's sole task is to resolve that dispute for the reasons already made known between the parties; and nothing else. Any change to those rules of engagement requires a written consent between the parties and that is clear from subsection 27(2). Were it otherwise, there would be no fair play and ultimately, no confidence in the mechanism that has been so elaborately set up by Parliament..."

It is clear from section 27 of the Act and those four cases that the adjudicator's jurisdiction is demarcated by the payment claim and the payment response or, in the absence thereof, an adjudication response. If a matter is raised in the payment claim and the payment response / adjudication response and the adjudicator decides it, then he has acted within his/her jurisdiction. Conversely, if an adjudicator decides on a matter that is not raised in the payment claim or the payment response / adjudication response, then he has acted in excess of his jurisdiction.

Apart from that, it is also crucial to bear in mind that the Court does not sit as an appellate body to review and set aside an adjudication decision on its merits.

In Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728, Mary Lim J (later FCJ) said: "It must be noted that under CIPAA, there is no right of appeal against the decision of the adjudicator which is interim in nature or of temporary finality only. Section 15 has provided limited grounds on which the decision of the adjudicator may be set aside. Since an application under s.15 is not an appeal, the decision of the adjudicator cannot be reviewed on merits. In the instant case, the applicant has relied on the ground of breach of natural justice and excess of jurisdiction to set aside the decision of the adjudicator. In the premises, the criticism of the adjudication decision by the applicant must clearly point to a breach of natural justice or a jurisdictional error in the adjudication process. Otherwise, the instant proceeding would be converted to a full blown appeal or a rehearing of the adjudication process."

In further clarification of that established principle, in Alpha Galaxy Sdn Bhd v Euro Destar (M) Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2021] MLJU 767, Wong Kian Kheong J (now JCA) listed out some of the matters which do not warrant setting an adjudication decision aside. He said: "A Setting Aside Application is not an appeal to the High Court against an adjudication decision. Nor is a Setting Aside Application a Judicial Review of an adjudication decision. Accordingly, the court in a Setting Aside Application cannot review the merits of an adjudication decision and cannot set aside an adjudication decision merely on any one or more of the following grounds-

an error of law has been committed by an adjudicator (unless the adjudicator has answered a "wrong" question of law which does not arise from the dispute to be adjudicated upon) - please see the judgment of Lee Swee Seng J (as he then was) in the High Court case of Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd & another case [2016] 5 CLJ 882, at [71];

an adjudicator has interpreted erroneously a provision in the construction contract-Econpile, at [67];

an adjudicator has misconstrued relevant documents;

relevant evidence has been wrongly excluded by an adjudicator;

an adjudicator has erroneously admitted irrelevant evidence;

an adjudicator has failed to attach due weight to relevant evidence, oral or documentary;

undue weight has been given by an adjudicator to any piece of evidence;

an adjudicator has assessed erroneously the evidence presented to the adjudicator;

a plain error regarding a finding of fact has been made by an adjudicator;

an adjudicator has omitted to make a finding of fact which can be adequately supported by evidence;

an erroneous finding of mixed fact and law has been arrived at by an adjudicator - please refer to Lee Swee Seng J's decision in the High Court in Syarikat Bina Darul Aman Bhd & Anor v Government of Malaysia [2017] 4 AMR 477, at [60];

an adjudicator has made a wrong inference from the evidence;

an adjudicator has erroneously omitted to make the right inference from the evidence;

errors have been made in the reasons given by an adjudicator in support of the adjudication decision; and

an adjudicator has erred in his or her reasoning with regard to the adjudication decision. The above errors and omission by an adjudicator can be remedied by an arbitration or litigation (whichever the case may be) regarding the dispute in question [as provided in s 13(c) CIPAA] - Econpile, at [67]."

Having set out those general principles of law relating to an application under sections 15 (b) and (d) of the Act, I will now go on to deal with the three grounds that TTDI contends in paragraphs 20- 22 of its Afidavit Sokongan in support of OS 204 ("TTDI's Supporting Affidavit") warrant the Adjudication Decision being set aside. Allegation of the Adjudicator having acted in excess of his jurisdiction

Paragraph 20 of TTDI's Supporting Affidavit comes under the title "Melebihi Bidang Kuasa", and thereby clearly contains TTDI's allegations under limb (d) of section 15 of the Act as to how the Adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in making the Adjudication Decision. Paragraph 20 of TTDI's Supporting Affidavit reads as follows: "20. Saya telah dinasihatkan oleh peguamcara Naza dan dengan sesungguhnya percaya dan menyatakan bahawa Adjudikator tersebut telah bertindak melebihi bidang kuasa, atas antara lainnya, alasan-alasan berikut:-

1 perkara-perkara seperti yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 17 di atas;

2 Adjudikator tersebut telah membuat pertimbangan berdasarkan LOA tersebut yang tidak berkuatkuasa dan tidak operatif, jikalau dibaca secara berasingan daripada Perjanjian Tiga Pihak tersebut. Oleh demikian, Adjudikator tersebut telah melangkaui bidang kuasa beliau dengan mempertimbangkan tuntutan CCYR berdasarkan Tuntutan Pembayaran, Respons Pembayaran, Tuntutan Adjudikasi, Respons Adjudikasi dan Jawapan Adjudikasi;

3 Memandangkan perenggan 20.2 di atas, Adjudikator tersebut telah mempertimbangkan isu-isu salah dan menjawab soalan-soalan fakta secara salah dalam Tuntutan Pembayaran, Respons Pembayaran, Tuntutan Adjudikasi, Respons Adjudikasi dan Jawapan Adjudikasi;

4 Adjudikator tersebut tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa di bawah CIPAA 2012 untuk melaksanakan penyiasatan (inquiry), penetapan (determination) atau siasatan (investigation) sendiri dan melangkaui Batasan Tuntutan Pembayaran, Respons Pembayaran, Tuntutan Adjudikasi, Respons Adjudikasi dan Jawapan Adjudikasi; dan/atau

5 Adjudikator tersebut tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa di bawah CIPAA 2012 untuk mempertimbangkan tuntutan CCYR, yang timbul daripada Tuntutan Pembayaran, Tuntutan Adjudikasi dan Jawapan Adjudikasi tersebut, di mana peguamcara Naza akan berhujah secara lanjut pada hari pendengan kelak."

For clarity, in paragraph 17 (that TTDI referred to in said paragraph 20.1), TTDI had essentially alleged that the Adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in deciding CCYR's claim under the Contract and not the Tripartite Agreement, and in particular the Adjudicator's findings in paragraphs 97.1, 97.2, 97.3 and 97.5 of the Adjudication Decision.

Overall, TTDI's allegations under limb (b) can be summarized into two:

the Adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in deciding CCYR's claim on the Adjudication Cause Papers, and not the Tripartite Agreement; and

(ii) the Adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in exceeding the limits of the Adjudication Cause Papers.

I dismiss both allegations.

In Sections C1, D1, D2 and D3 of the Adjudication Decision, the Adjudicator had clearly set out the respective and competing allegations of the parties, including TTDI's preliminary objection that CCYR's Payment Claim was invalid or defective as it was premised upon the Contract which had been superseded by the Tripartite Agreement.

In paragraphs 92(i) of the Adjudication Decision, the Adjudicator had then set out the following as the first issue that he should determine: "Whether the Respondent's Preliminary Objections in relation to the Adjudicator's jurisdiction to determine the disputes raised in the Payment Claim is sustainable"

In paragraphs 93-102 of the Adjudication Decision, the Adjudicator had dismissed TTDI's preliminary objection. In particular, in paragraphs 96-102 he said: "96. As such, for the Claimant to succeed, it must first establish that the Tripartite Agreement entered between parties as well as China Construction Third Bureau First Engineering Co. Ltd superseded the Contract.

I find no merit in the proposition that the Tripartite Agreement superseded the Contract. My reasons are as follows: -

1 Whilst it cannot be disputed that the primary terms and conditions of the Tripartite Agreement largely mirror that of the Letter of Award - save for 1) references to parties; 2) Contract Period to name a few - there is no evidence adduced by the Respondent to demonstrate that the Works in the Project was executed based on the terms and conditions of the Tripartite Agreement instead of the Contract;

2 Attention was equally not drawn to any express provision in the Tripartite Agreement that makes reference to the same superseding all previous agreements or contracts executed;

3 It is also worth noting that China Construction Third Bureau First Engineering Co. Ltd did not appear to have executed nor witnessed the said Tripartite Agreement;

4 What is even more telling is that subsequent agreements such as the Supplementary Agreements dated 7.12.2018 and 18.2.2019 makes no mention of China Construction Third Bureau First Engineering Co. Ltd much less the Tripartite Agreement;

5 This coupled by the fact that all instructions to work, correspondence, certificates including CPCs, CCC and Interim Certificates were all issued to the Claimant only and not China Construction Third Bureau First Engineering Co. Ltd as well lend to the finding that the Claimant being the only party executing the Works in the said Project - such that is relevant to these proceedings.

CIPAA applies only to "construction contracts" as defined under CIPAA 2012 (see sections 2, 3 & 4) and that the "payment dispute" must arise under a construction contract. These are fundamental jurisdictional premises for CIPAA to apply.

In this regard, it is also imperative to note that the subject matter is dispute in these proceeding pertains to, as mentioned above,:-

Unpaid Certified Sums;

(ii) Wrongly Deducted Sums;

(iii) First Half of the Retention Sum all premised on 1) Interim Certificates No 68-84; 2) CPCs and CCC - all issued pursuant to the terms of the Contract and in the name of the Claimant.

There is therefore no evidence that the Works in the Project was to be executed in accordance to the Tripartite Agreement in place of the Contract.

Given that the Payment Claim was issued by making references to the terms and conditions of the Contract and by the proper party i.e. the Claimant, I find that the Payment Claim was validly issued and the Adjudication Proceedings properly commence.

As such, there is no basis to support the Respondent's Preliminary Objection here - which is hereby dismissed."

The Adjudication Decision then shows that, after the Adjudicator had dismissed TTDI's said preliminary objection, he had then gone on to decide the following issues, under sections G2 and G3 of the Adjudication Decision:

Whether CCYR is entitled to the Unpaid Certified Sums;

(ii) Whether CCYR is entitled to the first half of the Retention Sum;

(iii) Whether CCYR is entitled to the Wrongful Deducted Sums;

(iv) Whether TTDI is entitled to its claim of Set Off and Counter Claim

Given that the Adjudicator had dismissed TTDI's preliminary objection and decided CCYR's claim based on the Contract, and also decided TTDI's claims for set off and counterclaim, then the Adjudicator had actually made the Adjudication Decision acting within his jurisdiction, based on what he was supposed to. He was supposed to decide CCYR's claim on the Adjudication Cause Papers, and he did.

As for TTDI's allegation that the Adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in exceeding the limits of the Adjudication Cause Papers, TTDI did not descend to any particulars in TTDI's Supporting Affidavit how he is alleged to have done so, and I further find that he did not.

I therefore dismiss TTDI's objection to the Adjudication Decision under limb (d) of section 15 of the Act. Allegation of a denial of natural justice

Paragraphs 21-22 of TTDI's Supporting Affidavit comes under the title "Perlanggaran Keadilan Asasi", and thereby clearly contains TTDI's allegations under limb (b) of section 15 of the Act as to how TTDI had been denied natural justice in the Adjudicator making the Adjudication Decision. TTDI's allegations thereunder may be summarized as follows:

there was a denial of natural justice when the Adjudicator rejected TTDl's request in its letter dated 19.9.2025 to file a reply/rejoinder to CCYR's Adjudication Reply; and

(ii) there was a denial of natural justice when the Adjudicator had gone on a frolic on his own without inviting parties to address him on issues relating to the Tripartite Agreement, including CTB's obligations thereunder.

In respect of the first matter, it is worth noting that, after receiving TTDI's letter dated 19.9.2025 to file a reply/rejoinder to CCYR's Adjudication Reply, the Adjudicator had then invited CCYR to respond to that request, which is totally in accord with natural justice. By its letter dated 22.9.2025, CCYR objected to that request. It was on these two letters that the Adjudicator decided to reject TTDI's request. That is reflected in paragraphs 89 and 90 of the Adjudication Decision in which the Adjudicator wrote: "89. It is worth noting that the Respondent did make an application for leave to Submit a Rejoinder to the Claimant's Adjudication Reply vide its letter dated 19.9.2025 ("Respondent's Application for Leave to Submit a Rejoinder").

After receiving the Claimant's response vide its letter dated 22.9.2025 in relation to the Respondent's Application for Leave to Submit a Rejoinder, I found that there are no justifiable grounds to warrant the submission of a Rejoinder to the Adjudication Reply and as such, the Respondent's Application for Leave to Submit a Rejoinder was dismissed."

I find that there was no denial of natural justice by the Adjudicator rejecting TTDI's request, for several reasons.

First, I find that TTDI's allegation fails to take into account that the conduct of adjudication proceedings is wholly within the ambit of the adjudicator's discretion. Section 12(1) of the Act and subsections (a), (g) and (j) of section 25 of the Act attest to that: "12(1) The adjudicator shall conduct the adjudication in the manner as the adjudicator considers appropriate within the powers provided under section 25." "25. The Adjudicator shall have the powers to -

establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings;

conduct any hearing and limiting the hearing time;

issue any direction as may be necessary or expedient; "

Second, section 12(2)(a) of the Act then requires an adjudicator to decide the claim and deliver an adjudication decision on it within 45 working days of the service of the adjudication response or adjudication reply, and section 12(3) of the Act renders void any adjudication decision delivered outside of that period.

The cumulative effect of these provisions is to put a strict time-compliance obligation on the adjudicator to decide the disputed claim, and this is facilitated by the adjudicator being given the powers and discretion about how to go about doing so.

Third, the Act does not expressly provide for any reply or rejoinder to an adjudication reply. The six 'cause papers' exchanged between the parties that are expressly mentioned in the Act that are supposed to set out the issues and the parties' respective positions on those issues are the payment claim, the payment response, the payment reply, the adjudication claim, the adjudication response and the adjudication reply.

In Balfour Beatty Construction Northern Ltd v Modus Corovest (Blackpool) Ltd [2008] EWHC 3029 (TCC), Coulson J said: "The provision of late material by a claiming party can sometimes give rise to an arguable breach of the rules of natural justice: see London & Amsterdam Properties Ltd v Waterman Partnership Ltd [2003] EWHC 3059 (TCC), 94 ConLR 154, [2004] BLR 179 and McAlpine PPS Pipeline Systems Joint Venture v Transco plc TCC (Unreported) 12 May 2004. Such a finding depends on the information concerned; the lateness of that material; whether it can properly be described as an "ambush" as in London & Amsterdam; the surrounding facts; and, most importantly, the adjudicator's obligation to comply with the 28 or 42 day timetable."

Fourth, in my view an adjudicator has the discretion to decide whether or not to allow the respondent a reply to an adjudication reply. If the claimant through its adjudication reply adduces multiple new issues and/or documents that in reality ought to have been mentioned in its adjudication claim, then an adjudicator may probably elect to err on the side of caution and allow that reply, in the interests of justice. But there is certainly no hard and fast rule that an adjudicator is obliged to allow that rejoinder the moment the respondent contends that there is a new issue or document adduced with the adjudication reply.

Fourth, in this case, the Adjudicator had asked for CCYR's response to TTDI's request, and had only then decided to reject that request. That went over and above what the Adjudicator was even expressly required or expected to do under the Act.

Fifth, as the Adjudicator had obviously considered both letters and decided that there were no justifiable grounds to warrant the submission of a Rejoinder by TTDI to CCYR's Adjudication Reply, this Court is not going to second-guess that decision and review its merits.

To assuage and remove all doubts, I find that, even if an arbitrator did not invite CCYR to submit on whether or not TTDI should be allowed to submit a rebuttal / response to its Adjudication Reply, that would not necessarily mean that there has been a denial of natural justice. At the end of the day, whether or not there has been a denial of natural justice would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.

In conclusion, I find that there was no denial of natural justice in the Adjudicator rejecting TTDI's request to submit a rebuttal to CCYR's Adjudication Reply and in proceeding to his Adjudication Decision. It follows that I find that there was no denial of natural justice in the making of the Adjudication Decision.

The second ground of a denial of natural justice is also rejected on the basis that it revolves around the Tripartite Agreement which the Adjudicator had found was not the contract on which CCYR had based its claims.

I accordingly find that TTDI has failed to establish that there was a denial of natural justice by the Adjudicator in the Adjudication Proceedings or in making the Adjudication Decision.

Having found that there was no denial of natural justice, it follows that TTDI has failed to raise any grounds to set the Adjudication Decision aside.

I therefore dismiss OS 204 with costs of RM15,000.00 subject to an allocator.

As mentioned at the outset, CCYR is applying under section 28 of the Act to enforce the Adjudication Decision against TTDI.

Section 28 of the Act provides:

A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court.

The High Court may make an order in respect of the adjudication decision either wholly or partly and may make an order in respect of interest on the adjudicated amount payable.

The order made under subsection (2) may be executed in accordance with the rules on execution of the orders or judgment of the High Court."

In Tan Eng Han Construction Sdn Bhd v Sistem Duta Sdn Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 395, Lee Swee Seng J (now FCJ) said: "In a case where there is no application to set aside an adjudication decision, the court upon being asked to enforce the adjudication decision would ordinarily grant an order in terms of the application to enforce unless there is patent non-compliance with the requirements of the CIPAA...”

In Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362, Mary Lim JCA (later FCJ) said in paragraphs [24]-[26] of the Judgment: "Section 28 confers discretion on the High Court. Although there are no express terms as to how that discretion is to be exercised, in our opinion, the discretion must be exercised judiciously, having regard to the underlying facts and the applicable principles under the CIPAA 2012. We must also bear in mind principles of statutory interpretation; that we cannot read into s 28 terms which are not there, or give s 28 a construction which cannot bear up when the other provisions in the Act are read and taken into consideration. From a reading of the CIPAA 2012, in particular, ss 13, 15, 16, 27 and 31, it is plain that though s 28 vests the High Court with discretionary power, it does not extend to requiring the applicant to show that there are no grounds for setting aside the adjudication decision under s 15. All that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the High Court that there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant's favour, that there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision, and that there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought. By this, we mean that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed, that there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or that there is no final decision rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law. Once these matters are established as matters of fact, the order to enforce ought to be granted. When making the order, the High Court may also make appropriate orders in respect of the whole or part of the adjudicated sum including make orders on interest see sub-s 28(2)."

I find that the deadlines for payment of the sums under the Adjudication Decision had passed when OS 192 was filed and that there was no evidence of TTDI having paid any of it.

I also find that, in paragraph 6 of TTDI's Afidavit Jawapan Defendan opposing OS 192, TTDI had only raised the following grounds for opposing the enforcement of the Adjudication Decision:

TTDI had filed OS 204 and the Interim Stay Application; and

(ii) TTD! had commenced the arbitration proceedings.

These are not grounds to deny the enforcement of the Adjudication Decision, especially when I have found that TTDI has failed to raise any grounds to set the Adjudication Decision aside, and that TTDI has also not made any application under section 16(1)(b) of the Act to stay the Adjudication Decision pending the resolution of those arbitration proceedings.

To avoid any doubt, even if TTDI had applied to stay the Adjudication Decision under section 16(1)(b) of the Act, that in itself would not have automatically meant that the Adjudication Decision should not be enforced. Any such application would still be subject to TTDI meeting the requirements for that stay in law. In the absence of any such application by TTDI, I will go no further on that.

In having already found that TTDI has failed to raise any grounds to set the Adjudication Decision aside, then there is really no impediment to this Court allowing OS 192.

Based on the foregoing, I accordingly make the following Orders on OS 204 and OS 192:

Enclosure 1 in Originating Summons No. WA-24C-204- 12/2025 is dismissed with costs of RM15,000.00, subject to an allocatur;

(ii) Enclosure 25 in Originating Summons No. WA-24C-204- 12/2025 is dismissed with no order as to costs, and

(iii) Originating Summons No. WA-24C-192-12/2025 is allowed with costs of RM5,000.00, subject to an allocatur. Dated the $ 2 2 ^{n d} $ day of April 2026 Counsel: Ms. Oon Khai Yue & Mr. Alexander Wong (Messrs. Lee & Poh Partnership) For TTDI KL Metropolis Sdn Bhd Ms. Khor Yong Shi (Messrs. Christopher & Lee Ong) For China Construction Yangtze River (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd Legislation: Construction Industry Payment And Adjudication Act, 2012, sections 15, 16(1), 21, 27 and 28 Rules of Court, 2012, Order 69A rule 3 (1) and (2) Cases: ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522 Alpha Galaxy Sdn Bhd v Euro Destar (M) Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2021] MLJU 767 Anas Construction Sdn Bhd v JKP Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2024] MLJU 53 Balfour Beatty Construction Northern Ltd v Modus Corovest (Blackpool) Ltd [2008] EWHC 3029 (TCC) Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728 Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd and another case [2017] 7 MLJ 732 Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 35 Tan Eng Han Construction Sdn Bhd v Sistem Duta Sdn Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 395 Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd v Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2017] MLJU 242 View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 222 WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1236