No such order for taxation shall in any event be made after the expiry of one year from the delivery of the bill of costs.” [17] In the present case, even though this application was filed after the expiration of 6 months, the application was still filed with one year from the delivery of the bill. Added to that, notice was also given to the defendant vide a letter dated 21.11.2016 that the plaintiff was not 7 agreeable to the said bills. Therefore, the next issue is whether there are any special circumstances that warranted this court to grant this application. [18] This issue on special circumstances was considered by the Court of Appeal in Tan Tek Sin & Anor v Tetuan Hayati & Assoc (sued as a firm) [2015] 2 MLJ 1, where the Court made the following findings: “[30] Applying the principles from the authorities that we have adverted to earlier, the most important question which we must now ask is whether there were special circumstances in the present case which would require the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction to grant an order to compel the defendant to prepare a detailed bill of costs even if more than one year had lapsed since the delivery of the bill to the plaintiffs. [31] In this regard, we have read with care the judgment of Mohamed Dzaiddin J in Phuah Choon Hwang & Ors v. Hassan & Kong Yeam. In our view, it was implicit within the judgment of that case that the contention of the petitioners that the bills involved were "oppressively" excessive had lent credence to the existence of special circumstances that warrant the intervention of the court under its inherent jurisdiction. In the Singaporean Court of Appeal case of Haw Par Brothers International Ltd v. Harry Lee Wee [1980] 1 LNS 26; [1980] 2 MLJ 8, it was held that where a solicitor's bill did not have specific sums shown against each item as detailed, itemised or narrated within the bill, but rather a 8 final lump sum figure shown to represent the costs of all the items, would in itself, constitutes special circumstances for the exercise of the court's discretion to order for the bill to be taxed.” (emphasis added) [19] In the present case, in respect of bill of cost in the sum of RM125,762.28 for the civil suit S6-22-1352-2005, the charges are for, inter alia, “..fee professional kami dalam menfailkan Saman Dalam Kamar untuk membatalkan Writ Saman di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi…” [20] In respect of the above bill, the defendant states that there was a „Surat Perlantikan Peguam‟ dated 4.1.2006, where the parties have agreed to the fee of RM120,000.00. However, the sum stated therein was disputed by the plaintiff, as she said that the figure therein was not agreed by the plaintiff when she sign the said „Surat Perlantikan Peguam’. This averment by the plaintiff was not disputed by the defendant. (Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd. [1995] 1 CLJ 609). Added to that, the fees charged is only in respect of an application to strike out the writ, but subsequently the parties have entered into a consent order. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the sum claim is grossly excessive which would be a special circumstance that warrants the court to order the bill to be taxed. 9 [21] In respect of the bill of cost in the sum of RM98,278.00 for preparation of the Sale and Purchase agreement with Magpa Properties Sdn Bhd, an amount of RM89,450.00 was charged. [22] In respect of the bill of cost in the sum of RM1,993,749.80 for the preparation of the share agreement with Exsim Development Sdn Bhd, there were no details in the said bill other than the preparation of the share agreement. [23] In respect of the bill of cost in the sum of RM4,789.80 for the preparation of the supplementary agreement with Exsim Development Sdn Bhd, there were no details in the said bill other than the preparation of the share agreement. [24] All the above bills are pertaining to the preparation of the respective agreements. In view of the oppressive amount claimed by the defendant for the preparation of the agreements, I am of the considered opinion that this would amount to a special circumstance that warrants the court to order the bill to be taxed. Conclusion [25] Premised on the reasons enumerated above, I find that there is merit in the application and the same is allowed with costs. 10 (AZIZAH BINTI HAJI NAWAWI) JUDGE HIGH COURT MALAYA (Appelliate and Special Powers Division 2) KUALA LUMPUR Dated: 8 May 2019 Counsels/Solicitors for the Plaintiff Dayang Noor Ailani Binti Puyungan Razali [Tetuan Zulpadli & Edham, Kuala Lumpur] Counsels/Solicitors for the Defendants Farah Binti Helmi [Tetuan Zalil Mohd & Partners] REFERENCES: 1) Tan Tek Sin & Anor v Tetuan Hayati & Assoc (sued as a firm) [2015] 2 MLJ 1 2) Phuah Choon Hwang & Ors v. Hassan & Kong Yeam 3) Haw Par Brothers International Ltd v. Harry Lee Wee [1980] 1 LNS 26; [1980] 2 MLJ 8 4) Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd. [1995] 1 CLJ 609