Unicious Energy Pte Ltd v Pemilik Dan/Atau Pencarter Demis Kapal atau Vesel Alpine Mathilde (No. Imo 9380506) yang Berdaftar DI Pelabuhan Hong Kong (WA-27NCC-49-10/2023)

(1), (2) and (3) therein but at the request of learned counsel for the Plaintiff, the application for prayer (6) seeking damages for wrongful arrest was adjourned to be heard at a later date. [3] The Plaintiff was ordered to pay the Defendant costs in respect of Enclosures 21, 27 and 39 but the amount of costs to be paid was agreed to be determined only after the hearing of prayer (6) of Enclosure 21. [4] The Court proceeded to hear oral submissions of counsel on prayer

of Enclosure 21 on 17.1.2024 and this is the judgment of the Court in respect of the Defendant’s claims for damages for wrongful arrest raised thereunder. Background Facts and Preliminary Issue [5] The detailed facts of this case have been set out in my grounds of judgment issued on 6.12.2023 in respect of prayers (1), (2) and (3) of Enclosure 21 and shall not be repeated here. [6] At the start of the hearing of prayer (6) of Enclosure 21, learned counsel for the Plaintiff informed the Court and learned counsel for the Defendant that he would be raising a preliminary issue, namely that this Court ought to stay the hearing of any submissions on damages for wrongful arrest as the same is a matter that should be heard by the arbitral tribunal. [7] No prior notice of this preliminary issue was given to learned counsel for the Defendant. Such practice should be discouraged and indeed but for the fact that learned counsel for the Defendant had indicated that he was prepared to address the issue, this Court would have disallowed the preliminary issue from being raised. [8] As authority in support of the preliminary issue, learned counsel for the Plaintiff referred to the case of Eastern Pacific Chartering v Polo Maritime [2021] 1 WLR 5475 (“Eastern Pacific”) and Astro Vencedor Cia Naviera SA of Panama v Mabanaft GmbH [1971] 2 QB 588 (“The Damianos”). [9] In Eastern Pacific, the owner of the vessel had a hire claim against the charterer. In connection with the claim, the owner had arrested another vessel belonging to the charterer in Gibraltar. Subsequently, the owner brought a claim for the charter hire in the English court. The charterer brought a “wrongful arrest damages” counterclaim in the English court. The owner contended that the right jurisdiction to determine the “wrongful arrest damages” claim was Gibraltar, the place of the alleged wrongful arrest, and applied to strike out the counterclaim. The charterer argued that the right place was England because the charterparty had an English jurisdiction clause. The court agreed with the charterer, that is, the jurisdiction clause covered also a tort claim for wrongful arrest, hence the claim should proceed in the English court, and dismissed the owner’s application to strike out the counterclaim. The following excerpts from the case report were referred to: “Held, dismissing the application, (1) that a tort claim might be said to arise “in connection with” a charter not only where there were parallel claims in tort and contract, or where there was a factual overlap or linkage between the tort and contractual claims, but also where the claim arose solely in tort and was in a meaningful sense causatively connected with the relationship created by the charter and the rights and obligations arising therefrom; that, as such, where there was an issue between the parties as to whether damages were recoverable for an allegedly wrongful arrest made in seeking security for claims under the parties’ charterparty, that was a claim “in connection with” the charter; and that, accordingly, the defendant’s tort counterclaims were within the scope of the jurisdiction clause in the charterparty and the English court had jurisdiction ... … 38 The claimant took those steps in express reliance on its rights under the charter and, but for the relationship created by the charter, no arrest would have taken place. … 44 I acknowledge that the tort claims here are not overlapping or factually interlinked with the contract … 47 The present case seems to me closest to Astro Vencedor Cia Naviera SA of Panama v Mabanaft GmbH (The Damianos) [1971] 2 QB 588, where the Court of Appeal held that a claim for damages for wrongful arrest fell within the scope of an arbitrator’s jurisdiction. Lord Denning MR there took a robust approach to a clause conferring jurisdiction on London arbitrators of “any dispute arising during execution of this Charterparty”, treating it as covering claims in respect of two arrests ... 48 … The charterers contended that the arrests fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause on the footing that the tort claims were entirely separate from the contract. Lord Denning MR rejected that saying (at p 595D): “The arrest of the ship was the direct consequence of the charterers’ claim for damages against the shipowners. The charterers arrested the ship so as to enforce their claim. Their claim—that the shipowners had wrongfully stopped discharging the oil—was certainly a claim which arose out of the contract during the execution of it. It was plainly within the arbitration clause. It had necessarily to be decided by the arbitrator. The arrest was simply the follow up to that claim. It was so closely connected with it that the rightness or wrongness of the arrest is also within the scope of the arbitration.” That part of the judgment is equally applicable to the facts before me. 49 Lord Denning MR then went on to refer (p 595F) to the fact that the charterers’ claim had been held to be “bad” and that therefore the lawfulness or otherwise of the arrests was “so much part and parcel of the inquiry that they come within the broad scope of the arbitration clause”. … The claimant relies on those passages as showing that what was essential to the decision was that this was a case where the substantive contractual claim in respect of which security had been sought by way of an arrest was alleged to be spurious and hence the issue of the wrongfulness of the arrest overlapped with the issues in the contractual claim. 50 Whilst that element of overlap in the factual issues made the conclusion reached in The Damianos an “a fortiori” case, it does not seem to me to follow that such an overlap is an essential element. The point that the arrest was a direct consequence of a contractual claim and therefore closely connected to the contract and the legal relationship there created, remains good whether or not the ground for attacking the validity of the arrest in the given case is that the contractual claim is “bad” or, as here, the contention that there simply is no contractual claim to found the arrest … 51 I draw some further support for that approach from London Arbitration 8/04 ((2004) LMLN 637, 14 April 2004). That was a decision of an ad hoc arbitration panel on whether claims for losses caused by alleged wrongful arrests fell within the scope of a clause referring to arbitration any disputes between the parties to the charter. The charterers argued that there were no issues of fact in common, but the panel took a broad view, holding that the owner’s claims formed part “if not of a seamless web, then at least of a thread that was sufficiently continuous”. The High Court refused leave to appeal, on the footing that that decision was not wrong, let alone obviously wrong. … [10] With respect, the facts of Eastern Pacific are completely different from the present case. [11] In the first place, there is no application for the proceedings in this action to be stayed pending the arbitral proceedings. [12] More importantly, in Eastern Pacific, there was no application before the Court in Gibraltar to set aside the arrest of the vessel. Instead, the plaintiff had released the vessel upon being shown a copy of the time charterparty for the vessel between the defendant and one Pola Rise OOO suggesting that the beneficial owner of the vessel was not the defendant. Accordingly, there was no hearing before the Court in Gibraltar for damages for wrongful arrest. Instead, the defendant had, in response to the plaintiff’s action for charter hire filed in the English Court, filed a counterclaim in tort for wrongful arrest. [13] The English Court held that the defendant’s tort claim is not the same as the arrest claim in the Court of Gibraltar. Furthermore, the English Court was considering articles 21 and 22 of the Brussel Convention which have no application to our present case. [14] Similarly, the facts in The Damianos also do not involved a situation where the court had set aside a warrant of arrest and was moved to hear an application for damages for wrongful arrest. In that case, the owners had claimed damages for wrongful arrest in the arbitration and the Court had to determined if the claim had come within the scope of the arbitration clause. [15] Accordingly, I have no hesitation in rejecting the preliminary issue raised by learned counsel for the Plaintiff. In fact, the claim for damages for wrongful arrest is not even an issue before the arbitral tribunal. [16] Having disposed the preliminary issue, I will now deal with the prayer

of Enclosure 21 for damages for wrongful arrest of the Vessel. Damages for Wrongful Arrest [17] It is trite that the Defendant is entitled to damages for a wrongful arrest of the Vessel if this Court finds that the arrest is brought with so little color or with so little foundation, that it implies malice or gross negligence. [18] The applicable test in deciding whether or not to order an inquiry as to damages for the wrongful arrest of a ship is succinctly encapsulated by the Privy Council in The Evangelismos [1858] 12 Moo PC 352: “... is there or is there not, reason to say, that the action was so unwarrantedly brought, or brought with so little colour, or so little foundation, that it rather implies malice on the part of the plaintiff, or that gross negligence which is equivalent to it?” [19] The test was reaffirmed in The Dong Nai [1996] 4 MLJ 454 where Abdul Malik Ishak J in the High Court found as follows: “An application to set aside the warrant of arrest meant that the defendants were alleging wrongful arrest and wrongful continuance of the arrest their ship. Therefore, the appropriate test to be applied was whether there was mala fides or crassa negligentia implying malice on the part of the plaintiffs. On the evidence tendered, the court found that malice had been established against the plaintiffs. Hence, the arrest of the Dong Nai was in fact wrongful (see p 466A–D; The Evangelismos

12 Moo PC 352 and The Euroexpress [1988] 3 MLJ 367 followed).” [20] In the "The Kommunar (No.3)” [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 22, the terms “crassa negligentia” and “gross negligence” are stated as follows: "Two types of cases are thus envisaged. Firstly, there are cases of mala fides, which must be taken to mean those cases where on the primary evidence the arresting party has no honest belief in his entitlement to arrest the vessel. Secondly, there are those cases in which objectively there is so little basis for the arrest that it may be inferred that the arresting party did not believe in his entitlement to arrest the vessel. It is, as I understand the judgment, in the latter sense that such phrases "crassa negligentia" and "gross negligence" are used and are described as implying malice or being equivalent to it…” [emphasis added] [21] Accordingly, the remedy of arrest is not something that can simply be invoked without consequences. The case of the “Vasiliy Golovnin” [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994 is particularly instructive in this regard: “The arrest of a vessel is never a trifling matter. Arrest is a very powerful invasive remedy. An arrest of a ship can lead to tremendous inconvenience, financial distress and severe commercial embarrassment. Even the briefest of delays can sometimes cause significant losses. It can also in certain instances prejudice the livelihood of the ship’s crew and the commercial fortunes of the shipowner. Maritime arrests can, when improperly executed, sometimes be as destructive as Anton Pillar orders an even as potentially ruinous as Mareva injunctions, the two nuclear weapons of civil litigation” [emphasis added] [22] In the present case, the Plaintiff was fully aware that the Cargo has become a Blocked Property under the U.S Sanctions Laws when the Plaintiff was designated as a ‘Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List” (“SDN”) by the OFAC of the U.S Treasury Department. [23] Upon knowing of its SDN status, the Plaintiff terminated the sale of the Cargo to Idemitsu Ltd, its Japanese buyer. [24] With the Plaintiff being designated an SDN and becoming a Blocked Person, the Cargo also became a Blocked Property and this resulted in the Plaintiff to be in breach of the Voyage Charter Party. [25] In this case, up until the issuance of the Notice of Arbitration, the Plaintiff had not disputed that it had breached the Sanction Clause in the Voyage Charter Party. [26] The Plaintiff must also be aware that by reason of the Cargo being a Blocked Property, the Defendant, being a U.S Person, would become subject to the U.S Sanctions Laws and therefore could not deliver the Cargo to the Plaintiff. [27] That the aforesaid is clearly known to the Plaintiff can be seen by the Plaintiff’s action where, to avoid sanctions implication, the Plaintiff arranged a scheme with Desert Oasis to enter into a sham sales contract of the sanctioned Cargo so that Desert Oasis would demand the sanctioned Cargo to be delivered to it as the buyer of the Cargo effective 10.5.2023. [28] It was only after Desert Oasis had failed to convince both the South African High Court and this Court on the legitimacy of its sales contract with the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff, who had previously never challenged the Defendant’s status as a U.S Person, presented the Defendant on 2.10.2023 with a Notice of Arbitration claiming an alleged breach of the Voyage Charter Party. This was notwithstanding that the Plaintiff knew that under the U.S. Sanctions Laws and Regulations the Defendant is prohibited from discharging the “Blocked Property” to the Plaintiff. [29] To my mind, on the very same day, 2.10.2023 when the Plaintiff commenced the instant arrest action and arrested the Vessel through the law firm Messrs. Shaik David & Co, the Plaintiff knew that it has little or no basis upon which to commence this admiralty in rem action or arbitration and seek damages. [30] In fact, its specious claims are a blatant attempt to get a third bite at the cherry, after both the South African Court and this Court had recognized the sham sales contract that the Plaintiff was asserting via its proxy, Desert Oasis. Yet, notwithstanding the aforesaid, the Plaintiff proceeded to apply for and issued a warrant of arrest to arrest the Vessel. [31] The Plaintiff stated that the issue of whether or not there is a breach of Voyage Charter Party is part of the “substantive dispute between the parties, which is for the arbitral tribunal to decide.” Yet, if the Plaintiff were so convinced that it has a valid and cogent claim in arbitration against the Defendant, it begs the question why then did it not take action immediately upon the Defendant’s refusal to discharge the sanctioned Cargo on 15.02.2023 but instead schemed an arrangement with Desert Oasis to make the claim as a new buyer to the Cargo. [32] In truth, the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant is not a U.S Person is an afterthought and the claim is made with the knowledge that the claim is simply inconsistent with the facts known to the Plaintiff. This is because as I have found in my judgment dealing with the setting aside of the Writ in rem and the Warrant of Arrest, the Plaintiff knew at all material times that the Defendant is not only “owned” by International Seaways, a “U.S. Persons”, but it is directly “controlled and operated” by officers and directors who are “U.S. Persons”. Indeed, there are ample evidence suggesting that the Plaintiff knew and or had acknowledged that International Seaways owns and or controls the Defendant. [33] A simple search of the vessel database, Equasis, lists Heroic Serena Inc. as “Registered Owner” and International Seaways as “Ship manager/Commercial manager”. It also notes International Seaways’ address at “39th Floor, 600, 3rd Avenue, New York NY USA.” Further, the Plaintiff as charterer of the Vessel had addressed all of its requests for return of the Cargo to International Seaways, including a letter to International Seaways dated 14.2.2023, a letter dated 4.4.2023, and a letter dated 19.4.2023. [34] The Plaintiff knew that the Defendant is prohibited from dealings with the Plaintiff related to the Blocked Property because the Cargo on board the Vessel is in the custody and control of a “U.S. Persons”. [35] Therefore, it is my judgment that the Plaintiff is well aware that it does not have a good faith claim or that it will succeed in arbitration, but the Plaintiff nevertheless proceeded anyway to arrest the Vessel seemingly to punish the Defendant into having to deal with it on the issue of the blocked Cargo. It does not want the blocked Cargo to be dealt with under the OFAC or U.S. Sanction laws where the property or the converted value of the blocked Cargo remains within the purview or adjudication of the U.S. sanctioning authority. [36] I agree with learned counsel for the Defendant, Mr Mathew Kurien that the present claims based on the breach of the single Voyage Charter Party for the failure to deliver the blocked Cargo are nothing more than an attempt by the Plaintiff to circumvent U.S. sanctions. [37] Recently, in the case of Conweld Engineering Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Goh Swee Boh & Anor [2023] 1 CLJ 323, S Nantha Balan JCA held: “(2) In circumstances where it has been demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities, that a plaintiff had filed a suit not for the genuine purpose of obtaining the requisite reliefs permissible by law but was instead filed for a collateral purpose of obtaining some other advantage, to extort the defendant, to put pressure on the defendant or to extract a benefit from the defendant, then such a situation might found cause of action in the tort of collateral abuse of process. The Malaysian courts should, in a fit and proper case, continue to recognise the tort of collateral abuse of process to cater for the conduct of a party which abuses the court’s process for ulterior or collateral purposes rather than to seek legal remedy as provided by law. The tort of collateral abuse of process should be recognised as a distinct tort. (paras 52-54)” [38] The fact that the Cargo on board the Vessel is Blocked Property has been explained to the Durban High Court and Malaysian High Court in the related Desert Oasis’s actions for which the Plaintiff was privy. To my mind, the Plaintiff’s arrest of the Vessel, after two previous arrests through its proxy Desert Oasis in respect of the same blocked Cargo is wrongful, an abuse of Court process and it does not have a good faith claim against the Defendant, as the innocent party under the Voyage Charter Party. The recourse to arbitration is being used to clothe the Plaintiff with some grounds by which to effect the arrest of the Vessel, with no real good faith belief that it actually has a cognizable claim before the arbitral panel. [39] Another point that is relevant to the question as to whether damages ought to be ordered for wrongful arrest in this case is the Plaintiff's non-disclosure or misleading or inaccurate statements in relation to material facts when the Plaintiff sought to arrest the Vessel by way of interim measure pending the arbitration proceedings in London. [40] Unlike the arrest of a vessel when a plaintiff invokes section 24 (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 read together with sections 20 - 24 of the United Kingdom Senior Courts Act 1981, an arrest based on section 11(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act 2005 is subject to the discretion of the Court and not as a matter of right. Being a discretionary matter, the Plaintiff is under a duty of full and frank disclosure which means that the Affidavit Leading to Warrant of Arrest ought to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts so as to put the Court in a position to properly exercise its discretion at the hearing before the High Court Registrar. [41] The test of whether a fact is material or not is an objective one and based solely on relevance. A failure to discharge the duty of full and frank disclosure can be an independent ground for setting aside an arrest: See: The AA V [1999] 3 SLR(R) 664 at [47]. [42] In my judgment, where the material non-disclosure or inaccurate statement is deliberate, calculated to mislead or if it was caused by gross negligence or recklessness, this can also constitute a ground for awarding damages for wrongful arrest. [43] In the present case, from the chronology of events, it is obvious that the Plaintiff has only presented selective facts in Affidavit Leading to Warrant of Arrest which also failed to give a clear and truthful or accurate account of the true nature of the claim against the Defendant. More specifically, the Plaintiff failed to disclose that:

it has always treated the Defendant as a “U.S. Person” and that U.S. sanctions Laws are applicable to the Defendant and the Cargo;

the Cargo was Blocked Property and unless approval was obtained from OFAC, the Defendant was prohibited from delivering the Cargo to the Plaintiff and therefore there could be no claim in an action in personam against the Defendant for breach of the Voyage Charter Party. On the contrary, that it is the Plaintiff who is the one who had breached the Voyage Charter Party by being a sanctioned party/SDN and causing the Cargo to be a Blocked Property under the Sanctions Clauses or U.S. Sanctions law;

both the South African High Court and High Court Malaya in the Desert Oasis’ actions have not only dismissed the claims by Desert Oasis but both the Courts also found that the sales contract entered into between the Plaintiff and Desert Oasis was a sham and an attempt to avoid the US Sanctions laws. Therefore, to aver that these 2 actions are irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s present action is misleading. [44] On the facts, if the Learned Deputy Registrar had been appraised of the matters stated above and that the owner of the Vessel was and is not the party liable to the Plaintiff in personam and that there are justifiable or lawful reasons why the blocked Cargo cannot be discharged/delivered by the Defendant to the Plaintiff or Desert Oasis, a Warrant of Arrest would not have been issued in the first place by this Court. [45] The Plaintiff’s conduct in commencing this action and arresting the Vessel as enumerated above coupled with the aforesaid breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure is an abuse of the Court process by the Plaintiff to achieve a collateral and or ulterior object otherwise than pursing a genuine claim. [46] Steven Chong J in the Singapore High Court case of The “Xin Chang Shu” [2015] SGHC 308 observed the policy and the principles of law relating to damages for wrongful arrest of vessel, as follows: “Principles governing the law on wrongful arrest 27 In The Vasiliy Golovnin at [134], the Court of Appeal affirmed the long-standing test set out in The Evangelismos (1858) 12 Moo PC 352; 14 ER 945 (“The Evangelismos”) (at 359; 948): Undoubtedly there may be cases in which there is either mala fides, or that crassa negligentia, which implies malice, which would justify a Court of Admiralty giving damages, as in an action brought at Common law damages may be obtained. … The real question in this case … comes to this: is there or is there not, reason to say, that the action was so unwarrantably brought, or brought with so little colour, or so little foundation, that it rather implies malice on the part of the Plaintiff, or that gross negligence which is equivalent to it? [emphasis added]

Elaborating on the “focus or emphasis” of the inquiry under the two parts to The Evangelismos test, the Court of Appeal held at [137]: … Focusing on the first part of the passage… would mean that the inquiry would be both an objective and a subjective one into the plaintiff’s state of mind at the time of the arrest as there would be a need to establish if the plaintiff had a genuine and honest belief that the arrest was legitimate then. On the other hand, if the focus is on the second part of the passage, this would mean a more objective inquiry into the circumstances prevailing and the evidence available at the time of the arrest, so as to determine if the action and the arrest were so unwarrantably brought, or brought with so little colour, or so little foundation, as to imply that they were brought with malice or gross negligence… [emphasis added] 29 The court then held that the inquiry should generally be focused on the second part of The Evangelismos test, ie, “whether the action and the arrest were so unwarrantably brought, or brought with so little colour, or so little foundation, as to imply malice or gross negligence on the plaintiff’s part” (The Vasiliy Golovnin at [137]). 30 It thus appears that the test is ultimately premised on a finding of malice (see also, The Kiku Pacific at [30]). Malice may be found on the basis of direct evidence of the plaintiff’s state of mind at the time of the arrest, or it can be inferred if the claim is so unmeritorious that the arresting party could not have honestly believed that he had an entitlement to arrest the vessel (or at least recklessly disregarded whether he had grounds to do so). ... 37 Notwithstanding the high threshold of The Evangelismos test, it can be seen that our courts would not be slow to find wrongful arrest and to award damages in appropriate circumstances. Indeed, this sentiment was expressed by the Court of Appeal in The Vasiliy Golovnin at [135]. From the above cases, it is clear that the court will pay particular attention to what the arresting party knew, or must have known, at the time of the arrest (see [34] and [36] above). Where facts which clearly undermine the plaintiff’s claim, and consequently, its right of arrest are known or must have been known to the plaintiff at the time of the arrest, the courts will be more inclined to award damages for wrongful arrest. … 39 I would add at this juncture that because the focus of the inquiry is on malice of the arresting party, special attention should be paid to what the arresting party knew or must have known at the time of the arrest. While this is not the only factor the court should consider, it is certainly an important one in evaluating the merits of the claim for wrongful arrest. If, based on the information available, the court finds that the arresting party knew or must have known that it had no reasonable or probable cause to arrest the vessel, the court may well be justified in awarding damages for wrongful arrest. By contrast, if the court only arrives at the finding that the arresting party had no reasonable or probable cause to arrest the vessel after a legal analysis of the jurisdictional basis of the claim (as in the case of The Inai Selasih), or based on documents or information which were not available to the arresting party at the time of the arrest, the judicial finding in such circumstances may not be a sufficient basis for an award of damages.” [emphasis added] [47] Premised upon the aforesaid governing principles on the law of wrongful arrest, it is my judgment that the Plaintiff had acted with mala fides and or crassa negligentia (gross negligent) in obtaining the warrant of arrest and arrested and continued to arrest the Defendant’s Vessel in this case. The Plaintiff, on the facts and circumstances as stated above, despite having no valid reasonable cause(s) of action directly against the Defendant with regard to the blocked Cargo or at all nevertheless proceeded to issue the Notice of Arbitration to serve as the basis to arrest the Vessel as security for the arbitration. [48] I agree with learned counsel for the Defendant that this case is therefore not only simply a case with “so little foundation”, it is a case with “no foundation” at all. Indeed, it is a case which the Plaintiff knew or ought to have known was based on a false foundation and a third bite of the cherry after it failed in the Durban High Court and the High Court of Malaya with regard to the blocked Cargo on board the Vessel. Conclusion [49] In the premises, this Court orders the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant damages for wrongful arrest of the Defendant’s Vessel together with all damages for wasted and unnecessary expenses whatsoever occasioned thereby, such to be assessed by the High Court Deputy Registrar. [50] As regards the costs for the Enclosures 21, 27 and 39, the Court orders that the Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant costs fixed at RM 50,000.00, RM 15,000.00 and RM 10,000.00 for Enclosures 21, 27 and 39 respectively. The order for costs is made subject to payment of the allocator. Dated the 30th day of January 2024 ONG CHEE KWAN Judge of the High Court of Malaya High Court of Kuala Lumpur, NCC2 Counsel:

Dr. Arunachalam s/o Kasi and Mr. Linda Alisbert a/p James for

Mr. Mathew Kurien A/L Kurien and Mr. Aaron Siva Jr Vaitilingam for

Eastern Pacific Chartering v Polo Maritime [2021] 1 WLR 5475 2. Astro Vencedor Cia Naviera SA of Panama v Mabanaft GmbH [1971] 2 QB 588 3. The Evangelismos [1858] 12 Moo PC 352 4. The Dong Nai [1996] 4 MLJ 454 5. "The Kommunar (No.3)” [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 22 6. “Vasiliy Golovnin” [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994 7. Conweld Engineering Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Goh Swee Boh & Anor [2023] 1 CLJ 323 8. The AA V [1999] 3 SLR(R) 664 9.

Section 24 (b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 2. Sections 20 - 24 of the United Kingdom Senior Courts Act 1981 3. Section 11(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act 2005