Where interest is awarded under subsection (1) for recovery of damages under section 6A of the Limitation Act 1953, the interest may be given for the whole or any part of the period between the starting date and the date of the judgement” Order 42 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 “Subject to rule 12A, except when it has been otherwise agreed between the parties, every judgment debt shall carry interest at such rate as the Chief Justice may from time to time determine or at such other rate not exceeding the rate aforesaid as the S/N fegxguO1Lki18I1tYfAbGw Court determines, such interest to be calculated from the date of judgment until the judgment is satisfied.” [18] Counsel for the Defendant argued that the above do not apply since the Plaintiff did not plead it. On this point, there is a permissive provision in Order 18 Rule 11 of the Rules of Court 2012 that allow points of law to be pleaded, but it is otherwise trite that parties are only permitted to plead material facts and not the law or evidence. [19] Thus, failure to plead the enabling provision of the law as the basis for the claim for interest does not defeat the Court’s power to award interest under that law. As the power to award interest is a discretionary one, I have no reason to interfere with the exercise of that discretion by the Sessions Court Judge as to the rate of interest. [20] However, the Sessions Court Judge did err in allowing pre-judgment interest to run until the date of full payment. It is clear that in the absence of any contractual provision, pre-Judgment interest awarded under Section 11 of the Civil Law Act 1956 must stop at the date of the Judgment. Removal of Goods [21] The Defendant contended that it was denied access to remove its goods from the Plaintiff’s storage facilities. However, there is no claim of set-off or counterclaim by the Defendant on grounds of detinue or conversion. On the contrary, the evidence showed that there was no interest by the Plaintiff in holding the goods as a lien for the payment of outstanding invoices. The Plaintiff’s position was quite the opposite. It had repeatedly demanded that the Defendant to remove its goods. S/N fegxguO1Lki18I1tYfAbGw [22] The goods remained at the Plaintiff’s warehouse despite the Judgment that the Defendant must remove its goods within seven (7) days and were ultimately disposed of by the Plaintiff. [23] In the circumstances, I also agree that this is not a bona fide issue. Election of Remedies [24] I have set out the orders made by the Sessions Court in the Judgment in paragraph [3] above. They are cumulative remedies and thus there is no requirement for the Plaintiff to make any election at the point of Judgment. The difference between cumulative as opposed to alternative remedies is explained in Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments Ltd [1996] AC 514: “The procedural principles applicable to cumulative remedies are necessarily different. Faced with alternative remedies a plaintiff must choose between them. Faced with cumulative remedies a plaintiff is not required to choose. He may have both remedies. He may pursue one remedy or the other remedy or both remedies, just as he wishes. It is a matter for him. He may obtain judgment for both remedies and enforce both judgments” [25] The Plaintiff prayed for damages to be assessed, which would, if pursued, presumably cover any damages beyond the costs of removal of the Defendant’s goods from the Plaintiff’s storage facility, if any. There is no prospect of double recovery as any assessment of damages proceedings will be undertaken inter partes and objections as to double recovery can be advanced. This is a non-issue for purposes of summary judgment. S/N fegxguO1Lki18I1tYfAbGw Conclusion [26] For the reasons set out above, I allow the appeal in part and set aside the Sessions Court’s Order on interest which should be replaced with the following Order: