Vasantha A/P K Sockalingam Chettiar v 1. ) Raja Alagappan Annamalai (MA-22NCvC-55-08/2024)

RAJA ALAGAPPAN ANNAMALAI (No. Pasport: 127958069)

PARVATHY SREENIVASAN (No. Pasport: P7195297)

ANNAMALAI ANNAMALAI (No. Pasport: M5089201)

SOLACHI SOMASUNDARAM (No. Pasport: U6924287)

SUBRAMANIAN ANNAMALAI (No. Pasport: Y7052841) ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 94 - Application to Appoint an Administrator Pendente Lite (2)) A. INTRODUCTION [1] Enclosure 94 is an application by the 1st to 4th Defendants for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite over the estate of the late Dr AL Annamalai @ Alagu Chettiar Annamalai a/I A Alagappa Chettiar (NRIC No: 410701-71-5511/9511584) ("the deceased"), brought under section 19 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 ("the PAA 1959") read with Order 72 rule 18 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("the ROC 2012"). It proposes one Venkitesan a/I V.N. Venugopal (NRIC No: 620612-02-5225) as the intended administrator, and is intituled as the second application of its kind: "Application to Appoint Administrator Pendente Lite (2)". [2] When Enclosure 94 came up before me, I struck it out, with no order as to costs, the Plaintiff having consented to that costs disposition. I further ordered that the 1st to 4th Defendants are at liberty, if so advised, to file a formal application for leave to file and/or to proceed with a fresh application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite, notwithstanding the Court's ruling of 22 April 2026 (in Enclosure 81) concerning the withdrawal of Enclosure 30 without liberty to file afresh. These are my grounds. [3] I should state at the outset what I did not decide.I did not decide whether an administrator pendente lite ought to be appointed over the deceased's estate; that question did not fall for determination. Nor did I decide whether the "unlawful interference with Estate Land" alleged by the 1st to 4th Defendants constitutes a material change of circumstances; that question is properly to be examined in a formal application for leave, or to vary the order of 22 April 2026, and I have left it open. The short point before me was whether Enclosure 94, in the manner and circumstances in which it was filed, was properly before the Court at all. For the reasons that follow, I held that it was not. [4] Before turning to the procedural question, I note the statutory framework. Section 19 of the PAA 1959 provides that "[p]ending any probate action, letters of administration may be granted to such person as the Court may appoint, limited so that the administrator shall not be empowered to distribute the estate, and shall be subject to such control by, and direction of, the Court, as the Court deems fit; and subject to that limitation the administrator so appointed shall have all the rights and powers of a general administrator". The provision dealing specifically with such an appointment is Order 72 rule 20 of the ROC 2012, headed "Administration pending trial". The parties did not dispute that this Court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator pendente lite in the present proceedings, in which the entitlement to a grant in respect of the deceased's estate is in issue. The question before me was not one of jurisdiction but of procedural propriety. B. THE PARTIES AND THE SUBSTANTIVE ACTION [5] The Plaintiff and the five Defendants are, on the face of the cause papers, persons interested in the estate of the deceased. Their dispute is the subject of this writ action, Guaman No. MA- 22NCVC-55-08/2024, which remains pending. Enclosure 94 is the latest of several interlocutory applications filed within that action, and it can only be understood against the procedural history that precedes it. C. THE APPLICATION IN ENCLOSURE 94 [6] By Enclosure 94, filed on 27 April 2026, the 1st to 4th Defendants seek, in substance, an order appointing Venkitesan a/l V.N. Venugopal as administrator pendente lite without security; directions empowering him to receive and manage the assets and liabilities of the estate (but not to distribute to beneficiaries); authority to consolidate the deceased's monies held in various bank accounts in Malaysia and India into a single trust account; and the usual consequential reliefs as to professional assistance, remuneration, indemnity, accounts, stay of proceedings, costs and liberty to apply. [7] The grounds advanced in support include matters said to require urgent attention, in particular an allegation of "unlawful interference with Estate Land" said to be occurring on estate land at Tangkak, Johor, including land-clearing works and occupation by third parties. That allegation is founded on correspondence dated 22 January 2026 and 27 January 2026, and on an affidavit affirmed on 24 April 2026 (Enclosure 95) exhibiting those letters and photographs. I return to its significance below. D. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY: ENCLOSURES 30,81 AND THE RULING OF 22 APRIL 2026 [8] Enclosure 30, filed on 21 March 2025, was the first application by the 1st to 4th Defendants for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite over the same estate. It proposed a different nominee, Datuk M. Ramanathan a/l SM Meyyappan (NRIC No: 600923-10-6815). The reliefs sought in Enclosure 30 were, in substance, the same as those later sought in Enclosure 94, save for the identity of the proposed nominee. Enclosure 30 did not proceed to a determination on its merits. [9] By Enclosure 81, filed on 15 April 2026, the 1st to 4th Defendants applied to withdraw Enclosure 30 with liberty to file afresh. On 22 April 2026 I dismissed Enclosure 81. The material parts of the order, at paragraph [80] of that ruling, were these: " [80] The Court therefore orders as follows:—(4) The 1st to 4th Defendants are at liberty, if so advised, within 7 days from the date of this order, to state on record whether they elect: (a) to proceed with Enclosure 30; or (b) to withdraw Enclosure 30 without liberty to file afresh. (5) If no election to withdraw Enclosure 30 without liberty is made within that period, Enclosure 30 shall proceed in accordance with the directions given on 12 March 2026. (6) There shall be no order as to costs for Enclosure 81." [10] Two features of that order are central. First, it confined the 1st to 4th Defendants to a binary election: either to proceed with Enclosure 30, or to withdraw it without liberty to file afresh. Secondly, and importantly, the order did not itself effect any withdrawal. Unless and until the Defendants elected to withdraw, Enclosure 30 was to proceed. It therefore remained, at all times material to Enclosure 94, a live and subsisting application before this Court, fixed for further submissions and decision. [11] The phrase "without liberty to file afresh" should be stated clearly, both as to what it forecloses and as to what it leaves open. What it forecloses is this: the 1st to 4th Defendants may not re-file, as of right, a fresh application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite over this estate that is, they may not simply lodge such an application again, of their own motion, as though the order of 22 April 2026 had never been made. An application of that same character is not taken outside the bar merely because it is differently framed or proposes a different nominee. What the phrase does not foreclose, however, is the seeking of the Court's permission. The bar is a bar against re-filing without leave; it is not a bar against asking for leave. The 1st to 4th Defendants therefore remain free to come to the Court by a formal, on-notice application - whether for leave to file a fresh application, or to vary the order of 22 April 2026 - and, upon demonstrating a proper basis, such as a genuine material change of circumstances, to revive the relief by that route. That is the proper way forward, and the only one. The election I imposed in Enclosure 81 confirms the distinction rather than contradicting it. That election was a binary one - to proceed with Enclosure 30, or to withdraw it without liberty to re-file - and it governed only the manner in which Enclosure 30 was to be brought to an end. It did not, and could not, extinguish the Defendants' right to apply to the Court for relief in the future should circumstances genuinely change. The position therefore reduces to a simple distinction. What is not permitted is the filing of Enclosure 94, or any like application, as of right while the order of 22 April 2026 stands. What is permitted is a formal, on-notice application for leave, or to vary that order, supported by proper grounds. It is precisely that distinction which underlies my disposition: I struck out Enclosure 94 because it adopted the wrong means, while granting liberty to apply because the right means remains open. E. WHAT THE 1ST TO 4TH DEFENDANTS DID [12] On 27 April 2026 five days after my ruling, and before the seven-day election window had closed the 1st to 4th Defendants took two steps on the same day. [13] First, at 14:36 on 27 April 2026, they filed Enclosure 94: a fresh application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite over the same estate, proposing a different nominee. [14] Secondly, by their solicitors' letter of the same date, they gave notice that, Enclosure 94 having been filed, they would withdraw Enclosure 30 - but only "without liberty to file afresh with the same candidate as in Enclosure 30", and without costs. The qualification "with the same candidate" was the Defendants' own addition; it does not appear in the order of 22 April 2026. [15] The Plaintiff, by solicitors' letter of 28 April 2026, objected. The objection was, in substance, that both the filing of Enclosure 94 and the qualified withdrawal offered by the letter of 27 April 2026 were inconsistent with the order of 22 April 2026, were an attempt to circumvent that order and the directions of 12 March 2026, and were an abuse of the process of the Court prejudicial to the Plaintiff. F. WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE HEARING [16] When Enclosure 94 was called up before me in open court on 29 April 2026, I indicated at once that the application did not appear to be properly before me in view of my ruling of 22 April 2026. I invited counsel for the 1st to 4th Defendants to address the preliminary question whether, in light of the subsistence of Enclosure 30 and the terms of the order of 22 April 2026 Enclosure 94 could properly be entertained. [17] Counsel for the 1st to 4th Defendants submitted that Enclosure 94 was properly before the Court because (a) it proposed a different nominee; (b) that there was no order made on 22 April 2026; and (c) that Enclosure 94 is entirely different from Enclosure 30. Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that Enclosure 94 was an abuse of process and an attempt to circumvent the order of 22 April 2026. G. THE ISSUE [18] The single issue was whether Enclosure 94 was properly before the Court, given (a) the subsistence of Enclosure 30 as a live application; (b) the terms of the order of 22 April 2026; and (c) the Defendants' contention that the new ground of land interference constituted a material change of circumstances. It was not an issue going to the merits of any pendente lite appointment, which I expressly did not reach. H. THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES [19] The following principles guide the determination. [20] First, every court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of its own process, preserved and not displaced by Order 92 rule 4 of the ROC 2012, which declares that nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. The classic statement remains that of Lord Diplock in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529, that the power exists to prevent the misuse of the court's procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [21] Secondly, an order of the court, while it subsists, binds the parties and the court itself, and must be adhered to until set aside, varied or reversed on appeal. It is not open to a party to treat a subsisting order as a dead letter, or to circumvent it by indirect means. This principle was stated by the Court of Appeal in Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57, where Gopal Sri Ram JCA held that once a judge makes a ruling — whether substantive or procedural, final or interlocutory — it must be adhered to and may not be reopened, and that such a ruling, though interlocutory and procedural, binds the court and all parties to the lis until reversed on appeal. An interlocutory order may, of course, be varied or discharged upon a material change of circumstances, or where it is shown to have been obtained by misrepresentation, or where fresh evidence comes to light; but the proper course in such a case is to apply to vary the order, not to circumvent it by filing a fresh application as though the order did not exist. [22] Thirdly, it is an abuse of process to maintain, side by side, two applications seeking substantially the same relief, or to file a fresh application of the same character as one already pending, without first disposing of the pending application, unless there is a material change of circumstances or the earlier application has become incapable of adjudication. That principle is rooted in the Court's inherent power to control its own process and to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. [23] Fourthly, where a court has, by its order, confined a party to a defined course here, a binary election it is an abuse for that party to seek, by a collateral step, to escape the confinement and to obtain indirectly that which the order withheld. The threshold question whether an application is properly constituted logically precedes its merits; a court is not bound to hear the substance of an application that is not properly before it. [24] Fifthly, the proper course for a party who has been refused, or who has surrendered, the right to bring an application, but who later wishes to revive it, is to come to the court by the front door by applying for leave, or to vary the order which stands in his way, demonstrating a proper ground or a change of circumstances — and not by the back door of simply re-filing as though no impediment existed. I. APPLICATION TO THE FACTS [25] Applying those principles, the position was, in my judgment, clear. [26] Enclosure 94 seeks substantially the same relief as Enclosure 30 - the appointment of an administrator pendente lite, without security, over the estate of the same deceased - together with the same management powers, including the consolidation of the deceased's monies held in Malaysia and India into a single trust account, the same restriction upon distribution, and the same provisions as to professional assistance, remuneration, indemnity and accounts. The only material difference is the identity of the proposed nominee: Enclosure 30 proposed Datuk M. Ramanathan a/l SM Meyyappan; Enclosure 94 proposes Venkitesan a/l V.N. Venugopal. In every other material respect - the office to be filled, the estate concerned, the scope of the powers sought, the handling of assets, the restriction on distribution, and the ancillary reliefs - the two applications are the same. [27] That difference does not assist the 1st to 4th Defendants. The change of nominee, while a factual difference, does not alter the essential character of the relief sought. The office to be filled (administrator pendente lite), the estate (the same deceased's estate), the scope of powers, and the substantive relief are in all material respects identical. The identity of the nominee is an incident of the relief - it specifies who is to fill the office - but it is not the essence of the relief. An application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite does not become a different application merely because a different individual is proposed to fill the same office. I accept that the nominee was changed in an endeavour to meet the Plaintiff's objections to Datuk M. Ramanathan; but that does not render Enclosure 94 a different application for the purposes of the order of 22 April 2026. [28] It follows, on the construction of the order set out above, that the 1st to 4th Defendants could not escape the bar by the simple expedient of changing the name of the proposed appointee. Were it otherwise, the order would be rendered nugatory: a party could withdraw, substitute a fresh nominee, withdraw again, substitute another, and so re-file without end. The Court does not make orders that are so readily evaded. [29] More fundamentally, at the time Enclosure 94 was filed on 27 April 2026, Enclosure 30 remained a live and subsisting application before this Court. No withdrawal had taken effect. The most the Defendants had done was to give notice of an intention to withdraw, and that on terms the order did not authorise. By Order 21 rule 6 of the ROC 2012, " [a] party who has taken out a notice of application in a cause or matter may not withdraw it without the leave of the Court". The Defendants' letter of 27 April 2026 did not, and could not, effect a withdrawal of Enclosure 30. Consequently, at the time Enclosure 94 was filed, there were two pending applications for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite over the same estate - one (Enclosure 30) proposing Datuk M. Ramanathan, and one (Enclosure 94) proposing Venkitesan. That multiplicity is precisely the mischief that the Court's control of its own process is designed to prevent. [30] To file Enclosure 94 in those circumstances was to do indirectly what the Court had declined to permit directly. It maintained two parallel applications for substantially the same relief; it sought to escape the binary election imposed on 22 April 2026; and, with Enclosure 30 still to be determined, it pre-empted the very question the Court had reserved. The change of nominee does not cure that impropriety. [31] As to the contention that the alleged "unlawful interference with Estate Land" constitutes a change of circumstances justifying a fresh application notwithstanding the order of 22 April 2026, it is sufficient for present purposes to say this. The asserted new ground does not cure the procedural impropriety in the manner in which Enclosure 94 was brought. Whether that ground amounts to a material change of circumstances such as would justify the appointment of an administrator pendente lite, or would warrant a variation of the order of 22 April 2026 or the grant of leave to file afresh, is a matter I have not decided and have deliberately left open, to be examined and tested in the ordinary way upon a properly constituted application. The existence of a new ground does not entitle a party to bypass a subsisting order of the Court. [32] Nor was I functus officio. Nothing in my earlier ruling deprived me of jurisdiction over the management of this action. The order of 22 April 2026 was an interlocutory case-management order, and the Court retains seisin of its own interlocutory orders; my jurisdiction to control the Court's process and to prevent its abuse remained fully engaged, and Order 92 rule 4 of the ROC 2012 expressly preserves it. The striking out of Enclosure 94 was the exercise of that jurisdiction. The finding of abuse does not depend upon any variation of the order of 22 April 2026; it rests on the fact that Enclosure 94 was filed in contravention of the regime established by that order. J. THE ORDER AND THE LIBERTY GRANTED [33] I struck out Enclosure 94, with no order as to costs, the Plaintiff having consented to that costs disposition. The strike-out rested on the impropriety of the manner in which the application was brought - a collateral, parallel re-filing while Enclosure 30 was live and the election under the order of 22 April 2026 was on foot - and not on any conclusion that an administrator pendente lite may never be sought over this estate. That distinction is important, and it is what the liberty I granted reflects. [34] I granted the 1st to 4th Defendants liberty, if so advised, to file a formal application for leave to file and/or to proceed with a fresh application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite, notwithstanding the ruling of 22 April 2026. That liberty is not a licence to re-file at large in disregard of that ruling, nor does it of itself lift the bar that ruling imposed. It is liberty to apply: a direction as to the proper route - a formal and properly constituted application, on notice, whether for leave or to vary the order of 22 April 2026 - at which the Plaintiff may be heard, and at which the merits of any pendente lite appointment, and any genuine change of circumstances, may be examined and tested. So understood, the liberty is not in tension with the finding of abuse; it is its necessary corollary. The Court struck out an application brought by the wrong means while leaving open the right means. The order of 22 April 2026 otherwise remains in force. [35] That disposal was, in my judgment, correct, measured and just. It worked no injustice to the 1st to 4th Defendants, whose substantive position - if there be merit in it - remains fully open to them by proper application. It vindicated the binding force of the Court's order of 22 April 2026. And it protected the Plaintiff from being vexed by two concurrent applications for the same relief, while giving effect to the Plaintiff's own consent that there be no order as to costs. K. CONCLUSION [36] For the reasons set out above, Enclosure 94 was filed while the substantially identical Enclosure 30 remained live and undisposed of, in an attempt to escape the binary election imposed by the order of 22 April 2026 and to circumvent the bar against filing afresh. To have entertained Enclosure 94 on its merits would have been to permit an abuse of the Court's process and to subvert the binding force of the Court's own order. [37] Accordingly, I made the following orders:

Enclosure 94 is struck out.

There shall be no order as to costs, the Plaintiff having consented thereto.

The 1st to 4th Defendants are at liberty, if so advised, to file a formal application for leave to file and/or to proceed with a fresh application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite over the estate of the deceased, notwithstanding the Court's ruling of 22 April 2026 (in Enclosure 81) concerning the withdrawal of Enclosure 30 without liberty to file afresh. Dated 14th May 2026 (YA Dato' Sri Raja Segaran A/L S. Krishnan) (Judicial Commisioner) High Court Of Malaya Malacca High Court (MELAKA) Lawyer For Plaintiff : Encik Nahdan Rengganathan bin Abdullah bersama Cik Ow Su Wan Tetuan A. Rengganathan & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 2-26, Jalan PM 3,Plaza Mahkota, 75000 Melaka. Lawyer For Defendents : Encik Vijaymohan a/l Mohan Ghandi Tetuan Vijay Peguambela dan Peguamcara E-09-11, Plaza Mont Kiara, No.2, Jalan Kiara, Mont Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur.