Pembelaan kedua Tertuduh tidak mampu mematahkan dapatan 685 fakta pemilikan dan pengetahuan atas imbangan kebarangkalian atau mewujudkan suatu keraguan munasabah dalam kes pendakwaan.” [31] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan HMT diatas, kami dapati HMT telah membuat dapatan bahawa perayu-perayu tidak mampu mematahkan 690 dapatan fakta pemilikan dan pengetahuan atas imbangan kebarangkalian atau mewujudkan suatu keraguan munasabah dalam kes pendakwaan. Adalah jelas di peringkat pembelaan, HMT telah khilaf apabila membuat dapatan dengan menggunakan beban pembuktian yang lebih tinggi ke atas pihak pembelaan untuk 695 menyangkal pemilikan dan pengetahuan dengan bukan sekadar menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. [32] Kami merujuk beberapa nas duluan seperti berikut: 700 - Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Alcontara Ambross Anthony v PP [1996] 1 LNS 597, memutuskan: "Nowhere in his judgment did the Judge direct attention to the statutory presumptions as to possession (s. 37(d)) and trafficking (s. 37(da)), and 705 as a result, he made no finding as to whether the defence had rebutted the same. In our view, this was a misdirection in law by way of non-direction having regard to the following passage in the judgment of Azmi SCJ so in Mohammad Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP [2002] 3 CLJ 794(1991] 3 MLJ 169, at p. 172 para 1: 710 In our opinion, unless the evidence in a particular case does not obviously so warrant, it is incumbent for the Court to consider whether, on the balance of probabilities, the evidence of the defence has rebutted the statutory presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) as a separate exercise, 715 even though the Court is satisfied on balance that the presumption of possession under s. 37(d) has not been rebutted. In this case, the failure to do so was a material misdirection and was fatal to the conviction. Having said that, we would add there may well be cases where, because 720 of the absolutely overwhelming nature of the affirmative evidence led by the prosecution, there is no need for resort to be had to the statutory presumptions aforesaid, but even in such a case, we consider that the trial Court should specifically so find." 725 -Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam Victor Chidiebere Nzomiwu & 2 Ors v PP [2012] 1 LNS 806 memutusakan: "This is our unanimous decision. We have perused through the evidence with a fine-tooth comb, and we have also considered the written grounds 730 of judgment of the learned High Court Judge as well as the submissions of the parties, and we find that there is evidence of possession of the dangerous drugs by all three appellants pursuant to a common intention. The charge in this case was that, pursuant to a common intention, the three appellants were trafficking in the dangerous drugs, and the learned 735 High Court Judge found them guilty of the offence of trafficking, having applied the presumption under s. 37(da)(iiia) of the DDA 1952. However, we find that when the learned High Court Judge came to consider the defence case, His Lordship misdirected himself when he failed to consider at all the question of whether the first, second and third appellants had 740 rebutted the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da)(iiia) of the DDA 1952 on the balance of probabilities (PP v. Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89, PC). In the circumstances, we are of the considered view that it is unsafe to convict all three appellants for the offence of trafficking in dangerous drugs as per the charge. But we are satisfied, and we hold that on the available 745 evidence, there is clear evidence of possession of the dangerous drugs in question pursuant to a common intention of them all. Consequently, we quash the convictions and sentences under s. 39B(1)(a) of the DDA 1952 and punishable under s. 39B(2) of the DDA 1952 read with s. 34 of the Penal Code, and we substitute it with a conviction of each of the appellants 750 under section 12(2) of the DDA 1952, and punishable under s. 39A(2) of the DDA read with s. 34 of the Penal Code." -Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam Bahram Nikkhouyabgram Nayeb v PP [2013] 6 CLJ 702, memutuskan: 755 “[27] The appellant is not required to prove his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. All that is required of him is to raise a reasonable doubt. It is incumbent on the learned judge to consider whether, on the balance of probabilities, the evidence of the defence had rebutted the statutory 760 presumption under s. 37(da) of the Act. We have perused the grounds of judgment, and it is apparent that the trial judge has failed to carry out a separate exercise to consider whether the appellant had succeeded on the balance of probabilities to rebut the statutory presumption. We agree with learned counsel that the learned judge has failed to consider evidence 765 from which inferences favourable to the appellant could have been made, which, on a balance of probabilities, would have succeeded in rebutting the said presumption. In our view, such omission has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. We find that it was not safe to sustain the conviction. For the reasons stated above, we allowed the appeal and set aside the 770 conviction and sentence." [33] Setelah meniliai keseluruhan keterangan yang ada di Mahkamah, mempertimbangkan alasan penghakiman bertulis HMT yang bijaksana serta hujahan pihak-piha, kami mendapati bahawa 775 terdapat bukti pemilikan dadah berbahaya oleh perayu-perayu menurut niat yang sama (common intention). [34] Walau bagaimanapun, kami mendapati, apabila HMT yang bijaksana dalam mempertimbangkan kes pembelaan, HMT telah 780 tersalah arah apabila HMT telah mempertimbangkan persoalan sama ada perayu-perayu mempunyai milikan, kawalan dan pengetahuan dengan menggunakan beban pembuktian atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Kami merujuk kepada para 75 dan 76 Alasan Penghakiman HMT yang telah membuat kesimpulan seperti berikut: 785 “Kesimpulan