Vimala A/P Maruthamuthoo v Paul Monash A/L Narayanasamy (BA-24NCvC-1077-05/2024)

Enclosure 6 is the application filed by the Proposed Intervener, one Kavitah a/p Vathumalai, seeking leave to intervene in the Plaintiff’s application under Enclosure 1.

In Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff seeks to remove the private caveat lodged by the Defendant, one Paul Monash a/l Narayanasamy, over S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA the property held under Geran 339999, Lot 126483, Mukim Dengkil, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor, bearing the address No. 2, Jalan Kananga 1/10, Taman Kenanga, 43900 Sepang, Selangor Darul Ehsan (the Property).

On 11 April 2023, the Plaintiff entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (the Agreement) with the registered proprietors of the Property for a total consideration of RM550,000.00 (the Purchase Price).

At the material time, the Property was jointly owned in three equal shares by the following individuals: a. Kejendran a/l Nadarajan (Kejendran), b. Mardai @ Ratha a/p Ponusamy (P Mardai), and c. The Estate of the late Sargunan a/l Nadarajan (Sargunan), represented by Kejendran as administrator of the deceased’s estate. These individuals shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as “the Vendors”.

The Plaintiff was represented in the transaction by Messrs Thana Krishnen & Co. (the Purchaser’s Solicitors), who prepared the S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA Agreement. Before executing the Agreement, the Plaintiff conducted a land search on 28 March 2023, which confirmed that there were no caveats registered on the Property. Based on this confirmation, the Plaintiff proceeded to execute the Agreement.

Following execution, the Plaintiff paid a deposit of RM55,000.00 to the Vendors. On 1 June 2023, the Plaintiff lodged a private caveat over the Property to safeguard her interest as purchaser.

On 4 November 2023, the Plaintiff’s financier, CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad (the Financier), paid the redemption sum of RM123,707.49.

On 21 December 2023, the Financier released the balance purchase price of RM371,292.51 to the Purchaser’s Solicitors.

The Plaintiff contended that throughout the transaction, she was unaware of any dispute between the Proposed Intervener, the Defendant, and Kejendran, and had no knowledge of any prior caveats on the Property. She maintained that she was a bona fide purchaser without notice and acted in good faith.

It was only upon the rejection of the transfer of ownership by the Land Office that the Plaintiff discovered a caveat previously lodged by the Proposed Intervener on 10 July 2023 (the First Caveat), which had prevented registration of the Property in her name.

Arising from this, Kejendran filed Originating Summons No. BA- 24NCvC-735-04/2024 (Suit 735) on 15 April 2024 at the Shah Alam High Court, seeking to remove the First Caveat. S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA

Meanwhile, on 3 April 2024, the Defendant lodged a second private caveat over the Property (the Second Caveat), prompting the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 to remove this Second Caveat.

Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012 empowers the Court, at any stage of proceedings, to add a person as a party if their presence is necessary to fully and effectively determine the issues in dispute or if there exists a question between that person and any existing party that is connected to the relief sought in the action and ought to be resolved together.

The guiding principle in determining whether leave to intervene ought to be granted is well established. In Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52, the Privy Council observed: “It has been sometimes said as in Moser v Marsden [1892] 1 Ch 487 and in In re IG Farbenindustrie AG [1944] Ch 41 that a party may be added if his legal interests will be affected by the judgment in the action but not if his commercial interests only would be affected. While their Lordships agree that the mere fact that a person is likely to be better off financially if a case is decided one way rather than another is not a sufficient ground to entitle him to be added as a party, they do not find the dichotomy between “legal” and “commercial” interests helpful. A better way of expressing the test is: will his rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA the action be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action?” [emphasis added]

This decision highlights that a distinction must be drawn between mere financial or commercial interest and a legal interest that is directly impacted by the court’s decision.

The same position was followed in Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn Bhd [1989] 2 MLJ 298, where the High Court made it clear: “…a person who wants to intervene must show that he has some interest which is directly related to the subject matter of the action. A mere commercial interest in the outcome is not enough. He will be allowed to intervene if his rights or liabilities in respect of the subject matter of the action will be directly affected by any order of the court in the action. To prevent injustice being done, the court should allow a person whose rights will be affected by its judgment an opportunity of being heard.” [emphasis added]

From these authorities, it is well settled that a Proposed Intervener must demonstrate a direct legal interest in the subject matter of the proceedings. A mere pecuniary or financial interest is not sufficient.

Accordingly, the burden lies on the Proposed Intervener to satisfy the Court that the order sought in relation to the Second Caveat would directly affect her legal rights or liabilities, thereby justifying her intervention in these proceedings. S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA

The Court now turns to assess the merits of the Proposed Intervener’s application in Enclosure 6. The central issue is whether she has demonstrated a sufficient legal interest in the subject matter of the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons to justify her joinder under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012.

Upon careful consideration of the parties’ affidavits and submissions, this Court finds that the Proposed Intervener had failed to demonstrate the requisite legal interest to justify her intervention in these proceedings.

The Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 1 concerns a specific relief— namely, the removal of the Second Caveat entered by the Defendant. It is undisputed that no relief is sought against the Proposed Intervener. She is not named in the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons, nor is her presence necessary for the adjudication of the dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

As discussed above, the law is settled. Under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012, intervention is permitted only if the applicant’s rights or liabilities will be directly affected by the order sought. This principle has been consistently affirmed in Pegang Mining, Tohtonku, and recently in Datuk Seri Maglin Dennis D’Cruz (in his capacity as President and public officer of myPPP) v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia (Tan Sri Datuk Seri M Kayveas & Ors, proposed interveners) [2024] MLJU 568, where the Court held: S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA “[7] It is settled law that those who apply to intervene because their legal interests would be directly affected will be allowed to intervene. Those with merely a monetary interest or those who are indirectly affected will not be allowed to intervene...” [emphasis added]

In the present case, the Proposed Intervener relies on two primary grounds to support her application: first, an alleged loan of RM35,000.00 said to have been extended to one of the Vendors, Kejendran, in 2011; and second, an alleged interest under a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 25 January 2012 (the Impugned Agreement). Upon scrutiny, both grounds are found to be legally unsustainable.

In relation to the alleged loan, the Proposed Intervener admitted that the RM35,000.00 did not originate from her personal funds. Even if it had, the nature of her claim is purely monetary. Such an interest, in law, does not give rise to a right to intervene. This was clarified in Natsafe (M) Sdn Bhd v Loi Teak Kuong [2005] 6 MLJ 454, where Abdul Malik Ishak J (as his Lordship then was) held that a party asserting only financial exposure, without a corresponding legal or proprietary interest in the land, does not have a caveatable interest. His Lordship said: “And so it can be surmised that the defendant’s right arising from the settlement agreement is merely ‘monetary’ and it arises from the value of his shares in the plaintiff. For these varied reasons, it cannot be said that the defendant S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA has a caveatable interest as he is neither claiming any right or interest to such title of the property.” [emphasis added]

As for the Impugned Agreement, the Proposed Intervener is not a named party. The contracting parties were Kejendran, P. Mardai, and the Defendant. The Proposed Intervener has not demonstrated that any legal rights were conferred upon her under this agreement. Her reliance on it is therefore misplaced.

The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the Proposed Intervener’s evidence. In her caveat form, she initially referred to an agreement dated 25 January 2011, which was later admitted not to exist. Her subsequent attempt to correct the error did little to remedy the deficiency, especially in light of her exclusion from the 2012 agreement, which she then sought to rely on.

On the whole, this Court is not satisfied that the Proposed Intervener has demonstrated any legal interest in the subject matter of these proceedings. The dispute concerning the Second Caveat lies solely between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The Proposed Intervener’s involvement is neither necessary nor justified. Her interest, at most, is pecuniary and collateral.

In any event, any rights she may have are protected by the First Caveat, which is the subject matter of Suit 735. That forum is the proper venue to determine whether she has a caveatable interest in the Property. S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA

For all the foregoing reasons, the Proposed Intervener’s application in Enclosure 6 is dismissed with costs of RM5,000.00. Dated: 23 May 2025 -sgd-JAMHIRAH ALI JUDGE High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam (NCVC 1) To the parties’ solicitors: For the Plaintiff : Etrus Tan (Messrs. L H Yeo & Co.) For the Defendant & : J.J. Naidu the Proposed Intervener (Messrs. J.J. Naidu Dan Rakan-Rakan) S/N pwsKlxHzqUmVItpd6EzFMA