Learned counsel for both the appellant made reference to Abdullah Zawawi v Public Prosecutor [1985] 2 MLJ 16 to suggest that the non-calling of witnesses such as Sathiya who was with SP8, and Pang Tze Ling who is a sister of DW4, should give rise to adverse inferences. The answer to this is stated by Augustine Paul J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 (HC): It is settled law that in a criminal trial the prosecution has a discretion, provided that there is no wrong motive, as to whether or not to call any particular witness and in particular has a discretion not to call in support of its case a witness whom it does not believe to be a witness of truth (see Khoon Chye Hin v Public Prosecutor [1961] MLJ 105, Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v Attorney General for Palestine [1944] AC 156). There is no obligation compelling the prosecution to call all witnesses who speak to facts which it desires to prove (see Malak Khan v Emperor 72 IA 305; AIR 1946 PC 16). Thus, the prosecution is not duty bound to call all the witnesses from whom statements may have been taken (see Public Prosecutor v Teh Cheng Poh [1980] 1 MLJ 251). This accords with s 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 which provides that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. This section enshrines the well recognised maxim that 'evidence has to be weighed and not counted'. As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated and one credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character (see Vadivelu Thevar v State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614). What is significant is that the prosecution must call the necessary witnesses to unfold the narrative upon which its case is based. In this regard, reference may be made to the advice delivered by the Privy Council in the celebrated case of Seneviratne v R [1936] 3 All ER 36 where Lord Roche said at pp 48-49: ... Their Lordships do not desire to lay down any rules to fetter discretion on a matter such as this which is so dependent on the particular circumstances of each case. Still less do they desire to discourage the utmost candour and fairness on the part of those conducting prosecutions; but at the same time they cannot, speaking generally, approve of an idea that a prosecution must call witnesses irrespective of considerations of number and of reliability, or that a prosecution ought to discharge the functions both of prosecution and defence. If it does so, confusion is very apt to result, and never is it more likely to result than if the prosecution calls witnesses and then proceeds almost automatically to discredit them by cross-examination. On the type of witnesses who must be called by the prosecution, Lord Roche said in the same case at p 49: ... Witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narratives on which the prosecution is based, must, of course, be called by the prosecution whether in the result the effect of their testimony is for or against the case for the prosecution. Thus, an adverse inference for not calling a witness cannot be drawn if there is sufficient other evidence to support the prosecution case (see (1) Namasiyiam (2) Rajindran (3) Goh Chin Peng, and (4) Ng Ah Kiat v Public Prosecutor [1987] 2 MLJ 336). No adverse inference can also be drawn when a witness has been offered for cross-examination (see Saw Thean Teik v Regina [1953] MLJ 124) or has been made available to the defence and the defence did not call the witness (see Public Prosecutor v Chee Kon Fatt [1991] 3 CLJ 2564). If a witness had been made available to the defence, there can be no suggestion, as stated by Lord Thankerton in the case of Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v Attorney General for Palestine, '... that the prosecutor has been influenced by some oblique motive' (see Samsudin v Public Prosecutor [1962] MLJ 405). However, where the prosecution evidence falls short of proving a prima facie case, the right of not calling a witness by merely offering him to the defence will not be available (see Abdullah Zawawi v Public Prosecutor [1985] 2 MLJ 16; Public Prosecutor v Chew Yoo Choi [1990] 2 MLJ 444; Teoh Hoe Chye v Public Prosecutor Yeap Teong Tean v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 220). However the presumption will arise where there is acute conflict on a material point in the evidence presented. In this regard Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ said in Alcontara a/l Ambross Anthony v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 MLJ 209 (FC) at p 220: We must add that, in a situation such as this, where there was an acute conflict of evidence on a material point, namely, the result of the search of the person of the accused, and a search list contemporaneously prepared by the police was presumably in existence, a copy thereof, ought, in all fairness, to be tendered in evidence or its non-production accounted for, the sanction for not doing so being the presumption, that if produced, it would have been unfavourable to the prosecution (see s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950). Instead, the judge did the opposite — he wrongly assumed that a copy of the search list was in evidence, and went on to presume that its contents supported the version of ASP Abdul Wahab.