Vistasik Sdn Bhd v Propel Synergy Sdn Bhd (WA-28NCC-370-04/2023)

There are two Enclosures before this Court, namely Enclosures 39 and 129.

A winding-up petition was filed by the Petitioner, Vistasik Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation), against the Respondent, Propel Synergy Sdn Bhd, in respect of a total debt of RM30,124,469.86 (the Petition Sum). The Petition was filed on 20 April 2023, and an Amended Petition was filed on 14 August 2024 (Enclosure 39).

The Petition Sum is founded on an Arbitration Award dated 13 July 2019, together with four Court Orders, all of which are final, enforceable and undisputed.

Enclosure 129 is a Form of Summons filed by the Respondent on 25 July 2025, seeking an unless order pursuant to sections 469(1)(c) and 469(3) of the Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

In essence, the Respondent does not dispute the debt. Instead, it proposes to pay the full Petition Sum in 30 monthly instalments, comprising 29 post-dated cheques of RM1,000,000.00 each and a final payment of RM1,124,469.86, on the terms that the winding-up order shall take effect automatically only upon any default in payment.

The Amended Petition in Enclosures 39 and 129 were heard together. Having heard the oral and written submissions of both parties and having perused all cause papers, I allowed the Respondent’s application to pay the Petition Sum in instalments and, upon any default, the Respondent to be automatically wound up.

I now set out the reasons for my decision.

The Respondent is a private limited company incorporated in Malaysia on 11 May 2006. It is primarily engaged in the hotel and hospitality sector and operates two hotels in Malacca, namely the Noble Resort Hotel Melaka and Asia Melaka Hotel (collectively, the Hotels). The Respondent currently employs 153 people across its hotel operations.

The Petitioner is in liquidation. The Petition Sum of RM30,124,469.86 comprises:

(a) An Arbitration Award dated 13 July 2019 for a sum of RM17,072,627.79, interest thereon, and a further sum of RM3,123,376.80, together with interest and other related fees;

(b) Costs awarded in the Kuala Lumpur High Court, Originating Summons No: WA-24C(ARB)-39-09/2019, in the Order dated 30 November 2020;

(c) Costs awarded in the Kuala Lumpur High Court, Originating Summons No: WA-24C(ARB)-44-10/2019, in the Order dated 30 November 2020; and

(d) Costs awarded in two Court of Appeal Civil Appeals, Nos: W-02(C)(A)-1946-12/2020 and W-02(C)(A)-1945- 12/2020, in Orders dated 7 November 2022.

The Respondent’s attempts to set aside the Arbitration Award and to obtain leave to appeal to the Federal Court were dismissed. The Petition Sum is therefore final, conclusive and no longer challengeable.

The Respondent has at no point disputed the amount of the debt.

A Statutory Notice pursuant to section 466 of the CA 2016 was served on the Respondent on 20 February 2023. The Respondent failed to pay or compound the debt within 21 days, resulting in the filing of the original Petition in Enclosure 1 on 20 April 2023. 5 13. As at the date of the hearing, the Respondent had not made any payment of the Petition Sum. It had earlier attempted to negotiate a discounted settlement, which was unsuccessful. It then applied, vide Enclosure 129, for an unless order on terms that it be given 30 months to pay the full amount in structured monthly instalments. Importantly, it also agreed, by way of Prayer 3 of Enclosure 129, that it shall be automatically wound up upon any default in the instalment schedule.

The Petitioner is in liquidation, and its Liquidator is under a statutory duty to recover assets for the benefit of its creditors. The Petitioner’s creditors have consistently and vocally opposed the unless order sought by the Respondent. At two Creditors’ Meetings, one held on 25 February 2025 (CRM 25.2) and another on 9 January 2026 (CRM 9.1), the creditors expressed a preference for a full lump-sum payment, with interest. The Reliefs Sought in Enclosure 129

The reliefs sought by the Respondent in Enclosure 129 are:

(a) That the sum of RM30,124,469.86 be recorded as the full and final settlement of all claims due and owing by the Respondent to the Petitioner;

(b) That the Respondent be permitted to pay the Petition Sum in 30 monthly instalments, comprising 29 post-dated cheques of RM1,000,000.00 each, followed by a final payment of RM1,124,469.86, payable on the 4th day of each month;

(c) That unless the Respondent pays the Petition Sum in accordance with the instalment schedule, the Respondent shall be automatically wound up pursuant to Enclosure 39; and

(e) That upon full payment, the Petitioner shall have no further claims against the Respondent. THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The following issues arise for the Court’s determination:

(a) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant an unless order in winding-up proceedings.

(b) Whether the Respondent’s request for a 30-month instalment plan constitutes an admission of commercial insolvency, and, if so, whether that admission is fatal to Enclosure 129.

(c) Whether the wishes of the Petitioner's creditors fetter the Court’s discretion.

(d) Whether, having regard to all the circumstances, it is just and appropriate for this Court to exercise its discretion to grant Enclosure 129. FINDINGS OF THE COURT The Court’s Jurisdiction to Grant an Unless Order

The Respondent relies on sections 469(1)(c) and 469(3) of the CA 2016 as the statutory basis for the unless order. Section 469(1)(c) of the CA 2016 expressly empowers this Court to make any interim or other order upon hearing a winding-up petition. It provides that: “Powers of Court on hearing petition for winding up

(1) On hearing the petition for winding up, the Court may, by order—

(a) dismiss the petition with or without costs;

(b) adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally; or

(c) make any interim or any other order that the Court thinks fit.” [emphasis added] 8 18. Section 469(3) further empowers this Court to adjourn the hearing, conditionally or unconditionally, on such terms as it considers fit.

The concept of the unless order in winding-up proceedings is well settled in Malaysian jurisprudence. In KTL Sdn Bhd v Azrahi Hotels Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 503, Vincent Ng J (as his Lordship then was) traced the origins of the unless order and explained that its rationale was to afford a respondent a fair opportunity to settle while ensuring that the Court’s time is not wasted if the respondent ultimately fails to do so. The learned judge observed that this was how the concept of unless orders took root in common law jurisprudence. The Court held: - “The ‘unless order’ is not a new creature. Australian cases where such orders are made are legion. The rationale underpinning this approach is both compelling and highly persuasive... in the interests of justice and good grace a defendant’s or respondent’s request for an adjournment of the hearing to another date to settle the matter amicably ought to be allowed; but allowed on terms such that the court’s time is not wasted in permitting the latter party to renege on his promise to settle... This is how the concept of ‘unless orders’ took root in jurisprudence.” 9 20. The validity and enforceability of such orders in winding-up proceedings were further affirmed in HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd v CS Metal Industries (M) Sdn Bhd [2006] 2 MLJ 578, where the same learned judge held that an unless order in such circumstances is “not only permissible but enforceable”, drawing on a long line of case law from England, Australia, Singapore and Malaysia. The learned judge held that: “An ‘unless order’ in circumstances such as the present case is not only permissible but enforceable, according to a long line of case authorities from England, Australia, Singapore and here. See my decision in KLT Sdn Bhd v Azrahi Hotel Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 MLJ 503; Changhe International Investments Pte Ltd (formerly known as Druidston Pte Ltd) v Dexia BIL Asia Singapore Ltd (formerly known as Banque International A Luxembourg BIL (Asia) Ltd [2005] SGCA 30; Re Mittagong RSL Club Ltd and the Companies Act [1980] 4 ACLR 897; Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Austral Oil Estates (No 2) [1989] 10 ACLR 354 and Re Roma Industries Pty Ltd [1976] 1 ACLR 296.”

Similarly, in Petro-Pipe Industries (M) Sdn Bhd v FW Industries Berhad [2006] MLJU 232, the Court made an unless order, providing that the winding-up consequence would take effect only if the respondent failed to comply with a stipulated payment deadline. This afforded the respondent a clear and structured opportunity to satisfy its obligations before the drastic remedy of winding-up was invoked.

Furthermore, in Prolink Marketing Sdn Bhd v Ambank Islamic Bhd [2022] 10 CLJ 247, the Court of Appeal held that the winding-up court’s powers under section 469(1)(c) of the CA 2016 are wide, and that an order imposing a condition requiring the company to pay the judgment sum within a specified period before the winding-up order takes effect is fair and reasonable, as it gives the company a structured opportunity to settle its debts. This is binding authority on this Court. The Court of Appeal held: - [14] Section 469(1) above, we find, is plain and unambiguous that the court’s discretionary power on hearing a winding-up petition is either to dismiss the petition, adjourn the hearing of the petition, or make an interim order, or any other order as the court thinks fit. Hence, the court must give effect to its natural and ordinary meaning without any other interpretation. … [17] Reverting to the present case, the phrase “any other order as the court thinks fit” under s. 469(1)(c) we find, its natural and ordinary meaning is wide. The court on hearing a winding-up petition may make other order as the court thinks fit that relate to the winding-up petition. This is a discretion given by law to a High Court Judge. [18] In the present case, on 5 August 2020, the High Court Judge had made an order that the appellant shall be wound-up on 5 January 2021 if fails to pay the judgment sums by that date. The condition to pay the judgment sums in five months period failing which the appellant shall be wound-up entails the ultimate result of granting the application for the winding-up of the appellant. The final order here is the winding-up of the appellant on 5 January 2021. The condition imposed by the High Court Judge is not entirely an independent remedy outside the application for the winding-up. … [21] Likewise in the present case, the condition to pay the judgment sums within five months relates to the winding-up of the appellant as the non-compliance of the condition resulting ultimately in the granting of the application to wind-up the appellant with effect on the 5 January 2021. As such, it falls within the provision “any other order as the court thinks fit” under s. 469(1)(c) of the CA 2016. [22] As alluded to earlier, although the phrase ‘any other order as the court thinks fit” seems provides a wide discretionary power to the court but it is not without limitation. The order made must relate to the winding-up petition where the ultimate result is either to allow the application for the winding-up or to dismiss it. In the present case, the ultimate result is the application to wind-up the appellant was made when the condition to pay the judgment sum was not fulfilled. … [25] Reverting to the present case, the imposition of the condition of five months’ period for the appellant to pay the judgment sums, we find, is fair and reasonable and it benefited the appellant as the appellant was given time to pay the debts. The condition is also relevant because it relates to the winding-up application where the ultimate result is the winding-up of the appellant on 5 January 2021 by the order dated 5 August 2020. [26] In the circumstances, we find that the conditional winding-up order dated 5 August 2020, is in accordance with the provision of s. 469(1)(c) of the CA 2016. … [29] Next, the contention that the High Court’s power on hearing a petition on winding-up can only decide to dismiss or grant the application is misconstrued. This would make the phrase “other order as the court thinks fit” under s. 469(1)(c) superfluous and render the provision otiose. Clearly, the Parliament does not legislate in vain. ... [30] Likewise in the present case, the phrase “any other order as the court thinks fit” under s. 469(1)(c) of the CA 2016 must not be disregarded or ignored. The purport and intent of Parliament in legislating this provision must be given its effect. [31] We also find that the contention by counsel for the appellant that there was no winding-up order made against the appellant on 5 August 2020 is untenable as the order clearly states that the appellant shall be wound-up on 5 January 2021 upon failing to pay the judgment sums. [32] Lastly, it is to be noted here that there is no provision under the CA 2016 and in particular s. 469(1) that prohibits the imposition of the condition to pay the debts within a period of time before the winding-up is made effective. On the contrary s. 469(1)(c), as discussed earlier, allows the High Court to do so.” [emphasis added]

In Kawasan Pilihan Sdn Bhd v Crecom Burj Group Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 2827, Nadzarin Wok Nordin J applied section 469(1) of the CA 2016, the very provision invoked here, to grant an unless order in a winding-up petition, allowing the respondent time to settle, failing which the unless order would be activated.

I am therefore satisfied that this Court has clear and ample jurisdiction, both statutory under sections 469(1)(c) and 469(3) of the CA 2016 and at common law through its inherent jurisdiction, to grant an unless order in winding-up proceedings. The question is not one of jurisdiction but of discretion: whether the facts of this case warrant the exercise of that discretion in the Respondent’s favour. The Commercial Insolvency Argument

The Petitioner’s second ground of opposition is that by seeking a 30-month payment plan, the Respondent has effectively admitted that it is unable to pay its debts as and when they fall due, thereby rendering itself commercially insolvent under the cash flow test in section 465(1)(e) of the CA 2016. Accordingly, Enclosure 129 therefore has “no leg to stand.”

The Petitioner argued that the relevant test is whether the company can pay its debts as and when they fall due, and that a company must have immediate realisable assets at the time the debt falls due. The Petitioner referred to the following cases as authority for this proposition: Hotel Royal Ltd Bhd v Tina Travel & Agencies Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 MLJ 21; Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 313; BMC Construction Sdn Bhd v Dataran Rentas Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 MLJ 356.

The Petitioner further referred to Lafarge Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Gold Trend Builders Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 817 in support of its argument. The Court of Appeal observed at paragraph [20] that: - “…The solvency of a company counts for nothing if it is not ready, willing and able to meet the demand of the creditor.” 16 28. I accept that the law on commercial insolvency and the cash flow test relied on by the Petitioner are well established. However, I do not accept that this is the end of the inquiry. The argument that an admission of inability to pay a debt in one lump sum is fatal to any relief in winding-up proceedings conflates two distinct questions: whether a winding-up order may be granted and whether it should be granted in the exercise of the Court’s discretion.

The first question is whether the grounds for a winding-up order exist at all. On that point, the Respondent’s admission that it cannot pay the full Petition Sum immediately may well be relevant. But that is distinct from the second question: whether a winding-up order should be made, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. The fact that the grounds for winding-up exist does not mean that winding-up is the only or the right outcome available to this Court.

Section 469 of the CA 2016 is precisely the provision that gives this Court the power to choose an outcome other than winding-up or outright dismissal of Enclosure 129. An unless order made under this provision is not a means of overlooking or excusing the Respondent’s admitted inability to pay in one lump sum; it is a recognised judicial tool for reaching the most just and practical outcome on the facts before the Court. The Petitioner’s commercial insolvency argument, while relevant, does not extinguish this Court’s discretion under section 469(1)(c) of the CA 2016 to consider and grant an unless order. I therefore do not accept that Enclosure 129 must fail simply because the Respondent is unable to pay the Petition Sum in one lump sum. The Wishes of the Petitioner’s Creditors

The Petitioner’s third ground is that its creditors, who have formally opposed Enclosure 129 at two Creditors’ Meetings, carry statutory weight under sections 487(2) and 521 of the CA 2016, which require the Liquidator to have regard to the creditors’ wishes. The creditors have consistently demanded a lump-sum payment with interest and have opposed any instalment arrangement.

I acknowledge that the creditors’ views are not irrelevant. The Liquidator owes statutory duties to the Petitioner’s creditors. However, I accept the Respondent’s submission that the Petitioner’s creditors are not creditors of the Respondent. They are essentially strangers to these winding-up proceedings. The creditors whose interests are at stake here are the Respondent’s creditors, not the Petitioner’s.

More importantly, whether to grant an unless order is a matter of judicial discretion conferred by statute. The wishes of the Petitioner’s creditors, however consistently expressed, do not and cannot fetter the Court’s statutory powers under section 469(1)(c) of the CA 2016. The Court is not bound to follow the creditors’ preferences. As the Respondent correctly contended, this Court must determine not merely what the creditors prefer, but what best serves the objective of maximum debt recovery in all the circumstances of this case.

There is also an important point to note about the creditors’ prior conduct. At the CRM 25.2, the Petitioner’s creditors voted against an earlier discounted settlement proposal of RM18,000,000.00 from the Respondent. By rejecting a substantial compromise, the creditors effectively signalled that they wanted the full sum of RM30,124,469.86. The Respondent’s application under Enclosure 129 is precisely an offer to pay that full amount, without any discount. To resist even that, preferring instead the risks and costs of a winding-up where the Petitioner ranks behind secured creditors, sits uneasily with the creditors’ stated objective of full recovery.

For these reasons, while the creditors’ wishes are noted and respected, they do not prevent the Court from exercising its discretion. In Exercising this Court’s Discretion: Why Enclosure 129 Ought to Be Allowed

Having determined that this Court has jurisdiction to grant an unless order and that neither the commercial insolvency argument nor the creditors’ wishes constitute a conclusive bar, the real question is whether the overall justice of the situation warrants granting Enclosure 129. I find that it does, for the following reasons.

(a) The debt is admitted, and the Respondent commits to pay in full.

(b) The Respondent does not dispute the Petition Sum. It has acknowledged the debt in full, both in its affidavits and in its court application. It proposes to pay the entire amount of RM30,124,469.86 without any discount or reduction. As the cases of KTL Sdn Bhd v Azrahi Hotels Sdn Bhd (supra) and HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd v CS Metal Industries (M) Sdn Bhd (supra) make clear, a respondent’s willingness to commit to full payment is a weighty factor in favour of granting an unless order.

(c) At the hearing, the Respondent demonstrated its commitment in a tangible and immediate manner by producing 30 cheques before this Court: one current-dated cheque for RM2,000,000.00 for the first payment and 29 post-dated cheques for RM1,000,000.00 each. This is not a bare promise. It is a concrete and enforceable commitment, backed by negotiable instruments, with an automatic winding-up consequence on any default.

(d) The Respondent is a going concern generating active revenue. The Respondent operates two revenue-generating hotels in Malacca, employing a total of 153 people. The Respondent's Detailed Monthly Statement of Profit and Loss Account as at 3 October 2025 shows that for the period January to September 2025, the Respondent generated total revenue of RM11,294,813.00, a gross operating profit of RM9,625,062.00 and a net profit of RM3,914,669.00. These figures demonstrate a profitable, actively trading business with consistent cash flow.

(e) The Respondent’s financial statements for the financial years ended 30 June 2022, 30 June 2023 and 30 June 2024 further support its status as a going concern. The Respondent is not a shell company or a company stripped of assets. It is an operational, profitable business capable of generating the cash flow required to meet the proposed instalment obligations.

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Litar Sistem Adilkap Sdn Bhd v Lee Teak Hock & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 84 is instructive. The Court of Appeal held that a viable and solvent company contributes to a nation’s economy and provides employment, and that winding-up should not be imposed without justification. The Court of Appeal emphasised that winding up a company should be a remedy of last resort. The Court of Appeal stated that: “[4] …Further, there was no evidence to prove that the appellant was not doing well and was running at a loss. A viable solvent company assists the economy of a nation. It provides jobs for its employees especially in the present trying times. For this reason, the appellant should not be simply wound up. The evidence on the contrary indicated that the winding up of the appellant would not be justifiable or equitable. All the foregoing findings based on the facts narrated were also consistent with the principle that the winding up of a company should be a remedy of the last resort.” [emphasis added]

That principle applies with equal force here. There is nothing before this Court to suggest that the Respondent’s hotels are failing or that its revenue streams are unreliable.

At the heart of the unless order inquiry is the question: what order best serves the interests of justice for all parties? I find that a winding-up order at this stage serves no one.

A winding-up order would bring the Hotels’ operations to an abrupt halt, render 153 employees jobless, and force the sale of the Hotels at distressed liquidation values, invariably significantly below their current market value. Importantly, the proceeds would first go to the Respondent’s secured creditor, Hong Leong Bank Berhad, which holds a Debenture and Facility Agreement over the Respondent’s principal assets. The Petitioner, being an unsecured creditor, would rank pari passu with all other unsecured creditors and would come behind the secured creditor. The practical prospect of the Petitioner recovering anything close to the full Petition Sum of RM30,124,469.86 through a winding-up is, at best, highly uncertain.

The purpose of a winding-up regime is to achieve the orderly realisation of assets and pari passu distribution for the benefit of creditors collectively. It is not a debt-collection tool for individual unsecured creditors, nor is it punitive. Winding-up is the last resort, not the first response to a debtor who has admitted the debt and offered to pay in full.

In these circumstances, it would be, to borrow the phrase, killing the golden goose. The Respondent’s Hotels are the very engine that generates the cash flow to service the debt. Winding up the Respondent at this stage would destroy that engine and, with it, the Petitioner’s best realistic prospect of full recovery.

Moreover, the unless order mechanism is not a device that assists the Respondent at the Petitioner’s expense. To the contrary, it fully preserves and safeguards the Petitioner’s position because:

(a) The full Petition Sum is agreed and payable, neither reduced nor discounted.

(b) The payment obligation is court-ordered and carries the full coercive force of an automatic winding-up order upon any default.

(c) 30 cheques are in the Petitioner’s possession as immediate and actionable instruments of payment.

(d) The payment schedule is fixed and court-supervised.

(e) This Court retains full supervisory jurisdiction throughout and may act on any default without further application.

The Petitioner is a creditor in liquidation seeking to recover debts for the benefit of its own creditors. The unless order achieves precisely that objective, full recovery, albeit through structured payments rather than a lump sum. The Petitioner’s desire for a lump sum is understandable, but it is an aspirational commercial preference, not a legal entitlement that can fetter the Court's discretion.

It is trite law that a winding-up petition is not a substitute for debt enforcement proceedings. The winding-up jurisdiction exists for the collective benefit of creditors and orderly liquidation, not as a blunt instrument to compel payment from a solvent, trading debtor. This principle runs through all the relevant authorities and is part of the reason the unless order has found such broad acceptance in common law jurisdictions. 24 46. This Petition has been before the Court since April 2023. If Enclosure 129 is allowed on the terms ordered, this litigation will reach a final and comprehensive resolution. The alternative, dismissing Enclosure 129 and pressing for an immediate winding-up order, will not guarantee the Petitioner a better outcome. It will very likely produce a worse one. The Petitioner's Remaining Objections

The Petitioner characterises Enclosure 129 as a “backdoor” attempt to convert a winding-up proceeding into a court-sanctioned 30-month debt restructuring exercise. The Petitioner also argued that the unless order cases invoked by the Respondent concerned only short-term reprieves, whereas 30 months is excessive.

I have considered these objections carefully. While many decided cases involved shorter reprieves, the length of the instalment period ultimately lies within the Court’s discretion and is calibrated to the particular facts and the amount of the debt. A debt of over RM30 million cannot realistically be discharged in weeks or even a few months. A 30-month plan, structured, court-ordered, and backed by 30 cheques, is not excessive when measured against the quantum of the debt and the Respondent’s going concern status. That said, the 30-month period proposed by the Respondent is not binding on this Court, which retains discretion to determine what instalment period is fair in the circumstances of this case. 25 49. As for the characterisation of Enclosure 129 as a “backdoor” application, I reject it. The unless order is a recognised and legitimate judicial tool expressly provided for in statute and affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Applying for an unless order through the proper legal channels, supported by comprehensive affidavit evidence and concrete financial commitments, is not backdoor conduct. It is a legitimate exercise of the Court’s statutory jurisdiction.

The Petitioner also contended that allowing Enclosure 129 will derail the administration of the Petitioner’s liquidation and delay the liquidator’s duties under section 477 and the Twelfth Schedule of the CA 2016. I acknowledge that the Petitioner’s liquidator has statutory duties to realise assets promptly for the benefit of creditors. However, the unless order does not extinguish or permanently delay those duties; it provides for the full recovery of the Petition Sum within a defined, court-supervised period. If anything, the unless order advances the liquidator’s objective of maximising recovery.

For the reasons stated above, I hereby order that the Respondent’s application in Enclosure 129 is allowed on the following terms:

(a) The sum of RM30,124,469.86 be recorded as the full and final settlement of all claims due and owing by the Respondent to the Petitioner pursuant to the Amended Winding-up Petition [Enclosure 39] (the Settlement Sum);

(b) The Respondent shall pay the Settlement Sum into the client account of the Petitioner’s solicitors, Messrs Wilson Lim, as follows:

(i) An upfront payment of RM4,000,000.00 shall be paid on or before 4 May 2026; and

(c) Upon full payment of the Settlement Sum, the Petitioner shall have no further claims against the Respondent arising from the following proceedings: -

(i) Arbitration Award dated 13 July 2019;

(v) Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No.: W-02(C)(A)-1946- 12/2020;

(d) Unless the Respondent pays to the Petitioner the Settlement Sum in accordance with the terms of this Order, the Respondent shall be wound up pursuant to the Amended Winding-up Petition [Enclosure 39];

(e) Each party shall bear their own costs; and

(f) Parties are at liberty to apply. Dated 18 June 2026 -sgd-JAMHIRAH ALI JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA COMMERCIAL 10 (INSOLVENCY 1) KUALA LUMPUR To the parties’ solicitors: For the Petitioner : Wilson Lim Mao Shen & Huam Wan Ying (Messrs Wilson Lim and Arbain & Co.) For the Respondent : Goik Kenwayne & Foong Kar Yee (Messrs Dennis Nik & Wong)