Schedule
Jadual (Kuasa Tambahan Mahkamah Tinggi) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964. 03/04/2026 17:54:11 PA-24NCvC-330-03/2025 Kand. 42 ANTARA W&L HARDWARE TRADING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 858160-V/ 200901015090) …PLAINTIF KETUA PENGARAH INSOLVENSI MALAYSIA (Dituntut dalam kapasiti sebagai Pemegang Harta Haji P. P Shaukat Ali Bin P. Gani, Si Bankrap) …DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] The Defendant applies for a stay of execution of an Order granted on 20.11.2025 (Order) pending appeal to the Court of Appeal and until the determination of the Originating Summons No. WA-24NCVC-4482- 09/2025 (Suit 4482) filed at the Kuala Lumpur High Court to set aside a High Court Order dated 4.7.2017 in the Originating Summons No. WA- 24NCvC-897-06/2017 (Suit 897). The Order was given pursuant to the Originating Summons filed by the Plaintiff to terminate the co-proprietorship and partition of a piece of land. [2] This Court dismissed the Defendant’s stay application for the following reasons. BRIEF FACTS [3] The Plaintiff commenced an action against the Defendant in respect of a parcel of land held under GRN 102, Lot 6682 (formerly known as Lot 630), Mukim 11, Daerah Seberang Perai Tengah, Pulau Pinang (Land). [4] It is not disputed that the Land forms part of assets placed under the administration of the Defendant, namely the Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi (KPI), following bankruptcy proceedings involving Haji P.P. Shaukat Ali P. Ghani (Deceased) and subsequent bankruptcy proceedings involving Lim Kooi Fatt. [5] On 5.05.2016, the Court of Appeal ordered that the Land be placed under the administration of the Defendant (COA Order) and that all claims or interests in the Land be determined by the Defendant. Thus, pursuant to the COA Order, the Defendant conducted an inquiry to ascertain the respective interests in the Land. Following the inquiry, the Defendant determined that Portion 1 of the Land belongs to the Plaintiff. [6] Subsequently, on 4.07.2017, a Vesting Order was obtained from the Kuala Lumpur High Court, vesting 92039 of 112439 shares of the Land to the Plaintiff. [7] However, despite the Vesting Order, disputes over ownership and interests in the Land continued involving multiple parties over the years. [8] The Plaintiff then commenced the present proceedings seeking termination of the co-proprietorship and partition of the Land. [9] On 20.11.2025, Justice Wendy granted judgment in favour of the Plaintiff. For convenience, the Order consists of- ‘1. Pemilikan bersama (‘co-proprietorship’) bagi suatu tanah yang dikenali sebagai GRN 102, Lot 6682 (No. Lot Sebelumnya: 630) Mukim 11, Daerah Seberang Perai Tengah (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Tanah tersebut”), Pulau Pinang, yang dimiliki bersama diantara Plaintif sebanyak 92039/112439 dan Defendan sebanyak 81600/449756 bahagian dalam Tanah tersebut, dibatalkan; 2. Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Seberang Perai Tengah dan/atau Pentadbir Tanah Seberang Perai Tengah dan/atau mana-mana pihak yang sepatutnya, pembahagian/memecah milik (‘partition’) Tanah tersebut kepada dua (2) bahagian ditanda sebagai ‘Plot A’ dan ‘Plot B’ sepertimana ditanda di dalam Pelan yang dieksibitkan sebagai Eksibit A disini, dimana pecah milik yang dicadangkan adalah mengikut syer-syer pemilik bersama masing-masing, yang mana adalah seperti berikut: (a) Plot A - 92039/112439; dan (b) Plot B - 81600/449756. 3. Pembahagian tanah berdasarkan bahagian pemilikan masing-masing dan mengikut pelan ukuran rasmi Plaintif yang dicadangankan melalui Laporan Penilaian ataupun mengarahkan pihak-pihak memperolehi Laporan Penilaian/Pelan Ukuran Bersama; 4. Bahawa sesiapa yang memiliki dokumen hakmilik keluaran asal Tanah tersebut hendaklah menyerahkan dokumen hakmilik asal tersebut kepada peguamcara Plaintiff dalam tempoh tiga (3) hari dari tarikh Perintah bagi tujuan pembahagian/pemecahan bahagian dan sekiranya gagal berbuat demikian, Plaintiff berhak memohon kepada Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Seberang Perai Tengah dan/atau Pentadbir Tanah Seberang Perai Tengah dan/atau mana-mana pihak yang sepatutnya bagi suatu dokumen hakmilik Tanah gantian, mengikut bahagian yang diperintahkan masing-masing, dimana semua kos hendaklah ditanggung oleh Defendan; 5. Defendan dikehendaki menandatangani semua dokumen yang diperlukan bagi tujuan penamatan hakmilik bersama dan pembahagian/pemecahan bahagian Tanah dan mengembalikan semua dokumen yang telah disempurnakan dengan sewajarnya dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh dokumen diserahkan kepada peguamcara Plaintif, jika gagal Penolong Kanan Pendaftar atau Timbalan Pendaftar hendaklah menyempurnakan semua dokumen yang berkaitan dengan Mahkamah, pemilikan bersama dan pembahagian/pemecahan bahagian bagi pihak Defendan dan semua kos yang berkaitan dengannya hendaklah ditanggung oleh Defendan; 6. Semua kos yang berkaitan dengan penamatan hakmilik bersama dan pembahagian Tanah ditanggung bersama oleh Plaintif dan Defendan mengikut bahagiannya di atas Tanah tersebut; 7. Secara alternatif, Tanah tersebut dijual melalui lelongan awam yang mana hasil jualan tersebut dibahagikan antara pihak-pihak menurut syer-syer pemilikan mereka masing-masing; 8. Sekiranya Tanah tersebut dijual melalui lelong awam, Plaintif dibenarkan kebebasan untuk menyertai dan membuat tawaran pembelian di dalam lelongan awam tersebut dan sekiranya Plaintif berjaya membeli Tanah tersebut di dalam lelongan awam tersebut, maka Plaintif dibenarkan menolak 92039/112439 bahagian yang sudahpun di letakkan hak (vested) dibawah nama Plaintif dari harga lelongan untuk keseluruhan bahagian Tanah tersebut, dimana Plaintif hany perlu membayar jumlah perbezaannya sahaja; 9. Defendan mengambil langkah-langkah sewajarnya termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada melaksanakan dan/atau menyempurnakan segala dokumen yang diperlukan untuk memberi efek sepenuhnya kepada Perintah Mahkamah ini dalam masa empat belas (14) hari dari tarikh Perintah ini dan sekiranya, Defendan enggan dan/atau gagal dan/atau abai berbuat demikian, maka Penolong Kanan Pendaftar/Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang diberi kuasa untuk melaksanakan dan/atau menyempurnakan segala dokumen yang diperlukan untuk memberi efek sepenuhnya kepada Perintah Mahkamah ini; 10. Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Seberang Perai Tengah dan/atau Pentadbir Tanah Seberang Perai Tengah, hendaklah memberi kesan dan efek sepenuhnya kepada Perintah ini; dan 11. Defendan diperintahkan untuk membayar kos kepada Plaintif berjumlah Ringgit Malaysia Lima Ribu (RM5,000.00) tertakluk kepada fi alokatur.’ [10] Dissatisfied with the Order, the Defendant filed an appeal on 21.11.2025 and subsequently filed this present application for a stay of execution. Cause papers [11] The relevant Cause papers are-i. The Court Order dated 20.11.2025 [Encl. 28] (Order); ii. Defendant’s Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeal dated 21.11.2025 [Encl. 23]; iii. Defendant’s Notice of Application dated 21.11.2025 [Encl. 24] (Stay Application); iv. Affidavit in Support by the Defendant, affirmed by Nabeel Syafiq Bin Amran on 21.11.2025 [Encl. 25]; v. Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff, affirmed by Chee Ho Chun on 9.12.2025 [Encl. 30]; vi. Plaintiff’s Notice of Intention to Use Affidavit dated 9.12.2025 [Encl. 31]; and; vii. Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant, affirmed by Nabeel Syafiq Bin Amran on 23.12.2025 [Encl. 34]. PARTIES CONTENTION Defendant’s Contention [12] The Defendant contended that this application for a stay has merit and ought to be considered. [13] The Defendant further contended that there exist special circumstances warranting a stay of execution, particularly pending the determination of Suit 4482 at the Kuala Lumpur High Court to set aside an Order dated 4.07.2017 of Suit 897. It is the Defendant’s position that the Vesting Order forms a foundational basis of this Court’s decision, and that if the Order dated 4.07.2017 of Suit 897 is subsequently set aside, it would materially affect the ownership of the Land and render the present proceedings academic. [14] Thus, the Defendant submitted that if a stay is not granted, any decision in Suit 4482 and the appeal would be rendered nugatory. [15] The Defendant also contended that the subject matter of the dispute involves immovable property, and that execution of the Order may result in irreversible consequences which cannot be adequately remedied. Further, it was also contended that the existence of structures and occupants on the Land would require careful administration and management. [16] The Defendant contended that the execution of the Order would be inconsistent with and contrary to the COA Order dated 5.05.2016, which requires the Defendant as administrator to determine the rightful ownership of the Land. [17] Further, the Defendant contended that the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting a stay to safeguard the proceeds and the proper administration of the property. [18] The Defendant also contended that the Plaintiff would suffer no serious prejudice if a stay is granted, as the appeal is expected to be disposed of within a short period. Plaintiff’s Contention [19] On the other hand, the Plaintiff contended that the Defendant had failed to establish any special circumstances to justify the grant of a stay of execution. It is the Plaintiff’s position that the grounds for stay raised by the Defendant do not amount to special circumstances but are merely an afterthought, filed without basis. [20] The Plaintiff submitted that, pursuant to the COA Order dated 5.5.2016, the Defendant was directed to determine all interests in the Land, and the Defendant conducted a full inquiry and, by letter dated 26.05.2017, decided that Portion 1 of the Land belongs to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also highlighted that the said determination was never challenged. [21] The Plaintiff further contended that the Defendant subsequently applied for and obtained a Vesting Order dated 4.07.2017 from the Kuala Lumpur High Court, thereby formalising the Plaintiff’s ownership of 92039/112439 shares in the Land. The Defendant had also, in an affidavit dated 30.10.2017, affirmed that the Plaintiff is the lawful owner of Portion 1. [22] Thus, it is the Plaintiff’s position that the Defendant cannot now disregard its own decision, affidavit evidence, and the Vesting Order which it had itself procured, particularly after a lapse of eight (8) years. [23] The Plaintiff further contended that the Defendant’s application to set aside the Vesting Order dated 4.07.2017 in Suit 897 is clearly time-barred, having been filed eight (8) years after the said Suit 897 Vesting Order was obtained. No allegation of fraud, jurisdictional defect, or any recognised ground has been raised to justify the setting aside of the Suit 897 Vesting Order. [24] The Plaintiff also contended that the Defendant is bound to comply with the Order dated 20.11.2025, unless and until it is set aside, and cannot refuse to comply merely because an appeal has been filed. The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant cannot unilaterally determine that the Order was wrongly issued and thereby refuse to comply with it. [25] In respect of the Defendant’s contention that the appeal will be nugatory if the stay is not allowed, the Plaintiff submitted that the subject matter of the dispute pertains to a commercial property, thus any alleged loss is compensable in damages, and the Defendant will suffer no prejudice. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff would be unable to satisfy any damages in the event the Defendant succeeds on appeal. Thus, it is the Plaintiff’s position that in any event that the Defendant succeeds its appeal, any loss is capable of being compensated by way of damages assessed based on the commercial value of the Land. [26] The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant has failed to demonstrate by evidence as to how the appeal would be rendered nugatory if the stay is not granted, and has merely made bare assertions without substantiation. [27] The Plaintiff further submitted that if the Defendant’s stay application is granted, it will cause serious prejudice to the Plaintiff. Further, the Plaintiff contended that it has suffered significant prejudice as a result of the Defendant’s inordinate delay since 2017. The Plaintiff has been deprived of the use and enjoyment of Portion 1 of the Land for at least eight (8) years, during which trespassers have remained in occupation on the Land. [28] The Plaintiff also contended that the Defendant’s action in filing multiple applications constitutes a deliberate attempt to delay the enforcement of the Court’s Order and amounts to an abuse of process. [29] On the balance of convenience, the Plaintiff submitted that it lies overwhelmingly in its favour. Granting a stay would deprive the Plaintiff of the fruits of its litigation and perpetuate the prejudice already suffered by the Plaintiff. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS [30] The law on application for a stay is trite: it is only if there are special circumstances. In this regard, the Federal Court in Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2003] 1 MLRA 536; [2004] 1 MLJ 257; [2003] 4 CLJ 1; [2003] 5 AMR 758 held- “23 The onus is on the applicants to demonstrate the existence of special circumstances to justify the grant of a stay of execution. The reasons must relate to the enforcement of the judgment. They must be deposed in the affidavit filed in support of the application (see Syarikat Berpakat v Lim Kai Kok [1983] 1 MLJ 406). Where it is alleged that there is a danger of the unsuccessful party not being repaid if its appeal is successful for any reason like, for instance, the insolvency of the other party, this must be shown in the affidavit (see The Annot Lyle (1886) 11 PD 114)” [31] Further, in Ming Ann Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 MLRA 214; [2002] 3 MLJ 49; [2002] 3 CLJ 380; [2002] 3 AMR 2867 the Court of Appeal held- “(2) A successful litigant should not be deprived of the fruits of a judgment obtained in his favour, unless there are special circumstances (or special grounds) that justify a stay of execution to be granted. The special circumstances must be special, not ordinary, common or usual circumstances and that go to the execution of the judgment and not to the validity or correctness of the judgment (or merits of the appeal) (see p 67G-H).” [32] Likewise, in Institut Teknologi Federal Sdn Bhd v. HUM Education Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 MLJ 221, [2005] 2 CLJ 734; [2005] 4 AMR 653 Abdul Malik Ishak J (as he then was) held- “In considering whether to grant a stay of execution, the court is to apply the test of “special circumstances”. The ‘nugatoriness’ of an appeal is a species of the ‘special circumstances’ test and not a separate test by itself. So, if the Defendant was able to show that a refusal of the stay would render any further successful appeal nugatory, this would certainly constitute ‘special circumstance (see para 21). The key issue is in relation to the enforcement of any judgment and not in regard to the merits of the case (see para 24); Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 followed. The court will consider the special circumstance approach: (1) in the event the stay was not granted, a successful appeal would be rendered nugatory: (2) in the event the stay was not granted, the substratum of the appeal would be destroyed; and (3) in the event the stay was not granted, the Defendant would suffer serious and irreparable damage (see para 22).” [33] These authorities were cited by the Plaintiff, and this Court is inclined to the submission of the Plaintiff that the Defendant has failed to show special circumstances that justify a stay of the Order pending appeal and the disposal of Suit 4482. [34] Accordingly, an appeal does not automatically operate as a stay, and the applicant must show special circumstances warranting a stay of execution. [35] Clearly, the onus is on the Defendant to demonstrate special circumstances, and the reasons must relate to the enforcement of the judgment, not to its validity or correctness. Pertinently, the supporting affidavit shall disclose those facts that would establish special circumstances. [36] Further, on the point of damages as compensation arising from the risk of loss of the Land, the Plaintiff referred to the Court of Appeal case of Univein Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [2003] 1 MLRA 163; [2003] 4 MLJ 618; [2003] 2 CLJ 514; [2003] 3 AMR 181 where in dismissing an application for a stay of execution, it was held- (1) The appellants would not mind losing the lands if they got the right price for them. This substantiated the fact that the lands, being commercial in nature, were of no sentimental value to the appellant. Thus, the issue of nugatoriness advanced by the appellant. was of no merit. (para 10) (2) The balance of convenience tilted heavily in allowing the sale to proceed. The interest, based on the debt owing to the respondent, was escalating at the rate of RM20,000 per day. The proceeds from the sale of the lands would not even pay half of what the outstanding amount would be. Therefore, the respondent ought not be deprived of the fruits of its litigation. Additionally, this would reduce the amount of interest that would otherwise keep accruing. (para 12) (3) If the appellants should succeed in the appeal, the loss resulting from the sale of their lands could be compensated for by the respondents with damages based on the commercial value of the lands. There was no question that the respondents would not be able to pay the damages. Thus, there was no justification for a stay of execution. (para 14)”. [37] Thus, this Court agrees with the Plaintiff's submission that the Land, in particular Portion 1 thereof, is a commercial property and does not carry any sentimental value, being merely a monetary matter to the Defendant. [38] Moreover, in the event that the Defendant succeeds in its appeal and suffers any loss, such loss is capable of being compensated by the Plaintiff by way of damages assessed based on the commercial value of the Land. [39] Therefore, this Court is of the view that the Defendant has failed to show special circumstances that justify a stay of the Order, pending appeal and disposal of Suit 4482. CONCLUSION [40] As such, having considered the totality of the circumstances, the parties' submissions, and the applicable principles governing the granting of a stay, this Court dismissed the application. DATED: 30 MARCH 2026 -SGD- (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of the High Court Georgetown High Court 3 Pulau Pinang For the Plaintiff: Sangeet Kaur and Harkiranjit Kaur Tetuan Karpal Singh & Co. For the Defendant: Emy Juliana Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Negeri Pulau Pinang