that the Plaintiff had negligently or with ma/a fide intent, conspired with a third party to wrongly benefit from the Defendant in the form of debts [7] The Plaintiff had pleaded in its Statement of Claim that at the request of the Defendant, for the period between July 2008 to September 2009, the Plaintiff had delivered to the Defendant electrical components comprising of, amongst others, switchgears, panels for 11 KV switchboard, control panel, PIX End cover (electrical switchgear panel c/w bolts & nuts) (the said goods). [8] It is also the Plaintiff’s case that the business relationship between the Plaintiff goes back a long way since the year 2000 when the Plaintiff first moved into its current business premises at Block C which was prior to the material transaction in this case. [9] It is the contention of the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff and the Defendant had conducted their business relationship with a special arrangement that was put in place in respect of the manner on which the business is to be conducted or transacted. The special arrangement among others; includes the manner orders of Goods are to be made, delivery of Goods and invoicing for the purposes of payment. According to the Plaintiff, the business arrangement between the parties was as follows: Even though the Defendant's S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA business address in the CCM's register is stated as 61A, Jalan Sesama, Taman Perusahaan Batu Caves, 68100, Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan (prior to 1.10.2008, the Defendant’s registered business address was at 17A, Jalan SG 3110, Taman Seri Gombak, 68100, Batu Caves, Selangor) (Batu Caves addresses) the business operation of the Defendant will be conducted at Block A. The Defendant will station its employees there and they were authorised by the Defendant to conduct the Defendant's business. The Defendant's employees' authority extends to, among others, making orders by issuing Purchase Order, endorsing Delivery Order, acknowledging receipt of Goods and receiving invoices. It is also the contention of the Plaintiff that the Defendant's factory was at Block A and it was sharing the same address with Areva. As such, it was also the arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that the Goods ordered by the Defendant through its Purchase Order should not be delivered to the Batu Caves addresses but to Block A instead. At para 23 -24 of this judgment, Azimah Omar JC (as she then was) held as follows: [23] Based on the aforementioned evidences, it is this Court's judgment that there are overwhelming evidences as to the existence of a special business arrangement between the Defendant and the Plaintiff in conducting their business. This Court would go as far as to say that the evidence is plainly glaring that from the MOU, the Defendant who was supposed to or obligated to make ready a factory for purposes of manufacturing the switchgears, had instead of setting up its own factory or facility, devised this special S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA business arrangement in conducting its business. In fact, the special business arrangement had been deliberately put in place by the Defendant itself and therefore the Defendant cannot now turn against the arrangement by asserting excuses that the transaction or documentations prepared by its own employees were made without its knowledge or permission or authority. (emphasis added). [24] .............The special agreement by the Defendant and the Plaintiff had been the status quo since as early as the year 2000. This special agreement is a business practice which was established or devised by the Defendant himself and was followed by its business partner which is Plaintiff and had consistently continued until the transaction became this dispute before this Court. “It is this Court's judgment that when one party had agreed to undertake to follow such business practice of this manner, and the other party had performed all their proper obligations pursuant to the said agreed business practice, thus the said other party shall retain the rights to claim for all that is properly due to him. Therefore, in this present case, the Defendant should not be allowed to raise anything which attempts to deflect and defeat the arrangement which the Defendant himself had willingly opted to venture, adhere to and agreed to ever since the inception of the business relations and deny their liabilities" (emphasis added). [40] In short, Her Ladyship ruled that the Plaintiff had produced PO’s, DO’s and Invoices to prove that the goods were sold and delivered and the customer ledger are entries which are supported by these other S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA documents. The special arrangement practiced had been the status quo since the year 2000 and had remained unchallenged until this dispute arose. [41] Similarly, in our present case the Defendant is well aware and continues to adhere to the special business arrangement which is not within the ordinary course of business between the Plaintiff, WTK Trading Sdn Bhd and the Defendant as it had been implemented from 2010 to 2013 until this dispute creeped up. Hence, the Defendant is estopped from denying the existence of the said business arrangement when the Defendant has admitted aware of the invoice, the delivery and payment make to WTK Trading Sdn Bhd with no fixed term of repayment (see payment receipts in exhibit P262 to exhibit P273). [42] On this point, Mary Lim J (as she then was) stated in Mega Pascal Berhad v. Tajukon Sdn Bhd & Ors [2011] 1 LNS 691 at [47]: "[47] With respect, I am not persuaded as to the significance of this issue as submitted by the Defendants. The lack of a firm, written arrangement or written documentation in the form suggested by learned counsel for the Defendants for the two remaining claims does not defeat the right to be paid for the RMC delivered to the 1st Defendant. The right to be paid for that supply arises from the existence of a contract which can be established through invoices, delivery notes, statement of account, debit notes or oral testimonies of persons with the necessary and relevant knowledge of the transactions and debt. To illustrate, in Pernas Trading Sdn Bhd v. Persatuan Peladang Bakti Melaka [1979] 2 MLJ 124, the Federal Court found the sale invoices and the delivery note of evidence of S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA the contract that had been reduced in writing between the appellants and the respondents and to which section 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 then applies. These documents were also clear evidence of goods ordered and delivered to the respondents. [43] On the issue of amount due on running account existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, we find it necessary to quote the Singapore Federal Courts decision directly on point. Ambrose J delivering the judgment of the court in Bajaj Textiles Ltd v. Gian Singh & Co Ltd [1968] 1 MLJ 279, held that: “This appeal arises out of an action in which the Plaintiffs, Bajaj Textiles Ltd., claim $1,336.35 cts., being the balance of the price of goods sold and delivered to the Defendants, Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. The appeal is brought by the Plaintiffs and concerns the Defendants' counterclaim for $690,377.66 cts. on a running account. The defence to the counterclaim is that the Defendants owe the Plaintiffs $11,846 on the running account. The trial judge held that a claim on a running account is a cause of action known to the law, and ordered that the registrar take an account of all transactions on the running account between Gian Singh & Co. and Bajaj Textiles and Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. and Bajaj Textiles Ltd. from the 14th May, 1951, to the 31st November, 1962, and kept in the books of Gian Singh & Co. and Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. The Plaintiffs appeal against the decision of the trial judge. S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA The first ground of appeal is that the trial judge erred in permitting the Defendants to put forward a counterclaim for the amount due on a running account which is not a cause of action known to the common law. In my opinion, the amount due on a running account is a cause of action known to the common law. The authority for this view is Re Footman Bower & Co Ltd [1961] 2 All ER 161, where Buckley J. said at page 165: “In the case of a current account, where the debtor-creditor relationship of the parties is recorded in one entire account into which all liabilities and payments are carried in order of date as a course of dealing extending over a considerable period, the true nature of the debtor's liability is, in my judgment, a single and undivided debt for the amount of the balance due on the account for the time being without regard to the several items which as a matter of history contribute to that balance.” The trial judge found there was a running account in the present case between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. He said: “From the evidence I find that the dealings between the parties consisted mainly of goods sold and delivered by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs and of loans from one to the other. The account between them was kept in the ledger of the Defendants and the Defendants debited the Plaintiffs with the costs of the goods as and when they were supplied and with the amount of the loans as and when they were made. The Plaintiffs from time to time made payments to the Defendants on account generally and credit was given in the ledger for these payments as they were made. The S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA payments were made in varying sums and clearly were not made in respect of any particular debit. The Plaintiffs also kept an account in the name of the Defendants in which there was a series of credits and debits. The account between the parties is in fact a running account which to the knowledge of both parties is of that kind and kept in that way. The claim of the Defendants is to recover from the Plaintiffs the balance due on the running account but the Defendants say that they do not owe anything to the Plaintiffs and that in fact the Defendants owe them on the running account. It is true that the part payments made by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants on account generally are not expressly pleaded in the Defendants' reply to the defence to counterclaim. But it seems to me in relying on a running account, which was admitted by Inder Singh, the managing director of the Plaintiff company, in his affidavit of the 20th August, 1963, the Defendants were clearly relying on the part payments to be found in the running account, particulars of which were supplied to the Plaintiffs. In my opinion, the Plaintiffs were fully aware that the Defendants were relying on these part payments. In my judgment, the trial judge was perfectly right in applying the case of Re Footman Bower & Co. Ltd. and deciding against the Plaintiffs on the issue of limitation. I would add that, in my view, the trial judge was right in treating the part payments as made on account generally and not on account of any particular items, because the only liability was in respect of a balance due on current account.” [44] To conclude of this issue, we find that the Summary of Ledger support the Plaintiff claim of a running account existed between the S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA Plaintiff and the Defendant. We find ourselves in agreement with the learned trial judge decision when she ruled as follows: “[145] With regard the s. 90A EA argument, I was of the view that PW4 was the proper person to tender the ledger and the said ledger satisfies the requirements of the section. The ledger was a computer printout from the accounting system. The document is a normal print out from the computer system or what he described as "exported from the existing system." Besides, this computer was under his control and management. Although he may not have personal knowledge of the various transactions therein because he joined only in 2015, he had knowledge that the postings therein were done in the ordinary course of business and he had checked them. The postings were based on existing documents, invoices and receipts. [146] His statement that the document was prepared especially for the purpose of this case has been taken out of context, in my view. Although he had agreed that he prepared P 274 & P 275 sometime in 2015 or 2016 on the instruction of PW5 especially for this case, he had at the same time stated that it was exported from the existing accounting system. [148] The essence of the evidence of PW4 is that although he prepared P. 274 and P. 275 (the Summary of Ledger) for the purpose of this case as instructed by PW5, it was in fact a printout from the existing accounting system which he had printed by computer in its ordinary use. Thus, it was a mere computer printout generated from the system to prepare for the case and not a document that he had created especially for purposes of this trial. S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA The evidence of PW5, which I accept, supports PW4's evidence that Bundle C1 pp 274 and 275 were in fact a print out from the existing ledger. That being the case, the Summary of Ledger (P. 274 and P. 275) are admissible under s. 90A as a document produced by computer in the course of its ordinary use. [149] For the same reason too, the document cannot be considered as a statement made by PW4 at a time when the proceeding was pending or anticipated under s. 73A (3) of EA as the Defendant has contended. [150] It must be noted too that section 73A(4) provides that a statement in a document shall not be deemed to have been made by a person unless the document, or the material part thereof, was written, made or produced by him with his own hand, or was signed or initialled by him or otherwise recognized by him in writing as one for the accuracy of which he is responsible. The Summary of Ledger being a computer printout from the existing accounts system is certainly not a document that PW4 had made. [151] As for the Defendant's contention that PW4 is a person interested in the proceeding, it was said in Allied Bank (Malaysia) (supra) at p 68 that "a person interested is someone who had a substantial material interest in the outcome of the proceeding". In Bearmans Ltd v. Metropolition Police District Receiver [1961] 1 All ER 384 the Court of Appeal was of the view that there must be a real likelihood of bias before the maker of a statement can be said to be a person interested. PW4 was neither a director nor a shareholder in the Plaintiff company. He was the S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA accounts supervisor and a mere employee. It cannot be seriously contended that he had a substantial material interest in the outcome of the proceeding. In any case, the Defendant has not pointed to anything in the evidence to persuade me that there is a real likelihood of bias on the part of PW4. [152] I do not agree with the Defendant that the Plaintiff has failed to produce the source documents upon which the summary of ledger was based. As PW4 had testified, the ledger contained an entire summary of the invoices billed to the Defendant and a record of the receipts of payments received and credited to the account. The invoices and receipts were all tendered as evidence and these are the source documents for the Summary of Ledger. [153] For the reasons stated above, I find the Summary of Ledger to be admissible [156] As PW4 had testified, the Summary of Ledger contained an entire summary of the invoices billed to the Defendant and a record of the receipts of payments received and credited to the account. PW5 as the General Manager said he had gone through the documents and was satisfied that the particulars therein truly reflect the state of account between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. I accept the evidence of PW4 and PW5 that the Summary of Ledger has all the elements of a running account as it contains the series of debit and credit entries with part payment and unsettled balance. PW5 gave unchallenged evidence that in step 7 (for example at page 140 of Bundle C1 is the Plaintiff's Invoice to Defendant for payment) there is this remark in the box DR 2248-05 61,640, CR 5400-01 61,640. He said DR 2248-05 is the Defendant's account in the Plaintiff's debtor ledger under the heading of Medan S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA Mestika Sdn Bhd and DR 5400-01 is TSC's sales-fertilizer account in the TSC general ledger to show TSC has sold the fertilizer to the Defendant. By debiting 2248-05, it means that Medan Mestika owe TSC and by crediting it means TSC has taken up the sale to Medan Mestika. [157] I find based on the evidence of PW4 and PW5 that the Summary of Ledger (P274 and Exhibit P275) is a true reflection of all the transactions for every invoice issued and billed to the Defendant by the Plaintiff for all the goods supplied either directly by the Plaintiff or the supplier. I also find that the Summary of Ledger falls within the corners of what was held to be a running account in Bajaj Textiles. [158] PW4's evidence that based on the records in the Summary of Ledger, the Defendant owed the Plaintiff a total sum of RM1,979,273.80 as at 30.11.2013 was not challenged during cross-examination. I accept that to be the case.” [45] Reference is also made to the case of Ekuiti Setegap Sdn Bhd v. Plaza 393 Management Corp (established under The Strata Titles Act 1985) [2018] 4 MLJ 284, where the Court of Appeal held as follows: [32] Before we proceed with the main issues, we wish to state at the outset that we find no appealable error in respect of the learned judge’s finding that the plaintiff’s claim is based on a running account. In Wembley Industries Holdings Bhd, it was held: S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA … a running account is a single account and not a composite of its various parts. A payment made on account of a running account is in respect of the entire outstanding balance, with the result that time is extended for the whole of the debt. It appears, therefore that a running account will become statute-barred only if more than six years elapse between the supply of the last article under it and the last payment on account. [33] Consequently, we agree with the learned judge that the plaintiff’s claim is not barred by limitation under s 6 of the Limitation Act 1953. We also agree that s 45(3)(c) of the STA allows the plaintiff to charge and claim interest of 10%pa for the late payment of the maintenance charges. [46] In Leisure Farm Corporation v. Chow Tat Chow & Anor [2019] MLJU 1349, Darryl Goon Siew Chye, JC (as he then was) held: [19] As indicated in the dicta of Sir William Grant that was quoted, a running account is very much like one in respect of an overdraft facility granted by a bank. There is but one account within which transactions are conducted thereunder. Each debit and credit is within that one account such that at any one time there is either one debt or none. It matters not the to and fro of credits and debits within that one account. They ―…form one blended fund, the parts of which have no longer any distinct existence…”. As there is but one account, it is not the date of the transactions within that one account that matters for the purposes of limitation. This can be understood from the judgment of Tengku Maimun JCA (as her she then was) in S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA Ekuiti Setegap Sdn Bhd v. Plaza 393 Management Corporation [2018] 4 MLJ 284 at p 295: [32] Before we proceed with the main issues, we wish to state at the outset that we find no appealable error in respect of the learned judge’s finding that the plaintiff’s claim is based on a running account. In Wembley Industries Holdings Bhd, it was held: … a running account is a single account and not a composite of its various parts. A payment made on account of a running account is in respect of the entire outstanding balance, with the result that time is extended for the whole of the debt. It appears, therefore that a running account will become statute-barred only if more than six years elapse between the supply of the last article under it and the last payment on account. Whether the Plaintiff’s claim is caught by limitation under the Limitation Ordinance (Sarawak Cap 49) [47] The learned trial judge judgment on the issue of limitation can be briefly summarised as follows: [48] The Plaintiff has relied on Item 23 and the Defendant on Item 22 of the Schedule to the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance. [49] Except for part of the claim which is based on the two last invoices, limitation has set in. S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA [50] Item 23 simply cannot apply if the period of credit is not fixed payment terms as in the case of the Plaintiff here. Item 23 applies to goods sold and delivered where there is a fixed period of credit. It does not apply to just any case of goods sold and delivered. [51] The Plaintiff’s claim is barred as time does not starts to run when the Plaintiff’s demand was made to the Defendant on 31/3/2015 for the credit term for supply of goods to the Defendant. Under Item 23 the limitation period of 3 years begins to run "when the period of credit expires." In short, for the price of goods sold and delivered to be paid for after the expiry of a fixed period of credit, limitation begins to run when the period of credit expires. Given that the Plaintiff's case has always been that there was no fixed period of credit, Item 23 does not avail them at all. [52] Item 22 of the Schedule is the applicable Item Pursuant to Item 22 of the Schedule of the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance, time begins to run from the date of delivery of the goods. Unfortunately, not a single delivery order has been produced in evidence in Court, be it the supplier's Delivery Notes or the Plaintiff's Delivery Orders. [53] The Plaintiff's claim was filed on 25/8/2016. The latest WTK Trading receipt is dated 17/6/2013 and the last three Plaintiff's invoices are dated 29/7/2013, 31/8/2013 and 30/11/2013 respectively with all the other Plaintiff's invoices predating these dates. If the dates of the Plaintiff's invoices were to be taken as the time from which the limitation period begins to run, limitation for the Plaintiff's third last invoice dated 29/7/2013 would have set in by 29/7/2016 Thus, even if the dates of the Plaintiff's invoices were to be taken, all of the Plaintiff's invoices (except for the last S/N cYww9M4hq0qmQx/x763ANA 2 Plaintiff's invoices dated 31/8/2013 and 30/11/2013 respectively) are still time-barred. [54] In respect of the payments made, the latest WTK Trading receipt being dated 17/6/2013, section 20(1) of the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance is relevant. It is in pari materia with section 26(2) of the Limitation Ordinance 1959. Hence, the account between the parties in the present case being a running account, time starts to run afresh on the occasion of each payment. Even if time is enlarged by the payment made on 17/6/2013, by virtue of section 20 of the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance, all of the Plaintiff's invoices (except for the last 2 Plaintiff's invoices dated 31/8/2013 and 30/11/2013 respectively) are time barred as limitation had set in on 17/6/2016, almost two months before the Plaintiff's claim was filed. Thus, the court has no discretion but to dismiss the rest of the claim of the Plaintiff. [55] For ease of reference, item 22, 23 and 66 of the Schedule to the Limitation Ordinance (Sarawak Cap 49) is reproduced below: