Wan Badaruddin Bin Che Wan Basor Ali v 1. ) Cimb Bank Berhad (KA-22NCC-7-06/2022)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI ALOR SETAR DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO: KA-22NCC-7-06/2022 ANTARA WAN BADARUDDIN BIN CHE WAN BASOR ALI (NO. K/P: 520826-02-5351) --- PLAINTIF

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Jadual Kesembilan kepada Perlembagaan Malaysia) dan tidak dikecualikan bagi orang Islam. Oleh kerana itu, undang-undang mengenai probet dan pentadbiran pusaka terdapat dalam Akta Probet dan Pentadbiran 1959…” [Emphasis added] 37. This principle laid down in Jumaaton (supra) was also recognised by our Court of Appeal in Latifah bte Mat Zin (supra), where Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA ruled: [24] …The Shariah High Court, however, ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute. The Shariah Court of Appeal upheld the ruling. They took the view (at p 563C and G) that the matter of succession to or division and inheritance of the property of a deceased person involves probate and administration, which is not included in the matter of 'succession, testate and intestate' in Item 1 of the State List. Since probate and administration falls in the Federal List and not in the State List, it was held that the Shariah courts have no jurisdiction over the dispute.” [Emphasis added] 38. Therefore, the decision underscores the fact that even when Shariah principles are in question, the dispute must be determined by the civil courts if a federal matter is involved (See also Indira Gandhi Mutho (supra)). 39. The purpose of a civil court in such matters is to grant administration and oversee the collection and distribution of assets. After all, the Joint Fixed Deposit Account has already been included in the Amended List of Assets of the Late Tunku Malik's estate by an unchallenged High Court order dated 23.02.2020. 40. Hence, should the funds ultimately be determined to be part of the estate, the civil court, as the administering court, would, after obtaining a Sijil Faraid from the Shariah Court, facilitate the proper distribution, in accordance with the Sijil Faraid to its rightful recipients. 41. In the context of letters of administration that involve Muslims, the Apex Court in Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101, couldn’t be clearer when Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ (later CJ) laid down the role of Civil and Shariah courts in determining different questions in respect of their jurisdictions, as follows: “[56] In the case of letters of administration (again I am only referring to non-small estates), an application is made to the civil High Court for the grant of a letter of administration. When the letter of administration is obtained, the administrator is appointed, and in case of an estate of a Muslim, the administrator will obtain a 'Sijil Faraid' from the shariah court which states who are the beneficiaries and their respective shares, in accordance with Islamic law …” [Emphasis added] 42. This approach avoids jurisdictional overlap while ensuring proper Islamic inheritance principles are applied at the distribution stage. 43. Above all, the Plaintiff asserted that the original cause of action against the First Defendant arose from the contractual terms agreed upon during the opening of the Joint Fixed Deposit Account, and not hibah. 44. As submitted by the Plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court should be determined by the nature of the relief sought. (See Siti Hasnah Vangarama Abdullah v Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (As the President of Perkim) & Ors [2012] 7 CLJ 845). 45. Since the Plaintiff's original action is based on a breach of contract by the First Defendant, it falls under civil jurisdiction, and thus no Shariah question arises. 46. All these authorities are clear that in contractual disputes, the civil court is the determiner and not shariah court. Thus, I hold that this question No. 1 need not be referred to the shariah court. 47. The above judgment has reinforced the principle that Civil and Shariah courts operate as co-equal and independent judicial systems within their respective constitutionally defined jurisdictions. Issue 2: Whether there was any valid form of gift (alang or pemberian) made by the Late DYTM Tunku Malik to the Plaintiff regarding the money in the Joint Fixed Deposit held by the First Defendant 48. The Second Defendant asserted that the civil court lacks competent jurisdiction to determine issues related to gifts (hibah) and Islamic inheritance law (Faraid). The Second Defendant claimed that civil court judges should refrain from deciding complex issues of Islamic jurisprudence (See JRI Resourcess (supra)). 49. They further argued that the Shariah Court is the appropriate forum for such matters, citing Article 121(1A) of the FC and Section 13(3)(b) of the Shariah Courts (Kedah Darul Aman) Enactment 2008. 50. Specifically, Section 13(3)(b) of the Shariah Courts (Kedah Darul Aman) Enactment 2008 confers jurisdiction to the Shariah High Court, reads as follows: 13. (b) dalam bidang kuasa malnya, mendengar dan memutuskan semua tindakan dan prosiding dalam mana semua pihak adalah orang Islam dan yang berhubung dengan— (i) pertunangan, perkahwinan, ruju’, perceraian, pembubaran perkahwinan (fasakh), nusyuz, atau pemisahan kehakiman (mufaraqah) atau apa-apa perkara yang berkaitan dengan perhubungan di antara suami isteri; … (vi) alang semasa hidup, atau penyelesaian yang dibuat tanpa balasan yang memadai dengan wang atau nilaian wang, oleh seseorang Islam;[Emphasis added] 51. The Second Defendant argued that the issue of "alang semasa hidup" (gift during lifetime), which is synonymous with "pemberian semasa hidup" or hibah, is a crucial Shariah question that must be referred to the Kedah Shariah High Court. 52. The Second Defendant’s counsel has also referred to the authentic Kamus Dewan, (4th Edition) published by Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka to establish that the word “alang” means, “hadiah, pemberian” in Bahasa Melayu. From the above, it is clear that Shariah High Court shall have competent jurisdiction to hear and decide issue pertaining to “alang semasa hidup” or “pemberian semasa hidup” or better known as “hibah”. 53. The Second Defendant pointed out that the Plaintiff, in his own affidavit, expressly acknowledged that his claim to the money was premised on a “pemberian ikhlas” (sincere gift) from the deceased, DYTM Tunku Haji Abdul Malik. On this basis, the Second Defendant construed the term “pemberian ikhlas” as a form of hibah under Islamic law and contended that the Plaintiff is bound by his own sworn statement and is now precluded from taking a contradictory position. 54. Accordingly, learned counsel for the Second Defendant submitted that the question whether the Plaintiff is beneficially entitled to the money by virtue of “pemberian ikhlas” properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. 55. In response, the Plaintiff contended that the Second Defendant has misunderstood the nature of the Plaintiff's claim and the relevance of the "alang semasa hidup" concept to the Joint Fixed Deposit Account. 56. The Plaintiff clarified that his claim is not based on hibah regarding the Joint Fixed Deposit Account. The Plaintiff further asserted that the Letter of Hibah dated 21.9.2012 (See Exhibit WB-1, Encl. 140), cited by the Second Defendant, refers to other properties and was merely adduced to demonstrate that the deceased had previously given gifts to the Plaintiff due to their close relationship, not as evidence that the joint account itself was a hibah. 57. In other words, the Plaintiff reiterated that his lawsuit is fundamentally about the breach of contractual terms, specifically the survivorship clause, by the First Defendant and hence, matters of contract fall under the Federal List of the Federal Constitution and are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts. 58. The First Defendant, citing Public Bank Bhd (supra), averred that the survivorship clause is a written contractual term and its interpretation, validity, and enforceability are matters of contract law. Hence, the clause grants operational access to the survivor and enables the bank to obtain a good discharge upon payment, but it does not determine beneficial ownership. The question of beneficial ownership is a separate matter between claimants and the surviving account holder, not the bank. 59. On this, I fully concur with the Second Defendant that Public Bank Bhd (supra) should be distinguished from this Application, for two main reasons. 60. Firstly, the Public Bank Bhd (supra) case did not involve any application of Shariah law on matters such as the law of gift (hibah) or Islamic law of succession (faraid). 61. Secondly, the Public Bank Bhd (supra) case solely involved corporations and non-Muslims. In contrast, the current case involves Muslim parties (the Plaintiff and the Late DYTM Tunku Malik) regarding the beneficial ownership of funds, necessitating the consideration of Islamic law. 62. Instead, it is the finding of this Court that the Federal Court's decision in Latifah Mat Zin (supra) should be preferred and applied to the present case. 63. Despite the Plaintiff's claim being premised on contract law,as highlighted by the Second Defendant, the Plaintiff himself, in his affidavit, admitted that his claim for the money was based on a "pemberian ikhlas" (sincere gift) from the late DYTM Tunku Malik. Since "pemberian ikhlas" means a form of gift or hibah in Islamic law, the Plaintiff is bound by his own sworn statement. He cannot blow hot and cold at the same time. 64. Therefore, the determination of whether the Plaintiff is beneficially entitled to the money as a "pemberian ikhlas" or hibah falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court, which is competent to decide on the law of gift. 65. This indeed aligns with the principle affirmed in Latifah Bte Mat Zin (Court of Appeal, later affirmed by the Federal Court), that a survivorship clause in a joint account merely entitles the survivor to receive the money and enables the bank to obtain a good discharge. 66. However, it does not automatically confer beneficial ownership of the money to the survivor. The question of who is beneficially entitled to the money is a separate matter, not the bank's concern. 67. For a Muslim's estate, the determination of beneficial ownership, especially when there's an alleged hibah or when the funds are listed as part of the estate to be distributed according to Faraid, requires the application of Islamic inheritance law and the law of gifts. 68. I am guided by the ratio of Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ (later CJ) in Latifah Bte Mat Zin (supra) that such jurisdictional issues might necessitate "double proceedings", one in the civil court and another in the Shariah court, to achieve a final resolution and avoid conflicting decisions: “[74] So, it is very clear that the determination whether the assets in question had been given a s a valid "hibah" by the deceased to the appellant is a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the shariah court. The Court of Appeal was right on this point. … [80] As a result, jurisdictional problems that had not been envisaged have arisen. Some require double proceedings, one in the civil court and another in the shariah court before a final decision may be made. This causes delay and incurs unnecessary expenses. Others are outside the jurisdiction of both courts. These are not matters that the courts can solve as the courts owe their jurisdiction to statutes. It is for the legislature to step in, to decide as a matter of policy what should be the solution and legislate accordingly.” [Emphasis added] 69. In our present case, the Joint Fixed Deposit Account of the late DYTM Tunku Malik has been inserted in the Amended List of Asset of the late DYTM Tunku Malik’s estate. Hence, the Second Defendant is duty bound to protect the rights of the lawful heirs of the late DYTM Tunku Malik. Yet, the Plaintiff is claiming his right over the Joint Fixed Deposit Account saying it is “pemberian ikhlas”, namely, hibah from the late DYTM Tunku Malik. 70. It is undeniable that hibah is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. Section 13(3)(b) of the Shariah Courts (Kedah Darul Aman) Enactment 2008 quoted earlier is crystal clear on this. Also, I am guided by the latest Federal Court’s decision in Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor and another appeal [2025] 1 MLJ 334 where Abang Iskandar PCA held: [170] First, my reason for saying this is that the decisions of the Shariah Courts must be recognised and respected consistent with our own Federal Constitution that do recognise the hierarchy, role and function of the Shariah Courts. In fact, the civil courts have long acknowledged this. This is illustrated by the cases decided by the former Federal Court Justice Mohd Zawawi Salleh and former Chief Justice of Malaysia Abdul Hamid Mohamed when they were at the Court of Appeal. The first case is Syarifah Nooraffyzza Wan Hosen v Director Of Jabatan Agama Islam Sarawak & Ors [2018] 3 CLJ 620, where it is said: [25] We are of the view that Shariah Courts and civil courts form two separate legal system. We agree with the view expressed by Salbiah Ahmed in her article entitled: "Islam in Malaysia: Constitutional and Human Rights Perspectives", Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 2, No. 1 (2005), when she asserts that: State Shariah Courts are not Courts inferior to the Federal Courts as the term "inferior court" is understood in terms of appeal and judicial review by superior courts over inferior courts. The State Shariah Courts are in a separate hierarchy to that of the federal civil courts. There is no right of appeal from the State Shariah Courts to the federal civil courts. There is no power of judicial review by the federal high court over the State Shariah Courts.” [Emphasis added] 71. In short, since the parties involved here are Muslims (Plaintiff and Second Defendant both of whom are claiming entitlement over the moneys held in the joint account), the determination on the law of gifts/hibah can only be adjudicated by the Shariah High Court, being court constituted under the State law as a court of competent jurisdiction under our Federal Constitution and being the court referred such jurisdiction by valid laws of the land. The Civil court must honour such jurisdiction of the Shariah Court and recognise the relevant decision from the Shariah Court on point. Therefore, it is my finding that question/issue No. 2 (concerning hibah) must be reffered to the Shariah Court. Issue 3: Whether the right of survivorship contained in the terms of opening the Joint Fixed Deposit Account by the Late DYTM Tunku Malik and the Plaintiff applies to the estate of the Late DYTM Tunku Malik according to Shariah law. 72. The core of the Plaintiff's claim and the First Defendant's defence, revolves around the contractual interpretation and effect of the survivorship clause within the banking agreement. 73. It is trite that banking and contract law are matters listed under the Federal List of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution and fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil court. 74. Crucially, it was undisputed that the First Defendant, CIMB Bank Berhad, is a corporate entity registered under the Malaysian Companies Act. A corporate entity is incapable of professing any religion, and therefore,cannot be subjected to Shariah Court jurisdiction. 75. While the Second Defendant argued that the survivorship clause may contravene Shariah inheritance principles, the jurisdiction of the shariah courts are explicitly limited to having jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam. Section 24 of the Shariah Court (Kedah Darul Aman) Enactment 2008 expressly states that no decision of the Shariah Court can involve any rights or property of a non-Muslim. Thus, subjecting First Defendant to the Shariah proceedings would be unlawful and unconstitutional. 76. This principle has been consistently affirmed by the Federal Court, holding that if any party is a non-Muslim, the Shariah Court has no jurisdiction over the case, even if the subject matter might fall within its general purview. 77. The Federal Court in Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and Other Appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147 could not be clearer when Nik Hashim FCJ held at [95] that: “… before a Shariah Court may concern a subject matter that is within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Courts, the Shariah Courts will have no jurisdiction in respect of the case if the parties, or any of the parties, is not a Muslim, because exercising jurisdiction in the case will necessarily involve exercising jurisdiction over the non-Muslim parties or party, which jurisdiction the Shariah Courts are denied.” [Emphasis added] 78. This principle was later reaffirmed by Iki Putra Bin Mubarak v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 323, when Abang Iskandar CJ Sabah and Sarawak (later PCA) emphasized that the Shariah Court only has power over cases where all parties are Muslims: “[63] … So, to take the example given earlier, if one of the parties is a non-Muslim, the shariah court does not have jurisdiction over the case, even if the subject matter falls within its jurisdiction.” [Emphasis added] 79. For this purpose, corporate entities are considered incapable of professing a religion, as clarified by the Court of Appeal in Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors v Berjaya Books Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 3 MLJ 65 as follows: “[27] (h) (iv) ... There is no ‘personal’ law of the first respondent as it is a creature of statute and does not profess any religion. Only a natural person can profess a religion ... … [31] (f) ... no action whatsoever can be taken against the first respondent as it is a corporate entity and incapable of professing a religion. The action taken against the first respondent was unlawful ...” [Emphasis added]. 80. Based on the above, a corporate entity registered under the Companies Act is incapable of professing a religion. The Court of Appeal ruling actually reaffirms the position stated by the High Court in Potensi Bernas Sdn Bhd v Datu Badaruddin Datu Mustapha [2009] 8 CLJ 573 as follows: “[16] There is no dispute that the plaintiff company consists of both Muslim and non-Muslim shareholders. In fact, the majority shareholder is a non-Muslim. The defendant's contention that the Shariah High Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff is based solely on the fact that Datu Amir Kahar, a shareholder in the company is a Muslim. This argument is untenable. Clearly the property is not the personal property of Datu Amir Kahar. It is not even registered in his name. It belongs to the company which, being a creature of statute does not profess any religion. Only natural persons can profess a religion. Therefore, the injunction order restraining the plaintiff from dealing with the property is not only manifestly unjust to the non-Muslim shareholders of the plaintiff but is also null and void for want of jurisdiction”. [Emphasis added] 81. Hence, the above reasoning of the Court of Appeal is particularly pertinent, as it establishes that legal entities such as corporations do not possess religious identities and, consequently, cannot fall within the ambit of religious legal frameworks. 82. Besides, the recent Federal Court majority decision in SIS Forum (Malaysia) & Anor v Jawatankuasa Fakta Negeri Selangor & Ors [2025] 7 CLJ 179, albeit concerning corporation /society in holding that the Shariah Court only has jurisdiction over natural person, has further confirmed this. 83. In applying the principles from the cited authorities to the present case, it is clear that the First Defendant, being a corporate entity incorporated under the Companies Act, lacks the capacity to profess any religion. As such, it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. Any attempt to subject the First Defendant to Shariah proceedings would therefore be both unlawful and unconstitutional. 84. The Plaintiff and the First Defendant also premised that, to which I agree, the dispute in this case primarily involves civil matter (banking and contract law), not Islamic law. The core dispute concerns the interpretation, validity, and applicability of the "survivorship clause" in the Joint Fixed Deposit Account. This falls squarely within the realm of banking and contract law, which are civil matters explicitly governed by the Federal List (List I, NinthSchedule of the Federal Constitution). 85. The High Court in Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ors (Koperasi Seri Kota Bukit Cheraka Bhd, third party) [2008] 5 MLJ 631 (note that the Court of Appeal had later overruled the other decision of this case) had affirmed that banking matters fall under the Federal List when Abdul Wahab Patail J held that: “[3] The introduction of Islamic financing in Malaysia is complicated by this country’s constitutional arrangements. Article 74 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia provides that finance, including banking, moneylending, pawnbrokers, control of credit, as well as trade, commerce and industry are subject matters within the federal list, while matters relating to the religion of Islam are within the states list. Cases involving the former are within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, while those involving the latter, but only so far as it concerns the matters in para 1 of the states list in Schedule 9, are within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Courts. [4] This jurisdictional limitation in respect of the states and the Shariah Courts means that cases involving Islamic financing in Malaysia remain within the Federal legislative jurisdiction, and cases relating thereto are brought in the civil courts. No legislation in the form of Islamic laws has been made for trade and financing based upon Islamic principles. The only provision is that there be no element involved which is not approved by the religion of Islam.” [Emphasis added] 86. This ruling reinforces the constitutional position that banking law and disputes including matters related to Islamic financing, falls exclusively within the legislative competence of the Federal Government and the jurisdiction of the civil courts. 87. Accordingly, any dispute concerning banking law must be adjudicated by the civil courts, and the Shariah courts have no jurisdiction over such matters. Additionally, the First Defendant submitted that the validity and applicability of the “survivorship clause” is an issue to be determined by the civil courts and not the Shariah courts. 88. The First Defendant also suggested that the “survivorship clause” is not applicable to Muslims. Hence, the First Defendant contends that the determination of a “survivorship clause” falls within the realm of contract law, which is also a matter of federal jurisdiction. 89. The Plaintiff's claim against the First Defendant is based on the breach of contractual terms, specifically that the First Defendant has failed to adhere to the survivorship clause by freezing the account. The terms of the contract stipulate that upon the death of one account holder, the balance should be paid to the survivor. 90. The "survivorship clause" is a written contractual term that must be interpreted according to its plain meaning under contract law. It merely grants operational access and enables the bank to obtain a good discharge by paying the survivor; it does not conclusively determine beneficial ownership. The issue of rightful beneficial ownership is a separate question, not the concern of the bank or banking law, and is to be determined in separate proceedings between the claimant and the surviving account holder (See Latifah bte Mat Zin (supra) and Public Bank Bhd (supra)). 91. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Pathmanathan a/l Krishnan (also known as Muhammad Riduan bin Abdullah) v Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho and other appeals [2016] 4 MLJ 455 unequivocally held that where Shariah principles are engaged but the subject matter falls outside the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court, the civil courts retain exclusive jurisdiction. As per Balia Yusof JCA: “[153] (b) … If the subject matter is not within the Shariah Court but Shariah principles are involved, the civil courts are the sole arbiter under the Federal Constitution. For example, Islamic banking matter, probate and administration matter, etc …” [Emphasis added] 92. Be that as it may, the above case authorities demonstrate that civil courts remain the competent forum for disputes even where Shariah principles are relevant, provided that the subject matter falls within federal jurisdiction, such as banking, contract law or probate and administration. I thus hold that this issue No. 3 is not to be referred to the shariah court. Reference to the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Bank Negara Malaysia? 93. At Paragraphs 51 and 52 of Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply at Enclosure 140, Plaintiff has made an alternative argument that the Enclosure 129 should be dismissed on the basis that any reference on Shariah question should be channeled to the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) under Central Bank Act of Malaysia 2009 (CBMA). 94. Regarding this alternate argument, I agree with the 2nd Defendant’s submission that the Plaintiff’s contention is untenable as the Fixed Deposit Joint Account in our present case involve conventional banking and not Islamic banking. Hence, the SAC is not the proper forum. 95. Section 56 of CBMA clearly provides that: “(1) Where in any proceedings relating to Islamic financial business before any court or arbitrator any question arises concerning a Shariah matter, the court or the arbitrator, as the case may be, shall (a) take into consideration any published rulings of the Shariah Advisory Council; or (b) refer such question to the Shariah Advisory Council for its ruling. (2) Any request for advice or a ruling of the Shariah Advisory Council under this Act or any other law shall be submitted to the secretariat.” [Emphasis added] 96. The above provision stipulates clearly that reference to the SAC is only confined to proceedings relating to Islamic financial business. In our present case, this Court take judicial notice that the 1st Defendant is licensed as a conventional bank under Financial Services Act 2013 (FSA) and not under Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA). There is also nothing forwarded by the parties to indicate that this Joint Fixed Deposit Account is operated under the Islamic window of the 1st Defendant. As such, SAC shall have no jurisdiction over conventional banking business. 97. In any event, I am in full agreement with the Second Defendant that the real dispute in our present case involves application of law of gift/hibah and Islamic law of succession (which fall under State List) whereas SAC’s statutory duty is confined to ascertainment of Islamic law for disputes concerning Islamic financial business. Thus, again the SAC of BNM has no business in this present dispute. 98. Based on the above, Plaintiff’s argument to refer these Issues to the SAC of BNM must be rejected as the SAC, nor any civil courts to that extend, cannot be permitted to encroach, or usurp the role of Shariah Court in determining law of gift and Muslim’s inheritance law. The ratio of Abg Iskandar CJ Sabah and Sarawak (later PCA) in Iki Putra (supra) concerning the sanctity of the Shariah Court is authoritative on this. Conclusion 99. I hereby partially allow this Application, in order to strike a balance between respecting the distinct and equal jurisdiction of the Shariah Courts on matters of Islamic personal law, particularly hibah, and maintaining the civil court's clear jurisdiction over federal matters such as banking and contract law. 100. The determination of issue No.2, by the Shariah Court, that is, whether the monies in the Joint Fixed Deposit Account were a valid hibah will be crucial in ascertaining the beneficial ownership of the funds, will assist this Court in its final judgment on the Plaintiff's claim and the Second Defendant's counterclaim. 101. To sum up, out of the 3 questions proposed by the Second Defendant, I only allow and order that the 2nd question concerning the hibah be referred to the Shariah Court for its determination. The further proceeding of this Case is hereby stayed pending the outcome over there. Once the case in the Shariah Court is adjudicated, the proceeding in our present Case would resume and this Court shall determine the entire case through a full trial conducted thereafter. The issues concerning survivorship and the beneficial ownership of the money in the Joint Fixed Deposit Account and to whom the 1st Defendant shall release the money in the Joint Fixed Deposit Account would be determined thereafter. Dated: 4th August, 2025 ....................................................................... YA Dr John Lee Kien How @ Mohd Johan Lee Judge High Court Alor Setar Kedah Darul Aman For the Plaintiff : Mohd Jamil Yaacob Messrs. Srihana Mohamad & Partners Advocates & Solicitors For the First Defendant : Saresh Mahendran Messrs. Shearn Delamore & Co Advocates & Solicitors For the Second Defendant : Hizri Hasshan & Dorina Abdullah Messrs. Najib Hisham Isa Advocates & Solicitors Table of Authorities Cases Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ors (Koperasi Seri Kota Bukit Cheraka Bhd, third party) [2008] 5 MLJ 631 Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor and another appeal [2025] 1 MLJ 334 Iki Putra Bin Mubarak v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 323 Indira Gandhi Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals [2018] 3 CLJ 145 Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors v Berjaya Books Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 3 MLJ 65 JRI Resources Sdn Bhd v Kuwait Finance House (M) Bhd (President of Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia & Anor, interveners) [2019] 5 CLJ 569 Jumaaton Dan Satu lagi lwn Raja Hizaruddin [1998] 6 MLJ 556 Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 2 SHLR 49 / [2006] 4 MLJ 705 Latifah Mat Zin v Rosmawati Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 CLJ 253 Mohamad Taupik Mohamad Nor & Yang Lain lwn. Siti Rahman Mohd Noor & Yang Lain [2016] CLJU 1462 / [2016] 1 LNS 1462 Pathmanathan a/l Krishnan (also known as Muhammad Riduan bin Abdullah) v Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho and other appeals [2016] 4 MLJ 455 Potensi Bernas Sdn Bhd v Datu Badaruddin Datu Mustapha [2009] 8 CLJ 573 Public Bank Bhd v New Ace Digital Print Sdn Bhd & Anor [2019] CLJU 294 SIS Forum (Malaysia) & Anor v Jawatankuasa Fakta Negeri Selangor & Ors [2025] 7 CLJ 179 Siti Hasnah Vangarama Abdullah v Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (As the President of Perkim) & Ors [2012] 7 CLJ 845 Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and Other Appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147 Statute Central Bank Act of Malaysia 2009 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 Federal Constitution Financial Services Act 2013 Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 Shariah Courts (Kedah Darul Aman) Enactment 2008 Others Kamus Dewan, (4th Edition)