Wan Badaruddin Bin Che Wan Basor Ali v Cimb Bank Berhad (KA-22NCC-7-06/2022)

CIMB BANK BERHAD (COMPANY NO: 13491-P)

YANG TERAMAT MULIA DATO’ SERI DIRAJA TAN SRI TUNKU PUTERI INTAN SAFINAZ BINTI TUNKU ABDUL HALIM MU’ADZAM SHAH (as the Administratrix of the Estate of Almarhum DYTM Tunku Haji Abdul Malik Ibni Almarhum Sultan Badlishah) (NRIC NO: 660722-02-5562 / A0464000) --- SECOND DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (After Full Trial)

This dispute requires the Court to resolve a fundamental tension at the intersection of commercial banking law and the doctrine of equity: whether a standard survivorship clause within a joint bank account contract operates as an absolute, self-executing path to beneficial ownership for a surviving non-heir, or whether equity must intervene via a resulting trust to preserve the underlying property for the estate of the deceased contributor.

The Plaintiff in this action is a former government employee who served as a personal aide to the late Duli Yang Teramat Mulia Tunku Haji Abdul Malik Ibni Almarhum Sultan Badlishah ("the Deceased"), the former Raja Muda of Kedah.

The First Defendant is a licensed financial institution where the disputed joint account was maintained. The Second Defendant was the lawful administratrix of the Deceased's estate, having been formally appointed via a grant of a letter of administration by the High Court of Alor Setar on 26.06.2018, and was subsequently added as an intervener and party to this suit on 20.12.2021.

The subject matter of this dispute is a Joint Fixed Deposit Account (Account No: 5003413704) (“the Joint Account”) maintained at the First Defendant’s Bangunan UMNO, Alor Setar branch. The account was opened on 12.07.2011 in the joint names of the Plaintiff and the Deceased.

Factually, the opening of the Joint Account was effected by the transfer of monies from twenty-six (26) existing fixed deposit certificates that were previously held solely in the name of the Deceased.

The Plaintiff made no financial contribution to the opening of the Joint Account. Over the years, the account accrued interest, and as of 15.10.2025, the credit balance in the Joint Account stood at

The Deceased passed away on 29.11.2015. On the very same day, the Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah (Council of Regency) issued a written directive to the First Defendant, instructing the freezing of all accounts belonging to the Deceased, including the Joint Account.

This was followed by a subsequent written notice from the Office of His Royal Highness the Sultan of Kedah on 30.11.2015, similarly seeking the First Defendant's cooperation to freeze the Deceased's accounts.

Upon receiving these formal notices of death and the directives from the royal household, the First Defendant verified the Deceased's passing and proceeded to freeze the Joint Account on 30.11.2015.

The First Defendant executed this freeze following consultations with its internal Consumer Service Department (CSD), acting in accordance with its internal institutional protocols which dictate that a joint account mandate should be contractually restricted in the event of the death of a joint holder when competing claims emerge, preserving the status quo pending a judicial declaration or the receipt of joint instructions from the surviving account holder and the legal representative of the Deceased's estate.

On 16.05.2018, the Plaintiff’s solicitors issued a letter demanding information on the account. The First Defendant provided the requested balance information confidentially on 24.05.2018.

On 26.06.2018, the Plaintiff's solicitors formally furnished their letter of authorisation to the First Defendant. Following this, on 05.07.2018, the First Defendant issued a letter providing a copy of the statement of account, showing a balance of RM9,564,664.72 as of 29.06.2018, but informed the Plaintiff that it could not unilaterally release the proceeds to him. The First Defendant cited the prior freezing instructions from the Deceased's representatives and stated it would only act upon joint instructions from the Plaintiff and the lawful administrator of the estate.

Following the First Defendant's refusal to release the funds unilaterally, the Plaintiff commenced the present civil suit to assert his claim over the total sum held in the Joint Account.

On 21.01.2025, the Second Defendant filed an application (Enclosure 129) to refer specific Syariah law questions to the Kedah Syariah High Court. The objective was to ascertain whether the monies in the Joint Account were subject to hibah (gift) or formed part of the Deceased's harta pusaka subject to Islamic inheritance laws. Pursuant to an Order of this Court dated 29.04.2025, the reference was allowed, and the questions were transmitted to the Syariah High Court. (See Wan Badaruddin Che Wan Basor Ali v CIMB Bank Bhd & Anor [2025] 8 CLJ 674.)

When the matter was brought before the Kedah Syariah High Court, the Plaintiff raised a preliminary objection (PO) challenging the court's jurisdiction. This objection was fundamentally supported by the First Defendant, who had strenuously maintained that the Syariah Court’s jurisdiction is strictly limited to natural persons professing the religion of Islam. Since CIMB Bank is a corporate entity, it falls outside Syariah jurisdiction.

On 01.09.2025, the learned Syariah High Court Judge allowed the PO and declined to answer the reference. In its written judgment, the Syariah Court provided specific statutory reasoning for refusing to hear the matter. To justify its refusal of the reference, the Syariah Court drew a sharp and fundamental distinction between the concepts of hibah and harta pusaka, as detailed in paragraphs 30 to 32 of its written judgment. The learned Syariah Judge explained that the question of hibah refers strictly to a voluntary gift made during one's lifetime without any consideration, whereas harta pusaka relates to the estate left behind as a direct result of death. Crucially, the Syariah Court observed a mismatch in the Second Defendant's own case: while the Second Defendant's primary pleaded claim in this civil suit was to declare the RM11.5 million as harta pusaka (which falls strictly under civil probate and administration jurisdiction), the Syariah questions framed by the applicant instead focused on hibah. Consequently, the Syariah Court found that the questions raised by the applicant were contradictory to the actual relief sought by the estate, rendering the Syariah reference disconnected from the underlying civil dispute.

Crucially, in paragraphs 33 and 34 of the written judgment, the Syariah Court explicitly held that while it respected the Civil High Court's reference order, the questions raised were not relevant or competent to be decided by them: "Mahkamah ini menghormati perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Alor Setar, Kedah bertarikh 29.4.2025 yang merujuk Persoalan Syariah tersebut ke Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah namun persoalan yang dibangkitkan itu adalah tidak berkaitan untuk diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini."

The Syariah Court anchored this refusal on its jurisdictional limits, expressly referring to Sections 13(3)(b)(viii) and (ix) of the Syariah Court Enactment (Kedah Darul Aman) 2008. The learned Syariah Judge clarified that these specific statutory provisions strictly limit the Syariah Court's jurisdiction to merely determining the rightful Muslim heirs and calculating their respective shares under Islamic inheritance law (faraid). They do not confer the Syariah Court with the jurisdiction to declare the underlying legal status of a disputed asset as 'harta pusaka'. Such declarations fall squarely within the realm of probate and letters of administration, which remain under the exclusive purview of the Civil High Court pursuant to the Federal Constitution. Consequently, the Syariah Court struck out the reference.

Despite striking out the reference, the Syariah High Court made a vital saving pronouncement to ensure that the dismissal would not be misconstrued as extinguishing the substantive rights of the Deceased's heirs. In paragraph 44 of the written judgment, the learned Syariah Judge expressly preserved the Second Defendant's counterclaim, ruling: "Kesan kepada keputusan bantahan awal ini tidak menjejaskan hak waris-waris kadim kepada Almarhum kerana Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil belum membuat sebarang keputusan yang muktamad terhadap tuntutan Responden untuk mengisytiharkan harta tersebut sebagai harta pusaka milik

This pronouncement is of paramount importance to the present proceedings. It serves as a clear judicial recognition by the Syariah Court that the substantive claim over the beneficial ownership of the RM11.5 million is preserved and rests entirely within the jurisdiction of this Civil High Court. The Syariah Court decision is final, and no appeal was filed by any party. Therefore, this Court is the competent and final forum to determine whether the funds belong beneficially to the surviving account holder or to the Deceased's estate under civil and equitable principles.

The Plaintiff’s case against the First Defendant is premised on breach of contract, negligence, and breach of statutory secrecy. The issues are: a) Whether the Plaintiff’s tortious claims for negligence and breach of secrecy, which were introduced via an Amended Statement of Claim in January 2022, are time-barred by the six-year limitation period under Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953; b) Whether the First Defendant breached its contractual obligations under the Joint Fixed Deposit Account's Terms and Conditions (specifically the Survivorship Clause) by freezing the account and refusing to release the funds unilaterally to the Plaintiff upon the Deceased's death; c) Whether the First Defendant acted negligently and breached its duty of care as a banker by complying with the freeze directives issued by the Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah and the Office of the Sultan of Kedah, pending the resolution of competing claims; and d) Whether the First Defendant breached its banking duty of secrecy by disclosing account information to the representatives of the Deceased's estate, or whether such disclosure was statutorily protected.

Meanwhile, the Plaintiff's sole cause of action against the Second Defendant is grounded in the tort of negligence, which includes the following issues: a) Whether the Plaintiff's claim of negligence against the Second Defendant, arising from a freeze directive issued on

29.11.2015 but only pleaded against the Second Defendant via an amendment in 2022, is statutorily time-barred under Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953; b) Whether the Second Defendant, acting in her capacity as the administratrix of the Deceased's estate, owed a recognisable duty of care to the Plaintiff (a non-heir); and c) Whether the Second Defendant actually issued the directive to freeze the Joint Account in her personal or administrative capacity, given that the contemporaneous royal decrees were issued collectively by the Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah.

The Second Defendant seeks a declaration that the funds belong entirely to the Deceased's estate. The issues to be resolved are: a) Whether the survivorship mandate in a Joint Account automatically confers beneficial ownership of the monies upon the surviving account holder, or whether it merely operates as an administrative mechanism to provide the bank with a valid discharge; b) Whether the equitable presumption of a resulting trust arises in favour of the Deceased's estate; and c) Whether the Plaintiff has adduced sufficient and admissible evidence to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust by proving that the Deceased had a clear intention to confer a beneficial interest or outright gift to the Plaintiff at the time the Joint Account was created.

The crux of the Plaintiff’s case rests on a single central premise: that upon the demise of the Deceased, the Plaintiff obtained an absolute and unconditional entitlement to the entire credit balance of the Joint Account by virtue of being the surviving account holder.

The Plaintiff asserts absolute beneficial entitlement to the funds strictly based on the "Survivorship Clause" found in Clause 9.3 of the First Defendant’s Terms and Conditions, read together with Paragraph 7 of the Account Opening Declaration. The Plaintiff's entire case rests solely on this clause, which it relies on as an absolute contractual mandate that automatically confers proprietary rights to the monies upon the death of the joint account holder. The Plaintiff contends that this civil and contractual banking principle operates independently of and supersedes any Islamic personal law or inheritance law (Faraid).

Against the First Defendant, the Plaintiff's case is grounded in breach of contract, negligence, and breach of statutory secrecy. The Plaintiff claims that the First Defendant breached its contractual mandate by failing to automatically and unilaterally release the funds to him upon the Deceased's death. The Plaintiff argues that the First Defendant was bound to release the full balance without qualification.

Then, the Plaintiff alleged that the First Defendant acted wrongfully and negligently by freezing the Joint Account on the instructions of third parties (the representatives of the Deceased's estate) instead of honourable fulfilment of the survivorship mandate. Furthermore, the Plaintiff submitted that the First Defendant breached its duty of secrecy by disclosing confidential account information to the Deceased's representatives.

Meanwhile, the Plaintiff’s sole cause of action against the Second Defendant is framed in the tort of negligence. The Plaintiff pleaded that the Second Defendant negligently and wrongfully issued the instruction or letter to the First Defendant to freeze the Joint Account in 2015. The Plaintiff contends that the Second Defendant lacked the legal capacity, privity of contract, and statutory authority to interfere with the banking mandate at the material time. Consequently, the Plaintiff sought a formal declaration from this Court that the Second Defendant's instruction/letter to freeze the account was ultra vires, null, and void.

In response to the Plaintiff's action, the First Defendant vehemently denies any liability for breach of contract, negligence, or breach of statutory duty. At the outset, the First Defendant maintains that it is a neutral stakeholder in this dispute; it asserts no proprietary claim to the RM11.5 million and is merely holding the funds to preserve the status quo pending this Court's final determination of beneficial ownership. The gist of the First Defendant’s pleaded case and submissions can be comprehensively distilled into the following primary contentions.

Relying heavily on the landmark Federal Court decisions in Latifah Mat Zin v Rosmawati Sharibun & Anor [2006] 3 CLJ 207, the First Defendant submits that the survivorship clause does not conclusively determine beneficial entitlement to the monies.

Furthermore, relying on the principle of contractual construction in Glamour Green Sdn Bhd v AmBank Bhd & Ors [2007] 3 CLJ 413, the First Defendant submits that the banking instruments must be read as a whole. Clause 9.3 of the Terms and Conditions and paragraph 7 of the Account Opening Declaration expressly state that the release of funds to a survivor is "subject to compliance (if required) with... the Bank’s internal policy". Therefore, the contractual obligation to release the funds is contingent and strictly qualified by the Bank's internal governance.

In response to the Plaintiff’s late attempt during submissions to challenge the validity of the Terms and Conditions document (on the basis that the document adduced bore a 2020 marking rather than 2011), the First Defendant submits that this argument is both procedurally and legally flawed. The First Defendant highlights that the Plaintiff is strictly bound by the Statement of Agreed Facts, which expressly records that the Plaintiff signed the Account Opening Form and fully accepted Clause 9.3 of the Terms and Conditions.

The First Defendant asserts that it acted lawfully and as a prudent banker by freezing the Joint Account. According to the Bank's established internal policies, upon receiving notice of the death of a joint account holder, and in the face of competing claims between a surviving account holder and the Deceased's estate, the account must be frozen pending a court order or joint instructions. Having received formal notices of death and official directives from the Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah and the Secretariat of the Sultan of Kedah on 29.11.2015 and 30.11.2015, the First Defendant was legally and contractually justified in freezing the Joint Account to preserve the estate’s assets. Consequently, there was no breach of contract.

In response to the Plaintiff's allegation of breaching banking secrecy, the First Defendant contends that the disclosure of the account balance to the representatives of the Deceased’s estate was lawfully permitted. The First Defendant relies on the statutory exceptions under Section 134(1) of the Financial Services Act 2013 (FSA) / Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA), arguing that providing such information was strictly necessary and legally permitted for the estate's applications for letters of administration and faraid certificates.

Finally, the First Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has failed to prove any actual, pecuniary loss. The principal sum of RM11.5 million remains fully intact in the Joint Account and continues to accrue interest annually.

The Second Defendant forcefully argues that the Plaintiff’s sole cause of action against her, negligence for purportedly issuing the freeze directive in 2015, is fatally defective. In fact, the freeze directives were issued jointly by the Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah and the Office of the Sultan of Kedah, not by the Second Defendant acting individually.

More critically, the Second Defendant highlights the legal impossibility of the claim as she was only granted the letter of administration by the High Court on 26.06.2018, making it impossible for her to have breached any duty of care as an administratrix three years prior in 2015.

In prosecuting her Counterclaim, the Second Defendant fundamentally attacks the Plaintiff's reliance on the survivorship clause.

Having locked out the hibah argument, the Second Defendant relies on civil equitable principles. The Second Defendant submits that, based on the financial contributions, the law automatically raises a presumption of a resulting trust in favour of the Deceased's estate, which, according to the Second Defendant, the Plaintiff has failed to rebut.

The Second Defendant submits that the civil doctrine of survivorship cannot be utilised as a device to bypass mandatory Islamic inheritance laws. The Second Defendant adduced a valid Faraid Order issued by the Syariah High Court, which officially recognises the lawful heirs of the Deceased. Relying on Salmah Omar & Ors v Ahmad Rosli Aziz [2012] 1 CLJ 923, the Second Defendant argues that under Islamic law, a Muslim does not have the legal capacity to limit property ownership to the duration of his life via a joint tenancy.

Upon a meticulous evaluation of the pleadings, the totality of the documentary evidence, and the oral submissions canvassed before me by the respective counsels, the Plaintiff's claims against both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant stand as fundamentally misconceived in law, unsupported by facts, and plagued by fatal procedural defects. Conversely, the Second Defendant has successfully proven her Counterclaim. PRELIMINARY ISSUE: THE LIMITATION ACT 1953 42. Before delving into the substantive merits, this Court must address a formidable threshold defence raised by both Defendants. The Joint Account was frozen on 30.11.2015 pursuant to a collective directive from the royal household. However, the Plaintiff only introduced the specific tortious causes of action for negligence and breach of secrecy against both Defendants via an Amended Statement of Claim filed on 26.01.2022, more than six years after the cause of action accrued.

43.

Crucially, when this Court invited the Plaintiff's counsel during oral argument to address this limitation defence, the Plaintiff's counsel explicitly declined to offer any oral rebuttal. Consequently, the statutory limitation framework operates to extinguish the Plaintiff's tortious claims for negligence and breach of secrecy against both the First and Second Defendants. (See also Government of Malaysia v Mohamed Amin Bin Hassan [1986] 1 MLJ 224).

Before delving into the substantive background and the merits of the case, it is necessary to record the formal determination regarding a preliminary evidentiary issue raised during the trial.

During the cross-examination of SD5, the Plaintiff attempted to dispute the authenticity of the Deceased's medical report from Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah on the basis that it lacked a signature. This contention cannot be sustained. The medical report was mutually agreed upon by the parties on the first day of trial to be classified as a Part B document. Applying the principle in Mohamad Fauzi bin Che Rus v JR Joint Resources Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] 6 CLJ 266, once a document is categorised in Part B, its authenticity is admitted, and there is no further requirement to call its maker to prove it. Furthermore, the said report is a public document issued by a government hospital, rendering it admissible under Section 74 of the Evidence Act 1950. The Plaintiff is therefore estopped from challenging its authenticity mid-trial, and the Court shall place full reliance on this document. A. DISMISSAL OF THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST THE FIRST

Even if the tortious claims were not time-barred as decided above, the Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of statutory secrecy fail entirely on their merits, for the reasons set out below. A1. The Qualified Nature of the Contractual Mandate 48. The Plaintiff’s primary contractual argument was that the "Survivorship Clause" in Clause 9.3 of the Terms and Conditions constituted an absolute, unconditional mandate compelling the First Defendant to release the funds. This Court rejects this interpretation. As astutely highlighted by the First Defendant’s counsel during the oral submissions, the wording of the clause is purely permissive, not mandatory. Clause 9.3 expressly states that the release of funds to a survivor is "subject to compliance (if required) with... the Bank’s internal policy", as well as relevant statutory and Shariah principles.

The First Defendant adduced uncontroverted evidence that its internal policy mandates the freezing of a joint account upon the death of a holder when there are competing claims. The Bank took a strictly neutral position to preserve the status quo pending this Court's determination on ownership. By freezing the Joint Account upon receiving official directives, the First Defendant did not breach the contract; it acted lawfully as a prudent banker. During cross-examination, the Plaintiff himself conceded that the right to payment was not absolute and was subject to these terms. A2. Procedural Boundaries and the Rules of Pleading 50. During the trial, the Plaintiff's counsel sought to introduce an unpleaded argument during cross-examination by suggesting that the Bank was negligent for freezing the account without first obtaining a court order. This contention is wholly unsustainable. This specific allegation was never pleaded in the particulars of negligence in the Plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim. The law is firmly settled that parties are strictly bound by their pleadings, which define and delimit the scope of the dispute. As established in Lim Nyuk Foh v Datuk Zainal Abidin Haji Ahmad & Anor [2018] 1 LNS 848, the court cannot adjudicate upon an unpleaded case, and procedural non-compliance, such as the introduction of fresh factual allegations at the submission stage, cannot be entertained.

During the oral submissions, the Plaintiff's counsel attempted to argue that an adverse inference should be drawn against the First Defendant for failing to call the branch manager, En. Mahazir, who procured the Deceased's signature during the account opening. This argument is entirely untenable. As rightly rebutted by the First Defendant's counsel during the hearing, there is absolutely no dispute between the parties regarding the validity or execution of the contract. In fact, the Plaintiff's entire cause of action relies heavily on the very same contract (to enforce the survivorship clause).

One cannot approbate and reprobate by relying on a contract to claim RM11.5 million while simultaneously demanding an adverse inference over its execution process. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's attempt to challenge the document's validity based on a '2020' marking is procedurally fatal, as he is strictly bound by the Statement of Agreed Facts, which explicitly recorded his acceptance of Clause 9.3 of the Terms and Conditions.

To further illustrate the Plaintiff's selective and skewed reliance on the contract, the 1st Defendant correctly highlighted the Plaintiff's conduct during the trial. During the cross-examination of the Bank's witness (SD2), the Plaintiff's counsel deliberately interrupted the witness to prevent her from reciting the full contractual provision of the survivorship clause. It was only during re-examination that the witness was permitted to read the full declaration, which explicitly subjected any survivorship payout to the Bank's internal policies. The Court will not allow a party to artificially dissect a contractual clause, suppress its qualifying conditions, and claim an absolute breach based on an incomplete reading.

During cross-examination, the Plaintiff's counsel sought to invalidate the Bank's reliance on its internal policies by highlighting that the 1st Defendant did not provide a physical, 'black and white' copy of these policies to the account holders at the time the account was opened. The Plaintiff argued that he cannot be bound by rules he was never given. This proposition runs counter to established commercial banking practice. In modern banking law and practice, it is a well-established principle that terms, conditions, and internal policies can be incorporated by reference. By signing the Account Opening Form and the Joint Account Mandate, the account holders expressly agreed to be bound by the Bank’s overarching rules, regulations, and policies as amended from time to time. The mere fact that a physical copy of the internal operational manual was not handed to the Plaintiff does not render the contractual incorporation void, nor does it strip the Bank of its qualified mandate to place an administrative freeze on the account upon receiving formal notice of adverse competing claims.

This Court must also address a specific contractual argument raised by the Plaintiff during the trial. The Plaintiff's counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of SD2 regarding Clause 5 of the Joint Account Mandate, which states that the bank is authorised to pay the survivor, subject to compliance with the provisions of the Estate Duty Enactment 1941. The Plaintiff argued that, because the said Enactment has been repealed, the Bank has lost any contractual right to withhold the funds and is strictly obliged to release the monies to the Plaintiff. This argument rests on a fundamental structural flaw. The repeal of a specific tax statute does not operate to extinguish the entirety of the Bank's protective mechanisms. The Joint Account Mandate must be read harmoniously with the overarching Terms and Conditions of the Fixed Deposit Account, specifically Clause 9.3, which expressly subjects any payment to the survivor to the 'Bank's internal policies'. Therefore, the repeal of the Estate Duty Enactment 1941 does not strip the 1st Defendant of its inherent contractual right to freeze the account and act as a neutral stakeholder when faced with competing claims. A3. Statutory Exceptions to Banking Secrecy 56. Even if the secrecy claim was not time-barred, it fails on its merits. The Plaintiff alleged the First Defendant breached its duty of secrecy by disclosing account information to the Deceased's representatives. As clarified during the oral submissions, this disclosure was legally permitted under Section 134 of the IFSA, as the information was strictly provided for the lawful purpose of applying for a sijil faraid.

Factually, the Plaintiff’s claim of breach of secrecy is also entirely misdirected. During the cross-examination of SD2, it was unequivocally established that the Bank's disclosure of the account balance in May 2017 was not even made to the 2nd Defendant’s solicitors as alleged by the Plaintiff. The documentary evidence confirmed that the disclosure was made to the solicitors acting for the late Sultan Abdul Halim, who was the Deceased's elder brother and the proposed administrator of the estate at that material time. Disclosing the balance to the proposed administrator's solicitors for the purpose of managing the estate is perfectly in order and cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, constitute a breach of banking secrecy. A4. The Absolute Absence of Pecuniary Loss 58. Furthermore, the tort of negligence fundamentally requires the aggrieved party to prove actual damage or loss. As admitted by the Plaintiff during cross-examination, the funds remain safely held by the First Defendant and continue to accrue interest. Had the Plaintiff succeeded, he would have received the entire funds with interest. Therefore, the Plaintiff has suffered absolutely no pecuniary loss or damages to sustain a claim in negligence against the 1st Defendant. [See NOP, Encl.208, p.101] Saya cadangkan kepada Pak Wan bahawa CIMB tidak mendapat apa-apa keuntungan kerana faedah masih dibayar atas akaun tersebut? Setuju, Yang Arif. Sekiranya Mahkamah ini memerintahkan bahawa Pak Wan berhak kepada jumlah tersebut. Setuju dengan saya Pak Wan akan dapat kesemua wang di dalam akaun tersebut termasuk faedah? Saya setuju. So, setuju dengan saya Pak Wan tetap akan menerima manfaat? Faedah. Saya setuju. [See NOP, Encl.208, p.108] Saya cadangkan ya, Pak Wan, Pak Wan tak mengalami apa-apa kerugian kerana duit itu masih ada dalam bank. Bila Mahkamah memberi, sekiranya Mahkamah memberi perintah bahawa Pak Wan yang berhak kepada duit itu, segala duit dalam akaun itu termasuklah faedah yang terakru dari 2018 akan dibayar kepada Pak Wan. Saya setuju. [Emphasis added]

As enunciated in Datuk Mohd Ali bin Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 465, the burden lies heavily on the plaintiff to prove both liability and the exact quantum of damages. Since the principal sum of RM11.5 million and its accrued interest remained safely intact within the 1st Defendant's custody, the Plaintiff failed to establish any pecuniary loss, rendering the negligence claim fatally defective. B. DISMISSAL OF THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST THE

The Plaintiff's sole cause of action against the Second Defendant was the tort of negligence, alleging that she wrongfully issued the instruction to freeze the account in 2015. This claim is irreconcilable with both the established timeline and recognised principles of legal capacity.

As contended by the Second Defendant's counsel during the oral hearing, the timeline renders the Plaintiff's claim a legal impossibility. The Plaintiff sued the Second Defendant in her capacity as the administratrix of the Deceased's estate for a freeze directive issued in November 2015. However, the Second Defendant was only granted the letter of administration by the High Court in June 2018, nearly three years after the Joint Account was frozen. She could not have breached a duty of care as an administratrix before she even had the legal capacity to do so.

The evidence conclusively proves that the 2015 directives were issued collectively by the Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah acting as the royal heirs at the material time, not by the Second Defendant in her personal or administrative capacity. It is legally untenable to hold the Second Defendant personally liable for a collective royal decree issued years prior to her appointment as the administratrix.

Moreover, the Plaintiff's attempt to seek a declaration to invalidate the so-called "2nd Defendant's letter" is effectively a collateral attack on a Royal Decree (Titah). The evidence clearly demonstrated that the freeze directives were institutional acts made by the Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah. The Civil High Court cannot grant a declaration to invalidate a decree issued by the Jemaah when the Jemaah itself was never made a party to this suit. Suing the 2nd Defendant in her capacity as the estate's administratrix for a collective, institutional act of the Jemaah is a fatal misjoinder of causes and capacities.

Even if the Second Defendant had the capacity at the material time, an administratrix's fiduciary and tortious duties are strictly owed to the lawful beneficiaries of the estate to protect their inheritance. As a matter of law, the Second Defendant owes no recognisable 'duty of care' to safeguard the financial interests of the Plaintiff, a non-heir and a stranger asserting an adverse claim against the estate.

The Plaintiff strenuously argued that the Second Defendant lacked privity of contract and had no locus standi to interfere with the Joint Account, as she was not a party to the banking contract. This argument is legally flawed and fundamentally misconstrues the law of succession. The Second Defendant is not asserting an independent personal contractual right. As the lawful administratrix appointed by the High Court, all surviving contractual rights and causes of action vested in her by the operation of law pursuant to Section 59 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959.

She effectively steps into the shoes of the Deceased and possesses the absolute legal duty to protect, preserve, and recover the assets of the estate. Therefore, the issue of privity of contract poses no bar to the Second Defendant's Counterclaim or her capacity to dispute the Joint Account's ownership.

Before delving into the merits of the Counterclaim, it is pertinent to set out the core agreed issue to be tried between the 2nd Defendant and the Plaintiff. As distilled from the Agreed Issues to be Tried (Enclosure 188), the central question for this Court's determination is to whom the monies standing in the joint fixed deposit account ought to be lawfully released—specifically, whether the Plaintiff holds the said monies on a resulting trust (amanah berbangkit) for the estate of the Deceased, thereby entitling the 2nd Defendant, in her capacity as the lawful administratrix, to recover the funds. In essence, the Second Defendant seeks a declaration that the RM11.5 million beneficially belongs to the Deceased's estate. The Plaintiff vehemently resisted this by utilising his strongest argument: the absolute application of the "Survivorship Clause" and a backdoor suggestion that the monies were a gift (hibah). A rigorous application of settled commercial and equitable principles reveals that both arguments are entirely legally unsustainable. C1. The Conclusiveness of the Survivorship Clause at Common Law 68. The Plaintiff's entire premise relies on the impermissible leap that a survivorship mandate automatically transmutes into beneficial entitlement. The law strictly dictates otherwise. Concurring with the astute submissions of both the First and Second Defendants, this Court finds absolute guidance in the landmark Federal Court pronouncement in Public Bank Bhd v New Ace Digital Print Sdn Bhd & Anor [2019] 5 CLJ 1, where it was held: “[38] The Court of Appeal had relied and accepted the ruling in Latifah bte Mat Zain that the survivorship clause was not conclusive for the purpose of determining the rightful beneficiary to the monies in the account. That notwithstanding, the Court of Appeal embarked on determining the rightful beneficiary to the money in the joint account by comparing the evidence on the source of fund to that of the survivorship clause. Greater weight was then given to the evidence on the source of funds leading to the conclusion that the first respondent was the rightful beneficiary. There was no basis for such a comparison, since the survivorship clause was only a clause to instruct the appellant bank on how to handle the outstanding balance in the joint account upon the demise of one account holder. The issue of who was the rightful beneficiary also did not arise in this case because that was not the concern or the business of the appellant bank.” [Emphasis added]

Applying this principle to the present facts, this Court holds that a standard survivorship clause is an administrative mechanism designed to govern the relationship between the financial institution and its depositors. It governs the debtor-creditor contractual relationship, providing the bank with a valid legal discharge upon payment to the survivor, but it does not alter the parties' underlying equitable rights. The administrative right to withdraw funds must not be conflated with an absolute proprietary right to retain them; beneficial ownership remains governed by the contributors' intentions and the operation of equity.

Dealing a final, fatal blow to the Plaintiff's reliance on the survivorship clause to claim the RM11.5 million, Rohana Yusuf FCJ (later, PCA) in New Ace Digital Print (supra) conclusively cemented this legal principle when Her Ladyship ruled: “[41] It was also observed that the learned High Court had, in the judgment appeared to have concluded that the balance in the joint account conclusively belonged to LCW. That finding in our view, was erroneously made since the objective of the survivorship clause was not to conclusively determine the beneficial owner of the balance in the account. The issue of who is the beneficial owner of the balance in a joint account cannot be determined by relying on the survivorship clause. It is a subject to be determined in separate proceedings between the claimant and the surviving account holder.” [Emphasis added]

Therefore, in the present case, the Plaintiff's reliance on the survivorship clause to establish beneficial ownership over the RM11.5 million must unequivocally fail.

Realising the weakness of the survivorship argument, the Plaintiff attempted during the trial to vaguely suggest the funds were an absolute gift. During oral submission, the Plaintiff's counsel conceded that the term hibah was absent from the banking contracts, but maintained that the generic concept of 'giving' implied an inter vivos gift. This Court is unable to accept this proposition on two unassailable grounds.

First, the Plaintiff completely failed to plead hibah or gift in his Statement of Claim. As ruled in Lim Nyuk Foh (supra), parties cannot detract from the agreed issues to be tried nor put forward unpleaded factual foundations.

Secondly, relying on the Federal Court's definitive ruling in Latifah Mat Zin (supra), issues relating to the existence, validity, and effect of a hibah between Muslims fall strictly and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court pursuant to Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution: “[73] Coming back to the instant appeal. There is a petition for a Letter of Administration in the civil High Court. An issue arises whether the joint accounts form part of the estate of the deceased or not which depends on whether there was a gift inter vivos or not. That gift inter vivos here means ‘hibah’ (the Islamic law of gift) was agreed by the parties in the agreed questions posed in the High Court for its decision. In the circumstances, I agree with the Court of Appeal that it is the Islamic law of ‘hibah’ that applies…”[Emphasis added]

Since the Syariah High Court declined to answer the reference due to the First Defendant's corporate status, the Plaintiff cannot utilise the civil forum to circumvent jurisdictional boundaries and procure a backdoor declaration of a valid hibah. Crucially, as explicitly pronounced by the Syariah High Court in its saving order, the ultimate determination of beneficial ownership over this asset rests squarely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of this Civil High Court, to be decided strictly under civil and equitable principles.

Furthermore, as carefully delineated by the Second Defendant's counsel during the oral hearing, in the absence of a proven hibah, the Court must ascertain the true intention of the transferor based on objective financial contributions. It is an undisputed fact that the RM11.5 million originated entirely from the Deceased's 26 sole fixed deposit accounts, and the Plaintiff made zero financial contributions to the Joint Account. Applying the Federal Court's binding precedent in Takako Sakao v Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2010] 1 CLJ 381, equity automatically presumes that the common intention was for the survivor to hold the property on a resulting trust for the transferor's estate.

The Plaintiff failed to adduce any admissible or legally competent evidence to rebut this presumption. The civil doctrine of survivorship cannot be utilised as a device to circumvent mandatory Islamic inheritance laws (faraid) and disinherit the lawful Muslim heirs of the Deceased, a principle firmly established in Salmah Omar (supra).

In a further attempt to bypass the application of Islamic inheritance laws, the Plaintiff's counsel rigorously cross-examined SD2 to establish that the Joint Account was a conventional, interest-bearing account and 'not a Syariah product'. The Plaintiff insinuated that because the banking product itself was arguably contrary to Islamic financial principles, the distribution of its proceeds should not be governed by faraid. This proposition is wholly fallacious. The legal or commercial characterisation of a banking product cannot alter, suspend, or override the personal law applicable to the Deceased. The Deceased (the late DYTM Tunku Abdul Malik) was a Muslim. Upon his demise, his entire estate, regardless of whether the underlying asset is held within a conventional, interest-bearing facility or a Shariah-compliant instrument, automatically falls subject to the mandatory rules of faraid. A conventional banking mandate governs the mechanism of asset holding, but it cannot be weaponised to strip lawful Islamic heirs of their rightful inheritance under personal law.

In another desperate attempt to claim ownership of the funds and rebut the resulting trust, the Plaintiff's witness (PW1) testified during the trial that the monies were the proceeds of a timber logging business he managed for the Deceased. This Court wholly rejects this narrative.

First, this allegation was never pleaded in the Statement of Claim. Second, this bare assertion was completely unsupported by any contemporaneous documentary evidence; there were no logging contracts, no company records, no income statements, and no tax declarations produced before this Court. The Plaintiff even conceded during cross-examination that, as a government servant, he never declared any such assets or income. Accordingly, the consideration of such unpleaded and unsubstantiated afterthoughts is procedurally barred.

To contextualise the severity of the Plaintiff's procedural non-compliance, it is imperative to revisit the fundamental purpose of pleadings within our adversarial system of justice. As extensively expounded by the Federal Court in Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lin Wen-Chih & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 293, the cornerstone of civil litigation dictates that parties must be fully apprised of the case they are to meet. Pleadings operate to define and delimit with absolute clarity the real matters in controversy so that neither party is taken by surprise at trial. By strictly confining the scope of adjudication to the pleaded case, the court ensures procedural fairness and maintains the structural integrity of the adversarial process.

The Plaintiff further attempted to establish a special, close relationship with the Deceased by submitting that the Deceased had gifted him a parcel of land purportedly valued at RM5 million and a luxury "Royal Oak" watch. Astonishingly, the Plaintiff invited this Court to take "judicial notice" of the multi-million ringgit market value of this watch. This invitation must be declined. Not only were these alleged material facts never pleaded, but the Plaintiff also failed to adduce a single shred of documentary evidence during the trial, no valuation report, no land title, and not even a photograph of the alleged luxury watch was produced. The doctrine of judicial notice cannot be utilised as a mechanism to bypass the burden of proof or substitute for a total absence of primary evidence. Invoking it under these circumstances represents a severe misapplication of Section 57(1) of the Evidence Act 1950 and runs counter to the principles established by the Supreme Court in Pembangunan

Maha Murni Sdn Bhd v Jururus Ladang Sdn Bhd [1986] 2 MLJ These shifting, unpleaded narratives regarding business proceeds and luxury gifts severely undermine the Plaintiff's credibility and amount to approbating and reprobating. As firmly established in Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196, which was further affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Cheong Heng Loong Goldsmiths v Chan Kim Swi (Capital Insurance Bhd, Garnishee) [1997] 5 MLJ 191, a party must stand and fall on his pleaded case and cannot simultaneously put forward an unpleaded justification.

Even if the Court were to consider these unpleaded assertions, the evidentiary weight of the Plaintiff's oral testimony was fundamentally compromised under cross-examination. His oral testimony constantly shifted between claiming the money was a joint "timber logging business" profit and asserting it was an absolute gift (hibah). Crucially, the Plaintiff admitted that he never declared this (allegedly) massive purported business income to the Inland Revenue Board (LHDN) and never obtained approval from the State Secretary to conduct business while serving as a civil servant. As held in Loh Yoon Sang v Loh Mun Hsing [2022] 1 LNS 496, which cited the Federal Court in Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 1 LNS 119, oral evidence must be critically tested against the whole of the documentary evidence and the circumstances of the case; plausibility should never be mistaken for veracity. Evaluated against the total absence of tax declarations and supportive documentation, these contradictory oral claims represent baseline afterthoughts devoid of evidentiary weight.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff's own conduct following the demise of the Deceased severely undermines his narrative of an absolute gift (hibah). During cross-examination, the 1st Defendant's witness (SD2) confirmed that while the Deceased passed away on 29 November 2015, the Plaintiff only made a formal demand through his solicitors for the RM11.5 million on 16 May 2018. For nearly two and a half years, the Plaintiff sat on his rights and remained completely silent. Such an inordinate and unexplained delay is highly inconsistent with the behaviour of a person who genuinely believed he was the absolute and lawful beneficiary of a massive cash gift. In equity, the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct of the parties serves as a critical indicator of original intent. The Plaintiff's prolonged inaction is entirely inconsistent with a genuine belief in an absolute beneficial interest, thereby reinforcing the equitable presumption of a resulting trust in favour of the Deceased's estate.

To compound the improbability of the Plaintiff's oral narrative, this Court must also highlight a glaring omission in the documentary evidence. During the trial, attention was drawn to a “Trust Deed and a Letter of Hibah” dated 21 September 2012 (adduced at Pages 34–35 of Bundle B1), executed by the Deceased to formally declare certain trust investments as gifts (hibah) to two beneficiaries, one of whom was the Plaintiff. It is highly conspicuous that this formal declaration made absolutely no mention of the RM11.5 million held in the CIMB Joint (Fixed Deposit) Account. The fact that the Deceased had the presence of mind and the legal foresight to formally execute a written hibah for his other assets, yet consciously omitted this massive Joint Account from the very same document, speaks volumes. If the Deceased had genuinely harboured a donative intention to gift the RM11.5 million to the Plaintiff, he would have undoubtedly included it in that formal declaration. The conspicuous absence of the Joint Account from the Deceased's own hibah instrument is fatal to the Plaintiff's unpleaded claim of an absolute gift. It conclusively cements the 2nd Defendant's assertion that the monies were never intended as a pemberian or hibah, but rather strictly held on a resulting trust for the Deceased's estate.

To further justify his claim to the alleged hibah, the Plaintiff attempted to weave a narrative during the trial that he shared a close familial and blood relationship with the late DYTM Tunku Abdul Malik. However, this assertion was founded entirely on bare oral testimony. The Plaintiff completely failed to adduce any birth certificates, his parents' identity cards, or any official genealogical records to substantiate his purported royal lineage. In an attempt to cure this evidentiary gap, the Plaintiff's counsel again urged this Court to take 'judicial notice' of this familial relationship. I must firmly reject this proposition. As mentioned earlier, the doctrine of judicial notice under Sections 56 and 57 of the Evidence Act 1950 is strictly reserved for universally established facts that are beyond reasonable dispute. It cannot be used as a backdoor mechanism to bypass the burden of proving highly disputed personal genealogies. In the absence of cogent, admissible documentary proof, the Plaintiff's assertion of a special familial relationship remains an uncorroborated afterthought that cannot disturb the legal or equitable ownership of the funds.

Lastly, the Plaintiff cannot rely on Clause 9.3 of the Terms and Conditions to demand the RM11.5 million while simultaneously rejecting the applicability of the rest of the document. As vehemently pronounced by the Court of Appeal in Cheah Theam Kheng v City Centre Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 MLJ 761, it is a principle of law of general application that a party cannot approbate and reprobate; he is not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude he adopts. By cherry-picking which clauses of the overarching terms are binding while seeking to avoid the operational limitations that qualify them, the Plaintiff adopts a fractured contractual interpretation that is legally untenable. A party cannot invoke the benefits of an agreement while simultaneously repudiating its internal restrictions.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim against the First and Second Defendants is dismissed with costs. The Second Defendant’s Counterclaim is allowed with costs, and it is hereby declared that the Plaintiff holds the entire credit balance of the Joint Account on a resulting trust for the estate of the late DYTM Tunku Abdul Malik.

The First Defendant is ordered to release the said monies to the Second Defendant in her lawful capacity as the Administratrix for distribution to the lawful beneficiaries. Dated: 1st July, 2026 -------------------------------------------------------------------- YA. Dr. Hj. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Table of Authorities Cases Datuk Mohd Ali bin Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 465 Government of Malaysia v Mohamed Amin Bin Hassan [1986] 1 MLJ 224 Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 Cheong Heng Loong Goldsmiths v Chan Kim Swi (Capital Insurance Bhd, Garnishee) [1997] 5 MLJ 191 Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor [2006] 3 CLJ 207 Lim Nyuk Foh v Datuk Zainal Abidin Haji Ahmad & Anor [2018] 1 LNS 848 Loh Yoon Sang v Loh Mun Hsing (2022) 1 LNS 496 Mohamad Fauzi bin Che Rus v JR Joint Resources Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] 6 CLJ 266 Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd v Lin Wen-Chih [2009] 6 MLJ 293 Pembangunan Maha Murni Sdn Bhd v Jururus Ladang Sdn Bhd [1986] 2 MLJ 30 Public Bank Bhd v New Ace Digital Print Sdn Bhd & Anor [2019] 3 MLJ 421 Takako Sakao v Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2010] 1 CLJ 381 Solicitor for the Plaintiff : Ashok K. Raman & Mohamad Jamil Yaacob Messrs. Srihana Mohamad & Partners Advocates & Solicitors Solicitors for the First Defendant : Sathya Kumardas, Saresh Mahendran, She Zen Yang, & Chew Ming Yih Messrs. Shearne Delamore Advocates & Solicitors Solicitors for the Second Defendant : Hizzri Hashan, Dorina Abdullah, & Najib Zakaria Messrs. Najib Hisham Isa Advocates & Solicitors Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 1 LNS 119 Wan Badaruddin Che Wan Basor Ali v CIMB Bank Bhd & Anor [2025] 8 CLJ 674 Weldon v Neal (1887) 19 QBD 394 Statutes Estate Duty Enactment 1941 (repealed)