Wan Mohd Faizrul Bin Wan Nor (DA-83D-1044-03/2025)

Upon reading said charge, the Accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

Upon close perusal of evidence presented by both parties to this proceeding, and upon applying maximum evaluation to the same set of evidence, this Court on 28th of April 2025, found that the Prosecution had failed to prove a prima facie case against the Accused. The Respondent was discharged and acquitted of the charge without being called to defend himself. Aggrieved by said decision, the Prosecution lodged an appeal. S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 2

It should be emphasized that in its inception and throughout an earlier stage of this proceeding, this case was first heard by previous magistrate and was later on continued by me. Upon assuming this role, I had examined the Notes of Proceeding in its entirety, alongside minutes and exhibits as tendered in court and I resumed to hear this proceeding as if it was heard from the very beginning by me.

This Grounds of Judgment is written to explain the rationale behind this court's decision dated 28th of April 2025.

On 05/08/2021 at approximately 6.00 pm, while SP1 together with 10 other members were passing through Jalan Yaakobiah 15200 Kota Bharu Kelantan, they spotted a suspiciously looking man (hereinafter referred to as “the Accused”) on the side of the road, who at the material time was seated on a blue/black Yamaha LC motorcycle with registration number DDB 7208, per their observation, the vehicle was statutory but the motorcycle's engine was running.

Using a Proton Persona, PW1 along with 3 other members of his team approached the Accused who was seated on said motorcycle and stopped on the right side of the motorcycle. PW1 introduced himself as a police officer by showing his authority card. In response to this overture, the Accused suddenly tried to escape by speeding up on the motorcycle and making a U-turn. The man together with the motorcycle then skidded and S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 3 crashed into a Proton Waja belonging to police force bearing registration number BHL1346 driven by Lance Corporal Yuzir.

After the collision, the Accused took his motorcycle and got up in an effort to to escape but he was successfully caught right in the middle of Jalan Yaakobiah by PW1 and 3 policemen, namely Corporal Zulkifli, Lance Corporal Yuzir and Corporal Azim. SP1 then took the Accused back to the overturned motorcycle and conducted a body search on him by the side of the road near where the motorcycle skidded but nothing illegal was found on his person.

After the body search, PW1, witnessed by the Accused, conducted an inspection to the motorcycle that the Accused was riding and found 1 transparent plastic package containing a bright yellow paper with clear tape inside the body of the overturned motorcycle.

PW1 proceeded to inspect the package and found that there were 10 blue plastic packages contained in it. A closer inspection done on one of the blue plastic packages found that there were reddish and greenish pills suspected of being drugs. Consequently, PW1 issued 1 Seizure form at the scene, this was later marked as P16A.

Subsequently, PW1 was taken by the Accused to his house located at Jalan Bayam, Kota Bharu. An inspection of the house did not find anything illegal. As soon as the inspection at the house was completed, PW1 with the assistance of 3 other members of his team took the Accused to seek treatment since the Accused was injured during aforesaid raid. S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 4 After receiving treatment, the Accused was taken by PW1 to Kelantan Contingent Police Headquarters for further action.

Upon arrival at Kelantan Contingent Police Headquarters, on 08/08/2021 at approximately 9.30 pm, witnessed by the Accused and members of the raiding team, PW1 conducted a more in-depth inspection of the seized case items and the result of the inspection was recorded in another seizure form that was later issued and marked as P16B. Both seizure forms issued by PW1 were signed by PW1 and counter signed by the Accused.

Upon completing the documentation for the seized case item, PW1 made police report Kota Bharu/10043/2021 which was marked as P15.

PW1 handed over all seized items and the Accused to investigating officer assigned to the case, PW4 on 05/08/2021 at approximately 11.30 pm at the Narcotics Criminal Investigation Division of Kota Bharu Police District Headquarters. PW1 informed the Court that in doing so, he had prepared one (1) Handover Form which was marked as exhibit P17.

PW4 later instructed PW3 to send the seized items, namely reddish and greenish pills, to the Malaysian Chemistry Department, Kelantan State on 12/09/2021 and such was acknowledged as received by Government Chemist, Nurul ‘Izzah bt Abdul Rahman (PW2). As proof of the handover, PW3 was handed one (1) copy of the official receipt of the Malaysian Chemistry Department by PW2 which was then handed over to PW4. The same receipt was submitted to the Court and was marked as P4. S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 5

In her oral evidence and based on the Chemist Report numbered: 21- FR-D-04476 (Exhibit P6), PW2 confirmed that she had examined 1 envelope marked “DV” stamped “POLIS DIRAJA MALAYSIA 652” containing 10 blue plastic packets each containing 198 red tablets and 2 green tablets. After analysis, as stated in the evidence of SP2 and P6, the results of the analysis were as the following: i.The total net weight of the red tablets was 188.03 grams containing 25.57 grams of methamphetamine; ii.The total net weight of the green tablets was 1.90 grams containing 0.26 grams of methamphetamine.

PW2 also confirmed that Methamphetamine is listed in the First Schedule of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952.

It is imperative for this Court to assess whether a prima facie case has been successfully made against the Accused. To do so, an exercise of maximum evaluation has to be undertaken against the totality of evidence presented by the Prosecution through their witnesses and in doing so assess these witness’s credibility and reliability, alongside examining whether elementary requirements for offences alleged against the Accused are met by the prosecution. (see Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006]1 CLJ 447, Looi Kow Chai v Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 734 and Balachandran v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 CLJ 85) S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 6

Therefore, it is time for this Court to find answer to the issue raised in this appeal, namely whether the Accused should have been found guilty of the charge alleged against him on the basis that the Accused allegedly had possession of impugned drugs found during the raid.

This question, if answered in the negative, is a strong justification for this Court’s decision to acquit and discharge the Accused from charges laid against him.

To answer this question, it is of utmost importance for this Court to assess whether evidence presented is capable of proving the Accused possession of such dangerous drugs.

This requires a careful examination on the existence of the element of possession of dangerous drugs which in turn cannot be divorced from further discussion on who has control, custody and knowledge of such seized items to determine whether the Accused ought to be held criminally liable for charges brought against him.

In relation to Section 12(2)/Section 39A(1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, the ingredients required to be proved relating to possession of illicit drug are as the following – i. The Accused has possession of dangerous drugs (control or custody); ii. The Accused has knowledge of said dangerous drugs; S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 7 iii. The impugned drugs are listed under the First Schedule of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952; iv. The Accused was not a person authorized or deemed as such under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, or Regulations made under that Act. [24] There is no need for a lengthy discussion on whether the impugned drugs are listed as dangerous drugs as defined in the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952.

This is because the parties have from the outset asserted that they do not intend to dispute the identity of seized items, rather the parties have chosen to focus more on efforts to unravel the question of whether the Accused in fact had possession of the dangerous drug as alleged by the Prosecution.

Upon close scrutiny, this Court finds no reason to discredit the evidence given by PW2 regarding dangerous drugs analysis done as indicated in Exhibit P6. There was no defect in PW2’s analysis and no credible challenge was made on the identity of illicit drug. PW2 confirmed that said illicit drug was listed as dangerous drug in the First Schedule of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, to wit: Methamphetamine weighing 0.05 grams. (see Public Prosecutor v Chia Leong Foo [2004] 4 CLJ 649). Thus, this Court is of the view that the nature and the weight of illicit drug forming the subject matter in this case has been successfully proved.

Looking at the totality of evidence adduced throughout this proceeding, it is safe to conclude that the Accused did not have permission S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 8 to have in his control and custody said dangerous drug as no evidence had been tendered to prove that license was granted to enable the Accused to have in his control and custody said dangerous drug.

Meanwhile, the task of proving “possession” has to be seen in light of the particular facts of each case. Not only is it vital to show that the Accused had custody or control over the impugned drug (actus reus), but it is also equally if not more important to show that he had the intention of dealing with it (mens rea) as if it belonged to him (See Ibrahim Mohamad & Anor v. PP [2011] 4 CLJ 113). In other words, possession is not made out merely because the Accused was situated so near to the impugned drug (See Romi Amora Amir v Public Prosecutor [2011] 1 CLJ 870). As laid out in Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 MLJ 237, possession is only proven when both physical element and mental element are present.

In gist, possession is only is only said to be present whereby a presiding judge is safely assured that there must be something in the evidence to satisfy the Court that the person who is physically in a position to deal with the thing as his own had the intention of doing so. (See Leow Nghee Lim v Regina [1955] 1 LNS 53 & Public Prosecutor v Hong Ah Huat [1970] 1 LNS 186).

Nonetheless, shedding light into what constitutes mental element in an offence of illicit drug possession is by no means an easy feat as this can only be done, more often than not, by way inference from the surrounding circumstances due to the fact that, by nature, intention cannot be proved S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 9 through direct evidence. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case. (see Pendakwa Raya lawan Lim Chsung Meng Dan Seorang Lagi [2015] 1 LNS 1226)

As alluded above, whether “possession” exist in a particular case could vary depending on factual peculiarity of that given case. Thus, in determining what amounts to “possession”, several questions will have to be answered namely; whether the impugned drugs found with the Accused were under his control, to what extent did the Accused had access to the place where the impugned drugs were found and how physically close was the Accused with the impugned drugs. Answering these questions in totality might shed light into the Accused’s ability as the alleged possessor capable of exercising the power to deal with said impugned drugs to the exclusion of others alongside his knowledge of the same.

On this front, the law is trite that the onus is upon the prosecution to adduce cogent evidence capable to rule out access by others to the impugned drugs. (See Abdullah Zawawi bin Yusoff v Public Prosecutor [1993] 4 CLJ 1, Pang Chee Meng v Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 265, Saludin bin Surif v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 CLJ 529 dan Gooi Loo Seng v Public Prosecutor [1993] 3 CLJ.)

Reverting to the case at hand, after evaluating factual matrix as presented during trial in the light of principles as explained above, this Court finds that there is a material lacuna in the prosecution against the Accused as existing evidential matrix indicates existence of a concrete possibility that there was someone other than the Accused who could have S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 10 exercise control over handling of seized items.

As evident from testimony of PW4 who investigated this case, the Accused was not the owner of the motorcycle. This was clearly explained by PW4 in cross-examination by the defense counsel by stating that at the material time, said motorcycle had belonged to a person named Che Tahir bin Che Lah whose name was printed on the JPJ document as exhibit IDD22 which was referred to SP4 before this Court during the trial.

Throughout the trial, PW4 also failed to demonstrate any proactive action taken by him as the investigating officer in the case in ascertaining the relationship between the Accused and the registered owner of the vehicle that was raided. No documentation in this regard was seized nor was any proof of ownership taken to assist in the investigation. PW4 in his testimony explained that he concluded only the Accused had control over the motorcycle, solely on the arrest made by PW2. It is vehemently clear that no comprehensive effort was taken during the investigation to verify the exclusion of other people from accessing the motorcycle. (See Abdul Hadi Ahmad v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 CLJ 145)

Therefore, control of the vehicle was not defined since the relationship between the Accused and the registered owner of the vehicle was not fully explained by the Prosecution. This in effect resulted with ambiguity as to who exactly had the custody and control of the impugned S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 11 drugs found in the motorcycle at the material time.

To my mind, no relationship existed between the Accused and the vehicle that had supposedly contained the impugned drugs, save given that ownership of the vehicle pointed towards another individual who was not investigated and was not presented in Court to be cross-examined.

I would be remiss if I do not promptly address further point of submission raised by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor on this point namely it was argued that PW4’s failure to put into record Che Tahir bin Che Lah’s statement in investigation concerning his ownership of the motorcycle in question and subsequently the failure to make sure Che Tahir bin Che Lah appear in person in this Court to testify to this effect does not in any way create a material gap to the Prosecution’s case.

In support of this argument, the Prosecution cited that case of Public Prosecutor v Rahaman Md Mizanur [2024] CLJU 2423 whereby it was alluded that even though the owner of the motorcycle was not called, this did not affect the prosecution case as the Court in that case was of the view that what was important when the Accused was arrested, the motorcycle was with him and the drug was in the basket of said motorcycle.

Nevertheless, I am of the view that such case has to be seen in the light of its own peculiar set of facts and as such differs greatly with the factual matrix presented in this case.

This is such so as, in said authority as cited by the learned Deputy Public Prosecution, it was revealed through testimony of the investigating officer of said case that the motorcycle was reported to have been stolen S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 12 from the registered owner almost 6 months prior to the raid conducted in that case. In this light, the possibility of the registered owner having access to impugned drug had been excluded, leaving behind the Accused in that case to answer for himself regarding how he came into possession of the motorcycle and consequently the impugned drug found therein.

This differs starkly from the fact of this present case as the failure to put into record Che Tahir bin Che Lah’s statement in investigation concerning his ownership of the motorcycle in question and subsequently the failure to make sure Che Tahir bin Che Lah appear in person in this Court to testify to this effect, in actuality means someone else besides the Accused could access the impugned drug given the fact that the relationship between the Accused, Che Tahir bin Che Lah and the motorcycle in question was never properly defined, let alone how the Accused came into possession of the motorcycle at the material time.

At this juncture this court wishes to reiterate the trite law that at all time, it is incumbent upon the Prosecution and not against the Accused to prove the Accused’s ability as the alleged possessor capable of exercising the power to deal with said impugned drugs to the exclusion of others alongside his knowledge of the same.

This Court views that an acquittal and discharge against the Accused is warranted given the prosecution’s failure to call Che Tahir bin Che Lah who by PW4’s own admission could serve as an important and material witness to give evidence in Court in relation to the charge brought against the Accused. Thus, the failure to call this important witness creates a material gap in prosecution’s case which in turn destabilizes the very core S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 13 of prosecution's case.

This Court finds it apt to discuss the propriety of invoking “adverse inference” under section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 due to alleged failure to properly investigate the veracity of the purported raid against the Accused which was argued, resulting with serious gap in prosecution’s case against him.

As the Accused had challenged the veracity of PW2’s account of the incident, it was argued that the Prosecution should have brought forward other witnesses who might be present together with PW2 during the raid to corroborate PW2’s testimony. As such, the prosecution's failure to summon other members of the raiding team gave rise to adverse inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950, against the prosecution.

As observed in Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492, it is essential to appreciate the scope of s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but a material document by a party in his possession nor for non-production of any witness but only an important and material witness to the case.

This Court reiterates the trite law that it is the discretionary right of the prosecutor to call any witnesses he or she deems fit to call as signified in Public Prosecutor v Norashikin Bt Yusof & Anor [2019] 7 MLJ 277.

Consequently, it is understood that the operation of adverse S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 14 inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1952 is only activated when the prosecution failed to ensure attendance of essential witness who could be helpful in unfolding the prosecution’s narrative. The law does not intend for adverse inference under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 to operate merely because the prosecution declines to call any Tom, Dick and Harry to testify when the prosecution is of the view that their present set of witnesses as presented in court is sufficient to prove their case.

As such, this Court finds that application of adverse inference in favour of the Accused under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 is justified given that the charge brought against the Accused is based on an incomplete investigation and imperfect evidential narrative.

This is based on the Court's finding that Che Tahir bin Che Lah was not called to give any evidence until the prosecution case was closed. This nominee was also never offered to the defence at all while his name consistently surfaced throughout the proceeding.

PW4 had admitted under oath that never at any point of time did he put into record statement of the actual owner of the motorcycle. As such no legal basis could be ascribed to the claim made by PW4 that the motorcycle was purchased by the Accused from the original owner. Such statement should be inadmissible in law as hearsay and as no concrete evidence existed to confirm when said purchase was said to have been made from the actual owner, namely Che Tahir Bin Che Lah as this individual was never called to give evidence as a witness. S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 15

This adds to the material gap in the prosecution's case, especially regarding the issue of the possibility of other individuals having access to the premises, given that the evidence of Che Tahir bin Che Lah, if presented at trial, could sufficiently offer some sort of answer to the question of to what extent did the Accused exercise custody, control and had knowledge of the existence of the impugned drug in the motorcycle which was raided by PW2.

There should to be no obstacle to presenting Che Tahir bin Che Lah as a prosecution witness who can explain the narrative of the case more comprehensively even though this nominee came up during trial, more so as the information concerning this person’s connection to the motorcycle was made easily available to him as a seasoned investigator in the police force. As the investigation was an ongoing process but no reasonable action was taken in examining the defense presented by the Accused, a verdict of acquittal and discharge as in the case of Public Prosecutor v Iskandar Mohamad Yusof [2006] 6 CLJ 379 ought to be preferred.

This Court is aware that the Prosecution has the right to call or not call any witness. However, at all times, the burden of proof to prove its case and to subpoena important witnesses who can unravel the narrative of the prosecution’s case against the Accused rests with the Prosecution. If by merit, evidence presented by the Prosecution fails to prove the essence of the charge brought against the Respondent, then this Court has the authority to make a decision to acquit and discharge the Accused from charge laid upon him on the basis of lack of evidence presented to S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 16 successfully support conviction against the Accused (See Ti Chuee Hiang v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 CLJ 1, Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v A-G (Palestine) [1994] AC156).

This Court also finds that a conviction against the Accused is not safe considering the location of the impugned drug when it was found and its relevance to the previous finding by this Court concerning the Prosecution’s failure to exclude possibility individuals other than the Accused of having possession of the dangerous drug found during the raid.

It is also worthy to note that no evidence was adduced by the Prosecution regarding since when the drug was in the motorcycle and who had placed the drugs there. This matter was left hanging by the Prosecution without being resolved and had become a question mark and had raised lingering doubts in the Prosecution's case. To my mind, if Che Tahir bin Che Lah, the registered owner of the motorcycle was called to testify, this question could be answered but this was not done by the Prosecution.

On the other hand, it was made patently clear through evidence that that other people also had access to the motorcycle as the drugs were found in an open and exposed place as stated by PW4 during the cross-examination session. Hence, the Accused cannot be said to be someone who knew the whereabouts and existence of the drug seized from the S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 17 motorcycle, as alleged and in turn could effectively deal in the control of said drugs.

Given this backdrop, this Court is guided by the decision in Choo Yoke Choy v. Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 CLJ (rep) 43, which ruled for discharge and acquittal of the Appellant in that case due to the fact that the seized items were found under the kitchen table, which was situated in a common area and accessible to other occupants of the house, leaving unanswered the question of who actually had knowledge of the dangerous drugs found during the raid. THE ACCUSED'S SHOCKED REACTION DURING THE RAID IS NOT AN INDICATION THAT THE ACCUSED WAS AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SEIZED ITEM

This Court could not bring itself to agree with the Prosecution’s submission that Section 8 of the Evidence Act ought to be applicable in explaining the Accused’s reaction of sprinting away at the sight of policemen coming closer to him as an indication that the Accused was aware of the existence of dangerous drug found in the motorcycle he rode.

As explained in Public Prosecutor v Karuma Hassan Ansaq [2021] 1 LNS 74, the Accused’s reaction was also consistent with the natural reaction of a person who was frightened and startled by the sudden appearance of the police. Should there be another possible explanation for the conduct or reaction, it would not be safe to conclude that the Accused had knowledge of drugs based on his reaction and conduct alone. S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 18 Therefore, such evidence should not be viewed in isolation but must be considered with the other evidence and circumstances. In this instance, it would be the duty of the court to draw a conclusion in favor of the Accused, should more than one inference arise from evidence as presented.

Per Notes of Proceeding, no further evidence was adduced to show that the Accused had knowledge of the contents of the plastic apart from the evidence of his conduct.

To my mind, the conduct of the Accused apparent reaction of fear and surprise which the Prosecution sought to adduce to show knowledge of the drug’s whereabout is typical following the sudden appearance of the police. Therefore, the Court is more inclined to admit the evidence in the Accused’s favor.

Looking at the totality of the factual matrix presented by the Prosecution, this Court finds that no clear and conclusive indication has been presented to discharge the burden of proof in order to effectively exclude the possibility of access to the drugs by anyone other than the Accused.

It is a trite law that if there are several inferences that can be drawn from the facts as presented in court, then the inference in favour of the Accused should prevail and be considered, and the Accused should be afforded the benefit of the doubt from such inferences. (See Public Prosecutor v Mohd Hanif Mosbah & Satu Lagi [2016] 3 CLJ 882) S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 19

In addition, based on evidentiary narrative as presented by the Prosecution, the question of how such impugned drug in question came to be in the motorcycle with the Accused could not be satisfactorily resolved and there is no evidence that the Accused had control and custody of such drug or, he had knowledge of them.

Given that the element of control or custody of the drug found could not be successfully proved against the Accused, it would not be apt for this Court to invoke presumption of knowledge under section 37(d) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 against him.

In assessing the strength of the case presented by the Prosecution, this Court must apply maximum evaluation to the set of evidentiary narrative as presented and decide whether the Prosecution has succeeded in proving a prima facie case against the Accused. If there is a prima facie case, then the Accused must be called to defend himself and if the Accused chooses to remain silent, the next question is, can this Court then convict the Accused based on evidence proffered by the Prosecution.

This Court refers to the following cases: a. Ibrahim v. PP [1962] 1 LNS 56; [1962] 28 MLJ 235, whereby it was stated: - "The defense should not be called where the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Under no circumstances should a magistrate call for the defense merely to clear any doubt he may have in his mind as to whether the prosecution had or had not proven its case." S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 20 b. Sia Soon Suan v. PP [1965] 1 LNS 165; [1966] 1 MLJ 116, whereby it was explained: - "... the requirement of strict proof in a criminal case cannot be relaxed to bridge any material gap in the prosecution evidence. Irrespective of whether the court is otherwise convinced in its own mind of the guilt or innocence of an accused, its decision must be based on the evidence adduced and nothing else..." c. Choo Chang Teik & Anor v. PP [1991] 1 CLJ 54 (Rep) [1991] 3 CLJ 2387; [1991] 3 MLJ 423, whereby it was enunciated: - "... although it is unfortunate that a guilty party cannot be brought to justice, it is more important that there should not be a miscarriage of justice and the law should be maintained that the prosecution should prove its case."

The Court finds that it is unsafe for this Court to call the Accused to defend himself on the charge levelled against him as reasonable doubt exists in Prosecution's case.

Accordingly, upon exercise of maximum evaluation and buttressed by reasons as discussed earlier, this Court opines that the Prosecution has failed to prove a Prima Facie case against the Accused for the offence charged. Therefore, this Court orders that the Accused be discharged and acquitted of the charge without having to be call for defence. This Court also orders for the return of bail money to its rightful bailor. S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Magistrate Rais Imran bin Hamid 21 sgd RAIS IMRAN BIN HAMID MAGISTRATE KOTA BHARU MAGISTRATE COURT KELANTAN Dated: 19th June 2025 For the Prosecution: Nursyafiqah binti Mohamad (Deputy Public Prosecutor, Kelantan State Legal Advisor's Office) For the Accused: Mohd Zubairi bin Salleh (Rafizi,Zubairi & Firdaus) S/N hbuHwewba0mQI4n1hW1oow **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal