Waythamoorthy A/L Ponnusamy v Penerbitan Sahabat (M) Sdn Bhd (WA-23NCvC-58-08/2022)

The Plaintiff, Waythamoorthy a/l Ponnusamy, is a former Federal Minister, former Senator and prominent advocate for the Indian community in Malaysia. He brought this defamation action against Penerbitan Sahabat (M) Sdn Bhd (the Publisher) and its Editor-in-Chief (collectively, the Defendants), arising from a front-page article published in the Tamil daily newspaper Malaysia Nanban on 6 January 2022 (the Article).

On 5 January 2022, the Plaintiff issued an open letter (the Open Letter) addressed to the then Prime Minister. The letter was written on the letterhead of Parti Kemajuan Malaysia (Malaysian Advancement Party) and signed by the Plaintiff as President. Its subject matter read: "Government should take cognisance of the worldwide Omicron threat. Health Ministry should assess the possible health hazard during Thaipusam gathering and make practical recommendations/decisions".

The Open Letter made the following key points:

Thaipusam (18 January 2022) typically draws 2 million Hindus across Malaysia, with Batu Caves alone attracting approximately 1 million devotees within 48 hours, making social distancing impossible.

The Omicron variant had caused a rapid surge in infections in the United States and Europe, and the available data justified renewed concern about mass gatherings.

The Health Ministry and National Security Council (NSC) had remained silent. The Plaintiff called on the Prime Minister to direct these bodies to assess infection risks, issue practical Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and take pre-emptive measures to prevent a potential "Thaipusam Cluster."

The Plaintiff emphasised that public safety was the primary concern and did not call for cancellation of the festival.

On 6 January 2022, the day after the Open Letter was issued, the Defendants published the Article in Tamil on the front page of Malaysia Nanban. The Article juxtaposed the Plaintiff's photograph against images of devotees performing sacred acts and carried prominent headlines in red font which the Plaintiff alleges used crude Tamil slurs to portray him as a "saboteur" attempting to stop the festival. The Defendants deny defamation, contending the Article was fair comment on a matter of public interest and was published on an occasion of qualified privilege and that the Reynolds privilege applied to the publication. C. The Pleadings

The Plaintiff pleaded that the Article, in its natural and ordinary meaning, conveyed that he:

acted wrongfully and intentionally to stop Thaipusam;

sabotaged the religious rights of the Hindu community;

intentionally created panic, fear and unrest among Hindu Malaysians;

acted as a provocateur and inciter against the festival;

issued the Open Letter as a hidden and deceptive effort to prevent the religious event; and

is a leader unfit to lead, having acted against the core values of his community.

The Plaintiff translated the headline as "Waytha Moorthy sabotaging Thaipusam" and pleaded both natural and ordinary meaning and innuendo. He further pleaded malice ("niat jahat") and pleaded particulars thereof, alleging that the Defendants published without seeking clarification and that the article was intended to sensationalise the issue for commercial gain. He sought general and aggravated damages together with a permanent injunction.

The Defendants denied the article was defamatory or published with malice. They offered their own certified translation, rendering the headline as: "Vethamoorthy inciting to block Thaipusam, wave of opposition from across the country".

The Defendants disputed the Plaintiff's translation as inaccurate and relied on three substantive defences:

Fair Comment on a matter of public interest;

Qualified Privilege; and

The Reynolds Privilege (responsible journalism).

They contended the article accurately reflected widespread public anger at the Plaintiff's Open Letter; that the source material was the Plaintiff's own public statements; and that verification was therefore unnecessary.

The central factual contest is the accuracy of the Tamil-to-Malay translation of the article's headline and content, specifically whether the words used carried defamatory meaning; and whether the Defendants acted with malice or in good faith in reporting public reaction to the Plaintiff's Open Letter. That said, the following issues arose for determination:

Whether the Plaintiff's pleadings were fatally defective for failing to specify the defamatory words.

Whether the three elements of defamation (defamatory meaning, reference to the Plaintiff, and publication to a third party) were established.

Whether the defences of Fair Comment and Reynolds Privilege applied.

Whether the article was published with malice, so as to defeat Qualified Privilege.

What damages ought to be awarded if liability was established.

Whether an injunction should be granted to restrain the publication of the defamatory material.

Whether the Defendant ought to be ordered to withdraw the publication for being defamatory.

Whether the Defendant ought to be ordered to publish an apology. D. Analysis

The Defendants argued the Plaintiff's pleading was defective for failing to identify the precise words complained of, citing Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia Bhd v SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 6 CLJ 129 (paragraphs 45-47); and Dato V Kanagalingam v David Samuels & Ors [2006] 3 CLJ 909 (paragraph 13); which confirm that the specific words alleged to be defamatory must be pleaded with sufficient particularity. The Court said, "... it is not the duty of the court on its volition to speculate and to pick out the words or phrases or sentences or paragraphs and to make a case out for the plaintiff ...".

The Defendants also denied the accuracy of the Plaintiff's Tamil-to Malay translation, relying on their own certified translation.

Having examined the Statement of Claim, the Court found the objection to be without merit. In paragraph 7, the Plaintiff reproduced the entire article. In paragraph 10, he identified the portions he alleged were defamatory and pleaded their meaning from Section D onwards. The sample pleading in Bullen, Leake & Jacob's Malaysian Precedents of Pleadings (2017, Sweet & Maxwell) at pages 475-477 requires verbatim reproduction of the impugned words, but does not require each allegation to be pinned to a specific word or sentence.

Fundamentally, the Federal Court in Melawangi Sdn Bhd v Tiow Weng Theong [2020] 2 MLRA 391 (paragraphs 37-41) held that pleadings must be read as a whole and that where the Defendant was not caught off-guard, no prejudice arises. The Defendants' own Defence demonstrates they were not taken by surprise and that they actively disputed the translation (paragraph 6(d) of the Defence); pleaded substantive defences; and participated fully in a ten-day trial. Having litigated on the merits throughout, they are estopped from retreating into technical objections at the close of proceedings: See: Raja Syahrir bin Abu Bakar & Anor v Manjeet Singh Dhillon (2021) 3 MLJ 482. The Defendants also failed to seek further and better particulars under Order 18 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012; interrogatories under Order 26 of the Rules of Court 2012; or to apply to strike out under Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012.

Issue 1 is decided in favour of the Plaintiff.

In an action for defamation, as seen in Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 the Plaintiff must prove three elements:

the words are defamatory;

the words refer to the plaintiff; and

the words were published to a third party.

Defamatory meaning is assessed from the perspective of the ordinary reasonable reader viewing the publication as a whole, not by a lawyer's minute analysis: Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad [1973] 2 MLJ 56. In Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 371 the court emphasised that allegations portraying a person as untrustworthy or deserving of public condemnation constitute serious defamation. Defamatory meaning may arise by implication or innuendo: Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952. The courts must consider the "publication as a whole" including context and mode of publication: Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 313 (Lord Bridge); and Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong v Seema Elizabeth Soy [2023] 3 MLJ 674 where the Court of Appeal held that the "sting" of an impugned text must be identified by viewing it as a whole.

The central factual dispute concerned the meaning of the Tamil word "Vettu". The Plaintiff's witnesses (PW3, PW4, PW5, PW6) testified that, in context, it connoted extreme sabotage or destruction. The Defendants offered 17 dictionary alternatives, and their translator, SD1, testified that "Vettu Vaikkum" meant "menghasut" (to incite), conveying that the Plaintiff was trying to incite the public to prevent Thaipusam.

The Defendants also relied on Tan Sri Rahim Tamby Chik v Howard Lee Chuan How & Ors [2026] 2 CLJ 769 for the proposition that a court is confined to the natural and ordinary meaning where that is the only meaning pleaded, and must derive meaning solely from the text and context.

This Court found it unnecessary to resolve the translation contest fully. Whether the word meant "sabotage" or "obstruct" (as per the Plaintiff); or "incite" (as per the Defendants); all three interpretations are, per se, defamatory, as they tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of the Hindu community he represents. The Defendants' own pleading at paragraph 6(d) of the Defence admitted that the article conveyed the Plaintiff was attempting to "menghasut menghalang Thaipusam" (inciting to block Thaipusam) and that this had triggered a nationwide wave of opposition. The term "menghasut" (incite) itself suggests provocation of unlawful conduct and connotes criminal wrongdoing.

The meaning of "sabotage" taken from the online edition of the Oxford Dictionary at https://www.oed.com/dictionary/sabotage n?tab=meaning and use#2 4584999 states that sabotage means: "The malicious damaging or destruction of an employer's property by workmen during a strike or the like; hence gen. any disabling damage deliberately inflicted, esp. that carried out clandestinely in order to disrupt the economic or military resources of an enemy."

The meaning of "obstruct" is taken from the online edition of the Oxford Learner's Dictionary at https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/obstruct? q=obstruct means: "to prevent somebody / something from doing something or making progress, especially when this is done deliberately"

The meaning of "incite" is taken from the online edition of the Oxford Learner's Dictionary at https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/incite?q=i ncite means: "to encourage somebody to do something violent, illegal or unpleasant, especially by making them angry or excited"

For completeness, the Defendants' use of the term "menghasut" is similar to the term "incite" as seen from 'Kamus Dewan Bahasa Edisi Keempat at https://prpm.dbp.gov.my/Cari1?keyword=menghasut: "membangkitkan kemarahan, kebencian seseorang terhadap orang lain:"

In Syed Husin Ali v Syarikat Perchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 1 MLRH 153; [1973] 2 MLJ 56, Mohamed Azmi J (as he then was) said at p 58: "Thus the test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, although no one believes the statement to be true (emphasis added). Another test is: would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally? The typical type of defamation is an attack upon the moral character of the plaintiff attributing crime, dishonesty, untruthfulness, ingratitude or cruelty."

Considering the above passage, this Court finds that the words attributed to the terms used by the Defendants in the Article, whether attributed by the Plaintiff or by the Defendants, show that those words are an attack on the moral character of the Plaintiff as the words tend to excite an adverse opinion from others against the Plaintiff, and tend to lower him the estimation of right-thinking members of society.

On a full reading of the Open Letter, it contained no incitement of any kind. It was a public-interest communication urging the government to assess health risks at a mass gathering, relying on international data regarding the Omicron variant, and calling for practical guidelines. It did not request cancellation of the festival.

The Article purports to be based on the Open Letter, but when read as a whole, it functions not as an opinion piece but as an attack on the Plaintiff. It asserted that the Plaintiff was attempting to incite a stoppage of Thaipusam and to create panic; that various organisations had expressed anger at the Open Letter; and that the Plaintiff's conduct was motivated by hidden or political purposes.

The Defendants suppressed the material context of the Open Letter, transforming a public health query into a narrative of sabotage. This constitutes a "defamatory half-truth": Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong v Seema Elizabeth Soy [2023] 3 MLJ 674 where at paragraphs 66-67, the Court said, [66] In response, we would say, 'The logic is superficially attractive; but the conclusion is suspect' (see: Lord Scarman in Goldsmith v Sperrings Limited [1977] 2 All ER 566 (CA) at p 582). And the reason we have given short shrift of this part of the defendant's argument is that the omission to paint the full picture is the very nature and essence of the concept of 'half-truth' which establishes liability for defamation in circumstances where the failure to present the requisite information portrayed a false impression in the minds of the ordinary person. [67] As we explained earlier, first, the defendant failed to give the full picture of the plaintiff's previous legal problems in Hong Kong, and secondly, the plaintiff's previous legal problems in Hong Kong being juxtaposed with the judicial findings of fraud and misrepresentation against Mayland gave the (false) impression that the plaintiff is a fraudster and is dishonest. Thirdly, there was no legitimate reason or justification for making any reference to the plaintiff in the impugned text. It was done for the obvious purpose of highlighting Mayland's unlawful conduct and to equate the plaintiff with Mayland, and in the process to malign the reputation of the plaintiff".

The Plaintiff further cites Datuk Harris Mohd Salleh v Datuk Yong Teck Lee [2017] 6 MLJ 133, in which the Federal Court held that publishers exceed legitimate reportage when they go beyond the source material and embellish it with defamatory insinuations. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendants transformed a health inquiry into a narrative of sabotage. He also refers to the Federal Court decision in Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato' Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2004] 4 MLJ 77, which recognised that persisting with defamatory allegations without any retraction or apology constitutes a significant aggravating factor.

This Court therefore takes the view that the three elements of defamation, as stated in paragraph 15 above, are accordingly established.

Although the Defendants' pleading (paragraphs 7-9 of the Defence) asserted the Article's contents were true, those paragraphs, on closer reading, constitute the foundation of the Fair Comment defence rather than an independent plea of Justification. Justification was therefore not properly before the Court and need not be addressed.

The Defendants pleaded Qualified Privilege at paragraphs 14-15 of the Defence, asserting they had a common and corresponding interest with their Tamil-speaking readership in communicating information about the Open Letter and its implications for Thaipusam. The applicable principle was succinctly put, in Dato Seri Mohamad Salleh Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah Anwar & Anor [2018] 9 CLJ 285 at paragraph 55 as follows: [55] A defence of qualified privilege is founded on the need or duty on the part of the alleged defamer to impart information to the public at large and that there is a duty on the part of the public to receive that information. In a defence of qualified privilege, unlike justification, truth is not a pre-requisite but it can only succeed if there is no malice in such publication. If untrue defamatory allegations are published on an occasion of privilege, they will be protected from a claim for defamation. Although the law of defamation exists to protect reputations, it is recognised that in particular situations it is to the benefit of society generally for people to be able to communicate without fear of being sued for defamation. This is so despite the risk that a person's reputation will be damaged and they will not be able to restore it by bringing a claim for defamation. Its rationale resides in the wider consideration that a general public good in such exercise overrides the need to protect individual reputation".

Qualified Privilege is founded on the publisher's duty to impart information and the public's corresponding duty to receive it; truth is not a prerequisite, but the privilege is defeated by malice. See also Mohd Apandi Ali v Lim Kit Siang [2024] 1 CLJ 50 the Court of Appeal said at paragraph 82: "... The concept of 'reasonableness of conduct' has no relevance or application to the traditional defence of qualified privilege. All the defendant needs to prove in his defence of qualified privilege is he has a duty to convey the information to the public; the public had a duty to receive the information conveyed and there was no malice on the part of the defendant ..."

To defeat Qualified Privilege, the Plaintiff must plead and prove express malice and comply with Order 78 Rule 3(3) of the Rules of Court 2012: See: S Packianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 233.

Compliance with this rule is mandatory: Dato Syed Azman bin Syed Ahmad Nawawi & Ors v Dato Seri Hj Ahmad bin Said [2015] 5 MLJ 141, citing Subramaniam a/l Paramasivam v Courts Mammoth Bhd & Anor [2010] 9 MLJ 363; [2011] 10 CLJ 739 wherein it was stated: "There can be no dispute that O 78 r 3(3) is a specific adjectival provision that had to be strictly complied with or adhered to, if one was intending to disqualify the defence of qualified privilege or fair comment on the grounds of express malice. The mandatory nature of this requirement had been affirmed by a long line of decisions of our courts. Subramaniam a/l Paramasivam v Courts Mammoth Bhd & Anor [2010] 9 MLJ 363; [2011] 10 CLJ 739 was one such decision on strict compliance required with respect to O 78 r 3(3), which also went on to set out succinctly the rationale for such strict compliance with this rule of procedure in the following terms: Order 78 r 3 ... operates to make a mandatory requirement that if the plaintiff disputes the defence of privilege on the grounds of malice, the plaintiff must serve a reply by giving particulars of the facts and matters from which malice is to be inferred. Thus the plaintiff bears the burden of proof (of) malice. The effect of O 78 r 3(3) RHC is to require particulars of malice to be pleaded so that the truth and correctness of the particulars relied upon can be checked and verified".

The burden of proving malice rests on the Plaintiff.

The Court found the Plaintiff complied with Order 78 Rule 3(3) of the Rules of Court 2012. In his Reply, he incorporated by reference paragraphs 7-15 of the Statement of Claim, including the specific particulars of malice at paragraph 12, and added fresh assertions that the Defendants intended to "sensationalise" the issue for commercial gain. Together, these satisfied the obligation to plead and particularise malice. The Defendants' submission that the Article was published bona fide and without malice, based on SD3's own evidence, is self-serving and cannot substitute for an objective assessment of the impugned article.

On the substance, the Court found malice established on the following grounds:

The Defendants created the derogatory, alliterative pseudonym "Vettu Vaikkum Waytha Moorthy", a phrase not found in the Open Letter and not attributed to any verifiable source, deliberately designed to brand the Plaintiff as a saboteur or inciter and subject him to lasting ridicule.

The Defendants published a defamatory half-truth by selectively editing the Open Letter to suppress the genuine public health purpose, replacing it with a narrative of sabotage or incitement. The use of the word "Vettu" (connoting sabotage or destruction, as per Plaintiff; and "menghasut" / "incite", as per Defendant); and the Plaintiff's name was highlighted in large, bold, red fonts to immediately signal a "targeted campaign of character assassination" to the reader.

Unlike in legal precedents, where accompanying text might neutralise a sensational headline, the Plaintiff argues that this Article contained no such "antidote'; and instead, the body of the Article repeated and amplified the defamatory message. See: Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 313

Despite being served with a Letter of Demand and having sight of the full Open Letter, the Defendants refused to retract or apologise and persisted in their allegations throughout the proceedings.

The Defendants produced no call logs, reporter notes, or independent witnesses to substantiate their claim of a nationwide wave of condemnation. Further, no temple administrator or representative of a Hindu organisation was called to testify and this confirms that the publication was motivated by a desire to cause reputational harm rather than to fulfil a legitimate public duty. An adverse inference is drawn under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 that such evidence would have been unfavourable to the Defendants.

Malice is also evidenced by the publication of a "defamatory half-truth", where the Defendants selectively edited the Plaintiff's Open Letter to suppress the material context of his genuine public health concerns regarding the Omicron variant, thereby creating a misleading narrative of "sabotage" or "incite" [depending on whether one chooses to use the Plaintiff or Defendants translation].

The defence of Qualified Privilege is therefore defeated by malice: Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135.

The Defendants argued the article satisfied the Reynolds criteria because:

it concerned a matter of genuine public interest (COVID-19 restrictions and a major Hindu festival);

the primary source was the Plaintiff's own Open Letter and public Facebook post;

the article included the "gist" of the Plaintiff's position; and

the matter was time-sensitive.

The Plaintiff submitted the Defendants failed virtually every Reynolds criterion, relying on Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (Lord Nicholls), where the Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee [2015] 8 CLJ 477 alluded to the non-exhaustive factors of Reynolds privilege to be considered at paragraph 34: [34] The Reynolds privilege defence is predicated on public interest and "responsible journalism". In the context of the present case, the Reynolds privilege defence required the defendant first, to establish that the impugned words were uttered on a matter of public interest and the public had a corresponding interest in receiving the same. Once that was established, the court must consider whether the defendant acted reasonably in publishing the impugned words. This second test has been described as the test of "responsible journalism" (see Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd (supra) and Jameel And Another v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl (supra). Although the test refers to "journalism", it is merely a convenient description because as we have decided earlier the Reynolds privilege defence is in no way limited to journalistic publications. If the defendant passed the test of responsible journalism, the issue would be determined in his favour. Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd (supra) sets out a number of factors to be taken into account in determining the issue of responsible journalism. These factors, which are not exhaustive, are, inter alia, as follows: (1) The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true.

The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public concern.

The source of the information. Some informants have no direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories.

The steps taken to verify the information.

The status of the information. The allegation may have already been the subject of an investigation, which commands respect.

The urgency of the matter. News is often a perishable commodity.

Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may have information others do not possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not always be necessary.

Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff's side of the story.

The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements of fact.

The circumstances of the publication, including the timing."

The Plaintiff argued that the Defendants omitted the material public health content of the Open Letter; that they made no attempt to contact him for comment before publication; that they produced no verifiable evidence of the alleged condemnation; and that the headline and pseudonym were editorial inventions rather than journalistic reporting.

The Plaintiff argues the Defendants substituted his actual health-based explanation with a narrative of sabotage and hidden motives. He asserts that the Defendants provided no verifiable sources, identified no temple administrators who condemned him, and failed to produce call logs or reporter notes, which is fatal to a claim of responsible journalism.

This Court agrees with the Plaintiff. The Reynolds privilege is denied for the following reasons:

The Defendants committed what Lord Nicholls in Reynolds described as "the most telling criticism": they failed to include the gist of the Plaintiff's explanation. Instead of conveying his genuine public health concerns, they substituted a narrative of sabotage or incitement.

The Defendants admitted they selected only portions of the Open Letter they considered relevant, suppressing its material context and thereby creating a defamatory half-truth.

The Defendants made no attempt to contact the Plaintiff for clarification before publication.

No verifiable evidence was produced to support the claim of nationwide condemnation.

The article's sting derived primarily from the Defendants' own editorial framing, including the use of "Vettu" in large red font and the invented pseudonym "Vettu Vaikkum Waytha Moorthy", rather than from the Plaintiff's Open Letter.

The Defendants relied on the defence of Fair Comment, supported by the Federal Court's analysis in Dato Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh Ismail & Anor v Mohd Rafizi Ramli [2022] 5 CLJ 487, which sets out the four requirements:

the words are comment;

the comment is on a matter of public interest;

the comment is based on facts; and

the comment is one a fair-minded person could honestly make on those facts (adopting Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 3 MLJ 1).

The Federal Court in that case also endorsed the analysis in Chen Cheng & Anor v Central Christian Church [1999] 1 SLR 94 (paragraphs 34-35), which directs the courts to adopt a common-sense approach and consider whether the ordinary reasonable reader would recognise the statement as comment or as a statement of fact. A comment must be recognisable as a deduction, inference, or criticism based on stated or indicated facts: Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345.

The Defendants argued that references to the Thaipusam gathering, the Omicron spread, WHO announcements, and the government's ban on the chariot procession were all grounded in verifiable fact, and that the Plaintiff's Open Letter had voluntarily placed the matter in the arena of public debate: Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd v Normala Samsudin [2006] 2 CLJ 46. The Defendants argue that the Article reflected sentiments already circulating in the community, as evidenced by negative public reactions on the Plaintiff's Facebook page even before the newspaper's publication.

The Court found the defence of Fair Comment should not be available for the following reasons:

The characterisation of the Plaintiff's motives as political or as an act against the Hindu community's interests is entirely inferential and subjective, with no factual foundation stated or indicated in the article.

The Article's portrayal of the Open Letter as a hidden or deceptive effort to cancel the festival is a fundamental mischaracterisation of its plain meaning.

The Defendants' editorial invention of the "saboteur" or "inciter" narrative exceeded the bounds of legitimate commentary on the facts.

The defence is independently defeated by the malice found above, evidenced by the Defendants' reckless indifference to the truth and deliberate construction of the derogatory pseudonym "Vettu Vaikkum Waytha Moorthy" designed to permanently stigmatise the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff sought substantial general, aggravated and exemplary damages. He relied on his high public standing as a former Federal Cabinet Minister, former Senator; founder of HINDRAF; and President of the Malaysian Advancement Party (MAP); noting that his entire public identity and credibility were rooted in his service to the Indian and Hindu community. The article reached an estimated readership of 438,000. He cited Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato' Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2004] 4 MLJ 77 on the scale of cumulative awards required to restore a reputation.

The Defendants contended the Plaintiff was entitled to no relief. They argued the sting was time-sensitive and had since dissipated, and that the Plaintiff had conceded, during cross-examination, that he had no concrete evidence or documentation of professional or financial loss attributable to the Article.

In Malaysian defamation law, damages for public figures are "at large" and assessed on the specific merits of each case.

The courts generally consider the following factors when determining the quantum of damages for politicians and public figures:

Position and Standing: The higher the public office or social standing, the greater the potential for injury to reputation: Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 2 MLRH 333.

The Sting: Malicious and unsubstantiated allegations of corruption against a Deputy Minister.

(ii) Award: RM500,000 compensatory damages; RM500,000 aggravated damages; and RM500,000 exemplary damages against each Defendant.

(iii) Key Principle: Public servants are expected to have impeccable integrity. A lack of apology and persistence in groundless defences justified serious aggravated damages.

Gravity of the "Sting": Allegations of criminal conduct (e.g., rape, treason, or corruption) or religious or racial bigotry are treated as extremely grave: Lim Guan Eng v Razman Zakaria [2022] MLRHU 937.

The Sting: A Facebook post alleging the Plaintiff supported a ban on Muslim women wearing headscarves, suggesting he was anti-Muslim.

(ii) Award: RM150,000 in general damages; and RM100,000 in combined aggravated and exemplary damages.

(iii) Key Principle: The Court held that the Plaintiff, holding high public office, suffered significant reputational damage exacerbated by the Defendant's lack of remorse and the sensitive nature of religious issues in Malaysia.

Mode and Extent of Publication: Widespread dissemination via mainstream media or viral social media posts significantly increases the harm: Lim Guan Eng v Mahiaddin Md Yassin [2025] 1 MLRH 589.

The Sting: The Defendant (a former Prime Minister) accused the Plaintiff (a former Finance Minister) of cancelling tax exemptions for an Islamic charitable foundation. The court found the "sting" suggested the Plaintiff was anti-Islam, racist, and had abused his power.

(ii) Award: RM1,050,000 in general damages; RM150,000 in aggravated damages; and RM150,000 in exemplary damages.

(iii) Key Principle: Aggravated damages were justified due to the direct attack on the Plaintiff's character involving sensitive racial and religious motivations.

Conduct of the Defendant: This is the primary driver for aggravated damages. Factors include a lack of remorse; failure to apologise; persistence in a groundless plea of justification; or repeating the libel during trial: Datuk Seri Utama Dr Rais Yatim v Amizudin Ahmat [2012] 1 MLRH 519.

The Court found the sting of this Article struck at the very core of the Plaintiff's public identity as he was branded a saboteur and traitor to the Hindu community he has spent decades serving. The allegations spread to 438,000 readers, transforming a respected community leader into a target of public hostility, abuse and ridicule. Witness PW6, an independent reader who previously respected the Plaintiff, testified he felt betrayed and angered by the article and came to view the Plaintiff as a hypocrite. The Defendants persisted in their unfounded defences throughout the trial without apology or retraction: Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato' Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2004] 4 MLJ 77.

While damages may be substantial, they must not be excessive or unreasonable.

The Plaintiff has sought relief from this Court to order the Defendants to publish an apology in the newspaper.

Such an Order depends on whether it is available at law.

The position in law on this point has been addressed recently by the Court of Appeal in Tan Sing How & Ors v Ng Ze Xuan [2026] 5 MLRA 158 where the Court of Appeal held that the Court cannot compel a Defendant to publish an apology.

The Court of Appeal opined that the primary reason a Court cannot compel a Defendant to publish an apology lies in the absence of a statutory or common law foundation for such a remedy. Under the Defamation Act 1957 and established common law principles, the recognised reliefs for a successful Plaintiff are strictly limited to the award of monetary damages to compensate for loss of reputation; and the granting of injunctions to prevent further publication of the defamatory material. Since the Court's jurisdiction is confined to these established heads of relief, ordering a mandatory apology would exceed the court's remedial powers. The law traditionally treats an apology as a voluntary act intended to mitigate damages under section 10 of the Defamation Act 1957, rather than a mandatory obligation that can be judicially enforced.

The Court of Appeal further said that, from a jurisdictional and practical perspective, the judiciary is not equipped to mandate or supervise a Defendant's state of mind or the sincerity of their expression. To compel an apology would require the court to "dictate the content of speech, and supervise its adequacy and sincerity". Such an order would be "beyond the proper province of judicial determination". An apology is inherently a personal expression of remorse, and compelling a party to issue one often results in a "hypocritical display of unfelt remorse". The court's proper province is to determine legal liability and award compensation for proven harm, not to dictate the content of a Defendant's speech or force a performance of contrition. Compelling a party to apologise is viewed as a form of "compelled speech" that falls outside the scope of judicial determination, as the court cannot effectively ensure the sincerity of a forced statement.

This relief is therefore rejected as it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.

The Plaintiff seeks an injunction to restrain "mengedarkan penerbitan menyinggung tersebut oleh 'Malaysia Nanban' yang melibatkan Plaintiff dalam apa-apa forum sehingga pelupusan Saman ini".

From a reading of this relief, it is drafted as an interlocutory prayer, and more importantly, it seeks to restrain what has already occurred. The phrase "to shut / close the stable door after the horse has bolted" comes to mind.

Based on the manner in which the relief was pleaded and notwithstanding that liability in defamation has been found against the Defendants, this Court is unable to grant an injunction to restrain a publication that is already in the public domain. To do so would be an exercise in futility.

Injunctive relief is rejected.

In the supporting judgment of Muniandy JCA in Tan Sing How & Ors v Ng Ze Xuan [2026] 5 MLRA 158 the Learned Judge addressed whether, instead of ordering an apology, any other Order can be made to compel a libellous Defendant to retract the defamatory article and state the truth.

The Learned Judge said at paragraphs 104 and 105 of the Judgment: " [104] To resolve the practical difficulties of supervising emotional speech, any order made pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court must be structured not as a command to express a subjective feeling of regret, but as a mandatory command to state an objective fact. The court will not force a party to say they are "sorry", but they can be legally compelled to declare what is true. [105] Consequently, to give effect to this inherent power while avoiding the quagmire of regulating forced remorse, the scripted order by the High Court may be substituted with a Mandatory Order for Rectification and Factual Withdrawal under the court's inherent jurisdiction. Such an order does not violate the Appellants' freedom of speech, nor does it force them into a hypocritical display of an unfelt remorse. It is a mechanical enforcement of the truth, entirely analogous to forcing a judgment debtor to part with funds to pay a civil debt. Compliance with this order requires no verification of the heart; it requires only verification of the text".

The Court's authority to address defamatory publications is properly exercised not by commanding "a subjective feeling of regret", but through a "Mandatory Order for Rectification and Factual Withdrawal" under its inherent jurisdiction. By shifting the focus from a forced apology to a "mechanical enforcement of the truth", the Court avoids the "quagmire of regulating forced remorse" and ensures that defendants are not coerced into a "hypocritical display of an unfelt remorse". This approach respects constitutional boundaries by treating the retraction of false statements as "entirely analogous to forcing a judgment debtor to part with funds to pay a civil debt". Ultimately, because such an Order "requires no verification of the heart" but only "verification of the text", it serves as a legally sound mechanism to vindicate a Plaintiff's reputation without infringing upon the Defendant's freedom of speech.

The Defendants are hereby ordered to withdraw the libellous statement and publish a rectification and factual withdrawal based on the decision here.

Upon evaluating all of the above, the Court makes the following orders: (a) General damages: RM500,000.00, with interest at 5% per annum from the date the Writ was filed to the date of realisation.

Aggravated damages: RM100,000.00, with interest at 5% per annum from the date the Writ was filed to the date of realisation. The basis for this award is the Defendants' marked lack of remorse; their failure to issue a timely or sincere retraction despite service of a Letter of Demand; their persistence in unfounded defences; and the deliberate editorial conduct set out above.

An apology cannot be ordered on the basis of the decision of Tan Sing How & Ors v Ng Ze Xuan [2026] 5 MLRA 158.

The prayer for injunction is dismissed.

The Defendant is to publish a retraction and withdrawal of the offending Article and issue a rectification of the same.

Costs: RM30,000.00 to the Plaintiff. Dated the 30th of June, 2026. AVINDER SINGH GILL A/L RANJIT SINGH JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE HIGH COURT HIGH COURT (CIVIL DIVISION NCvC2) HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA Counsel for Plaintiff: Mr. Karthigesan Shanmugam Messrs. Karthig Shan (Seremban) Counsel for Defendants: Mr. S. Natarajan together with En. Ilyas bin Ramli