if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, the Land Administrator [7] The acquiring authority for the West Coast Highway is Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia ( ). As the highway concessionaire to LLM and paymaster in the land acquisition exercise, it is no longer disputable that the Plaintiff is legally recognized as to receive the S.43 Notice of hearing of the Land Reference from the High Court (Spicon Products Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd & Anor [2022] 4 CLJ 195 ; Cahaya Baru Development Bhd v Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia [2011] 2 MLJ 729; Sistem Penyuraian Trafik KL Barat Sdn Bhd v Kenny Heights Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2009] 4 CLJ 57). There is also no question of lack of identification as a person interested for purposes of the Land Form O ) since the Plaintiff was present at the enquiry before the Land Administrator. [8] Notwithstanding this, it is common ground that the Plaintiff did not receive a S.43 Notice in the Land Reference, and as averred on affidavit, neither did LLM. According to Spicon, the obligation to serve a S.43 Notice on all persons interested lies with the Court and is a mandatory requirement of the law. It is the effect of the failure to do so in this case that is now disputed. [9] The Plaintiff contended that the resulting Order was obtained in contravention of a substantive law and is illegal. It resulted in deprivation of a substantive right to be heard and is therefore also in breach of natural justice. On that basis, it was argued that the case falls squarely within the principle laid down in Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 and the Order is consequently null and void and liable to be set aside ex debito justitiae under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. [10] The Defendants contended that the Order is not rendered null and void because it can be validated by section 56 of the LAA. Section 56 of the LAA provides that: No omission or failure to make due publication of a notice or to make due service upon persons and parties interested as provided in this Part shall invalidate any proceedings under this Act. [11] On section 56 of the LAA, this Court agrees with the Plaintiff that it does not apply in this case because that provision only applies to any failure to make due publication or due service as provided in Part VI of the LAA. Part VI of the LAA is titled Service of Notices encompasses sections 52 to 56 and sets out the prescribed methods of effective service and are procedural requirements. In other words, the correct interpretation of the LAA is that section 56 only validates irregularities in the method of service and not the non-service of notices (United Allied Empire Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor & Ors [2018] 1 MLJ 661; Ng Kim Moi (P) & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Seremban, Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus (Negeri Sembilan Township Sdn Bhd & Anor, Proposed Interveners) [2004] 3 MLJ 301). To construe section 56 of the LAA in the manner suggested by the Defendants would defeat the ratio in Spicon on the importance of the S.43 Notice under the LAA. [12] The High Court authority of Projek Lintasan Kota Sdn Bhd v Wisma Denmark Sdn Bhd & Anor [2012] MLJU 837 referred to by the Defendants did not assist because it was a civil suit filed because the Form O was filed beyond the 6-month period prescribed under the LAA. The facts of that case are also distinguishable inter alia, because the Court held that the Plaintiff was proved at trial to have been fully aware of instead of intervening in the proceedings. [13] Thus, based on Spicon and Badiaddin, this Court is bound to conclude in this case that the Order is null and void and liable to be set aside ex debito justitiae under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Finality according to section 68 of the LAA [14] Section 68 of the LAA falls under Part VIII of the LAA on Miscellaneous matters and provides as follows: Bar to setting aside of awards No suit shall be brought to set aside an award or apportionment [15] Based on Lim Cheng Chuan Realty Co Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pulau Pinang [1999] 4 MLJ 669 ( ) and common parlance, of the LAA would refer to any civil proceedings other than judicial review proceedings and thus includes Originating Summons proceedings like the present. The authorities are not consistent on whether the term should exclude judicial review proceedings, though the better view as expressed in Lim Cheng Chuan is probably that it does and that certiorari remains available to set aside an award or apportionment under the LAA. [16] In any case, the Defendants have argued based on Lim Cheng Chuan that section 68 of the LAA would certainly apply to preclude the filing of the present action. The bone of contention is whether, as the Plaintiff argued, it only applies to awards or apportionments made by the Land Administrator because the subject of that provision is specifically under the LAA, and not decisions of the High Court in land reference proceedings. [17] The Plaintiff argued that Parliament had deliberately used distinct accordingly section 68 of the LAA should only apply to the Land To address the appearance of references to the same term in sections 40D, 47 and 49 of the LAA relating to decisions of the Court on compensation, the Plaintiff contended that the term is used there as a verb and not a noun. [18] This Court that section 68 of the LAA only applies to awards and apportionment by the Land Administrator, but the reasoning is unnecessarily pedantic. It is a trite principle of statutory interpretation that in the event of ambiguity in the words used by statute, the purposive approach should be adopted. Since the LAA provides for a land reference mechanism for the challenge of an award or apportionment after an enquiry, it would serve the purpose of the LAA that no collateral suit may be brought to set aside such an award or apportionment to circumvent the prescribed mechanism for challenge. [19] The avenue of appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court is also specifically set out under section 49 of the LAA (Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Another Case [2017] 5 CLJ 526; Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd [2021] 7 CLJ 1). This has been interpreted to preclude appeals from decisions of the High Court on compensation which are not questions of law. In other words, there is to be finality on factual questions like the amount of compensation after a High Court land reference. In the scheme of things, there is no reason to construe section 68 of the LAA as an ouster clause that takes away the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside its own decisions in the circumstances envisaged by Badiaddin as that would leave such aggrieved parties without a remedy. [20] It was further noted that Lim Cheng Chuan itself concerned a declaration that an acquisition was null and void which effect was to set aside the award of the Land Administrator, and there is no clear authority cited where section 68 of the LAA had been invoked to strike out or dismiss a suit to set aside a decision of the High Court in land reference proceedings. [21] Based on these considerations, the correct view is that section 68 of the LAA only applies to awards of the Land Administrator and does not preclude a suit to set aside an impugned order of the High Court in a land reference. Time-bar or estoppel [22] The key dates in this case are as follows: Gazette No. 587 affecting the land acquired was issued on 18-2-2016, the award and notification of compensation by the Land Administrator was issued on 2-3-2017, and the Order in the Land Reference is dated 18-9-2018. The 1st Defendant snipped and pasted in its written submissions, what was ostensibly a letter dated 8-8-2018 from LLM to the Plaintiff with a list of land references including the subject of the present action ( ), while the 2nd Defendant adduced other letters, namely one dated 30-12-2020 from the 1st Defendant to Kementerian Kerja Raya copied to LLM and from LLM to the Plaintiff dated 15-7-2022, both after the Order was made. [23] As the Disputed Letter was not adduced or verified in any affidavit affirmed by a representative of LLM or the 1st Defendant despite the opportunity to do so, and in the light of an unchallenged affidavit by the Plaintiff that it had no record of such a letter, it was disregarded by this Court. [24] In any case, based on the affidavits, case is not that the Plaintiff failed to intervene to be heard in the Land Reference, but that it delayed in moving the Court to set aside the Order after becoming aware of it. In this regard, the Defendants relied on Khor Cheng Wah v Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 223 ( ) where the Court of Appeal held: when a litigant seeks the intervention of the court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant [25] The Defendants also raised section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 for the time bar argument as it relates to the 1st Defendant who is a public authority. It reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect