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1 IN THE SESSIONS COURT LANGKAWI IN THE STATE OF KEDAH, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO: KD-A53KJ-29-07/2023 BETWEEN WINARTA BIN LALUSAH ...PLAINTIFF
KD-A53KJ-29-07/2023
Sessions Court of Malaysia13 Mar 2025
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“b. In light of the clear differentiation between interlocutory applications, the question of whether an interlocutory application, is amenable to appeal is governed by the provisions of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA). c. Recent amendments to Sections 28 and 68 of the CJA have instituted specific limitations on”
“rrent statutory framework and prevailing judicial interpretations. [22] Therefore, any appeal predicated on the mischaracterization of the proceeding's nature is without merit and stands dismissed. THE LAW Courts Of Judicature Act 1964 Section 28: Civil appeals from the subordinate courts. [23] This section delineates”
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1 IN THE SESSIONS COURT LANGKAWI IN THE STATE OF KEDAH, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO: KD-A53KJ-29-07/2023 BETWEEN WINARTA BIN LALUSAH ...PLAINTIFF
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RASIDAH BIBTI SAUD ...DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Appeal against the decision of the Defendant's application in Enclosure 17) INTRODUCTION [1] This judgment pertains to the Notice of Appeal (refer to Enclosure 33) filed by the Defendant's counsel. This appeal is filed against the decision of the Langkawi Sessions Court delivered on 13 March 2025, whereby the court dismissed the Defendant’s application in Enclosure
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The said dismissal was premised on specific grounds, which will be elaborated upon in detail herein. The Defendant contends that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in fact and in law in reaching the said decision, and this appeal seeks to challenge the reasoning and findings of the lower court in relation to the Defendant’s application. [2] The Defendant had earlier filed Enclosure 17, seeking leave to amend the Defendant’s statement of defence at a stage where the Plaintiff had already closed their case. Upon careful deliberation of the arguments advanced by both parties and the applicable legal principles, this Court found that the Defendant’s application was not meritorious and accordingly dismissed it. Following the said dismissal, the Defendant proceeded to file a notice of appeal, now marked as Enclosure 33. [3] Having considered the circumstances of the case, it is my considered view that Enclosure 17 ought not to be allowed, and the reasons for this determination shall be set out in detail in the following paragraphs. [4] Upon a thorough examination of the facts, relevant legal principles, and applicable precedents, the Court has reached a decision to dismiss the application. Consequently, the Court orders the Defendant to pay costs in the sum of RM2,000 to the Plaintiff. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE [5] This is an action initiated by the Plaintiff against John Doe and the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Defendant’) for pain, injuries, and damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of an accident that occurred on 19 March 2021 at Jalan Ulu Melaka. The accident involved a motorcycle bearing registration number KEV 1204, which was ridden by the Defendant, and another motorcycle bearing registration number KDM 8516, which was ridden by the Plaintiff. [6] Curiously, despite overwhelming evidence of the accident, the Defendant has taken a rather creative approach in her defence. In paragraph 3 of the statement of defence at Enclosure 6, the Defendant boldly claims that she did not meet with an accident at all. This assertion is not only astonishing but also borders on the absurdity, one might even wonder if the Plaintiff simply collided with thin air or perhaps an invisible force at Jalan Ulu Melaka on that fateful day. The Defendant’s version of events, or rather, her complete denial of reality, is nothing short of remarkable, showcasing her imagination. [7] The Plaintiff has named the rider of the motorcycle bearing registration number KEV 1204, which was involved in the accident with the Plaintiff, as John Doe in this action, as neither the rider nor the owner of the said motorcycle had lodged any police report regarding the incident. The Defendant only lodged a police report admitting involvement in the accident, as confirmed by the Investigating Officer (SP2) who testified in Court on 8 October 2024. [8] This application is made under the pretext that the Defendant has only now obtained a new version of the accident, conveniently at this stage of the proceedings. The Defendant insists that this application is not an attempt to alter the version of events or deny involvement but merely to plead this newly discovered version. [9] What the Defendant truly seeks, in reality, is nothing short of an artful revision of events, one that conveniently absolves them of liability. With remarkable audacity, the Defendant now attempts to recast the narrative in a more palatable light, as if their original account was somehow incomplete or flawed from the outset. Having presented a version of events that directly contradicts the Plaintiff’s, the Defendant now insists that this discrepancy must be formally pleaded, as though the Plaintiff should have anticipated and accounted for the Defendant’s ever-evolving version of the truth. If permitted, such a maneuver would amount to nothing more than an exercise in strategic evasion, an attempt to escape responsibility by tailoring the facts to serve the Defendant’s interests rather than seeking genuine clarity or justice. [10] In light of the unequivocal legislative directives and authoritative judicial interpretations, the Langkawi Sessions Court’s decision to dismiss the Defendant’s application in Enclosure 17 was well-founded. The Court found that allowing the amendment at such a late stage, after the Plaintiff had already closed their case, would not only prejudice the Plaintiff but also amount to an unnecessary and unjustifiable waste of judicial time and resources. [11] The judicial process is intended to be conducted efficiently and expeditiously, and permitting such an amendment to Enclosure 17 at this juncture would undermine the principles of procedural fairness and case management. Accordingly, the application was rightfully dismissed to prevent any undue delay and to uphold the integrity of the judicial process. [12] Therefore, this judgment reaffirms the fundamental principle that strict compliance with procedural rules, statutory provisions, and established judicial guidelines is essential in ensuring the fair and efficient administration of justice. The integrity of the judicial process demands adherence to these procedural requirements, as they serve to uphold the rule of law, prevent unnecessary delays, and safeguard the rights of all parties involved. [13] Any deviation from these mandatory provisions, particularly when it results in procedural impropriety or an abuse of process, cannot be countenanced by the Court. Fundamentally, to permit such deviations would not only compromise the orderly progression of proceedings but also set a dangerous precedent that could erode public confidence in the justice system. As such, it is incumbent upon all litigants to observe procedural regularity, failing which the Court must intervene to prevent any misuse of the legal process ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED [14] The primary issues for determination are: a. Whether the application is bona fide; b. Whether the Court's dismissal of the Defendant's application was justified. c. Whether this case which is an Interlocutory Application can be appeal. [15] As for the first issue, (a) whether the application is bona fide ? a. The Defendant’s application to amend the Statement of Defence is clearly not made in good faith but rather as a belated and opportunistic attempt to alter the pleadings to fit a more favourable version of events. Despite the existence of Police Report No. 001691/24, in which the Defendant initially admitted involvement in the accident on 19 March 2021, the Investigating Officer later sought to absolve them of liability, raising serious doubts about the credibility of this sudden change in position. The Plaintiff’s testimony further contradicted the Defendant’s claims, stating that motorcycle No. KEV 1204 was ridden by an elderly woman at the time of the accident. Notably, the Defendant failed to file a police report immediately after the accident and only did so later, conveniently aligning with their revised version of events. This application is nothing more than an attempt to manipulate the Court process by tailoring the defence to fit newly obtained evidence rather than maintaining consistency with the original pleadings. b. Allowing such an amendment would unfairly prejudice the Plaintiff and set a dangerous precedent where parties could alter their pleadings at will to suit their evolving narratives, undermining the integrity of the judicial process. [16] As for the second issue, (b) whether the Court's dismissal of the Defendant's application was justified ? a. Defendant’s application was entirely justified, as the application was not made in bona fide but rather as a strategic afterthought to alter the defence in a manner favourable to the Defendant while prejudicing the Plaintiff. The Defendant had already admitted involvement in the accident in their police report No. 001691/24, yet now seeks to amend the defence to contradict that admission, conveniently shifting the narrative after the Plaintiff had closed their case. The timing of the application further undermines its legitimacy, as it was only filed after the Plaintiff’s witnesses had testified and after the Defendant had the benefit of scrutinizing the evidence presented against them. This suggests an attempt to tailor the defence to fit the testimony already given, rather than maintaining a consistent version of facts, making it a clear abuse of process. b. Allowing such an amendment at this late stage would not only waste judicial resources but would also be highly prejudicial to the Plaintiff, who would then be required to counter an entirely new version of events after having already presented their case. The Defendant’s failure to file a police report immediately after the accident, coupled with the belated attempt to amend pleadings, further casts doubt on the sincerity of their application. Permitting this amendment would set a dangerous precedent, encouraging litigants to manipulate legal proceedings by shifting their positions whenever convenient, undermining the principles of fairness and judicial efficiency. Therefore, the Court was right to reject the application, as allowing it would have effectively granted the Defendant an unfair advantage, wasted the Court’s time, and compromised the integrity of the legal process [17] As for the third issue, (c) Whether this case which is an Interlocutory Application can be appeal. a. Upon meticulous examination of the Court's Case Management System records (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CMS records’), it is evident that this matter was scheduled for Interlocutory Applications. b. In light of the clear differentiation between interlocutory applications, the question of whether an interlocutory application, is amenable to appeal is governed by the provisions of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA). c. Recent amendments to Sections 28 and 68 of the CJA have instituted specific limitations on the appealability of certain interlocutory orders. Notably, orders pertaining to the dismissal of applications for summary judgment, the striking out of pleadings, and the setting aside of default judgments are among those classified as non-appealable. d. However, it is imperative to recognize that not all interlocutory orders are precluded from appellate review; the determinative factor hinges upon the nature of the order and its finality concerning the substantive rights of the parties THE COURT’S ANALYSIS [18] This application comes at the most convenient and strategic time for the Defendant, only after the Plaintiff’s witness has completed giving their testimony, only after the Plaintiff has officially closed their case, and only after the Defendant has had the full advantage of reviewing exactly what has been presented in Court. It is glaringly obvious that this application is not made in the pursuit of justice or due process but rather as a calculated move to salvage the Defendant’s case by conveniently adjusting their pleadings to fit the evidence that has already been given. [19] The timing of this application is not just suspicious but undeniably deliberate, as it seeks to correct the Defendant’s position rather than present any genuine new facts. This is nothing more than a last-minute attempt to manipulate the proceedings, delay the case further, and unfairly disadvantage the Plaintiff while wasting the Court’s valuable time. If such tactics were to be entertained, litigation would become a free-for-all where parties could conveniently alter their case whenever they found themselves in an unfavourable position. [20] An application for the amendment of pleadings is governed by Order 20 of the Rules of Court 2012 and must be considered in accordance with the established principles of law, as affirmed in the case of Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha (M) Sdn Bhd [1983] 1 MLJ 213. The general principle dictates that while courts generally allow amendments, such discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised judiciously to prevent injustice to the opposing party. In determining whether an amendment should be permitted, three fundamental considerations must be taken into account, namely: first, whether the application has been made in good faith or merely as a tactical maneuver to suit the party’s changing narrative; second, whether any prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a result of the amendment can be adequately compensated by costs; and third, whether the proposed amendment would fundamentally alter the nature and character of the suit into one that is entirely different or inconsistent with its original pleadings. It is therefore incumbent upon the applicant to satisfy the Court that the amendment sought is necessary, legitimate, and does not amount to an abuse of the court process intended to unduly disadvantage the opposing party or disrupt the fair administration of justice [21] It is crucial for legal practitioners to carefully assess the specific nature of an interlocutory application to determine its appealability in light of the current statutory framework and prevailing judicial interpretations. [22] Therefore, any appeal predicated on the mischaracterization of the proceeding's nature is without merit and stands dismissed. THE LAW Courts Of Judicature Act 1964 Section 28: Civil appeals from the subordinate courts. [23] This section delineates the circumstances under which appeals from subordinate courts may be brought before the High Court. Notably, it specifies that no appeal shall lie to the High Court in civil matters where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter is RM10,000.00 or less, except on a question of law. Additionally, amendments have further restricted appeals in certain interlocutory decisions. Specifically, appeals are precluded in cases where a subordinate court has dismissed applications for summary judgment, dismissed applications to strike out any writ or pleading, or allowed applications to set aside a default judgment. Section 68: Non-appealable matters. [24] This section outlines the conditions under which appeals from the High Court can be made to the Court of Appeal. It stipulates that no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal where the amount or value of the subject matter is less than RM250,000.00 except with the leave of the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, similar to Section 28, amendments have been instituted to limit appeals in specific interlocutory matters. Appeals are not permissible in instances where the High Court has dismissed applications for summary judgment, dismissed applications to strike out any writ or pleading, or allowed applications to set aside a default judgment. [25] These provisions aim to streamline the appellate process, reduce frivolous appeals, and ensure that only matters of significant legal or monetary importance are escalated to higher courts. THE COURT’S FINDING [26] Based on the facts of the case as set out above, it is abundantly clear that the Defendant’s application to amend the Statement of Defence should not be allowed. The Defendant has already admitted involvement in the accident, yet now seeks to conveniently alter the narrative at this stage, as if the earlier admission was somehow incomplete or mistaken. This transparent attempt to introduce a more favourable version of events at the eleventh hour is nothing more than a calculated effort to evade liability. [27] The Defendant’s so-called version of the accident should not be pleaded at this stage, as parties are bound by their pleadings and are not permitted to introduce facts and issues that were never pleaded in the first place. The Court is similarly precluded from deciding on matters that are not properly pleaded. The Defendant, however, now wishes to rewrite its case entirely, wasting valuable judicial time and taking advantage of the legal process in the hope of shifting blame onto the Plaintiff. If this amendment is permitted, it would unfairly prejudice the Plaintiff and open the floodgates for litigants to conveniently reshape their case whenever they find themselves in an unfavourable position. Such an abuse of process should not be condoned by any Courts. [28] The Defendant appears to be utterly confused by the provisions of Order 20 Rule 5(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, seemingly interpreting “at any stage of the proceedings” as an open invitation to amend pleadings whenever it suits their convenience, regardless of how far the trial has progressed. However, the Defendant conveniently ignores the well-established principle that amendments must not cause prejudice to the opposing party or be used as a tactic to manipulate the proceedings. At this advanced stage of the trial, where the Plaintiff has already closed their case, allowing such an amendment would be nothing short of an injustice. [29] The Defendant is not seeking a simple clarification or correction but a fundamental alteration of their defence after having had the benefit of hearing the Plaintiff’s entire case. Such an attempt is nothing more than a last-ditch effort to shift their position and distort the proceedings in their favour, an approach that is clearly impermissible under the very rule they seek to rely on. [30] In the Federal Court in Mirza Mohamed Tariq Beg bin Mirza HH Beg v Margaret Low Saw Lui & Ors [2009] 4 MLJ 671. underscored that adherence to statutory provisions governing legal practice is paramount to uphold the rule of law and public confidence in the legal system. Non-compliance with these provisions renders any proceedings tainted and susceptible to nullification. CONCLUSION [31] The Court finds no merit in the Defendant's application in Enclosure 17, which is, at its core, a transparent and opportunistic attempt to rewrite the narrative in a manner more favourable to the Defendant. This sudden change of heart regarding the version of events is not borne out of any genuine need for clarity but rather a calculated effort to evade liability at the expense of both the Plaintiff, who is left to contend with shifting defences, and the Court, whose time is unnecessarily expended on such tactical maneuvering. The Court cannot, and will not, lend credence to such an approach, which does little more than undermine the integrity of the proceedings [32] After admitting involvement in the accident, the Defendant now conveniently discovers a ‘new’ version of events that just so happens to be more favourable. This is not a case of clarifying facts but rather an exercise in creative storytelling, where the Defendant expects the Court to entertain a revisionist account of the incident simply because it suits their interests. Fortunately, the judicial process is not so easily manipulated, and the Defendant’s attempt to rewrite reality is as unpersuasive as it is opportunistic. [33] In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the Defendant’s application in Enclosure 17 is nothing more than a last-ditch effort to manipulate the legal process to their advantage. Having admitted involvement in the accident, the Defendant now seeks a convenient escape route by attempting to rewrite history with a more favourable version of events. [34] If litigants were allowed to amend their pleadings whenever it suited them, the entire judicial system would devolve into a playground for opportunistic revisions and strategic denials. Fortunately, the Court is not in the business of indulging such blatant attempts to delay proceedings, prejudice the Plaintiff, and waste judicial time. The Defendant has had every opportunity to present its case properly from the outset, and this sudden revelation of a 'new' version is as unconvincing as it is opportunistic. [35] This case, filed in July 2023, has been unjustly delayed due to the Defendant’s persistent stalling, causing undue hardship to the Plaintiff. Justice is not a tool for delay, and the court will not tolerate tactics that frustrate rightful claims. As justice delayed is justice denied, this matter must now be resolved without further obstruction. [36] Justice demands finality, not endless revisions to accommodate a party’s shifting narrative. Accordingly, this application should be dismissed with the decisiveness it deserves. Dated on this day, 21 March 2025 -sgd- (ALLAN SUMAN PILLAI) Sessions Court Judge Langkawi Kedah Date of Decision : 13 March 2025 On behalf of the Plaintiff : Mohd. Hamdi Bin Zainol On behalf of the Defendant : 1. Vilashani a/l Arumugham
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Jannu Binti Babjan
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