Schedule
Schedule H, I fail to see any merit in this argument. There is no question of the parties contracting out Schedule H. 19. I therefore consider the only ground that merits some consideration is the alleged wrong computation arrived at by the Tribunal. LAD for late delivery of vacant possession of the Parcel 20. The only point in contention between the parties is the operative date to consider for delivery of vacant possession. For the Applicant it is the date of the SPA; for the 2nd Respondent, it is the booking fee date. 21. I consider this issue to have been settled in PJD Regency. The present case is on all fours with PJD Regency in that booking fee was paid on a much earlier date than the execution of the SPA. The Federal Court had to decide whether the period for delivery of vacant possession was to commence from the date of SPA or from the date the purchasers paid the booking fee. 22. In determining it was the booking fee date, the Federal Court held as follows: [85] Had the developers in the present appeals complied strictly with the terms of the scheduled contracts as statutorily prescribed, then the payment of the initial 10 percent deposit and the signing of the statutory sale and purchase agreement would have been done simultaneously. The fact that they have nonetheless bypassed the statutory prohibition against the collection of booking fees, and the pro forma agreements being amply clear as to the fundamentals of the agreement, means that a bargain was indeed made at the time of the payment of the booking fee. In our judgment, the legislative intent was that the initial payment of monies, in the form of a deposit, is sufficient to constitute an intention to enter into a contract given that the agreement would have to be signed at the same time. [86] The other reason that attracts the application of these foundational principles of contract law is to ensure maximal protection of the purchasers having regard to the social purpose of the HDA 1966 and its subsidiary legislation. At the risk of repetition, if the 10 percent deposit is paid at the same time of the signing of the agreement, there would be no issue of there being separate dates for calculating the LAD. Having bound themselves to a bargain by collecting the booking fee and procuring a signed pro forma and top of it being responsible for drafting the final formal agreement, the developers have thereby put the purchasers in a disadvantageous position. The problem this poses is that the developers may abuse the opportunity to put whichever date they wish with a view to extend the date to deliver vacant possession. … [89] We agree fully with the views expressed above and as such we answer all related leave questions on the common issue to the effect as follows: Where there is a delay in the delivery of vacant possession by a developer to the purchaser in respect of Scheduled Contracts under Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 (Regulation 1989) enacted pursuant to Section 24 of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, the date for calculation of liquidated agreed damages (‘LAD’) begins from the date of payment of deposit/booking fee/initial fee/expression by the purchaser of his written intention to purchase and not from the date of the sale and purchase agreement literally. 23. I consider this court bound by the decision of PJD Regency. 24. Therefore, the Tribunal was correct when it computed the LAD on the basis that the commencement date for delivery of vacant possession runs from 5.5.2017 being the date of booking fee. Completion of common facilities 25. I now come to the issue on the completion of the common facilities. 26. Clause 29 of the SPA stipulates that the common facilities shall be completed within 36 months from the date of the SPA. Clause 29 further states that the architect’s certification shall accompany the completion of common facilities. 27. The Applicant’s case is that it was completed when its architect issued a letter dated 22.2.2021 to certify the building works and common facilities had been completed. Alternatively, if the architect’s letter is not sufficient to prove the completion date, then 7.6.2023 being the date the CCC was issued, is the relevant date. 28. The 2nd Respondent however contends that the common facilities were only completed much later when he was informed by the Building Manager that the gymnasium could be used on 10.8.2023. 29. To determine this issue, I would again refer to PJD Regency which decision is on point. The developer in PJD Regency sought to argue that the architect’s certification in the form of Certificate of Practical Completion (“CPC”) is the determining date. 30. The Federal Court held as follows: [101] Reverting to the principles of interpretation of social legislation, the court is required to construe the statutory contract in a manner most favourable to the purchasers. It is clear that the sale and purchase agreements only refer to one type of certification namely, the CCC. Further, if we were to apply logical reasoning, a developer is only entitled, pursuant to cl 27(1)(a) of the sale and purchase agreement, to deliver vacant possession to the purchasers upon the issuance of the CCC. We cannot fathom why the drafters of the legislation would have intended to apply one standard in respect of vacant possession and another standard in respect of the completion of common facilities. Thus, absent clear legislation or written words to the effect that the certification of an architect means anything other than the CCC, we are not prepared to accept the submissions of the developer. [102] Additionally, the CCC is a legal requirement imposed by law which in turn is only issued upon the developer complying with all regulatory laws such as the Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974. This in our view, affords protection to purchasers who would be assured that the relevant authorities have approved the construction. The same cannot be said in respect of the CPC or any other such document not amounting to a CCC. The CPC, in any case arises under the building or construction contract and not the scheduled contracts. [103] For completeness, we reproduce the observations of Azizah Nawawi J held in the court below in respect of this issue, as follows: [40] Added to that, the certifications are for different purposes. The Certificate of Practical Completion was issued by the Developer’s architect to the Developer’s main contractor to show proof that work undertaken by the main contractor in the building contract entered between the main contractor and the Developer, has been completed to the satisfaction of the Developer’s architect. On the other hand, the CCC was issued to certify that the Property, together with the common facilities, has been constructed and completed in conformity with the approved plans and requirements of the Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974 and its by-laws. [41] Therefore, the certification under Clause 27 of the SPA can only refer to the CCC. This is because the completion of the common facilities must be in tandem with the completion of the Property itself, as the purposes of the common facilities are for the use and comforts of the purchasers. [104] For the reasons aforementioned, we agree with Her Ladyship’s observations on the distinction between CCCs and CPCs and how the LAD period commences from the issuance of the CCC. The Court of Appeal, upon citing numerous authorities for the proposition that the scheduled contracts, the HDA 1966 and the HDR 1989 ought to be construed in favour of the purchasers, also agreed with the High Court. 31. Therefore, based on PJD Regency, the relevant date for determining completion of common facilities is the date of the CCC, namely 7.6.2023. 32. The Tribunal therefore made an error of law when it computed the LAD premised on 10.8.2023, being the date the gymnasium could be used. Conclusion 33. In view of my findings as aforementioned, certiorari is ordered to be issued to quash part of the decision of the Tribunal in respect of LAD for late completion of common facilities. It is not 10.8.2023 but 7.6.2023, being the date of the CCC. 34. The computation of LAD for common facilities must take into account an extension of 593 days granted by the Ministry in view of Covid-19. Therefore, the due date for completion of common facilities calculated from booking fee date, is 18.12.2021. As it was completed only on 7.6.2023, there was a delay of 536 days. Based on the formula in the SPA, the LAD is computed at RM 14,452.91. 35. The decision of the Tribunal in respect of LAD for late delivery of the Parcel, costs and interest payable on the LAD are maintained. Dated: 10th June 2026 -sgd-Alice Loke Yee Ching Judge High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsel for Applicant: Pn. Vianne Ang Ni Shan Tetuan Lee Sharon & Associates Counsel for 2nd Respondent: Pn Rugayah Taris Tetuan Taris & Co.