Wong Keat Wai v Timbalan Menteri dalam Negeri Malaysia (WA-25-369-10/2024)

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KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ... RESPONDENTS

This was an application by the Applicant for judicial review against the Restriction Order dated 20.9.2024 (‘RO’), which was issued by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs (‘Deputy Minister’) pursuant to sub-s 6(3) of the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 [Act 316] (‘DDSPMA 1985’), whereby the Applicant was ordered to undergo restriction in Mukim Batu, Kuala Lumpur for two years.

Prior to the issuance of the RO, the Applicant was arrested and remanded for 60 days under the DDSPMA 1985.

Leave to apply for judicial review was allowed on 24.10.2024. The main reliefs sought by the Applicant were as follows:

a declaration and/ or an order of certiorari that –

the RO is invalid and void;

(ii) the restriction imposed on the Applicant in Mukim Batu, Kuala Lumpur pursuant to the RO is invalid and void, and that the Applicant be released therefrom;

(iii) there has been non-compliance with ss 3 to 6 of the DDSPMA 1985; and

(iv) there has been non-compliance with the Federal Constitution and s 28A of the Criminal Procedure Code; and

further relief that the Applicant be discharged from all conditions imposed under the RO.

In her Written Submission, the learned counsel for the Applicant drew the Court’s attention to the following illuminating judgments by the apex court.

In Re Datuk James Wong Kim Min; Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors v Datuk James Wong Kim Min [1976] 2 MLJ 245 at pp 250 -251 where it was held that: “Preventive detention is the detention of a person without trial as opposed to punitive detention where a person is detained after a trial in a court of law in which he is proved to have committed an offence punishable under certain provisions of the penal law. Preventive detention is therefore, a serious invasion of personal liberty. Whatever safeguard provided by law against the improper exercise of such power must be zealously watched and enforced by the court. In a matter so fundamental and important as the liberty of the subject, strict compliance with statutory requirements must be observed in depriving a person of his liberty. The material provisions of the law authorizing detention without trial must be strictly construe and safeguards which the law deliberately provides for the protection of any citizen must be literally interpreted. Where the detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, the detention is bad and the person detained is entitled to be released forthwith. Where personal liberty is concerned an applicant in applying for a writ of habeas corpus is entitled to avail himself of any technical defects may be invalidate the order which deprives him of his liberty. See Ex parte Johannes Choeldi & Ors [1960] MLJ 184.”.

In cases where an individual is detained without trial, it is sufficient for the applicant to assert that the restriction imposed on them is unlawful. The burden of proof then rests on the respondent to demonstrate that the restriction is lawful and that the detention was carried out in accordance with mandatory procedures (see S.K. Tangakaliswaran v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2009] 6 CLJ 705).

If there are multiple versions or inferences, the version or inference that favours the applicant should be adopted by the court (see Murugan a/l Supparamaniam v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2010] 4 CLJ 110).

Meanwhile the learned Federal Counsel referred to sub-s 11C(1) of the DDSPMA 1985 in cautioning that, when considering judicial review for the grant of certiorari, the court does not act as an appellate court but is limited to procedural non-compliance. The said provision reads: “Judicial review of act or decision of Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Minister”

(1) There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision.”.

Jeffrey Tan J (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Noor Ashid Bin Sakib v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 5 MLJ 22 at pp 29 - 30 held as follows: “… But other than to require the detaining authority to show that the detention is in the exercise of a valid legal power and that the provisions of the relevant statute have been rigidly and meticulously followed, it is not for the court to investigate into the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds’ relied on by the detaining authority for arrest and detention. For it is settled law, that whether there is reasonable cause to detain is a matter of opinion and policy which can only be taken by the executive (see Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129), that so long as the Minister is satisfied after considering all the information available to him, it is not for the court to question how or why he became so satisfied Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors v Chua Teck [1990] 1 MLJ 104), that the subjective satisfaction of the Minister of Home Affairs is not subject to judicial review, (Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 29), that the fairness of the Minister's decision is subjective and that the court is only concerned with the procedural aspects of the exercise of executive discretion (Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v IGP [1988] 1 MLJ 293), that courts do not sit in appeal against the decision of the Minister regarding the material on which the detention order was made, Wong Fook Nyen v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [1988] 2 CLJ 274; Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279, that courts do not examine the adequacy or truth of these materials and cannot interfere with the decision on the ground that if the court had examined them it would have come to a different conclusion (Wong Fook Nyen v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors; Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia), and that the court cannot arrogate to itself the responsibility of judging the sufficiency or otherwise of the grounds (Wong Fook Nyen v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors).”.

It is not for the court to create procedural requirements when there are none. In Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914, the Federal Court said that: “… the first thing that the courts should do is to see whether the ground forwarded is one that falls within the meaning of procedural non-compliance or not. To determine the question, the courts should look at the provisions of the law or the rules that lay down the procedural requirements. It is not for the courts to create procedural requirements because it is not the function of the courts to make law or rules. If there is no such procedural requirement then there cannot be non-compliance thereof. Only if there is that there can be noncompliance thereof and only then that the courts should consider whether, on the facts, there has been non-compliance.”.

Guided by the abovementioned explications of the law, I then proceeded to consider the grounds of application raised by the Applicant in the instant case.

The grounds of application are as follows: 1st Ground: Non-Compliance with s 4 of the DDSPMA 1985

the Applicant’s recorded statement was not provided to the Applicant despite request for the same by the

the statement was not made by the Applicant who did not sign or affix his fingerprints on the same 2nd Ground: Non-Compliance with s 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 [Act 234] (‘DDA 1952’) and sub-s 6(1) of the DDSPMA 1985 – the drug mentioned in the Investigation Report does not exist and is not listed in the First Schedule, Part III of the DDA 1952 and therefore the RO is defective and flawed 3rd Ground: Non-Compliance with s 6 of the DDSPMA 1985 read together with Article 151 of the Federal Constitution – failure to inform the grounds for the Applicant’s detention and subsequent restriction 4th Ground: Non-Compliance with sub-s 3(3) and 6(3) of the DDSPMA 1985

delay of 26 days by the Investigating Officer (‘IO’) in conducting investigation and submitting the Applicant’s complete investigation report to the

delay of 30 days by the Deputy Minister in issuing the RO against the Applicant. Analysis and Findings of the Court 1st Ground: Non-Compliance with s 4 of the DDSPMA 1985

the Applicant’s recorded statement was not provided to the Applicant despite request for the same by the Applicant

Section 4 of the DDSPMA 1985 stipulates that: “Examination of persons acquainted with the facts and circumstances of case

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For the purpose of satisfying the Minister that an order under subsection 6(1) should be made and for the purpose of enabling the Minister to furnish a statement under paragraph 9(2)(b), a police officer making an investigation under this Act may direct any police officer not below the rank of Sergeant to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case and shall reduce into writing any statement made by the person so examined.

Such person shall be bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer.

A person making a statement under this section shall be legally bound to state the truth, whether or not such statement is made wholly or partly in answer to questions.

A police officer examining a person under subsection (1) shall first inform that person of subsections (2) and (3).

A statement made by any person under subsection (1) shall bear the date and time of making thereof and shall be signed by the person making it or affixed with his thumbprint, as the case may be, after it has been read to him in the language in which it was made and after he has been given an opportunity to make any corrections he may wish.

The foregoing provisions of this section shall be without prejudice to subsection 3(3A).”.

In the Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’; encl. 21) affirmed by DSP Zainal Asmawi Bin Hasan, he deposed that he received the Applicant’s request for a copy of the recorded statement dated 23.10.2024 and that he had, on the same date furnished a copy of the recorded statement to the Applicant (see exhibit “ZAH-1”).

The Applicant referred to paragraph 5 of the Supplemental AIR (encl. 23) and exhibit “MM-1”, which was a screenshot of the Applicant’s solicitors’ e-mail record, to support the submission that the solicitors did not receive the letter dated 23.10.2024 enclosing the recorded statement and this amounted to non-compliance of s 4 of the DDSPMA 1985.

It was observed that –

encl. 23 was affirmed by Meera a/p Mathivanan, the solicitor in charge of the Applicant’s case. However, in paragraph 1 the deponent described herself as the “Pemohon”; and

(ii) it does not appear that all the e-mails received by the Applicant’s solicitors on 23.10.2024 were shown. There appears to be an e-mail from “Insp Mohammad Izzany bin Zulkifli” right at the end of the exhibit but only the name can be seen and the rest of it has been cut out. For completeness, the Applicant should have exhibited the e-mail thread for the next few days after 23.10.2024.

Based on the AIR (encl. 21), the Court finds that the recorded statement was in fact provided to the Applicant on 23.10.2024 upon request by the Applicant’s counsel vide the letter dated on the same day.

the statement was not made by the Applicant who did not sign or affix his fingerprint on the same

The Applicant repeatedly affirmed that he never signed or affixed his fingerprint on the recorded statement. He denied that the signature and fingerprint appearing on the copy of the recorded statement were his. In these circumstances, the Applicant contended that the burden to prove otherwise then shifts to the Respondents.

The Applicant relied on the cases of Goh Leng Hiong lwn Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri [2018] MLJU 853 and Vishnu A/L Telagan v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] MLJU 738 to support the submission that there was non-compliance with the mandatory procedure under s 4 of the DDSPMA 1985, which has rendered the RO defective and invalid.

In the AIR affirmed by the IO, Inspector Muhd Khairi Bin Abu Bakar (encl. 9), he stated as follows: “11. Memandangkan Pemohon telah mengesahkan isi kandungan rakaman percakapan Pemohon tersebut, saya telah meminta Pemohon untuk menurunkan tandatangan dan cap jari Pemohon pada rakaman percakapan Pemohon tersebut. Pemohon kemudiannya telah menurunkan tandatangan dan cap jari Pemohon pada rakaman percakapan tersebut dengan rela hati dan tanpa sebarang paksaan. Sebelum itu, saya juga telah memberitahu Pemohon bahawa Pemohon boleh untuk tidak menandatangani rakaman percakapan tersebut sekiranya Pemohon tidak memahami isi kandungan rakaman percakapan tersebut. Pemohon mengakui telah memahami penerangan saya tersebut dan terjemahan dalam Bahasa Mandarin yang telah dibuat oleh DETEKTIF SARJAN MEJAR MUHAMMAD LIAN BIN ABDULLAH. Rakaman percakapan Pemohon di bawah Akta tersebut telah dijalankan secara teratur tanpa sebarang dorongan, ugutan atau janji.”.

The Applicant claimed that the above affirmation was not true because, based on exhibit “ZAH-1”, it can be clearly seen that the signatures on each page of the document appear different.

After having considered the Applicant’s averments and the affirmations by the IO, I accepted the Respondents’ submission that the IO was merely doing his official duty and without proof of mala fide, there was no valid reason for me to disbelieve the IO’s evidence (see Su Yu Min v Ketua Polis Negeri & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 875 where the court accepted the evidence by the Deputy Superintendent of Prisons over the evidence of the applicant as the former was “merely performing an official duty in which he had no personal interest. The applicant was however was trying to secure his release from restricted residence and was not averse at putting a slant on things to suit his case.”).

The Court was satisfied that the requirement as provided under sub-s 4(5) of the DDSPMA 1985 that the statement shall be signed by the Applicant or affixed with his thumbprint was fulfilled. It is not uncommon for there to be slight variations to a person’s signature and in any event, the statement contains the Applicant’s thumbprint on each page. The Applicant failed to produce any evidence before this Court to rebut the facts as established by the Respondents; bare denial was not sufficient. 2nd Ground: Non-Compliance with s 2 of the DDA 1952 and sub-s 6(1) of the DDSPMA 1985 – the drug mentioned in the Investigation Report does not exist and is not listed in the First Schedule, Part III of the DDA 1952 and therefore the RO is defective and flawed

Section 2 of the DDSPMA 1985 provides as follows: “Interpretation In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires – … “dangerous drug” has the same meanings as is assigned to it under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 [Act 234];”.

Section 2 of the DDA 1952 states that ““dangerous drug” means any drug or substance which is for the time being comprised in the First Schedule;”.

Sub-s 6(1) of the DDSPMA 1985 reads as follows: “Power to order detention and restriction of persons

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Whenever the Minister, after considering –

the complete report of investigation submitted under subsection 3(3); and

the report of the Inquiry Officer submitted under subsection 5(4), is satisfied with respect to any person that such person has been or is associated with any activity relating to or involving the trafficking in dangerous drugs, the Minister may, if he is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of public order that such person be detained, by order (hereinafter referred to as a "detention order") direct that such person be detained for a period not exceeding two years.”.

The Applicant contended that there was a failure to comply with the above-mentioned statutory provisions because the drug which is stated in the grounds for the order and the Statement of Facts in the RO, namely “Cocaine” does not exist and is not listed in the First Schedule, Part III of the DDA 1952. Therefore, the Statement of Facts upon which the RO is based is unreliable as it contains incorrect information.

Further, by applying the decisions in POA Jac Ky v. Deputy Home Minister, Malaysia & Anor [2020] 1 LNS 1410, Mohd Herman Bin Abdul Ghafar v TMDN & 2 lagi (Federal Court Criminal Appeal No: [05(HC)-199-09/2017(B)], Ng Hong Choon v. Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & 1 Lagi [1994] 4 CLJ 47 and Kumareshan v Dato’ Chor Chee Heung & Anor [2003] 4 MLJ 384, the Applicant submitted that there was non-compliance with a mandatory procedure which has rendered the RO defective and invalid.

The Court was of the considered view that the Applicant’s contention was misconceived as the learned FC has shown that “Cocaine” is listed in Part III of the First Schedule in the DDA 1952 as of 4.7.2023. Based on the AIR affirmed by the Deputy Minister, he was satisfied that the Applicant is part of a substantial body of person who has been, or is, associated with activity relating to, or involving, the trafficking in dangerous drugs known as “Cocaine” as listed under the said Part and Schedule of the DDA 1952. 3rd Ground: Non-Compliance with s 6 of the DDSPMA 1985 read together with Article 151 of the Federal Constitution – failure to inform the grounds for the Applicant’s detention and subsequent restriction

Article 151 of the Federal Constitution provides that: “Restrictions on preventive detention

(1) If any law or ordinance made or promulgated under this Part provides for preventive detention –

the authority by whose order any person is detained under such law or ordinance shall, as soon as may be, inform that person of the grounds for his detention and, subject to Clause (3), the allegations of fact on which the order is based, and shall give him the opportunity to make representations against the order as soon as may be;

no citizen shall be detained under such law or ordinance unless an advisory board established as mentioned in Clause (2) has considered any representations made by that citizen under paragraph (a) and made recommendations thereon to the Yang di- Pertuan Agong within three months of receiving such representations, or within such longer period as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may allow.

An advisory board established for the purposes of this Article shall consist of a chairman, who shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and who is or has been or is qualified to be a judge of the Federal Court, Court of Appeal or High Court, or who has been a judge of the Supreme Court before Malaysia Day, and two other members appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

This Article does not require any authority to disclose facts the disclosure of which, in its opinion, would be against the national interest.”.

The Applicant also referred to sub-ss 6(1) and (3) of the DDSPMA 1985. The former was quoted previously while the latter reads as follows: “(3) If the Minister is satisfied that for the purposes mentioned in subsection (1) it is necessary to exercise control and supervision over any person or that restrictions and conditions should be imposed on such person in respect of his activities, freedom of movement, place of residence or place of employment, but that it is not necessary to detain such person for that purpose, the Minister may make an order (hereinafter referred to as a ‘restriction order’) imposing on such person (hereinafter referred to as a ‘restricted person’) all or any of the following restrictions and conditions: ...".

The Applicant asserted that he should be informed of the grounds for detention and to be provided with the Statement of Facts that forms the basis of the order made. Failure to do so was said to be contrary to Article 151 of the Federal Constitution and sub-s 6(1) of the DDSPMA 1985 and renders the restriction imposed on the Applicant under sub-s 6(3) of the DDSPMA 1985 to be unlawful.

However, as submitted by the Respondents, the requirement to be informed of the grounds for detention and to be provided with the Statement of Facts arise in the context of a detention order under sub-s 6(1) of the DDSPMA 1985 whereas the Applicant was not detained under such an order, but rather was subjected to a RO pursuant to sub-s 6(3).

Based on the decisions in Muhammad Fitri bin Saad v Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [2025] 1 MLJ 606 and Mohd Azam Bin Ab Razak v Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [No. Kes: D-01(A)-515-08/2024 as cited by the Respondents, there was no requirement for the Applicant, who was subjected to a RO, to be provided with reasons or Statement of Facts as he would not undergo the representation process before the Advisory Board. 4th Ground: Non-Compliance with sub-s 3(3) and 6(3) of the

delay of 26 days by the IO in conducting investigation and submitting the Applicant’s complete investigation report to the Minister and the Inquiry Officer

Sub-s 3(3) of the DDSPMA 1985 provides as follows: “Power to detain suspected persons

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The police officer making an investigation pertaining to a person arrested and detained under this section shall cause a copy of the complete report of the investigation to be submitted –

to an Inquiry Officer appointed under subsection 5(1); and

to the Minister, within such period as may be prescribed by the Minister by regulations made under this Act. …”

The Applicant referred to paragraphs 5 and 14 of the AIR affirmed by the IO in alleging that there was a total delay of 26 days from the date of the Applicant’s arrest until the submission of the complete investigation report to the Minister and the Inquiry Office. Although the IO had provided an explanation for the delay in submitting the report under sub-section 3(3) of the DDSPMA 1985, the Applicant contended that the explanation was merely administrative in nature and lacked merit.

Further, it was submitted that, even though sub-section 3(3) of the DDSPMA 1985 does not prescribe a specific time frame for an investigating officer to submit the complete report to the Minister and the Inquiry Officer, such action must nonetheless be taken as soon as reasonably possible.

The parties acknowledged the fact that, to date, the Minister has not made any regulations to prescribe the time period. In such situation, sub-s 54(2) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 [Act 388] applies, namely “Where no time is prescribed or allowed within which anything shall be done, such thing shall be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion arises.” (see Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor v Awang Sari bin Lasikan (05(HC)-69-04/2021).

What is considered as convenient speed involves an objective test and will vary from case to case (see Chua Kian Voon v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & 2 Ors [2020] 1 CLJ 747). However, in the case of Muhammad Redzuan Bin Omar v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [2023] 2 CLJ 859, the court held: “[58] It is our view that the terms of ss. 3 and 5 are crystal clear. So long as the submissions of the required reports are made within the prescribed 60-day period of the detention order, there is no procedural non-compliance. It is not for the courts to determine whether the investigation period and/or inquiry period have been conducted with convenient speed. The time period taken to conduct investigation and inquiry is very subjective and depends on each individual case. One case may take longer or lesser than another, so long as the total number of days taken does not exceed the prescribed 60 days period. This is precisely why the Minister could not prescribe a fixed-period for each stage of investigation or inquiry period to be completed.”.

In the instant case, I accepted the Respondents’ submission that, as the Minister has not made any regulations to prescribe the time limit on this matter, the investigation and submission of the investigation report to the Minister and Inquiry Officer must be done with all convenient speed. In his AIR, the IO has explained the reasons as to why the report under sub-s 3(3) of the DDSPMA 1985 could only be submitted on 14.8.2024. In paragraph 36 of the Respondents’ Written Submission, the learned FC had diligently tabulated 11 cases which were decided by the apex court where the court held that there was no merit in the submission on the issue of delay where the delay exceeded 26 days.

This Court similarly found that there was no merit in the Applicant’s submission as regards this ground of challenge.

delay of 30 days by the Deputy Minister in issuing the RO against the Applicant

The Applicant referred to the following averments to support the argument that there was a delay of 30 days by the Deputy Minister in issuing the RO against the Applicant:

the IO stated that he submitted the complete investigation report under sub-s 3(3) of the DDSPMA on 14.8.2024 to the Minister and the Inquiry Officer;

(ii) the Inquiry Officer stated that he finalised and submitted the written report on the Applicant’s case under sub-s 5(4) of the DDSPMA 1985 to the Minister on 21.8.2024. The said provision stipulates that “An Inquiry Officer shall submit his report in writing to the Minister within such period as may be prescribed by the Minister by regulations made under this Act.”; and

(iii) the Deputy Minister stated that he issued the RO on 20.9.2024.

It was the Applicant’s contention that, although ss 3 and 5 of the DDSPMA 1985 do not prescribe a specific timeframe for the police investigating officer or the inquiry officer of the Ministry of Home Affairs to conduct investigations against an applicant, any action must be taken as expeditiously as possible, as outlined in sub-s 54(2) of Act 388.

The Applicant cited the cases of Ex-Parte Austo Pty Ltd. [1985] 2 QDR 1, Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors. v. Liau Nyun Fui [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 458, Tai Choi Yu v. Government of Malaysia [1994] 2 CLJ 174; [1994] 1 MLJ 678, Chua Kian Voon (supra), Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor v Awang Sari Bin Lasikan (Criminal Appeal No: 05(HC)-69-04/2021(B), Nagarajan Ramalingam v. Deputy Minister Of Home Affairs And Two Others [2022] 1 LNS 739, Soo Shiek Lee v. Deputy Minister Of Home Affairs And Two Others [2022] 1 LNS 517 and Dhinesh Tanaphll v. Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah & Ors [2022] 5 CLJ 1 in submitting that the delays in this case do not fall within the definition of “with all convenient speed,” and thus constitute non-compliance with mandatory procedures.

In my considered view, the time taken by the Deputy Minister was reasonable as he was was duty-bound to consider the statutory reports received from the IO and the Inquiry Officer in order to be satisfied as to the necessity of issuing any order against the Applicant. The Deputy Minister ought not to be compelled to decide in haste.

In N Ramakrishnan P Nagasamy v Deputy Minister of Internal Security, Malaysia & Ors [2008] 7 CLJ 480, Nallini Pathmanathan J (as Her Ladyship then was) said: “[28] It therefore follows that there is no requirement that the Minister set out or specify the date when he was ‘satisfied’ because it is the date of the detention order. It would therefore follow that there was a gap of some four days between the day when the Minister received the report from the inquiry officer on 2 August 2006 and the issuance of the order on 6 August 2006. There is no requirement that the Minister must make his decision on whether or not to exercise his discretion immediately upon receiving the relevant reports. That would attract the criticism of failing to give any adequate consideration to the reports which is a crucial part of the basis for his decision.”.

Furthermore, unlike sub-ss 3(3) and 5(4) of the DDSPMA 1985, which carry the phrase “…within such time as may be prescribed by the Minister by regulations made under this Act”, sub-s 6(1) contains no such phrase. Therefore, the precondition which must be satisfied before sub-s 54(2) of Act 388 can apply was not fulfilled.

In sum, the Court was again convinced by the Respondents’ submission that there was no requirement for the Deputy Minister to –

state and provide reasons to show that the RO was issued with all convenient speed (see Mohd Izzul Fakhrul bin Mat Yasin v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia &Ors [2024] MLJU 1782 which was affirmed by the Federal

(ii) issue a RO immediately or as soon as possible upon receipt of the statutory reports; and

(iii) provide reasons for any purported delay.

This ground of challenge was therefore rejected.

In the final analysis, the Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in all the four grounds in support of the application and thus, the application in encl. 6 was dismissed with no order as to costs. DATED: 9.1.2026 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BKK1) Solicitors for the Applicant: Naizatul Zamrina Binti Karizaman (Meera a/p Mathivanan with her) Messrs. K.L. Chee & Co.