Wong Ley Hoon v Teo Siew Hwa (JA-24NCvC-506-04/2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO. : JA-24NCVC-506-04/2026 In The Estate Of Lee Kok Choon (Deceased) (Nric No. : 730323- 01-7005 / A2383776), Whereas The Grant Of Letters Of Administration Dated 11 September 2024 Was Issued By The High Court On 10 October 2024 Under Originating Summons No. : Ja-31ncvc-750- 06/2024 In The Matter Of Section 34 Of The Probate And Administration Act 1959 30/06/2026 11:48:51 JA-24NCvC-506-04/2026 Kand. 18 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 In The Matter Of Section 40 Of The Trustee Act 1949 In The Matter Of Order 20 Rule 11, Order 71 Rule 36, Order 80 Rule 1, Order 80a Rule 2, And Order 92 Rule 4 Of The Rules Of Court 2012. BETWEEN WONG LEY HOON [NRIC NO. : 770220-08-5706] …PLAINTIFF TEO SIEW HWA [NRIC NO. : 730901-01-6400] …DEFENDANT **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION

1. Before me is the Plaintiff’s application by way of the Originating Summons dated 2 April 2026 (Enclosure 1) to remove the Defendant as one of the two joint administrators of the estate of the late Lee Kok Choon (“the Deceased”), to appoint the Deceased’s elder brother, Lee Kuan Choon, as co-administrator in her place, to amend the Grant of Letters of Administration accordingly, and for consequential and ancillary relief. BACKGROUND FACTS

2. The Deceased died intestate on 11 January 2024. He was survived by three persons who are the beneficiaries of his estate under the Distribution Act 1958, namely –

3. The Defendant was formerly married to the Deceased. That marriage was dissolved by a Decree Nisi dated 23 April 2014 in Divorce Petition No. : 33NCvC-184-05/2013 in the High Court of Malaya at Muar. The Defendant is the mother of and was granted the custody, care and control of, the elder son Lee Jing Xuan. She is not a beneficiary of the estate. She is employed as an accounts and human resources manager.

4. Because a minority interest subsisted in the estate, the younger son being a minor, section 4(2) of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 [Act 97] required that administration be granted to not less than two individuals. By the agreement of the parties, the Plaintiff and the Defendant were appointed joint administrators, where the Plaintiff represented the interest of her minor son and the Defendant the interest of her son, the elder beneficiary. The LA was granted to them in Originating Summons No. : JA-31NCvC-750-06/2024 and was issued on 10 October 2024.

5. The estate is of some substance and complexity. It comprises, among other things, shareholdings in two companies operated by the Deceased in his lifetime (LNH Landscaping Sdn Bhd and LNH Asia Development Sdn Bhd), together with motor vehicles, immovable properties and bank accounts, as well as assets said to be held by the Deceased on trust for the companies. The shares in the two companies have since been distributed to the beneficiaries in accordance with the Distribution Act 1958 [Act 300]. The balance of the estate remains substantially unadministered. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 6. The estate’s liabilities, as disclosed in the List of Assets and Liabilities, include a sum of RM23,122.58 said to be due to the Defendant as arrears of maintenance payable under the Decree Nisi. The Defendant is, to that extent, a creditor of the estate. The Application

7. By Enclosure 1 the Plaintiff seeks, in substance, the following relief –

8. The Plaintiff had first sought similar relief by an application filed on 5 February 2026 within the original administration suit. That application was withdrawn on the footing that a fresh proceeding ought to be commenced and the present Originating Summons was filed on 2 April 2026. The Plaintiff’s Case

9. The Plaintiff’s case, in summary, is that the Defendant has shown a persistent want of diligence and cooperation in the administration of the estate and has acted in breach of her fiduciary duties as administrator, such that sufficient cause exists to revoke her appointment. The Plaintiff relies, in particular, upon the following matters –

10. The Plaintiff contends that these matters, taken together, demonstrate that the Defendant is unfit to continue in office, and that the welfare of the beneficiaries requires her replacement by the Proposed Co-Administrator, who has consented to act. The Defendant’s Case

11. The Defendant denies any breach of duty and resists removal. Her case, in summary, is as follows – **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8

12. The Defendant added that she would consent to being replaced only if a genuinely more suitable person were appointed in her stead. THE ISSUE

13. The question for determination is whether the Plaintiff has established “sufficient cause” within the meaning of section 34 of Act 97 to revoke the Defendant’s appointment as co-administrator and if so, whether the Proposed Co-Administrator ought to be appointed in her place. The Governing Law

14. Section 34 of Act 97 provides that a grant of letters of administration may be revoked or amended for any sufficient cause. The phrase “sufficient cause” is not defined. The principles governing its application were not, in truth, in dispute between the parties, who cited substantially the same line of authority. I summarise them as follows.

15. First, whether sufficient cause exists is to be determined objectively. In Re Khoo Boo Gong, decd. Khoo Teng Seong v. Teoh Chooi Ghim & Ors. [1981] 2 MLJ 68 the Federal Court, adopting the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 observations in In the Goods of William Loveday [1900] P 154, held that the real object which the court must always keep in view is the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the parties beneficially entitled to it.

16. Secondly, the categories of sufficient cause are not closed but include an administrator’s inaction, want of diligence or honesty, a conflict of interest, or an inability to act. [See : Ligar Fernandez v. Eric Claude Cooke [2002] 6 CLJ 152].

17. Thirdly, the paramount and overriding consideration is the welfare, interests and benefit of all the beneficiaries of the estate. This is the Court of Appeal held in Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Ors v. Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi & Ors [1998] 4 CLJ 81, an approach affirmed by the Federal Court in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor v. Tan Ying [2023] 2 CLJ 169. The sufficiency of cause must be weighed carefully, balancing the grounds of complaint against the welfare and interests of all the beneficiaries.

18. Fourthly, and as the Defendant rightly emphasised, the jurisdiction to remove a duly appointed administrator is an exceptional one which is not to be exercised lightly. In Ezral Ghazali bin Shahudin v Shahudin @ Abdul Malek bin Zainudin (As the administrator of the estate of Aisah bt Ahmad Hourmain)[2025] MLJU 4449 the High Court observed that the court must be satisfied to a high degree that the administrator is guilty of serious misconduct, has materially breached his fiduciary duties, or is for some other compelling reason demonstrably unfit to continue in office; that mere dissatisfaction, or disagreement over the strategy of administration, will not ordinarily **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 suffice; and that delay, if reasonably explained and not prejudicial, will not by itself ground a revocation.

19. Fifthly, where non-cooperation is relied on, the conduct complained of must be such as genuinely impedes the due administration of the estate. In Lim Heng Chai & Ors v Lim Tian Choy [2025] MLJU 3356 the High Court removed an administrator whose refusal to cooperate, to execute necessary documents and to agree to courses of action supported by the other beneficiaries had brought the administration to a standstill.

20. I approach the application on those principles, bearing in mind that the burden of establishing sufficient cause lies on the Plaintiff and that the threshold is a high one. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS

21. I begin with the matter which, in my judgment, lies at the heart of this application and is decisive of it, that, the Defendant’s retention of the trust account passbook.

22. The material facts are not in any real dispute. By the agreement of the parties, the passbook for the estate’s trust account was to be held by the Defendant’s then solicitors as stakeholder. The passbook was handed to the Defendant on or about 15 August 2025 for the limited purpose of updating its entries. She did not return it. Her own former solicitors, upon their discharge, recorded that despite their repeated **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 requests and despite their best efforts to persuade her, she remained adamant and failed to return the passbook so that it might be held as stakeholder pending the appointment of new solicitors. The passbook was returned only on 25 March 2026, some seven months later and only after the Plaintiff had commenced removal proceedings.

23. I have considered the Defendant’s explanation that this arose from a misunderstanding, and that she did not appreciate the importance of returning the passbook because no moneys could be withdrawn without the signatures of both administrators. I am unable to accept that as an answer to the complaint. The passbook is the record and instrument of an estate asset, entrusted to the Defendant in her fiduciary capacity and for a limited purpose. Her retention of it against the agreed arrangement, in the face of repeated requests and contrary to the repeated requests of her own solicitors, who were ultimately driven to withdraw from acting for her, was a breach of the duty of an administrator.

24. I accept, in the Defendant’s favour, that there is no evidence of dishonesty and no suggestion that any moneys were misappropriated or even placed at risk, the trust account requiring the signatures of both administrators. But sufficient cause under section 34 does not require proof of fraud or misappropriation. The objective question is whether the conduct evidences a want of the diligence, candour and cooperation that the office of administrator demands, such that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the beneficiaries are imperilled. The Defendant’s conduct in relation to the passbook crosses that line. It was a unilateral assertion of control **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 over estate property in defiance of an agreed arrangement and of her own advisers and it was persisted in for months.

25. The passbook episode does not stand alone. I consider it significant, in assessing the Defendant’s regard for the interests of the beneficiaries as a whole, that on 30 October 2025, in the midst of the impasse over the administration, she pressed a fourteen-day demand for payment of her own maintenance arrears, at a time when she knew the estate to be without liquid funds and when the Plaintiff and the companies were advancing payment of the estate’s liabilities.

26. I make clear that I do not accept the Plaintiff’s wider contention that the Defendant’s status as a creditor of the estate, of itself, placed her in a disqualifying conflict of interest. As the Defendant correctly submitted, the claim was disclosed in the List of Assets and Liabilities, the arrears are undisputed and the mere coexistence of a creditor’s claim with the office of administrator does not, without more, amount to sufficient cause. What is material is not the existence of the claim but the manner and timing of its assertion –

27. As to the delays relied on by the Plaintiff, the protracted opening of the trust account and the want of progress on the valuation and disposal of the vehicles and the immovable properties, I accept that a number of the matters relied on by the Defendant in explanation were real and that some of the delay is attributable to circumstances beyond her control and to the genuine complexity of the estate. Delay of that character, reasonably explained, would not by itself constitute sufficient cause. [See : Ezral Ghazali]. I therefore do not rest my decision on delay simpliciter. Nonetheless, viewed as a whole, the history discloses a pattern of slow and intermittent engagement on the Defendant’s part which, taken together with the passbook episode and the conduct I have described, has impeded the due administration of an estate that remains, more than eighteen months after the grant, substantially unadministered.

28. I should address directly the Defendant's positive case that her insistence on an independent valuation of the vehicles and the immovable properties was not delay at all, but the proper discharge of her duty to obtain the best price for the estate and to guard against a disposal at an undervalue, in particular a sale of estate vehicles to the companies in which the Plaintiff is a director and shareholder. She relied in this regard on Visaladchumy Narayanan & Ors v. Representative of the Estate of Haridas Narayanan (deceased) & Ors [2020] 9 CLJ 541, in which the Court of Appeal held that an administrator owes the beneficiaries fiduciary duties that include a duty to act with prudence in dealing with estate property, a duty to obtain the best possible price for assets sold, and a duty to protect the interests of the beneficiaries. I accept that an administrator who **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 insists on a proper, independent valuation before estate assets are sold is, in general, doing no more than her duty and that caution of that kind is not, without more, a ground for removal. I therefore do not find the Defendant's conduct in relation to the valuations to amount to sufficient cause, whether by itself or in combination with the other matters relied on. My findings against her rest not on her valuation stance but on the passbook and the want of cooperation and candour it evidenced. As to that conduct, the standard described in Visaladchumy tells in the Plaintiff's favour rather than the Defendant's –

29. I also deal with the Plaintiff's further contention that the Defendant is unfit by reason of an admitted want of knowledge and competence in estate administration. I do not accept that the Defendant's candid acknowledgement that she found aspects of the administration unfamiliar, or that her professional and personal commitments left her with limited time, amounts to an admission of unfitness. She is an accounts and human resources manager with relevant experience and a lay administrator is in any event entitled to act on the advice of solicitors, as she did. This ground adds nothing of substance to the Plaintiff's case and I place no weight on it. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16

30. Standing back and weighing these matters cumulatively against the paramount consideration of the welfare and interests of all the beneficiaries, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has established sufficient cause within the meaning of section 34 of Act 97. This is not a case of mere dissatisfaction, or of disagreement over the strategy of administration. There has been a material breach of fiduciary duty in relation to estate property, attended by a want of cooperation and candour, in circumstances where the estate is substantially unadministered and where one of the beneficiaries was, at the material time, a minor whose interests demand that the administration proceed without further impediment.

31. The authorities relied on by the Defendant do not assist her on these facts. Ezral Ghazali was a case in which the applicant had established no misconduct, no breach of fiduciary duty and no misappropriation, the high threshold there described is, for the reasons I have given, met in the present case. Lim Heng Chai, far from assisting the Defendant, illustrates that a want of cooperation which impedes the administration of an estate may constitute sufficient cause, while the deadlock in that case was more complete than the position here, the underlying principle is the same.

32. I also record that I considered whether a course short of removal, in particular, the giving of directions and a timetable for the completion of the valuations and the disposal of the estate assets, might suffice. I have concluded that it would not. The breakdown of trust between the administrators, evidenced most starkly by the passbook episode and by the breakdown in her relationship with her own former **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 solicitors, who withdrew from acting, is such that mere directions. Removal is, in my judgment, the proportionate and necessary course.

33. It follows that the Defendant’s appointment must be revoked. The remaining question is whether the Proposed Co-Administrator, Lee Kuan Choon, ought to be appointed in her place. I am satisfied that he should. He is the elder brother of the Deceased and has, by his affidavit affirmed on 25 March 2026 (Enclosure 3), consented to act. No evidence has been adduced to suggest that he is unfit, or that he is subject to any conflict of interest. The requirement of section 4(2) of Act 97 that there be not less than two administrators while the minority interest subsists, will continue to be satisfied, the Plaintiff remaining in office.

34. I have not overlooked the Defendant’s submission that no positive case was made for the Proposed Co-Administrator’s suitability and that her removal disturbs the balance of representation reflected in the original appointment, she having been appointed to represent the interest of the elder son. As to the first, the test for the appointment of an administrator is suitability, not comparative fitness as between candidates; the Proposed Co-Administrator is a close relative of the Deceased with a natural interest in the proper and timely distribution of the estate to both of the Deceased’s sons and nothing is said against him. As to the second, the elder son is now of age and his interest as a beneficiary will continue to be protected both by the supervision of the court and by the fiduciary obligations owed to him by both administrators. The Defendant herself accepted that she would consent to replacement by a more suitable person, for the reasons I have given, the due administration of this estate is the better **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 served by the appointment of a co-administrator who is not embroiled in the breakdown that has stalled it.

35. Finally, as to costs, the Defendant submitted, primarily, that the costs of the application be borne out of the estate, the valuation and administrative steps in issue being necessary for its proper administration. In the alternative, that even if she were removed it would not be just and equitable for her to bear the Plaintiff's costs, she having acted in good faith. I am unable to accede to either submission. The application has succeeded by reason of a material breach of fiduciary duty in relation to the passbook and the want of cooperation attending it and not by reason of any honest difference over the strategy of administration. While I have accepted that the Defendant did not act dishonestly, the proceedings were rendered necessary by her own default and in those circumstances costs ought to follow the event and to be borne by her personally, rather than to diminish an estate whose beneficiaries have already been kept waiting. CONCLUSION

36. For these reasons I was satisfied that sufficient cause had been shown and that the welfare of the beneficiaries required the relief sought. I therefore made the following orders –