(iii) By demonstrating that the grant of the order for sale would be contrary to some rule of law or equity, as stated by Aitken J in Murugappa Chettiar v Letchumanan Chettiar [1939] MLJ 296, 298 in a case where “the chargee has been paid in full what is due from himself in another capacity.” The Supreme Court in Low Lee Lian (supra) emphasized that to fall within the scope of the principle in Murugappa Chettiar’s case, the chargor must be able to point to a statutory direction or some rule of common law Page 6 of 10 or doctrine of equity operating in his favour and against which an order for sale would militate. [9] After giving due consideration to the arguments of learned counsel before us, we found no merit in the defendant’s contention relating to limitation issue. The plaintiff’s cause of action is based on the chargor’s default to remedy the breach stated in the Form 16D issued under s 254 of the NLC. As such, the cause of action, i.e. the right to exercise the statutory remedy of an order for sale did not arise until after the chargor failed to remedy the default specified in the Form 16D notice. In this instance, the breach occurred on 28.7.2011 after the expiry of the 30 day timeline. As subsection 21(2) of the LA 1953 provides that any foreclosure action must be brought within 12 years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued, it follows that limitation set in on 27.7.2023. In this instance, the Originating Summons was filed on 27.10.2015, well within the 12 year timeline stipulated by subsection 21(2) of the LA 1963. [10] Be that as it may, we are inclined to agree with the submission of learned counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff failed to prove the correct amount lawfully due to it by the defendant. For the purposes of subsection 256(3) of the NLC, cause to the contrary may be shown where the notice demands sums not lawfully due from the charge and the court must be concerned with the very narrow question whether the material produced by the chargor constitutes cause to the contrary (Low Lee Lian (supra)). The plaintiff relied on two statements of account to prove the claim owed by the defendant under the loan facility; the first statement of account from 28.12.1981 to 31.12.1991 (“1st SOA”) and the second statement of account as at 20.11.2003 (“2nd SOA”). It is not disputed that the loan facility agreement does not state the amount of interest imposed Page 7 of 10 under the facility. We noted a number of discrepancies in the plaintiff’s affidavits with regard to the interests imposed by the plaintiff. In particular, learned counsel for the defendant pointed to para. 13 of the plaintiff’s affidavit in support which asserts that the chargor failed to make any payment towards the loan facility. In reply to the defendant’s affidavit in reply, the plaintiff produced the 2nd SOA, which is only an update of the plaintiff’s records of the amount purportedly owed to the plaintiff. The 1st SOA and the 2nd SOA are inconsistent because the 2nd SOA recorded 16 payments towards the facility between 17.2.1982 to 18.2.1989 whereas the 2nd SOA did not record any of the 16 payments at all. The plaintiff’s explanation that 1st SOA was only a schedule and not a statement of account is untenable as it contradicts the title “STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT” in the 1st SOA. As the 1st SOA was prepared and produced by the plaintiff, we do not think that it is proper for the plaintiff to assert otherwise. In our view, the above discrepancies and contradictions clearly indicate that the amount claimed by the plaintiff under the Form 16D and in the application for the order for sale is incorrect; as such the sum claimed is not the amount which is lawfully due to the plaintiff. Had the learned judge considered the foregoing matters, the learned judge would have found the existence of cause to the contrary. [11] The third issue relates to the certificate of indebtedness. The defendant’s argument is that the charge does not provide for the use of a certificate of indebtedness by the plaintiff to prove its claim. In reply, learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that para. 9 of the charge annexure is a conclusive evidence clause and that there is no manifest error on the face of the certificate of indebtedness. Para. 9 of the charge annexure is as follows: Page 8 of 10 “9. (1) The chargee may at any time with or without the consent or concurrence of the chargor transfer the benefit of this security to any person.