if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it; … [60] I refer to the case of PP v Jowy Manjoro [2004] CLJU 724 (HC) which discussed evidence obtained by the use of recording 15 technology. The learned High Court Judge referred to an English case in the following paragraph for the principle as follows: “Reference must also be made to TAYLOR v. CHIEF CONSTALBE OF CHESHIRE [1987] 1 AER 225. In that case the appellant was charged with theft of a packet of batteries from a shop. The prosecution evidence rested 20 partly on what three police officers had seen in a video recording which allegedly showed the appellant committing the offence. The video recording was mistakenly erased before the trial and was therefore not available to be viewed by the justices, who nevertheless regarded the officers' evidence of what they had seen on the video recording as admissible and convicted the 25 appellant. The appellant appealed, contending that the officers' evidence should have been excluded as hearsay. The appeal was dismissed. In his judgment Ralph Gibson LJ. Said at page 230: "As to the submission for the prosecutor, counsel submitted that once it is proved that a video recording was a recording of what a machine 30 detected and reproduced at the time and place in question, evidence of witnesses of what they say they saw on the recording is not different in law in point of principle from evidence of witnesses who claim to have seen the events by direct vision. She contended that all the arguments advanced on behalf of this appellant are in truth arguments properly 35 directed at weight and not at admissibility. I think she adds that they were present to the mind of the justices, and that they were fully taken into account. She has referred the court to no further authority. In substance I accept the contention made for the prosecutor. For my part I can see no effective distinction so far as concerns admissibility between a direct view of the action of an alleged shoplifter by a security officer and a 5 view of those activities by the officer on the video display unit of a camera, or a view of these activities on a recording of what the camera recorded. He who saw may describe what he saw because, as Ackner LJ said in R v. Kajala, to which I have referred, it is relevant evidence provided that that which is seen on the camera or recording is connected by sufficient evidence 10 to the alleged actions of the accused at the time and place in question. As with the witness who saw directly, so with him who viewed a display or recording, the weight and reliability of his evidence will depend on assessment of all relevant considerations, including the clarity of the recording, its length and, where identification is in issue, the witness's 15 prior knowledge of the person said to be identified, in accordance with well-established principles. Where there is a recording, a witness has the opportunity to study again and again what may be a fleeting glimpse of a short incident, and that study may affect greatly both his ability to describe what he saw and his confidence in 20 an identification. When the film or recording is shown to the court, his evidence and the validity of his increased confidence, if he has any, can be assessed in the light of what the court itself can see. When the film or recording is not available, or is not produced, the court will, and in my view must, hesitate and consider very carefully indeed before finding 25 themselves made sure of guilt on such evidence. But if they are made sure of guilt by such evidence, having correctly directed themselves with reference to it, there is no reason in law why they should not convict. Such evidence is not, in my view, inadmissible because of the hearsay principle. It is direct evidence of what was seen to be 30 happening in a particular place at a particular time and, like all direct evidence, may vary greatly in its weight, credibility and reliability." [Emphasis added] [61] In another High Court case of PP v Mohd Azmi Bin Ibrahim & 35 Satu Lagi [2012] CLJU 1284, the court also referred to the same English case (supra) where it was held: “Held - There was no effective distinction, for the purpose of admissibility, between a direct view of the actions of an alleged offender by a witness and a view of those actions on a visual display unit of a camera or on a video recording of what the camera recorded, provided that what was seen on the visual display unit or video recording was connected by sufficient evidence to the alleged actions of the accused at the time and place in question. Evidence as to the contents of a film or video recording was not inadmissible 5 because of the hearsay principle, but was direct evidence of what was seen to be happening in a particular place at a particular time. The fact that the video recording was not available at the trial did not of itself render the evidence of the police officers inadmissible, although the court had carefully to assess the weight and reliability of that evidence. Since the evidence of 10 the police officers had been rightly admitted and since the justices had correctly directed themselves as to its weight and reliability, the appeal would be dismissed (see p 227 e f, p 228 h, p 230 b to g, p 231 e and p 232 a e to g, post).” 15 [62] It is necessary for this Court to delve further into Taylor’s Case (supra) to understand the context in which the principle was based and how it is to be applied to the present case. The relevant parts of the judgment are as follows: “The submissions made by counsel for the appellant have been in summary as 20 follows. Without production of the original recording, or of a proven copy, no evidence, he said, could be given of what any witness says he saw on the recording. Where evidence is given by production of a recording for viewing by the court, a witness, it was conceded, may give evidence to supplement it by giving evidence of identification, but such evidence of identification is 25 inadmissible if the recording is not produced and viewed by the court. Finally, it was submitted that, even if there is no demonstrably applicable principle of law by reference to which evidence of what is seen on a recording can be treated as inadmissible if the recording is not produced, this court should nevertheless as a matter of policy pronounce such a principle because, if the recording is not 30 produced, there is no possibility of the court assessing what counsel referred to as the only real evidence, which was the recording itself. I for my part am unable to accept those submissions. In my judgment the evidence tendered was not inadmissible in law, whether by reference to 35 the hearsay rule or any other principle in law. I would start with R v Kajala (1982) 75 Cr App R 149. The nature of that case was that there had been a public disturbance in Southall. Parts of what occurred were filmed by BBC cameras. A prosecution witness saw the BBC broadcast and recognised the appellant as one taking part in the disturbance. That witness gave 40 evidence of what he saw on the recording and said that he confidently recognised the appellant. There was evidence to prove that the film depicted some of the events of the disturbance at the time and place at which it had occurred. In that case a copy of the original recording which had been seen by the witness was shown to the court. Because what was tendered was not the 5 original, objection was taken to it, and to evidence given by reference to it. In rejection the submission that the evidence was inadmissible, Ackner LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said (at 152): 'The old rule, that a party must produce the best evidence that the nature of the case will allow, and that any less good evidence is to 10 be excluded, has gone by the board long ago. The only remaining instance of it is that, if an original document is available on one's hands, one must produce it; that one cannot give secondary evidence by producing a copy. Nowadays we do not confine ourselves to the best evidence. We admit all relevant evidence. The 15 goodness or badness of it goes only to weight, and not to admissibility. Garton v. Hunter ([1969] 1 All ER 451, [1969] 2 QB 37), per Lord Denning. See also Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice ((40th edn, 1979) para 1001).' 20 [Emphasis added] [63] His Lordship Ralph Gibson LJ continued at page 227: “That is sufficient to dispose of the point raised in the case. I would answer the question by saying that the evidence was admissible, and the justices were right so to treat it. 25 It is necessary to mention some other aspects of this case. The objection to the admission of the evidence included, as I have already read out, reference to a contention that the witnesses, if called, would say that the appellant had committed an offence, whereas it was contended that it should be the court, 30 after viewing the video recording, who should determine whether or not an offence had been committed. There can be no doubt that a witness cannot be called to give his view, on what he has seen in a recording, or indeed on what he saw direct, that in his opinion an offence of any sort has been committed. All he can do is to describe what he saw, and matters of 35 inference from the primary facts are for the court. [Emphasis added] [64] At page 230, His Lordship stated: 40 “As to the submission for the prosecutor, counsel submitted that once it is proved that a video recording was a recording of what a machine detected and reproduced at the time and place in question, evidence of witnesses of what they say they saw on the recording is not different in law in point of principle from evidence of witnesses who claim to have seen the events by direct vision. 5 She contended that all the arguments advanced on behalf of this appellant are in truth arguments properly directed at weight and not at admissibility. I think she adds that they were present to the mind of the justices, and that they were fully taken into account. She has referred the court to no further authority. 10 In substance I accept the contention made for the prosecutor. For my part I can see no effective distinction so far as concerns admissibility between a direct view of the action of an alleged shoplifter by a security officer and a view of those activities by the officer on the video display unit of a camera, or a view of these activities on a recording of what the camera 15 recorded. He who saw may describe what he saw because, as Ackner LJ said in R v Kajala, to which I have referred, it is relevant evidence provided that that which is seen on the camera or recording is connected by sufficient evidence to the alleged actions of the accused at the time and place in question. As with the witness who saw directly, so with him who 20 viewed a display or recording, the weight and reliability of his evidence will depend on assessment of all relevant considerations, including the clarity of the recording, its length and, where identification is in issue, the witness's prior knowledge of the person said to be identified, in accordance with well-established principles.”. 25 [Emphasis added] [65] At the risk of repeating itself, this Court opined that the principle in Taylor’s Case (supra) was applicable to this case and therefore what SP8 saw on the video call was admissible and relevant 30 evidence provided that that which was seen on the video call was connected by sufficient evidence to the alleged actions of the child offenders at the time and place in question. The weight and reliability of SP8’s evidence will depend on “assessment of all relevant considerations, including the clarity of the video call, its 35 length and, where identification is in issue, the witness's prior knowledge of the person said to be identified, in accordance with well-established principles.”. In her re-examination at page 240 onwards of the Notes of Evidence, SP8 told the Court: Seterusnya tentang video yang kamu lihat dan kamu telah padam, kenapa kamu padam video tersebut? 5 Saya dapat video call, saya tidak ada bukti video call itu sebab tidak boleh merekod. Soalan saya, kenapa kamu pada video call tersebut? Sebab saya berasa takut. 10 Tadi kamu kata ada lihat, sekarang kamu kata tidak boleh rekod, apa maksud kamu ini? Video call lihat apa yang berlaku pada masa itu dan tidak ada fasiliti dalam telefon saya untuk rekod. 15 Kenapa kamu tidak menghalang bila CO1 beritahu untuk bunuh Simati? Saya tidak menghalang bila CO1 beritahu hendak bunuh simati sebab saya ingat dia dalam keadaan marah dan saya tidak ambil perkara itu sebagai serius. 20 Kenapa kamu tidak beritahu kepada CO2 tentang perkara yang telah CO1 beritahu kepada kamu tentang hendak bunuh simati? Saya tidak beritahu CO2 yang CO1 hendak bunuh abangnya. Sebab saya anggap tidak serius kerana dia marah dan perkara ini akan berlalu. 25 Video call yang kamu kata CO1 ada pegang pisau, ada kelar yang ditunjukkan kepada kamu itu wujud atau tidak wujud? Video call yang kamu cerita pada Mahkamah wujud atau tidak wujud? Wujud video call. 30 Kamu tidak setuju bila peguam kata kamu rasa SP10 yang merancang untuk membunuh simati, kenapa? Sebab kami tidak ada perasaan apa-apa terhadap Simati dan tidak ada sebab untuk merancang perkara itu. 35 Berkaitan dengan perjumpaan di Burmese Pool ada kamu tahu? Adakah terlibat? Perjumpaan di Burmese Pool saya tidak tahu dan tidak terlibat. 40 Apa tujuan kamu padamkan video call daripada yang kamu terima daripada CO2 dan CO1? Saya padam perasaan takut. Takut apa? Sebab dia akan menyalahkan saya, sebab itu saya berasa takut. 5 Mahkamah Dia itu siapa? CO2. [Note: I have substituted the names of the child offenders with CO1 and 10 CO2, respectively.] [66] I asked SP8 why she could not record the video call and it was established that her telephone could not record it as it did not have the facility/function to record a video call on that was made via 15 WhatsApp. The video call was made from CO2’s telephone. It must be remembered that this happened in 2019 and the WhatsApp technology then would not have been as advanced as it is now. This Court opined further that SP8’s description of what she saw in the video call and her reaction to it was for the Court to 20 decide on the weight of that evidence, it was not for her to give her opinion on what sort of offence had been committed. SP8 saw the clothes that the deceased was wearing at that time and she desribed them “baju oren, seluar warna hitam” and these items were the same as the clothes that could be seen in the photographs 25 of the deceased. She told the Court that she was very scared with what she had seen and later deleted their WhatsApp group conversation because she had been threatened by CO1 that “kalau you tinggalkan saya you akan dapat nasib yang sama”. On 6.7.2019, SP8 threw away her perfectly working mobile telephone 30 into a sewage pond near her neighbourhood. But the police managed to retrieve it after she told them where she had thrown away the telephone (P4(C1)). Refer to her evidence at page 189. [67] The weight of this piece of evidence must be assessed together with all the other evidence available before the Court, including her 5 demeanour and credibility as a witness. SP8 was cross-examined extensively by both counsels. They imputed her as a person of loose morale and bad character as she was prone to lying (refer to pages 217 – 238 of the Notes of Evidence). It was suggested to SP8 that she had a motive to kill the deceased because he 10 objected to her close relationship with CO2. It was put to this witness that she hated him and threw away her telephone to avoid any connection with the death of the deceased. It was also suggested that she, SP9 and SP10 had planned to kill the deceased at Burmese Pool that day because all of them did not 15 like the deceased due to his strict ways with CO2. It was further suggested that she had lied because she had given two different versions to the police during the first and second time that she was detained. Therefore, she had also lied to the Court and her evidence could not be believed. They contended that the video call 20 never happened and that was why she did not have any evidence of the video call in her telephone. SP8 disagreed with all these suggestions and had explained to the Court her answers. [68] I refer to P11(19) which was a photograph of the telephone that 25 listed the calls made in and out of SP8’s telephone. It can be clearly seen that a number of calls had been made from CO2’s number (see her profile photo on the left-hand side) and there was one video call made on 5.7.2019 at 4.05 pm for about 1 minute or so. I found that this record corroborated SP8’s evidence that a video call was made by CO2 to her telephone around 4.00 pm after the initial WhatsApp message to SP8 that CO1 had killed her brother. [69] There was also a telephone seized from a person named Karthik 5 A/L Krishnan i.e Samsung Galaxy Note in blue color on 10.7.2019 at 3.30 pm (marked by SP13 as LL1, exhibit P4(F1)). This person came to Court for identification and was offered to the defence. SP14 told the Court it was believed he was a relative of CO1. SP14 at page 546 of the Notes of Evidence mentioned something about 10 what CO1 had told Karthik regarding the incident but I did not admit any confession because Karthik did not testify in Court. However, I admitted SP14’s evidence which he said in the course of his investigation on CO1’s telephone (K8) and by SP2, there was a photograph in K8 which captured their attention. The photograph 15 was printed from the thumbdrive that SP2 created (P4(A1)) and marked as P43. The file name was 1562314397296.jpg and the time stamp was 5/7/2019 8:13:17 UTC (Device) that was stored in the device. 20 [70] Earlier, SP2 had explained about the time stamp and in this case, 8+ denoted the Universal Time Greenwich. I believed what he meant was UTC referred to Coordinated Universal Time which replaced the old reference to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). In any event, by adding +8, the time of 8:13:17 meant it was 16:13:17, i.e. 4.13:17 25 pm. This photograph was taken on 5.7.2019 at around 4.13 pm, which was just minutes after the video call made to SP8 by CO2. P43 was disputed by the defence, unsurprisingly. The Court considered the probative value of this evidence as a photograph that was stored on the device K8 i.e. CO1’s telephone. But the Court did not make any conclusion that he was the person who snapped the picture. The significance of P43 was it showed a figure of a person clad in orange-coloured shirt and black pants, face-down and there was a white cloth around it which looked like it 5 had some bloodstains. The figure was on the floor of the room, and at the fore of P43, there could be seen parts of two pairs of feet with dark-colored skin. The figure in the photograph P43 appeared to be similar to the figure in the photograph tendered by the prosecution in P13(6). SP8 had testified that she saw the deceased lying on the 10 bed in the video call, but in P43, it was already on the floor. There appeared to be some white-colored items at the background which could be white cloths. The tiles on the floor of the room appeared to be similar to the tiles on the floor of the room in photograph P13(16). I was of the view that the photograph P43 could well have been 15 taken in the room on the groundfloor of the deceased's house where the murder was carried out. However, if this exhibit had been wrongly admitted, this Court opined there were many other evidence which pointed to the child offenders as the perpetrators of the crime against the deceased. 20 [71] From my observation of SP8, I found that she was a truthful witness despite her admission that she had lied to the police on one occassion. She admitted that she had lied to the police when first arrested because she was afraid of CO2’s threat. I found her explanation that she did not have any ill feelings towards the 25 deceased was honest and credible. She told the Court that she was not angry with the deceased since he was merely carrying out his duties as an elder brother of CO2. She did not tell CO2 about what CO1 had wanted to do to the deceased because she thought he was just being upset at that time and so she did not take his words seriously. She deleted the messages because she was afraid that CO2 would be angry at her after she found out about the death of her brother. 5 [72] The defence also claimed that SP8, SP9 and SP10 had concocted the stories against CO1 and CO2. They took objection to the fact that the 3 youths were sitting together outside the Court while waiting for their turn to testify because SP8 could brief the 2 boys about her testimony under cross-examination. The defence claimed that the 3 10 witnesses had gone for a meal together during one of the trial days and tendered some photographs taken from counsels’ mobile telephone. The DPP explained to the Court (see page 281) that SP8 was only called for identification that afternoon and was not present [73] I will now deal with the evidence of SP9. This witness went to the 15 same school as CO1, SP10 and the deceased at SMK King Edward in Taiping. CO1, SP10 and himself had been friends since they were in primary school. He had also been friends with CO2 and SP8. He explained about his relationship with the child offenders that CO1 was a good friend but they were not that close although he admitted 20 they ewould always meet up. CO2 was introduced to him by CO1. On 5.7.2019, for the first time he had gone to CO2’s house. He went with CO1 and SP10 from their school by Grab ride. Earlier at the school canteen, CO1 told him that CO2 invited them to go to Aeon Mall. He said it was Hari Berkomunikasi where parents would come 25 to meet the teachers and get their children’s report cards. Their parents did not come to the event. [74] CO1 said they would be going to the house at 11.00 am and then he ordered a Grab car. By 11.30 am they had arrived at her house. SP9 told them to enter through the backdoor. Upon entering the house, he saw SP8 there and an elderly woman. He then sat at the lounge and played a game on his telephone. CO1 was sitting in front of him 5