Pempetisyen membayar kepada Responden jumlah sebanyak RM10,000.00 setahun sebagai perbelanjaan atau hadiah Responden untuk perayaan Tahun Baru Cina yang mesti dibayar pada minggu pertama bulan Januari setiap tahun sehingga Responden berkahwin semula atau meninggal dunia; pembayaran pertama bermula pada Januari 2012. [4] In December 2024, the Petitioner filed this Application seeking to vary the terms of the Decree Nisi by reducing the annual sum payable to the Respondent from MYR180,000 to MYR60,000, and to set aside paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Decree Nisi. Issues [5] The principal issue for determination was whether the Petitioner had demonstrated a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a reduction of the payments he was required to make to the Respondent pursuant to the Decree Nisi. [6] A related issue was whether the Petitioner’s remarriage and his ensuing financial obligations towards his new family could properly constitute grounds for a variation of the spousal maintenance payable to the Respondent. [7] This Application was only partially allowed for the following reasons. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether material change in circumstances had been established [8] The central issue to address in this Application was whether material change in circumstances, as prescribed by section 83 of S/N Uu387xnks0O1WJpbllyXg 19 August 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act”), had indeed taken place. This provision reads: Section 83 – Power for court to vary orders for maintenance The court may at any time and from time to time vary, or rescind, any subsisting order for maintenance, whether secured or unsecured, on the application of the person in whose favour or of the person against whom the order was made, or, in respect of secured maintenance, of the legal personal representatives of the latter, where it is satisfied that the order was based on any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any material change in the circumstances. [Emphasis added.] [9] The term ‘material change’ was judicially clarified by Azahar Mohamed JC (as he then was) in the case of Sivajothi a/p K Suppiah v Kunathasan a/l Chelliah [2006] 5 CLJ 318; [2006] 3 MLJ 184. In that case, it was emphasised that the word ‘material’ is the operative and determinative element of the phrase. This means that not every change in circumstance will suffice to warrant a variation; instead, the change must be significant or substantial in nature. It must be one that alters the factual or legal landscape in a meaningful way, thereby justifying a reconsideration or adjustment of the original order or agreement. [10] George Seah SCJ elaborated on the phrase 'material change in circumstances' in the Supreme Court case of Gisela Gertrud Abe v. Tan Wee Kiat [1986] 2 MLJ 297 with the following passage: S/N Uu387xnks0O1WJpbllyXg 19 August 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 In our opinion, when an application is made to the court to vary an existing order for maintenance, the proper approach is to start from the original order and see what changes financial or otherwise, have taken place since that date including any changes which the court is required to have regard to under s 78 of the Act as well as any increase or decrease in the means of either of the parties to the marriage and make adjustments roughly in proportion to the changes, if that is possible. [Emphasis added.] [11] A more detailed explanation of the term ‘material change in circumstances’ may be found in Lim Hong Bee v. Mah Teck Oon [2010] 8 CLJ 473, [2010] MLJU 264. In that case, Suraya Othman J (as she then was) stated that "the change in question must be material and not just any change. It signifies a change in a crucial and vital part. In determining whether there has been a 'material change' within the meaning of this section, all relevant circumstances must be considered." [12] Hence, in examining the question of material change in circumstances, the inquiry before this Court was not simply whether any change had occurred. The crucial aspect was to determine if such change was sufficiently significant to warrant a departure from the status quo. The Court needed to assess whether maintaining the current state of affairs would be unjustified in light of the new, substantial, and pivotal changes that had taken place. This analysis required a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors and circumstances to ensure that any decision made was fair and equitable given the material changes presented. S/N Uu387xnks0O1WJpbllyXg 19 August 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 [13] It was also important to note that determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances is a question of fact, as established in the High Court case of Anna Tay Siew Hong v Joseph Ng Tiong Yong [1995] 3 CLJ 717, [1995] MLJU 257. This principle was further reinforced in the case of Navarajan a/l Subramaniam v Rajeswary a/p Muniandy [2019] MLJU 715 by Hayatul Akmal Abdul Aziz J (as she then was) in the following passage: The legal definition of material change in circumstances is not cast in stone. It is ultimately dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No one case is like the other. [Emphasis added.] [14] The Petitioner, therefore, had the legal burden to prove the material change of circumstances on a balance of probabilities: YCC v LSY [2007] 7 CLJ 207; Ng Say Chuan v Lim Szu Ling [2010] 10 CLJ 37. [15] With regard to the Respondent’s claim for annual maintenance in the sum of MYR180,000, it was important to highlight that such sum was intended to cover ‘nafkah, perbelanjaan rumah dan perbelanjaan untuk pembantu rumah’. The Petitioner submitted that this amount was originally calculated to encompass not only the Respondent’s personal expenses, but also the general household expenditure, including costs related to the care, and daily needs of the two children of the marriage (“the Children”). It was pointed out that the Children were, at that material time, residing with the Respondent, and as such, the overall household expenses were understandably higher. S/N Uu387xnks0O1WJpbllyXg 19 August 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 [16] I had to agree with the Petitioner and acknowledge that the circumstances had, in fact, materially changed, in that, the Children were no longer residing with the Respondent, resulting in a reduction of household expenses. In view of this material change, I was of the opinion that it would no longer be reasonable or justifiable for the Respondent to continue receiving maintenance at the same rate of MYR180,000 per annum. [17] As such, the maintenance sum should be recalibrated to reflect the Respondent’s actual needs exclusive of expenses attributable to the Children, as the basis upon which the original amount was agreed or ordered no longer subsisted. [18] I, therefore, reduced the quantum of MYR180,000 (MYR15,000 per month) to MYR84,000 (MYR7,000 per month) to reflect such change which occurred between 2011, when the Decree Nisi was granted, and 2024, when this Application was filed. [19] However, after scrutinising the evidence and perusing the submissions of Counsel for both Parties, I dismissed the Petitioner’s application to nullify paragraph (e) which was regarding the Respondent’s holiday expenses and paragraph (f) regarding the Chinese New Year monetary gifts. [20] The Petitioner reiterated his position that the Respondent’s previous justification for financial support, namely, the need to travel abroad to visit the Children who, at the time the Decree Nisi was granted, were studying overseas, was no longer valid. He contended that the Children had since completed their education and returned from S/N Uu387xnks0O1WJpbllyXg 19 August 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 overseas, thereby removing the necessity for such travel. On that basis, the Petitioner argued that there was no longer any justification for him to continue providing the Respondent with funds to cover travel or related expenses. [21] The Petitioner went further to question the propriety of such expenses, suggesting that given the Respondent’s age, it was neither necessary nor reasonable for her to undertake frequent or extensive travel. Accordingly, the Petitioner maintained that any financial provision on this ground ought to cease. [22] I was unable to agree with the Petitioner’s contention, as the terms of the spousal maintenance arrangement were not expressly or impliedly contingent upon the Respondent’s need to travel overseas to visit the Children. There was no condition attached to the payment which limited it to such a purpose. The Respondent’s entitlement to travelling expenses remained valid and enforceable irrespective of whether the Children were still studying abroad or not. [23] I also found the Petitioner’s contention to be tainted by ageist assumptions, as it implied that the Respondent, by virtue of her age, ought not to be engaging in travel. I was, therefore, compelled to emphasise that age, in and of itself, should not be regarded as a constraint on one’s autonomy or used as a basis to diminish an individual’s right to determine their own lifestyle, including the freedom to travel. The Respondent, for her part, asserted that she remained entitled to the agreed or awarded spousal maintenance sum, and that S/N Uu387xnks0O1WJpbllyXg 19 August 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 there had been no material change in circumstances sufficient to justify its reduction or cessation. [24] The Petitioner further argued that paragraph (f), which pertained to an annual payment of MYR10,000 for Chinese New Year gifts and related expenses, was no longer necessary as the Children had grown up and the Respondent purportedly no longer required such a sum. [25] I found this contention untenable. Paragraph (f) was not contingent upon the needs or ages of the Children; rather, it was an annual amount allocated to the Respondent for Chinese New Year. The Children reaching adulthood did not, in any way, negate or diminish the basis for that provision. Whether Petitioner’s remarriage and new family amounted to material change in circumstances [26] In support of this Application, the Petitioner had also cited the need to support his new family. [27] Although remarriage in itself may amount to a change in circumstances, determining whether it was material enough to merit a variation of the term pertaining to spousal maintenance required a more nuanced examination of the nature and extent of the change. [28] The mere fact that the Petitioner had entered into a new marriage did not inherently alter the financial responsibilities established by the original spousal maintenance arrangement. These obligations were based on the financial needs and circumstances of both Parties at the time the term was agreed upon. The rationale behind such term was S/N Uu387xnks0O1WJpbllyXg 19 August 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 to ensure that the Respondent, who may have become financially dependent during the marriage, continued to receive necessary support. This consideration remained pertinent regardless of the Petitioner's new marital status. [29] Thus, while remarriage may be a change in circumstance, any application for variation of the term pertaining to spousal maintenance must be substantiated by a thorough evaluation of the current financial situations and needs of both Parties. Only then will the Court be able to make a fair and equitable decision regarding the variation of the term pertaining to spousal maintenance. [30] On this point, I was guided by the Singapore case of ANH v ANI [2019] SGHC 170, where it was stated by Choo Han Teck J: Remarriage in itself is a change in circumstances but whether it is sufficient to merit a variation of the maintenance order requires further examination of the nature and extent of the change. Either party in a divorce is free to remarry. When the woman remarries, the ex-husband who is maintaining her may have the maintenance order revoked on account of the fact that the new husband is maintaining her. When the man remarries, and has a family with the second wife, any diversion of his income towards the maintenance of the ex-wife reduces the coffers of the new family and that needs to be considered too.