YAP CHIN HUAT v 1. ) Tung Goon Guat (Sebagai Wasi Harta Pusaka Yap Kuang. Simati) (PA-12BNCvC-5-10/2022)

TUNG GOON GUAT (NO. K/P: 680323-07-5050) (sebagai wasi harta pusaka Yap Kuang, Simati)

TUNG GOON GUAT (NO. K/P: 680323-07-5050) …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI GEORGETOWN DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG GUAMAN NO: PA-A52NCVC-77-06/2020 ANTARA YAP CHIN HUAT (NO. K/P: 411114-08-5361/ 0328507) …PLAINTIF

TUNG GOON GUAT (NO. K/P: 680323-07-5050) (sebagai wasi harta pusaka Yap Kuang, Simati)

TUNG GOON GUAT (NO. K/P: 680323-07-5050) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 07/10/2024 18:28:31 PA-12BNCvC-5-10/2022 Kand. 32 Page 2 of 21 JUDGMENT (POST-TRIAL APPEAL) PRELUSION [1] A son passed away. He had made a Will. The father asserted that the son died intestate (died without a Will). With the Will, the son’s wife, as executrix (whom I will refer to, purely for convenience, as “executor”) of the estate, applied for a grant of probate. The father lodged a probate caveat and made known his intention to contest the grant of probate. [2] Before probate was granted, the father and the daughter-in-law negotiated to settle the dispute. The probate was then granted. The parties signed an agreement to pay the father a sum of money. The wife (daughter-in-law) could not fulfil all the payments. The father sued the wife for the balance amount of RM275K not paid. The wife counterclaimed for a declaration that the agreement was void and unenforceable. They went to trial. [3] The Sessions Court dismissed P’s claim and allowed the wife’s Counterclaim. Hence the father appeals to this High Court. [4] Applying the principles of appellate intervention, should P’s Appeal be allowed (and the Sessions Court’s judgment be reversed), or should it be dismissed (and the Sessions Court’s judgment be upheld)? THE PARTIES [5] Mr. Yap Kuang is the deceased. The Appellant-Plaintiff is his father. I will refer to him as “P”. Mr. Yap Kuang’s wife is Madam Tung Page 3 of 21 Goon Guat. She is the executor of Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate. She is also a beneficiary. [6] In the Sessions Court suit, P sued his son: Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate and his daughter-in-law: Madam Tung. The 1st Defendant is Madam Tung, as executor of the estate. The 2nd Defendant is Madam Tung in her personal capacity. I will refer to Madam Tung, in either or both her capacities as the 1st Defendant and 2nd Defendant simply as “D2”. THE PERTINENT FACTS [7] Mr. Yap Kuang passed away in November 2018. In January 2019, P asserted that Mr. Yap Kuang passed away intestate i.e. without leaving a Will, which would mean that P (as the father) and his wife (as the mother) are entitled to a ¼ share each to Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate. To secure their rights, P proceeded to lodge a probate caveat over Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate. [8] Also in January 2019, D2 (as wife and executor of Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate) notified P that Mr. Yap Kuang did not die intestate. He had left a Will. And P and his wife (the father and mother) were not named as beneficiaries under the Will. D2 proceeded to apply for a grant of probate. [9] A few months later in July 2019, P notified D2 that he intended to challenge the validity of the Will. At the same time, P made a without prejudice proposal to settle the dispute for RM300K. In other words, he would not challenge the validity of the Will and contest the grant of probate application if he is paid RM300K. Page 4 of 21 [10] D2 counter-proposed to pay off P with 1/4 shares in two properties owned by Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate. P rejected the counter-proposal and maintained his request for the RM300K in cash. After some negotiations, the parties agreed to a RM300K payment in instalments. [11] P’s caveat was not renewed. D2 obtained the grant of probate in August 2019. [12] After obtaining the grant of probate, in September 2019, the parties signed a Family Settlement Agreement (FSA) based on this RM300K amount. The pertinent terms of the FSA include these terms—

P is to be paid RM5K a month for six months (totalling RM30K) from September 2019 to February 2020;

P is to be paid the remaining RM270K in a lump sum in March 2020;

D2 personally guarantees the RM300K payment. [13] As it turned out, RM25K was paid, but RM275K was not. P thus sued D2 for the RM275K. D2 mounted a Defence and Counterclaim that sought—

a declaration that the FSA was null and void;

the return of the RM25K that was paid over; and

damages. THE LAW ON APPELLATE INTERVENTION—THE ‘PLAINLY WRONG’ TEST [14] It is vital, in this post-trial Appeal, to review the law on appellate intervention. An appellate court should only interfere to disturb the findings Page 5 of 21 of the first-instance court (here: the Sessions Court), if the Sessions Court was “plainly wrong”. [15] The “plainly wrong” principle for appellate intervention has developed in the United Kingdom and in Malaysia for over a century. [16] Our Federal Court, in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC); [2020] 8 AMR 227; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 MLRA 193, through the written grounds of Her Ladyship Justice Zabariah Mohd. Yusof FCJ, comprehensively expounded the genesis of the “plainly wrong” principle, through its development over the years, into its current meaning. [17] Ng Hoo Kui (supra) propounded that the primary “plainly wrong” principle, includes the following not-exhaustive elaborative principles, and I apply them here—

The Sessions Court’s judgment is “plainly wrong” if it was arrived at through “no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence”: referring to UEM Group Bhd (previously known as United Engineers (M) Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2011] 1 AMCR 338 (FC); [2010] 9 CLJ 785; [2010] 2 MLRA 668; [2010] MLJU 2179.

This phrase of the “lack of judicial appreciation of the evidence” encompasses these three errors— Page 6 of 21

critical factual finding which has no basis in evidence (that is, findings not based on the evidence);

(ii) demonstrable misunderstanding of the relevant evidence (that is, misunderstanding the evidence);

(iii) demonstrable failure to consider the relevant evidence (that is, failure to consider the evidence).

The Sessions Court’s judgment is “plainly wrong” if it was arrived at through a “material error of law”: following Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600 (UKSC).

The Sessions Court’s decision is “plainly wrong” if it “could not reasonably be explained or justified”, making it a decision “which no reasonable judge could have reached”: citing Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Anor Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177 (FC); [2018] 1 AMR 517; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 MLRA 263.

An appellate court is to evaluate whether the Sessions Court’s decision was “reasonably made”: paragraph 77 of Ng Hoo Kui (supra). [18] However, the “plainly wrong” principle is not intended to be used as a catch-all method to replace the Sessions Court’s decision with my Page 7 of 21 own (the appellate court’s) decision, on the facts of the case. The Federal Court in Ng Hoo Kui (supra) puts it this way— [76] What is pertinent is that, the ‘plainly wrong’ test is not intended to be used by an appellate court as a mean to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts. [78] Hence following this court’s ruling in Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial judge was ‘plainly wrong’ where in arriving at the decision it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge could have reached. If the decision did not fall within any of the aforesaid category, it is irrelevant, even if the appellate court thinks that with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge. [emphasis added] [19] Put differently—even if an appellate court finds, on the evidence and the facts of a case, that the appellate court would have come to a different decision, the appellate court, when it is deciding on the Appeal, should not by-pass an analysis of the first-instance court’s reasoning. [20] I must consider the Sessions Court’s appreciation of the evidence and the Sessions Court’s application of the principles of law, in the context of these elaborative principles, to see if the Sessions Court has committed a fundamental error. [21] Applying these elaborative principles to this Appeal, I do not find that the Sessions Court’s analysis of the evidence, and its conclusion on the evidence, to be “plainly wrong”; or fundamentally erroneous; or that Page 8 of 21 the Sessions Court had not sufficiently appreciated the evidence; or that the Sessions Court’s decision was not reasonably made. [22] Another case law authority that instructs me to be careful not to interfere with the judgment of the Court of first instance is MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 428 (CA); [2016] 4 CLJ 665; [2016] 3 MLRA 1144. The Court Of Appeal there through the grounds of Her Ladyship Justice Nallini Pathmanathan JCA (later FCJ) held— [14] The requirement for the trial judge to have come to a finding which was ‘plainly wrong’ before an appellate court may intervene is therefore well entrenched in our appellate philosophy and practice. In Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd and another, Lord Reed considered the meaning to be accorded to the phrase ‘plainly wrong’: … there may be some value in considering the meaning of that phrase. There is a risk that it may be misunderstood. The adverb ‘plainly’ does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appellate court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. [15] This is a point of some importance because it underscores the rationale that the appellate court is not at liberty to reverse or interfere in the finding of a trial judge even if the appellate court is clearly of the view that it would not have reached the conclusion the trial judge did on the evidence on record before it. It requires something more. The requisite or correct standard to be applied is that no reasonable judge, on the evidence on record, could have reached the conclusion of the trial judge. Page 9 of 21 In other words, so long as the findings of the trial judge are plausible on the evidence on record, there is no room for interference merely on the grounds that the appellate court forms a different opinion on the same evidence. [16] There is, however, little room for variation in the application of the principle of intervention when the trial judge is ‘plainly wrong’. Appellant courts ought to be consistent in ensuring that appellate intervention only comes about when a trial judge reaches a conclusion which no reasonable judge could have reached. A lack of such consistency in approach would give rise to considerable uncertainty in the practice and progress of litigation. Litigants through their counsel should be able to assess with some degree of certainty, on clear and distinctly applied principles of law, whether a judgment obtained at first instance is likely to be overturned or not. This is only possible if there is a consistent application of the ‘plainly wrong’ principle underlying appellate intervention. [17] The obverse or counterpart to the requirement for appellate restraint in dealing with findings of fact by the trial judge is the fundamental requirement that the judgment of first instance does in fact amount to a comprehensive and cohesive determination of the material matters comprising the subject matter of dispute before the trial judge. This requires the trial judge to undertake a full evaluation of the evidence and issues placed before the court. A first instance judgment is open to challenge when it fails to address or wholly ignores material evidence or issues placed before it, or when bald findings of fact are made with no reasoning or evidence to substantiate such findings. Equally errors of law, a clear misunderstanding of relevant evidence and such clearly identifiable errors will all contribute towards a decision that would be considered to be ‘plainly wrong’. [18] Judicial decisions are required to be handed down expeditiously and with minimum delay. However this ought not to compromise the fundamental requirement that trial judges undertake a comprehensive and holistic approach to the evaluation of evidence in reaching their findings at first Page 10 of 21 instance. A failure to consider the entirety of the evidence and material issues, a failure to make findings of fact or the making of bare findings of fact, all allow for appellate intervention. Apart from the real possibility of a miscarriage of justice, such omissions by a trial judge require the appellate courts to take on the role of first instance judges and review the evidence in its entirety afresh. This in turn amounts to a strain on judicial resources. The importance of a comprehensive consideration of the matter at first instance cannot be sufficiently emphasised. Equally when there has been just such a holistic approach adopted, there should be considerable appellate restraint exercised when reviewing a first instance judgment on appeal. P’s CLAIM [23] P‘s claim is premised entirely on the FSA. It is therefore a claim for breach of contract—that D2 did not make all the payments stipulated in the FSA. [24] P asserts that D2 signed the FSA. P asserts that the terms of the FSA were negotiated by D2’s solicitors i.e. D2 had the benefit of solicitors’ advice. As such, D2 is bound by the contract. D2’s DEFENCE AND COUNTERCLAIM [25] D2’s defence is that the FSA is tainted by undue influence, coercion, misrepresentation and mistake. D2’s counterclaim is to declare the FSA void and unenforceable, and for the return of the RM25K that were paid to P under a nullified contract. THE PERTINENT CONTRACTS ACT PROVISIONS [26] Several sections of the Contracts Act 1950 (Contracts Act) are pertinent to this suit and pertinent to the Sessions Court’s grounds for arriving at its judgment. Firstly, section 14 of the Contracts Act provides Page 11 of 21 that a contracting party’s consent is free (freely given) when there is no coercion or undue influence (among other factors) on the part of the other party: the counterparty. [27] Section 14 provides thus— Section 14. "Free consent" Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by -

coercion, as defined in section 15;

undue influence, as defined in section 16;

fraud, as defined in section 17;

misrepresentation, as defined in section 18; or

mistake, subject to sections 21, 22 and 23. Consent is said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the existence of such coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. [emphasis added] [28] Secondly, section 19 of the Contracts Act provides that when a contract is entered into without free consent, particularly when there is coercion—that contract is voidable i.e. rendered invalid or unenforceable. [29] Section 19(1) provides that— Section 19. Voidability of agreements without free consent.

When consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. [emphasis added] Page 12 of 21 [30] Thirdly, section 20 of the Contracts Act similarly provides that when a contract is entered into, but induced by undue influence—such a contract is voidable too. [31] The pertinent part of section 20 is set out below— Section 20. Power to set aside contract induced by undue influence. When consent to an agreement is caused by undue influence, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. Any such contract may be set aside either absolutely or, if the party who was entitled to avoid it has received any benefit thereunder, upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem just. . [emphasis added] THE SESSIONS COURT’S FINDINGS [32] From the Grounds Of Judgment, I extracted the Sessions Court’s findings of fact that include the following findings of fact—

P’s conduct of entering a probate caveat over Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate before the grant of probate was obtained, was an oppressive act that placed pressure on D2 to agree to the terms of P’s settlement proposal.

D2, who had the duty as the executor of Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate to distribute his estate to the beneficiaries named in the Will, was under pressure to obtain the grant of probate, so that she could carry out her duties as executor.

At the hearing of the application for the grant of probate, the Court rejected P’s challenge to the granting of probate. The Page 13 of 21 Court held that P’s caveat had expired and was no longer valid.

Despite that outcome in the probate proceeding, P continued to “threaten (ugut)” D2 and misrepresented to her that he could still enter another caveat before the physical grant of probate was formally issued.

D2 was “influenced (terpengaruh)” and “pressured (tertekan)” by P’s threats, to the extent that D2 “did not freely negotiate and enter into (tanpa rela berunding dan memasuki)” the FSA settlement terms with P.

D2 was “forced (terpaksa)” to agree to the threat, pressure and influence (ugutan, tekanan dan/atau pengaruh)” from P.

There is no evidence of the basis for the RM300K settlement amount. That amount was arbitrary.

The estate’s two immovable (real) properties were bequeathed to D2’s two sons, and not to D2. And the estate’s cash-at-bank, which was willed to D2, did not amount to even half of the RM300K that D2 was to pay P.

P knew that D2 owned a piece of land in Bukit Panchor, Nibong Tebal, which was registered in her name. P “forced (memaksa)” D2 to sell it and use the proceeds to pay him the RM300K. In fact, the process of selling her land was the reason that P relented to wait for six months before he received the full RM300K. (The balance of RM270K was to be paid after six months.) [33] The Sessions Court found that even though D2 signed the FSA, the FSA was tainted by an absence of free consent, because of undue influence and coercion on P’s part, rendering the FSA voidable and hence Page 14 of 21 unenforceable. On these grounds, the Sessions Court dismissed P’s claim and allowed D2’s counterclaim. The absence of free consent [34] The Session Court referred to section 14 of the Contracts Act and found that D2 did not give her free consent to enter into the FSA because there was undue influence and coercion. Undue influence [35] Undue influence is captured in section 16 of the Contracts Act. Section 16 sets out the requirements that should be proven for there to be undue influence. The pertinent parts of section 16 reads as follows— Section 16. "Undue influence"

A contract is said to be induced by "undue influence" where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other.

In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another-

where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or

where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress.

(a) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another, enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden Page 15 of 21 of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other. . [emphasis added] [36] Analysing section 16 and applying the case law authority on undue influence of Majlis Bandaraya Johor Bahru v Satupadu Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLRH 748 (HC); [2010] MLJU 566 (HC); [2010] AMEJ 0098, I see that the Sessions Court reasonably gleaned that—

there is undue influence when one party is in a position to dominate the will of another party; and

that party uses that position to get an unfair advantage over the other party (section 16(1)); and

that party is presumed to be in a position to dominate the will of the other party when that party has a real or apparent authority over the other party; or

that party has a fiduciary relationship with the other party (section 16(2)(a)); and

when this presumption is invoked (the presumption that that party is in a position to dominate the will of the other party), and that party enters into a contract with the other party, and the contract appears to be unconscionable—the burden is then on that party to rebut the presumption, so that the contract is not voided by undue influence (section 16(3)(a)). [37] The Sessions Court found that D2 had proven that there was undue influence on P’s part which tainted the FSA. The Sessions Court’s grounds include these findings made from the evidence (which warrant reiterating)— Page 16 of 21

Mr. Yap Kuang (deceased) made a Will. P is not named as a beneficiary in the Will.

P challenged the distribution of Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate according to the Will, and for this reason, P lodged a probate caveat over the estate.

P wanted RM300K from either the estate or from D2 personally. P appeared at the hearing of the application for the grant of probate, citing his caveat. The Court noticed that his caveat had lapsed and as such found that he had no locus standi to challenge the grant of probate.

The Grant Of Probate was granted. But P threatened D that he could still lodge a fresh caveat over the estate to prevent the issuance of the hard copy of the Grant Of Probate.

P even procured D2’s agreement to sell her own property in Nibong Tebal to satisfy her obligation to fully pay P the RM300K under the FSA. [38] The Sessions Court found that: (i) P was in a position to dominate D2’s will, because P had a fiduciary relationship with D2; and (ii) P used the position of dominance to get an unfair advantage over D2. [39] The Sessions Court found a fiduciary relationship between P and D2 because P is a person in loco parentis (in the place of a parent) with Page 17 of 21 D2. P is D2’s father-in-law. And this relationship allowed P to dominate D2’s will. [40] The Sessions Court found that P had acquired an unfair advantage over D2 because the FSA brought no benefit to D2. On the contrary, although Mr. Yap Kuang’s Will did not name P as a beneficiary, D2, as the executor of the Will, became obligated to pay RM300K to P under the FSA. The two properties in Mr. Yap Kuang’s estate were to be distributed to his two sons. The cash-at-bank was to be given to D2. But the cash-at-bank was only approximately RM91K, which was significantly insufficient to meet the RM300K needed to pay P under the FSA. [41] The FSA gave P an unfair advantage over D2. The FSA appeared to be unconscionable. [42] So, the Sessions Court reasonably found that P had a fiduciary relationship with D2, thus invoking the presumption that P was in a position to dominate D2’s will. The Sessions Court also found that P used this dominant position to exercise an unfair advantage over D2. The Sessions Court also found that P failed to rebut the presumption that P was in the position to dominate D2’s will, thus failing to demonstrate that there was no undue influence when the FSA was made. [43] I further notice that in the FSA, the consideration (to pay P RM300K) is “respect, love and affection”. And the purpose of the FSA is “to give effect to the arrangement and proportion” of P and D2 “pertaining [to] the distribution of the deceased’s estate”. However, it is a fact that D2’s proportion from the distribution of the estate is only the cash-at-bank of approximately RM91K. Yet P obligated D2 to pay him RM300K (clearly Page 18 of 21 exceeding the inheritance money due to D2), which went beyond the very purpose of the FSA. [44] I therefore find it reasonable for the Sessions Court to have made the findings that it did on the issue of undue influence and how it rendered the FSA voidable. Coercion [45] Section 15 of the Contracts Act defines what coercion is. Coercion includes the act of detaining or threatening to detain any property from some other person, to pressure (or compel, or oblige) that person to enter into a contract. [46] Section 15 is set out below— Section 15. "Coercion". "Coercion" is the committing, or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Penal Code, or the unlawful detaining or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement… . [emphasis added] [47] The Sessions Court found that D2 had sufficiently proved coercion on P’s part. The relevant element was the threat of detaining property, to D2’s prejudice, to cause D2 to sign the FSA. The Sessions Court found that P’s caveat, which was lodged over the estate, constituted the threat of detaining property to D2’s prejudice. The prejudice was borne out by the fact that D2 had a duty as executor to obtain the Grant Of Probate so Page 19 of 21 that the estate could be distributed. P’s caveat would have prohibited or hindered D2 from performing her duty as executor, and hindered D2 from getting her portion of the estate under the Will as a beneficiary as well. It also hindered D2 from distributing the two properties under the estate to her two sons. [48] I hence also find it reasonable for the Sessions Court to make the findings that it did on the issue of coercion and how it rendered the FSA voidable. [49] It is apposite for me to remark here that the FSA is rendered voidable not only when both undue influence and coercion are sufficiently proven, but rather when only either undue influence or coercion is sufficiently demonstrated. This is because, among other factors, undue influence or coercion causes the consent to enter into a contract not-free (not freely given). Hence rendering the FSA voidable. CONCLUSION [50] In conclusion, I find that the Sessions Court—

did not misappreciate the evidence;

did not make critical factual findings which are not based on the evidence;

did not fail to consider the relevant evidence;

did not make a material error of law; Page 20 of 21

did not make a decision that “could not reasonably be explained or justified”, or “which no reasonable judge could have reached”;

did not make a decision that was “plainly wrong”. [51] I therefore dismiss P’s Appeal with costs of RM15K to be paid by P to D by 24.9.2024. Costs are subject to the allocatur. I affirm the Sessions Court’s judgment, which dismissed P's claim and allowed D2’s counterclaim. Dated: 7 October 2024 KENNETH ST JAMES Judicial Commissioner Penang High Court Counsel/Solicitors: For the Appellant – Ang Boon Pin and Toh Khay Yann [Koay Partnership (Bukit Mertajam)] For the Respondents – Kavineesh Ravintahran [K. Kumara & Co. (Penang)] Page 21 of 21 Legislation referred to:

Section 14 of the Contract Act 1950.

Section 15 of the Contract Act 1950.

Section 16 of the Contract Act 1950. Cases referred to:

Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC); [2020] 8 AMR 227; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 MLRA 193.

UEM Group Bhd (previously known as United Engineers (M) Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2011] 1 AMCR 338 (FC); [2010] 9 CLJ 785; [2010] 2 MLRA 668; [2010] MLJU 2179.

Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600 (UKSC)

Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Anor Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177 (FC); [2018] 1 AMR 517; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 MLRA 263.

MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 428 (CA); [2016] 4 CLJ 665; [2016] 3 MLRA 1144.

Majlis Bandaraya Johor Bahru v Satupadu Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLRH 748 (HC); [2010] MLJU 566 (HC); [2010] AMEJ 0098.