Preamble
menurut PAP 2018. Dalam kes ini Responden telah mengenakan hukuman yang tiada kaitan dengan perbuatan atau kesalahan yang diperuntukan dalam PAP 2018. Mahkamah ini berpendapat setiap kes itu perlu dilihat dan dipertimbangkan mengikut faktanya tersendiri. [33] Mahkamah ini boleh menyemak dan membatalkan keputusan Responden jika pada pendapat Mahkamah Responden telah bertindak diluar bidangkuasanya dan menyalahi undang-undang. Ini dapat dilihat daripada keputusan kes Ketua Pengarah Buruh v Britania Brands (Malaysia) sdn Bhd [2010] 6 CLJ 370, Mahkamah rayuan memutuskan; “ [33] It is for these reasons, that a decision of an inferior court or public authority may be quashed by an order of certiorari where that court or authority acted without jurisdiction, or exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to comply with the rules of natural justice, or where there is an error of law on the face of the record, or where the decision is unreasonable in the Wednesbury’s sense”. [34] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada keputusan kes Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors v Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur [2013] 8 CLJ 890, CA (keputusan dikekalkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan) memutuskan seperti berikut; 21 “[69] …the decision maker must consider matters required to be considered and disregard irrelevant collateral matters and the decision must be within the perimeters of the statutory powers given to the decision maker on the matter. It goes without saying therefore if the decision is made in compliance with these principles and requirements such decision cannot be said to be unreasonable and is unassailable. But if the exercise of the discretion is made on contravention of any law or that decision maker has taken into consideration irrelevant matters or that the decision maker has acted in excess of powers conferred upon him in respect of the matter which he decided or that decision militates against the object of the statute, then the court can intervene and strike down the decision as unreasonable and unlawful.” [35] Sama ada keputusan atau hukuman yang dibuat ke atas Pemohon berpadanan atau setimpal dengan kesalahan? Peraturan 14 PAP 2018 memberi kuasa luas kepada Responden untuk tertakluk kepada apa-apa keputusan LKPU termasuk menahan calon daripada mengambil PSAG untuk suatu tempoh tertentu atau selama-lamanya. Meskipun Pemohon tidak dinyatakan kesalahan yang dilakukan di bawah mana-mana Peraturan 14 (i) hingga (v), maka adakah keputusan 22 untuk menahan Pemohon dari menduduki PSAG selama 3 tahun dan menahan pelepasan keputusan peperiksaan PSAG 2018 wajar dan munasabah? Pemohon telahpun diambil tindakan di bawah Peraturan 18(ii) PAP 2018. Mahkamah ini berpendapat hukuman selanjutnya adalah keterlaluan dan bertentangan dengan peraturan yang ditetapkan oleh Responden sendiri. Pemohon juga telah dinafikan haknya untuk merayu bagi apa-apa kesalahan jika dibuktikan sebelum Responden membuat keputusannya. Responden membuat keputusan dengan merujuk kepada Surat Tunjuk Sebab dari Pemohon dan Laporan Pengawas Peperiksaan. [36] Adalah suatu kewajaran bagi Responden menyatakan sebab-sebab keputusan dan hukuman dikenakan di bawah PAP 2018. Dalam kes Pemohon ini, Responden tidak menyatakan sebab-sebab atau alasan-alasan bagi Responden mencapai keputusannya. Keputusan Responden bukan sahaja menjejaskan kehidupan masa hadapan Pemohon tetapi juga bertentangan dengan Artikel 5 Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang memberi jaminan Kebebasan Asasi bahawa tiada seseorang pun boleh diambil nyawanya atau dilucutkan kebebasan dirinya kecuali mengikut undang-undang. Jaminan kebebasan asasi ini telah dijelaskan dalam penghakiman Richard Malanjum KH (Sabah & Sarawak) kemudiannya KHN di dalam kes 23 Yusuf Sudin v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Polis & Anor [2012] 1 CLJ, 448 di mukasurat 459 iaitu seperti berikut; [5] Accordingly, observation of procedural fairness that is closely connected to a fundamental right, for instance, the right to life (art.5 (1) as enshrined in our Federal Constitution is of paramount importance. Indeed right to life has been interpreted to include the right to livelihood. And it has been said that ‘income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work, becomes as much fundamental’ (see: Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress & Ors [1991] Supp 1 SCC 600) and referred to by our Court of Appeal in Tan Tek Seng & Tan Chee Meng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 771. Hence, failure to observe such procedural fairness would tantamount to a breach or aiding a breach of such fundamental rights”. (penekanan tambahan oleh Mahkamah ini) [37] Responden juga gagal mengambilkira doktrin perkadaran hukuman (doctrine of proportionality) yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Norizan Bakar v Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2013] 9 CLJ 409 yang memutuskan bahawa hukuman bercorak penindasan 24 (oppressive) dan terlalu keras tidak dibenarkan. Pemohon bukan sahaja telah diambil tindakan di bawah Peraturan 18(ii) PAP 2018 tetapi telah dikenakan hukuman tambahan yang bukan sahaja tidak patut dikenakan ke atas Pemohon tetapi juga bertentangan dengan kesalahan yang diperuntukkan di bawah PAP 2018. Mahkamah ini mendapati kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan tidak sepadan dengan fakta dan hukuman yang dikenakan. [38] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Perkhidmatan [1996] 2 CLJ 771, Gopal Sri Ram HMR dalam penghakimannya menyatakan seperti berikut; “In a case like the present, this Court is, for the reasons already given sufficiently empowered to come to its own conclusion on the merits on the case. Taking into account all the relevant facts of the case, including the extenuating factors alluded to by the Maur High Court, I am inclined to agree with the submission of Counsel that the order of dismissal was too severe a punishment to impose upon the appellant. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, some lesser punishment ought to have been imposed. Having come to this conclusion, the 25 next question that arises is: what relief ought the appellant to be given? The appellant has, as earlier observed, claimed declarations. If he is granted these, they would have the effect of reinstating him to his former post with no loss of pay and other benefits. Now, this Court may certainly direct reinstatement on such terms. But that, in my view, is not the proper remedy in the peculiar circumstances of this case. The important question is: Can, and ought this Court impose any other appropriate punishment? I think that it can and that it should. In arriving at my conclusion on the remedy that ought to be given in this case, I have derived much assistance from the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in Rohana bte Ariffin v. University Sains Malaysia [1988] 2 CLJ 390 (supra ), which I have already described as an important decision. In that case, recognition was afforded by his Lordship to the move away from the technicalities of particular remedies and to the achievement of substantial justice. The relevant passage in the judgment of his Lordship is at p. 489 of the report and it reads as follows: 26 “I would, however, in passing, and as a matter of general interest, remark that there are dicta in administrative law cases in the UK which indicate that Judges there are beginning to depart from their traditional preference of dealing with the technicalities of remedies rather than the principles governing official action and individual rights. For example, in a recent immigration case Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] 1 All ER 940, in the House of Lords, Lord Bridge stated that Courts are entitled within limits. “to submit an administrative decision to a more rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in no way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the decision determines. The most fundamental of all human rights is the individual's right to life and when an administrative decision under challenge is said to be one which may put the applicant's life at risk, the basis of the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny.” And Lord Templeman said this: 27 Where the result of a flawed decision may imperil life or liberty a special responsibility lies on the Court in the examination of the decision making process.” [39] Kesimpulan Menimbang permohonan Semakan Kehakiman Pemohon ini, afidavit, hujahan bertulis dan hujahan lisan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah ini mendapati Responden telah membuat keputusan diluar dari bidangkuasa yang diperuntukkan oleh undang-undang sehingga membuat keputusan yang tidak rasional, tidak munasabah, tidak seimbang, keterlaluan dan tidak adil kepada Pemohon. Mahkamah ini wajar membatalkan keputusan yang dibuat oleh Responden dan memerintahkan Responden melepaskan keputusan Peperiksaan Sijil Amalan Guaman 2018 kepada Pemohon. Mahkamah membenarkan permohonan Semakan Kehakiman Pemohon dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00. 28 MARIANA BINTI HAJI YAHYA HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI (BAHAGIAN KUASA-KUASA KHAS) MAHKAMAH TINGGI KUALA LUMPUR BERTARIKH: 31 JULAI 2019 Peguam Cara bagi pihak Pemohon Encik Sundra Anath bersama Cik Rosliza binti Abdul Rahim, Tetuan Chew & Yap, Subang Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Peguam Cara bagi pihak Responden Encik Sean Tan bersama Cik Chia Ka Mun, Tetuan Wong Kian Kheong, Kuala Lumpur. Rujukan Undang-Undang 1) Legal Profession Act 1976 2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan 3) Peraturan Dan Arahan Peperiksaan Kepada Calon-Calon Peperiksaan Sijil Amalan Guaman 2018” (“Pap 2018”) Rujukan Kes-Kes 1) R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147, 171-172 29 2) Ranjit Kaur a/p S Gopal Singh v Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLJ, 1, FC 3) Ketua Pengarah Buruh v Britania Brands (Malaysia) sdn Bhd [2010] 6 CLJ 370 4) Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors v Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur [2013] 8 CLJ 890, CA 5) Yusuf Sudin v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Polis & Anor [2012] 1 CLJ, 448 6) Norizan Bakar v Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2013] 9 CLJ 409 7) Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Perkhidmatan [1996] 2 CLJ 771 30