Yap Teak Sing v Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (WA-25-293-09/2023)

By this amended application for judicial review (encl. 21), the Applicant sought the following reliefs:

an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Respondent in the letter dated 21.6.2023 (‘Impugned Decision’) to suspend the exercise of power of the Commissioner of Buildings, Kuala Lumpur (‘CoB’) under the Strata Management Act 2013 [Act 757] (‘SMA 2013’) until the disposal of High Court Civil Suit No. WA-22NCvC- 257-05/2023 (‘HC Suit 257’); and

an order of mandamus to direct the Respondent to exercise the power under paragraph 11(5)(b) (which was mistakenly stated as “perenggan 11(b)” in the application), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 to convene an extraordinary general meeting (‘EGM’) of the Suria Stonor Management Corporation (‘SSMC’).

After having considered the cause papers and submissions of the parties, I had, on 31.3.2026, dismissed the Applicant’s application.

The Applicant is dissatisfied with my decision and has filed a Notice of Appeal.

These are my full grounds of judgment for purposes of the appeal.

The Applicant is an owner and resident of Suria Stonor Condominium (‘Condominium’).

The Applicant together with the proprietors of 50 parcel units had sent all relevant and necessary documents to the SSMC in requesting the SSMC to convene an EGM in accordance with the provisions of the SMA 2013. However, the SSMC failed, refused or neglected to hold the EGM.

On 19.1.2023, the Applicant together with other proprietors of the Condominium representing more than 25% of the aggregate share units’ value (‘said Proprietors’) had sent a letter to the CoB to request that an EGM be held pursuant to paragraph 11(2)(a), 11(2)(b) and/ or 11(5) of the Second Schedule of the SMA 2013.

On 2.2.2023, the Respondent issued a letter to SSMC to inform that the CoB had received a petition from the said Proprietors requesting that an EGM be convened. The Respondent instructed the SSMC to respond within seven days from the date of the letter. However, the SSMC did not do so.

Subsequently, the Respondent issued a letter dated 7.4.2023 to the Applicant to resubmit the request for an EGM to the SSMC as the SSMC claimed that they did not receive the earlier request.

The letter dated 19.1.2023 together with the relevant documents were resubmitted to the SSMC on 11.4.2023. The Applicant took the position that the SSMC was required to convene an EGM within six weeks from the date of the letter i.e. no later than 23.5.2023. However, this was not done.

The Respondent then issued a letter on 24.5.2023 informing the SSMC that they need to respond within 14 days from the date of the letter to provide evidence of their allegation that the said Proprietors do not constitute 25% of the aggregate share units.

On 31.5.2023, the Applicant wrote a letter to the Respondent to inform regarding the SSMC’s failure to hold an EGM and further requested that the CoB invoke paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 by appointing and authorising any person to convene the EGM due to the failure of the SSMC to do so.

In the meantime, many reminder letters were sent by the said Proprietors to the SSMC, allegedly totalling 156 letters, regarding the request to convene an EGM and for the CoB’s letter dated 2.2.2023 to be circulated via the portal and Bulletin Board of the Condominium.

On 7.6.2023, the Applicant again wrote to the Respondent to request that an EGM be held since the SSMC failed to provide any evidence to support their claim that the said Proprietors did not constitute 25% of the aggregate share units.

In the letter dated 21.6.2023, the Respondent informed the Applicant that they have received the Writ and Statement of Claim (‘SoC’) from the solicitors acting for the SSMC pertaining to HC Suit 257 between the SSMC and the Applicant on the issue of convening an EGM. HC Suit 257 was later transferred to the Sessions Court as Civil Suit No.: WA-B52NCvC-270-06/2023 (‘Suit 270’).

On 11.7.2023, the Applicant’s solicitor objected to the Respondent’s letter dated 21.6.2023 by stating, among others, that –

the Respondent had previously acknowledged that the said Proprietors constituted more than 25% of the aggregate share units and that all documents were in order to proceed with the EGM;

the SSMC had failed to convene an EGM as instructed by the Respondent;

the SSMC has not provided the Respondent with any evidence to support its claim that the said Proprietors do not constitute 25% of the aggregate share units;

the Respondent’s decision not to hold an EGM pursuant to paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 was unreasonable and unfair to the said Proprietors;

the Respondent’s decision was disproportionate because the pending court proceedings between the SSMC and the Applicant was irrelevant to the Respondent’s powers under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013, which does not state that the powers granted to the Respondent must be stayed when there are ongoing court proceedings;

the court proceedings was a mere tactic of the SSMC to delay the call for an EGM; and

the Applicant has no other option but to proceed to file a judicial review application in the High Court on the Respondent’s decision not to invoke paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 by holding an EGM.

The Applicant duly filed the application to commence judicial review proceedings against the Respondent on 20.9.2023 (encl. 1) and leave for the same was allowed by the Court on 24.10.2023.

The application to amend encl. 1 was allowed on 4.12.2023.

A Notice of Discontinuance was filed for Suit 270 on 4.4.2024.

In Mohammad Izzuddin bin Zulkifly v Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [2026] MLJU 1002, I had summarised the key legal principles in the following manner: “20. In Nor Azlinda bt Mohd Abdullah v Jawatankuasa Tatatertib Kumpulan Bukan Eksekutif (JKTKBE) Tabung Haji & Ors [2026] MLJU 580, this Court said: “33. The legal principles which can be discerned from the case authorities as cited by the parties in the instant application may be summarised as follows:

judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. The High Court does not sit in its appellate jurisdiction, but rather, in its supervisory jurisdiction. The Court is more concerned with the decision-making process and not the decision itself. The Court is not entitled on an application for judicial review to consider whether the decision itself, on the merits of the facts, was fair and reasonable. The Court is merely to quash the decision of the relevant authority, if required, and not to substitute the decision with what it thinks is the correct decision [see Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union Of Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417 (SC), Michael Lee Fook Wah v Menteri Sumber Tenaga Manusia Malaysia & Anor [1998] 1 CLJ 227 (CA) and Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Alcatel-Lucent Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Anor [2017] 2 CLJ 1 (FC)]; …”.

The renowned passage from the judgment by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors. v. Minister for Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 at pp 410 and 411 on judicial review of administrative actions, and as adopted by the Federal Court in R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court Of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145, reads: “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the Judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By “irrationality” I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. I have described the third head as “procedural impropriety” rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.” [see too, Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia v. Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 186 (SC)].

The well-established Wednesbury principle of reasonableness as explicated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 specifies that a decision is unlawful where the decision-maker has –

taken into account matters which ought not to have been considered;

failed to take into account matters which ought to have been considered; or

reached a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have arrived at it.

In subsequent decisions by the Federal Court, we are reminded that not every case is amenable to the Rama Chandran approach and it all depends on the factual matrix and/ or the legal modalities of the case. In Ranjit Kaur a/p S Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLJ 1, it was held, among others, that: “[16] The Rama Chandran decision has been regarded or interpreted as giving the reviewing court a license to review without restrain decisions for substance even when the said decision is based on finding of facts. However, post Rama Chandran cases have applied some brakes to the courts’ liberal approach in Rama Chandran. The Federal Court in the case of Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789; [1997] 2 CLJ 11 after affirming the Rama Chandran decision held that there may be cases in which for reason of public policy, national interest, public safety or national security the principle in Rama Chandran may be wholly inappropriate.” (see too, Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Selangor Bhd v Zaid Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789, Petroliam National Bhd v Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2004] 2 MLJ 288 and Alam Venture Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Abdul Aziz Abdul Majid & Ors [2015] 5 CLJ 1).”.

In his Written Submission, the Applicant referred to the judgment of the Penang High Court in Perbadanan Pengurusan Mar Vista Resort v Pesuruhjaya Bangunan, Kawasan Pentadbiran Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang & Ors [2023] CLJU 1196 where it was held that the decisions made by the respondent in not granting the applicant’s request for an extension of time to convene the general meeting were tainted with illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. However, this decision was reversed on appeal (see Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kawasan Pentadbiran Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang v. Perbadanan Pengurusan Mar Vista Resort [2025] 1 CLJ 555).

The Applicant further cited the decision of the Court of Appeal in Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors [2021] 2 CLJ 808, which was affirmed by the Federal Court in Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and Other [2023] 5 CLJ 167, where the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s application for judicial review for the reason, among others, that: “[108] In any event, given our views earlier that there is a common law duty to inform the adjoining landowners of a hearing and of their right to attend and express their concerns at the hearing, it makes sense that there is a corresponding duty on the Commissioner, that is, the Datuk Bandar, to inform those who attended of the decision made, the outcome of the hearing and the response to their objections and/or concerns. The presence of r. 5(8) amplifies this requirement especially in relation to the applicant for planning permission and to those who objected. Since these other appellants were not informed of the decision, there is clearly procedural impropriety in the decision reached which renders the development order granted, liable to be quashed.”.

The Grounds of Application which were relied upon by the Applicant were as follows:

the Impugned Decision was tainted with illegality, error of law and lack of jurisdiction as the Respondent failed to take into consideration the following matters:

that upon reading paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013, the Respondent has the power to appoint and authorise any other person to convene an EGM;

(ii) that the SSMC has failed to convene an EGM as repeatedly instructed by the Respondent;

(iii) that the Respondent should exercise his power under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 to convene an EGM for the Condominium; and

(iv) that the SMA 2013 does not state that the powers granted to the Respondent must be stayed when there are ongoing court proceedings on the same issue;

the Impugned Decision was irrational, unreasonable and disproportionate and no reasonable person or body would have made the Impugned Decision for the following reasons:

the Respondent himself stated that the SSMC was required to convene an EGM;

(ii) the Respondent has acknowledged that the said Proprietors requesting for an EGM to be convened constitutes more than 25% of the aggregate share units and that all documents are in order to proceed with the EGM;

(iii) the SSMC has failed to convene an EGM as repeatedly instructed by the Respondent;

(iv) the SSMC failed to provide the Respondent with any evidence to support its allegation that the said Proprietors did not constitute 25% of the aggregate share units;

the SMA 2013 does not state that the powers granted to the Respondent must be stayed when there are ongoing court proceedings on the same matter;

(vi) the pending court proceedings were irrelevant to the Respondent’s powers under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013; and

(vii) the pending court proceedings between the SSMC and the Applicant were completely baseless and made without any merit; and

the Respondent committed procedural error in arriving at the Impugned Decision as –

the SMA 2013 does not state that the powers granted to the Respondent must be stayed when there are ongoing court proceedings on the same matter;

(ii) he should use his power under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 to convene an EGM for the Condominium since the SSMC has failed to do so;

(iii) he refused to invoke his powers as there were pending Court proceedings between the SSMC and the Applicant regarding the same matter; and

(iv) the Impugned Decision was made without taking into account the Applicant’s legitimate expectation which was recognised to be a right protected under the law (see Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 CLJ 65).

The Respondent’s main arguments in opposing the judicial review application were that –

the determination under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 falls within the jurisdiction of the SSMC;

the Respondent never determined whether the requisition by the Applicant consisted of proprietors who are together entitled to at least one quarter of the aggregate share units;

the Respondent never issued any direction in writing to the SSMC under paragraph 11(2)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013;

the conditions under paragraph 11(3), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 were not met;

the Respondent’s power under paragraph 11(5), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 was not exercisable; and

leave for an order of Mandamus cannot be made.

The Respondent additionally submitted that there was no valid written request to hold the EGM for the following reasons:

the request was only signed by the Applicant and not all of the said Proprietors and it was not sent to the correct address;

the letter from the SSMC dated 19.5.2023 stated that the said Proprietors do not constitute 25% of the aggregate share units;

the full list of Proprietors representing more than 25% of the aggregate share units was not provided;

the request letter dated 19.1.2023 was only shown to the CoB officers but not to the SSMC; and

HC Suit 257/ Suit 270 should be disposed before the present judicial review application can be heard. Analysis & Findings of the Court 1st Issue: Whether the application for judicial review is academic

The Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 contains provisions for the Management Corporation. Paragraph 11 of the Second Schedule provides as follows: “11. Extraordinary general meetings

A general meeting of the management corporation other than the annual general meeting shall be known as the extraordinary general meeting.

The management committee –

shall convene an extraordinary general meeting upon a requisition in writing made by the proprietors who are together entitled to at least one-quarter of the aggregate share units;

shall convene an extraordinary general meeting upon receiving a direction in writing from the Commissioner for the transaction of such business as the Commissioner may direct; and

may convene an extraordinary general meeting on such other occasion as it thinks fit.

The requisition shall state the objects of the meeting and shall be signed by the requisitionist and deposited at the registered office of the management corporation, and may consist of several documents in like form each signed by one or more requisitionists.

The extraordinary general meeting shall be held as soon as practicable but in any case not later than six weeks after-

the requisition has been deposited at the registered office of the management corporation; or

receiving a direction in writing from the Commissioner under subsubparagraph (2)(b).

If –

the Commissioner is satisfied that the management committee has not been properly constituted; or

the management committee fails to convene the extraordinary general meeting within the time period stipulated in subparagraph (4), the Commissioner may authorize in writing any person to convene an extraordinary general meeting for such purposes as may be approved by the Commissioner.

In the case of a meeting convened pursuant to subsubparagraph (5)(b), all costs incurred by the person in convening the meeting shall first be paid by the management corporation to that person and such costs shall be recoverable as a debt due from all the members of the management committee personally to the management corporation.”.

The contents of the first letter which was sent by the Applicant to the CoB dated 19.1.2023 (exhibit “Y-1” in the Affidavit In Support (‘AIS’), encl. 3), reads as follows: “We, the proprietor of Perbadanan Suria Stonor (PPSS), representing more than 25% of aggregate share units’ value (see attached appendix), humbly request to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) within two (2) to six (6) weeks pursuant to Paragraph 11 (2) (a) and/or 11 (2) (b) and/or 11 (5) of the Second Schedule of the Strata Management Act 2013 on the basis that our confidence in the present composition of management committee has been lost. The agenda for the EGM is amongst others the election of new committee members who are not named in currently ongoing lawsuit by Pengurusan Perbadanan Suria Stonor against Woodtec Vision Sdn Bhd and eleven (11) other defendants.”.

Based on the Respondent’s Supplementary Affidavit which was affirmed on 11.10.2024 (encl. 36), –

the SSMC held their 10th Annual General Meeting (‘AGM’) on 20.1.2024, which was attended by the Applicant (see the Attendance List in exhibit “SMA-2”);

the Applicant was one of two candidates nominated to be chairman of the 10th AGM but after the polling result, he came in second (see subparagraphs 2.2, 2.6 and 2.7 of the Minutes of the AGM in exhibit “SMA-1”);

eight nominations were received before the AGM for election as the Management Committee where the Applicant was one of the nominees. When the nominees were called for introduction, there was no response by the Applicant who had left the AGM. Five other nominees were eventually elected as the Management Committee (see subparagraphs 5.5 and 5.6 of the Minutes of the AGM in exhibit “SMA-1”); and

on 5.4.2024, the Respondent received the letter dated 3.4.2024 from the solicitors for the SSMC in relation to Suit 270 informing that the parties have resolved the dispute through mediation (see exhibit “SMA-4”). The letter was copied to the Applicant’s solicitor. The relevant part of the letter is re-produced below for ease of reference: “3. Untuk makluman Tuan/Puan, sebelum ini, terdapatnya pertelingkahan antara PPSS dan Yap Teak Sing berkenaan dengan isu sama ada satu mesyuarat agung luar biasa (EGM) perlu diadakan berdasarkan satu permintaan yang dikatakan terdiri daripada surat bertarikh 19-1-2023 dan dihantar pada 11-4-2023. PPSS menegaskan bahawa EGM tidak perlu diadakan kerana tidak ada jumlah secukupnya daripada penghuni, iaitu sebanyak satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat, yang menyatakan niat untuk mengadakan EGM. Sebaliknya, Yap Teak Sing mendakwa bahawa EGM perlu diadakan kerana permintaan yang dikatakan dihantar pada 11-4-2023 merupakan satu permintaan yang sah dan cukup.

Memandangkan pihak-pihak mempunyai kedudukan berlainan, satu kes telah difailkan dalam Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur no. WA-B52NCVC-270-06/2023 (dipindah daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur no. WA-22NCVC-257-05/2023) oleh PPSS terhadap Yap Teak Sing untuk penentuan pihak Mahkamah.

Selepas kes difailkan dalam Mahkamah, pihak-pihak telah diarahkan untuk mendaftar kes di pusat mediasi Kuala Lumpur untuk mencuba penyelesaian. Berikutan mediasi tersebut, Yap Teak Sing telah bersetuju untuk tidak meneruskan semua aduan yang dibuat kepada DBKL sebelum ini berkenaan dengan dakwaan keengganan PPSS untuk mengadakan EGM berdasarkan permintaan dikatakan terdiri daripada surat bertarikh 19-1-2023 dan dihantar pada 11-4-2023 dan bersetuju supaya tidak membuat aduan selanjutnya kepada DBKL berkenaan dengan isu ini.

Sebagai balasan dengan perenggan 5 di atas, pihak PPSS akan menarik balik kes no. WA-B52NCVC- 270-06/2023 tanpa kos, memandangkan hal perkara berkenaan dengan EGM tersebut telah menjadi akademik selepas pemilihan baru barisan pengurusan PPSS.

Surat ini juga disalinkan kepada peguamcara Yap Teak Sing. Berikutan persetujuan pihak-pihak, kami percaya bahawa perkara ini telah diselesaikan. Dengan ini, kami memohon supaya aduan yang dibuat oleh Yap Teak Sing kepada DBKL sebelum ini berkenaan dengan permintaan EGM boleh ditutup.”.

It is a well-established legal principle that the court does not answer academic questions. In Bar Council Malaysia v Tun Dato’ Seri Arifin bin Zakaria & Ors (Persatuan Peguam-Peguam Muslim Malaysia, intervener) and another appeal [2020] 4 MLJ 773 at p 787, the apex court said: “[51] The position is well established in Malaysia (see for instance Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed & Anor v The Board of Trustees of the Sabah Foundation & Ors and another appeal [1998] 2 MLJ 137). The meaning of ‘academic’ was explained in Metramac Corp Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Syarikat Teratai KG Sdn Bhd) v Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd [2006] 4 MLJ 113 at para [9], per Augustine Paul FCJ: The test therefore, in deciding whether an appeal has become academic is to determine whether there is in existence a matter in actual controversy between the parties which will affect them in some way. If the answer to the question is in the affirmative the appeal cannot be said to have become academic.”.

Applying the above test to the present case, in my view there was no longer in existence a matter in actual controversy between the parties which will affect them is some way because any disagreement has been extinguished following the convening of the 10th AGM of the SSMC on 20.1.2024.

The Applicant attended the 10th AGM and he offered himself for election as Chairman of the same and as a member of the Management Committee, however these did not turn out in his favour.

Significantly, the request for an EGM in the letter dated 19.1.2023 and the proposed agenda for the EGM was, amongst others, the election of new committee members. Clearly, with the 10th AGM and the election of the members of the SSMC having taken place on 20.1.2024, the relief sought by the Applicant in the instant application for an order of mandamus to direct the Respondent to exercise the power under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 to convene an EGM of the SSMC has now become academic.

Moreover, there was no averment by the Applicant to controvert the letter in exhibit “SMA-4”. Therefore, the statement in paragraph 5 of the letter serves as an admission of the Applicant, where he effectively abandoned his demand for an EGM.

Having elected, as part of the settlement agreement with the SSMC in Suit 270 to not pursue all complaints lodged with the Respondent concerning the alleged refusal of the SSMC to convene an EGM, based on the request in the letter dated

19.1.2023, and not to make any further complaints to the Respondent regarding the EGM issue, the Applicant cannot be allowed to resile from such an admission. To allow the Applicant to do so would be akin to him approbating and reprobating before different courts, which this Court will not countenance (see Cheah Theam Kheang v. City Centre Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) And Other Appeals [2011] 2 MLRA 660).

In the premises, I was in agreement with the Respondent’s submission that whatever controversy surrounding the request for the EGM has been rendered moot and the instant application is now academic. 2nd Issue: Whether the Respondent failed to raise certain issues/ arguments in his affidavits

The Applicant contended, on the strength of the decision in Time Online Dotcom Bhd v Bates (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2005] 4 MLJ 251, that the Respondent failed to raise the following issues/ arguments in his affidavits and hence, the Respondent was barred from raising these issues/ arguments in the written submissions:

the determination under paragraph 11(2)(a), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 falls within the jurisdiction of the SSMC;

the Respondent never determined whether the requisition by the Applicant consisted of the said Proprietors who were together entitled to at least one quarter of the aggregate share units;

the Respondent never issued any direction in writing to the SSMC under paragraph 11(2)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013;

the Respondent’s power under paragraph 11(5), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 was not exercisable; and

leave for an order of mandamus cannot be made.

Upon perusal of the Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’, encl. 23), I find that, whilst it is correct to say that the Respondent did not expressly aver that it was for the SSMC to determine whether the said Proprietors seeking to convene the EGM were at least one-quarter of the aggregate share units, there were affirmations on the following: “8.

19.

05.2023 tersebut juga memaklumkan bahawa setelah mengambil kira alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan PPSS mendapati bahawa tidak ada jumlah secukupnya daripada penghuni bagi mewakili satu perempat daripada syer agregat bagi membentuk niat untuk mengadakan EGM. Oleh yang demikian PPSS berpandangan EGM tidak boleh diadakan berdasarkan permohonan yang dihantar serah pada 11.04.2023 sebagaimana dirujuk di eksibit

Saya juga telah dinasihatkan oleh peguamcara saya dan sesungguhnya percaya bahawa permohonan-permohonan untuk mengadakan EGM telah dikeluarkan tanpa mengenal pasti senarai pemilik-pemilik yang didakwa mewakili lebih daripada 25% unit syer agregat dan tanpa tandatangan peminta-peminta yang didakwa. Oleh yang demikian PPSS tidak berobligasi di bawah Perenggan 11(2) (a) Jadual Kedua untuk mengadakan satu EGM berdasarkan permintaan bertulis yang defektif.

Seterusnya saya menyatakan bahawa pada setiap masa yang material, permintaan yang dirujuk di Eksibit Y-4 dalam Afidavit Sokongan Pemohon merupakan suatu permintaan bertulis atau notis yang tidak sah menurut perenggan 11

(a) Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013, kerana Permintaan-permintaan yang didakwa terdiri daripada surat-surat bertarikh 19.1.2023 ditujukan kepada Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Sahaja tetapi tidak kepada PPSS sebagai diperuntukkan.

Saya sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa, Pemohon hendaklah menunjukkan jumlah syer agregat yang sah bagi membentuk jumlah syer yang dicapai bagi tujuan permohonan mengadakan EGM dan junlah yang dikemukakan oleh Pemohon di eksibit Y-1 adalah dicabar keesahannya oleh PPSS.”.

Paragraph 11(2)(a), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 mandates the Management Committee to “… convene an extraordinary general meeting upon a requisition in writing made by the proprietors who are together entitled to at least one-quarter of the aggregate share units”.

Arguably, the fact that the request in the letter dated 19.1.2023 was not addressed to the SSMC means that the SSMC would not be in a position to make a determination as to whether the written requisition made by the said Proprietors are together entitled to at least one-quarter of the aggregate share units.

In my opinion, the averments as quoted above form a sufficient basis for an argument as per subparagraph 36(a) above to be raised by the Respondent.

In any event, I accepted the Respondent’s submission, citing the case authorities of Kassim Bin Sulong & Anor v Guthrie Estates Holdings Ltd & Ors [1993] 3 MLJ 303 and Tarlia Enterprises Sdn Bhd v. Ng Giak Pin [2020] MLRHU 1815 in support, that the issue on the interpretation of paragraph 11(2)(a), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 involved a question of law and therefore there is no requirement for it to be raised in the AIR before the Respondent can make submissions on the same. The same can be said of the submissions as per subparagraphs 36(d) and (e) above.

Meanwhile the arguments as per subparagraphs 36(b) and (c) above involve a close examination of the correspondence which have been exhibited in the AIS.

I therefore find and hold that there is nothing to bar the Respondent from submitting on the abovesaid issues/ arguments. 3rd Issue: Whether the Impugned Decision is

tainted with illegality, error of law and lack of jurisdiction; and/ or

(ii) irrational, unreasonable and disproportionate, and the Respondent had committed procedural error

The Applicant’s main grounds of application are addressed together as there is an overlap in the points of arguments in relation to each of these main grounds.

Firstly, it is indisputable that, under paragraph 11(5), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013, the Respondent has the power to authorise any person to convene an EGM if either subparagraph

or (b) is fulfilled and that the SMA 2013 does not expressly state that the powers granted to the Respondent must be stayed when there are ongoing court proceedings on the same issue.

Secondly, although the relief sought by the Applicant was to quash the Impugned Decision to suspend the exercise of power of the CoB under the SMA 2013 until the disposal of HC Suit 257, the letter dated 21.6.2023 in exhibit “Y-9” shows only the following: “2. Dimaklumkan bahawa pihak Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kuala Lumpur (COBKL) telah menerima beberapa salinan dokumen Mahkamah (Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan) daripada Tetuan Mah-Kamariyah & Philip Koh, pihak peguam mewakili Perbadanan Pengurusan (MC) Suria Stonor. Merujuk kepada sesalinan surat bertarikh 31hb Mei 2023 daripada Tetuan Mah-Kamariyah & Philip Koh, pihak peguam telah memaklumkan bahawa pihak MC Suria Stonor telah memfailkan suatu tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Guaman Sivil No. WA-22NCVC- 257-05/2023 terhadap Tuan (Yap Teak Sing) berkenaan dengan isu permohonan untuk mengadakan mesyuarat agung luar biasa (EGM).

PIhak COBKL juga percaya bahawa perkara-perkara seperti di Para 2 adalah dalam pengetahuan Tuan di mana pihak MC Suria Stonor telah memaklumkan kepada pihak COBKL bahawa Tuan juga telah dimaklumkan berkenaan pemfailan saman ke atas Tuan berkaitan permintaan secara bertulis yang dibuat oleh Tuan untuk mengadakan mesyuarat agung luar biasa (EGM).”.

Thirdly, in deciding whether there is merit in the Applicant’s grounds of application that –

the Respondent has stated that the SSMC was required to convene an EGM and has repeatedly instructed the SSMC to do so;

the Respondent has acknowledged that the said Proprietors requesting for an EGM to be convened constitutes more than 25% of the aggregate share units and that all documents are in order to proceed with the EGM; and

the Respondent should exercise his power under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 to convene an EGM for the Condominium, the letters issued by the Respondent as exhibited in the AIS have to be carefully scrutinised.

The gist of these letters is re-produced below for ease of reference:

Respondent’s letter dated 2.2.2023 to the SSMC (exhibit “Y-2”): “…

Dimaklumkan bahawa Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kuala Lumpur (COBKL) telah mendapat aduan daripada beberapa pemunya petak di kawasan pemajuan Suria Stonor berkenaan minit Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan (AGM) ke-9 di mana AGM tersebut telah diadakan pada 17hb Disember 2022. Pihak COBKL telah dimaklumkan bahawa minit mesyuarat AGM tersebut masih belum dipaparkan di papan notis Kondominium Suria Stonor untuk perhatian dan makluman semua pemunya petak.

Pihak COBKL juga ingin menarik perhatian pihak Tuan bahawa pihak kami juga masih belum menerima apa-apa maklumat berkenaan AGM yang telah diadakan pada 17hb Disember 2022. Untuk makluman pihak Tuan, Perenggan 7(8), Jadual Kedua, Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 (Akta 757) memperihalkan seperti berikut:- “Jawatankuasa Pengurusan hendaklah, dalam masa dua puluh lapan hari dari sesuatu mesyuarat agung, memfailkan dengan Pesuruhjaya salinan yang diperakui benar bagi – a) akaun teraudit bagi perbadanan Pengurusan dengan laporan juruaudit yang telah dibentangkan pada mesyuarat agung itu; b) ketetapan yang diluluskan pada mesyuarat agung itu; dan c) minit mesyuarat agung itu.” Oleh itu, pihak Tuan dikehendaki untuk memberikan maklumbalas mengenai perkara ini dengan kadar yang segera kepada pihak COBKL dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh surat ini.

Seterusnya, pihak COBKL juga telah menerima petisyen daripada pemunya-pemunya petak di kawasan pemajuan Suria Stonor berkenaan permohonan untuk mengadakan Mesyuarat Agung Luar Biasa (EGM). Untuk makluman pihak Tuan, Perenggan 11(2)(a), Jadual Kedua, Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 (Akta 757) memperihalkan seperti berikut:- “Jawatankuasa Pengurusan – hendaklah mengadakan suatu mesyuarat agung luar biasa atas permintaan secara bertulis yang dibuat oleh pemilik-pemilik yang bersama-sama berhak ke atas sekurang-kurangnya satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat”.

Oleh hal yang demikian, pihak Tuan diarahkan utnuk memberikan maklumbalas berkenaan Para 3 dan Para 4 seperti yang dinyatakan di atas dengan kadar yang segera kepada pihak COBKL dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh surat ini untuk makluman dan tindakan lanjut pihak COBKL. …”.

Respondent’s letter dated 7.4.2023 to the Applicant (exhibit “Y-3”): “Dengan segala hormatnya saya merujuk kepada perkara di atas dan dua (2) salinan surat bertarikh 16.02.2023 dan 24.03.2023 serta sesi perbincangan yang diadakan pada 05hb April 2023 jam 3.00 petang di pejabat Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kuala Lumpur (COBKL) yang dihadiri oleh Pengerusi dan anggota-anggota jawatankuasa Perbadanan Pengurusan (MC) Suria Stonor bersama-sama Pengurus Bangunan mewakili MC Suria Stonor adalah dirujuk dan berkaitan.

Berdasarkan hasil perbincangan pihak COBKL bersama pihak MC Suria Stonor pada 05hb April 2023, pihak COBKL telah dimaklumkan secara bertulis dan lisan bahawa MC TIDAK menerima permintaan secara bertulis yang dibuat oleh pemilik-pemilik yang bersama-sama berhak ke atas sekurang-kurangnya satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat secara lengkap dan sempurna menurut peruntukan Perenggan 11(2)(a), Jadual Kedua, Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 (Akta 757). Pihak MC Suria Stonor telah memaklumkan kepada pihak COBKL bahawa pihak mereka hanya menerima beberapa permintaan secara bertulis tanpa ditandatangani oleh mana-mana pemilik. Pihak MC Suria Stonor juga telah menegaskan bahawa sekiranya pihak mereka menerima permintaan secara bertulis yang lengkap dan sempurna daripada sekurang-kurangnya satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat, maka pihak mereka akan mengadakan mesyuarat agung luar biasa (EGM) dengan kadar segera, iaitu tidak lewat daripada enam minggu menurut peruntukan Perenggan 11(4)(a), Jadual Kedua, Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 (Akta 757).

Hasil semakan dan penelitian phak COBKL, berdasarkan keterangan yang diberikan oleh kedua-dua pihak, iaitu pihak Tuan dan pihak MC Suria Stonor serta dokumen-dokumen yang diserahkan kepada pihak COBKL oleh kedua-dua pihak, maka dengan ini, pihak COBKL mengarahan pihak Tuan untuk membuat serahan tangan secara lengkap dan sempurna berkenaan permintaan secara bertulis daripada pemilik-pemilik (senarai pemilik yang lengkap) sekurang-kurangnya satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat bagi mengadakan EGM di bawah peruntukan Perenggan 11(2)(a), Jadual Kedua, Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 (Akta 757) di hadapan wakil pihak COBKL di pejabat Perbadanan Pengurusan Suria Stonor pada tarikh dan waktu yang ditetapkan oleh pihak Tuan.

Oleh yang demikian, pihak COBKL memohon kepada pihak Tuan untuk memaklumkan kepada pihak kami akan tarikh dan waktu yang dicadang pihak Tuan bagi membuat serahan tangan secara lengkap dan sempurna berkenaan permintaan secara bertulis daripada pemilik-pemilik (senarai pemilik yang lengkap) sekurang-kurangnya satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat bagi mengadakan EGM kepada pihak MC Suria Stonor supaya wakil pihak COBKL dapat menyaksikan dan mengambil maklum penyerahan sempurna tersebut daripada pihak Tuan bagi mengelakkan sebarang konflik dan permasalahan berbangkit daslam kalangan pemilik-pemilik MC Suria Stonor dengan pihak MC Suria Stonor. …”.

Respondent’s letter dated 24.5.2023 to the SSMC (exhibit “Y-5”): “Dengan segala hormatnya saya merujuk kepada perkara di atas dan sesalinan surat daripada pihak tuan bertarikh 19 Mei 2023 serta sesi pebincangan di antara pihak tuan dengan pihak COBKL (Encik Fawwaz dan Encik Palaniappan) pada 19 Mei 2023 jam 5.00 petang di pejabat COBKL adalah dirujuk dan berkaitan.

Pihak Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Kuala Lumpur (COBKL) telah dimaklumkan bahawa pihak tuan telah menjalankan semakan dan siasatan terhadap beberapa surat permintaan secara bertulis untuk mengadakan Mesyuarat Agung Luar Biasa (EGM) daripada pemilik-pemilik Perbadanan Pengurusan

Suria Stonor yang berhak sekurang-kurangnya satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat yang telah dibuat serahan secasra tangan pada 11 April 2023 di pejabat pihak tuan yang juga telah disaksikan di hadapan wakil COBKL yang hadir (Encik Fawwaz dan Encik Palaniappan).

Merujuk kepada sesi perbincangan diantara pihak tuan dengan pihak COBKL (Encik Fawwaz dan Encik Palaniappan) pada 19 Mei 2023 jam 5.00 petang di pejabat COBKL, pihak tuan telah membentangkan bukti-bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa jumlah permintaan secara bertulis daripada pemilik-pemilik Perbadanan Pengurusan (MC) Suria Stonor yang berhak sekurang-kurangnya satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat tidak tercapai. Walau bagaimanapun, pihak tuan TIDAK mengemukakan bukti-bukti tersebut secara rasmi untuk perhatian pihak COBKL.

Oleh yang demikian, pihak tuan diminta untuk memberikan bukti-bukti bahawa permohonan tersebut tidak mempunyai jumlah yang secukupnya oleh pemilik-pemilik iaitu sekurang-kurangnya satu perempat daripada unit syer agregat dan memberikan jumlah sebenar permohonan yang diterima setelah siasatan dijalankan oleh pihak tuan. Pihak tuan diminta untuk memberikan maklumbalas berkenaan perkara di atas dalam tempoh empat belas (14) hari daripada tarikh surat ini. …”.

Based on the contents of the above-quoted letters, it is obvious that, contrary to the Applicant’s averments and submissions, the Respondent never stated that the SSMC was required to convene an EGM and has repeatedly instructed the SSMC to do so, and that the Respondent has acknowledged or came to the conclusion that the said Proprietors requesting for an EGM to be convened constitutes more than 25% of the aggregate share units and that all documents are in order to proceed with the EGM.

Both letters in exhibits “Y-2” and “Y-3” make reference to paragraph 11(2)(a), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013, which is the provision that imposes a duty on the SSMC to convene an EGM upon a requisition in writing made by the proprietors who are together entitled to at least one-quarter of the aggregate share units, and not to paragraph 11(2)(b) which mandates the SSMC to convene an EGM upon receiving a direction in writing from the CoB for the transaction of such business as the CoB may direct.

Apart from the Respondent’s letters which were exhibited in the AIS, the Applicant has not shown any correspondence from the Respondent to the SSMC, directing the SSMC to convene an

In order for the Respondent to exercise his power under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013, the SSMC must have failed to convene the EGM within the time period stipulated in paragraph 11(4). In this regard, not only did the Applicant fail to establish that the conditions in paragraphs 11(2)(a) and (b) have been met, the requirement under paragraph 11(4) was also not fulfilled.

In the circumstances, there was no valid basis for the Respondent to exercise his power under paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013 and the Applicant’s submission on his legitimate expectation was unfounded.

With reference to HC Suit 257/ Suit 270, among the reliefs sought in the SoC (see exhibit “MAM-2”, encl. 23) are as follows: “23.1 A declaration that the purported requisitions delivered by the Defendant and received by the Plaintiff on 11 April 2023 (“Purported Requisitions”) is Invalid and insufficient to constitute legal and binding requisition under paragraph 11(2) of Second Schedule to the Strata Management Act 2013 for the convening of an

23.2 A declaration that the Plaintiff is not obliged to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting pursuant to the Purported Requisitions;

23.3 An injunction to restrain the Defendant or any of the Defendant's agent from taking any steps to demand for convening of Extraordinary General Meeting pursuant to the Purported Requisition; …”.

In light of the reliefs sought as above quoted, I was of the considered view that the Respondent’s decision to suspend the power under s 11 of the SMA 2013 until HC Suit 257/ Suit 270 was disposed, albeit there appeared to be a missing page to the letter dated 21.6.2023 in exhibit “Y-9”, cannot be said to be procedurally wrong.

Furthermore, it was not for this Court to make a determination on whether HC Suit 257/ Suit 270 was baseless and without any merit. As it turned out, the dispute was resolved through mediation.

As the Applicant has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that there was a legal duty on the Respondent to act pursuant to paragraph 11(5)(b), Second Schedule of the SMA 2013, and that he failed to perform the same, there was simply no basis for an order of mandamus to be granted (see sub-s 44(1) of the Specific Relief Act 1950 [Act 137] and the cases cited by the learned counsel for the Applicant, namely, Workon Sdn Bhd v The Director of Lands & Surveys, Sabah [1999] 4 MLJ 177, Menteri Besar Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur v Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd [2010] 4 MLJ 360 (CA) and Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad v Tan Sri Mohd Sidek bin Hassan & Ors [2018] 7 MLJ 768).

In the upshot, I find and hold that the Applicant has not established that the Respondent’s decision was tainted with illegality, error of law and lack of jurisdiction; and/ or irrational, unreasonable and disproportionate, and that the Respondent had committed a procedural error in making the Impugned Decision.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Applicant’s application was dismissed with costs of RM15,000.00 to the Respondent, subject to allocatur. DATED: 29.5.2026 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BKK1) Solicitors for the Applicant: Dhinesh Nandrajog Messrs. Nandrajog Solicitors for the Respondent: Mohd. Ruzaini bin Zulkifli Messrs. Haris Salleh & Co.