The person attesting shall attest by signing one of the Forms in Schedule XXXVIII, and if he be an official holding a seal of office shall authenticate his signature by his official seal.” [24] Based on the above provisions of the Land Code, we agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the defendant that it is not necessary for both the transferor and transferee to be physically present together (i) at the signing of the Memorandum of Transfer, or (ii) at the time of presentation for registration, unless both parties elected to sign together the transfer before the Registrar of Titles at the land office. [25] However, pursuant to s.85(ii) of the Land Code, it is a requirement that both the transferor and transferee must be alive when the transfer is presented, otherwise the registration of the transfer is void (see also Jamaluddin v. Sapiah [1936] MLJ Rep 221). [26] We note however that the documents relied upon by the defendant to prove the transfer of the land are all Part C documents. This means that, pursuant to 0.34 r.2(2)(e)(ii) of the Rules of Court 2012, the authenticity and contents of such documents are disputed. The defendant therefore bears the burden of proving the authenticity and contents of such documents. Death before presen-tation. Form of attesta-tion. 9 [27] As contended by the plaintiff, the defendant did not produce the Memorandum of Transfer executed by the deceased which we think is a critical document to prove whether the deceased in fact signed on the transfer document for the purpose of execution. Neither did the defendant subpoena any officer from the land office to verify the transfer. The plaintiff was never cross-examined nor asked that, based on the transfer on 17.1.1949 as stated in the title (D17), the deceased was still alive on that date. In fact, the plaintiff testified that he had never seen the transfer, as shown in D17, from Yap Foh Sang, as a representative to Choo Lin Cheong, to the deceased before. [28] We are of the view that while s.85(ii) of the Land Code prohibits the registration of an instrument after the death of the person executing it, s.85 cannot be used to presume that the deceased in the present case was alive in 1949, and died in 1951. The legal presumption of life and death are dealt which specifically by s.107 and 108 of the Evidence Act 1950, and not by the Land Code. [29] It must be borne in mind that the fact in issue in this case is not whether the transfer to the deceased is void, but rather when did the deceased pass away. The title (D17) itself cannot prove the life or death of the deceased. In the absence of a death certificate or any confirmation of death by the Registrar of Births and Deaths, we are of the considered opinion that the best evidence adduced before the learned trial Judge is not the title, but instead is still the tombstone of the deceased and the inscriptions thereon, which were supported by the Association’s record of burial of the deceased that was produced by PW3, and corroborated by the inscriptions on the tombstone of Yap Chin Fook at the same cemetery. It can be safely concluded from such evidence that the deceased had 3 10 children, namely 2 sons, Chin Fook and Fatt Yew, and a daughter, Yap Tin. [30] One of Chin Fook’s 2 sons was Yap Hong. Yap Hong was the plaintiff’s father. Therefore, the learned Judge rightly held that the plaintiff is the deceased’s great grandson. [31] On the other hand, based on evidence adduced by the defendant, Fatt Yew was the father of Yap Phooi Hong. Yap Phooi Hong was the defendant’s father. Therefore, the defendant is also a great grandson of the deceased. The learned Judge accepted this fact. [32] After having perused the record of appeal and considered the submissions of both learned counsels, we find no merit in this appeal. We are satisfied that the learned Judge did not err in fact or in law to warrant our appellate intervention. The learned Judge is correct in his decision that both the plaintiff and the defendant are beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased and they should be made co-administrators of the estate. The appeal is therefore accordingly dismissed with costs. The decision and order of the High Court are affirmed. DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION [33] The defendant filed an application in this Court by way of a Notice of Motion (“Motion”) on 24.5.2018. Enclosure 15 was fixed for hearing before us on the same day as the substantive appeal herein. We considered and decided the Motion together with the appeal. [34] In enclosure 15, the defendant applied for leave pursuant to s.69(1) and (3) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (“CJA”) and rule 7 of the 11 Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 (“RCOA”) to adduce further evidence by way of an affidavit affirmed by the defendant which contains: “i. The photographs of the tombstone erected for Madam Shum Poh Sum who died on 13th June 1951 and was buried at the Kwong Tong Cemetery Kuala Lumpur together with copies of the register book of records of the Association of Kwong Tong Cemetery Management Kuala Lumpur and the receipt issued in respect of plot No. 21399 and the duly certified translation of the inscription on the tombstone and the contents of the records pertaining to Madam Shum Poh Sum from Chinese into English; ii. The photographs of the original tombstone erected in 1945 for Yap Chin Fook that it was erected by his sons: Yap Kit Fong and 6 other siblings together with the duly certified translations of the inscriptions thereon from Chinese to English. The copy of the register book of records showing the entry of the particulars was previously marked as P12 and the receipt therefor was marked as P11 in the Record Rayuan Part C Jilid 3(1)”. [35] The defendant’s grounds for the application is that the further evidence was not available earlier and the defendant had tried several times to obtain the information from the Association of Kwong Tong Cemetery Management (“Association”), but was not able to do so. The defendant, not being able to read or write Chinese, was not able to personally search for the tombstone of his great grandmother in the Kwong Tong Cemetery as there are more than 250,000 bodies buried there and the writing on the tombstones are in Chinese. [36] Under s.69(1) of the CJA, this Court has “full discretionary power to receive further evidence by oral examination in court, by affidavit or by deposition”. Under s.69(3) of the same Act, upon appeal from a judgment 12 after trial or hearing, this Court shall admit further evidence “on special grounds only” with leave of the Court. [37] As stated earlier in this Judgment, the learned Judge accepted the evidence of the plaintiff based on the tombstone of Madam Tham/Madam Shum, the deceased, and the inscriptions thereon, which evidence was supported by the evidence of PW3 who had custody of, and who produced the record book of the Association. At that point, during the trial, the defendant and his sister had admitted that they could not show a different tombstone belonging to the deceased, when they were challenged to do so. [38] As submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiff, the defendant now claims that he has “found the grave” and “tombstone of the Deceased” through the “assistance” of an unknown and unidentified “grave searcher” after the judgment of the High Court. [39] On the question, what constitutes “special grounds” for admission of further evidence, r.7(3A) of the RCOA provides as follows: “(3A) At the hearing of the appeal further evidence shall not be admitted unless the Court is satisfied that –