Yb LIM Guan Eng v Datuk Zuraida Binti Kamaruddin (BA-23CY-15-06/2024)

My judgement concerns Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants for defamation. The Plaintiff, a Malaysian citizen and senior politician, previously served as Malaysia’s Minister of Finance. He was also Chairman of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Member of Parliament for Bagan (P043). The First Defendant is a Member of Parliament and former Minister of Housing and Local Government. The Second Defendant operates the online news portal Malaysia Now, while the Third Defendant is a media entity responsible for publishing and republishing articles on that portal.

This Judgment concerns two appeals filed by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants against my decision delivered on 5 March 2026.

(A) The Defendants appeal against the entirety of the decision, challenging the finding of liability and the allowance of the Plaintiff’s claim; and

(B) The Plaintiff appeals solely against the quantum of damages, contending that the award of RM50,000.00 was inadequate. A. DEFENDANTS APPEAL AGAINST THE ENTIRETY OF THE

BRIEF MATERIAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff brings this action against the Defendants for defamation, arising from oral and written statements originally made by the First Defendant and subsequently republished by Second and Third Defendants.

The central allegations pleaded are that the impugned words and articles:

expressly referred to the Plaintiff;

conveyed defamatory imputations calculated to injure the Plaintiff’s reputation as a public figure and former Cabinet Minister;

were circulated to a wide audience; and

occasioned serious reputational harm, mental distress, and public contempt.

The impugned article is set out in full and reproduced verbatim below for the courts reference: "Bekas menteri perumahan dan kerajaan tempatan (KPKT) Zuraida Kamarudin mendedahkan sebuah projek perumahan untuk bekas pekerja ladang di Bestari Jaya yang diumumkan kerajaan baru-baru ini tidak dapat diteruskan kerana ditolak oleh bekas menteri kewangan Lim Guan Eng. Pada 6 Mei, Menteri Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan Nga Kor Ming mengumumkan pembinaan lebih 200 unit Projek Perumahan Rakyat (PPR) untuk bekas pekerja ladang di Bestari Jaya. Zuraida berkata ia sebahagian taktik meraih undi kaum India pada Pilihan Raya Kecil Kuala Kubu Baharu. “Ini disebabkan politik, dia (Nga) tahu undi orang India tidak bersama PH dan dia hendak tunjuk bahawa dia boleh menjadi juara untuk orang India. “Saya nasihatkan penduduk untuk berhati-hati dengan janji kerajaan. Mereka pandai berjanji tapi belum tentu pandai buat,” tambahnya.

In the said impugned article, the First Defendant alleged, inter alia, that a housing project known as “Bestari Jaya,” intended to benefit former Indian plantation or estate workers in Bestari Jaya, Selangor, could not be continued because it had allegedly been rejected by the Plaintiff during his tenure as Minister of Finance in 2018 and again in 2019. The First Defendant, further alleged that the Plaintiff’s purported rejection of the said project had caused its delay for approximately twenty (20) years.

The Defendants admit publication and acknowledge that the statements were indeed referred to the Plaintiff. However, they deny, that the words are defamatory and in the alternative, invoke the defences of justification of the truth, fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible journalism. Upon consideration of the all the pleadings, admissions and the records before this Court, the following material facts are established on the balance of probabilities:

First Defendant made the relevant oral statements in public forums and subsequently provided those statements to the media.

The Third Defendant published an online article containing the relevant allegations and the Second Defendant, acting in the capacity of a journalist, an editor, or an agent, participated in the publication and republication of the material, thereby contributing to its widespread dissemination across media outlets and social platforms domestically.

The publications expressly identified the Plaintiff by name and were capable of being understood by a reasonable reader or listener as referring to the Plaintiff.

The publications conveyed meanings that extended beyond neutral reportage of a dispute concerning an administrative decision. A reasonable reader was likely to understand the publications as imputing wrongdoing, improper motives, lack of integrity, discriminatory intent, and conduct undermining the Plaintiff’s fitness to hold public office.

The publications were widely circulated and remained persistent in the public domain. Requests by the Plaintiff for retraction and apology were made both prior to and subsequent to the publication only. The Defendants, however, declined to retract or issue an apology in a timely manner.

The Defendants assert that certain factual events occurred during the First Defendant’s tenure as Minister, including the Plaintiff’s alleged refusal to approve a particular housing project. That assertion is pleaded by the Defendants but rests solely upon the First Defendant’s own account as set out in the Defence. No independent documentary evidence has been placed before the Court to establish, to the requisite standard, the factual background relied upon by the Defendants in justification of the broader allegations and innuendo published.

The First Defendant was, a prominent political figure and the Second and Third Defendants are corporate entities engaged in the business of media publication and dissemination. The political context in which the impugned statements were made, together with the foreseeable impact of such statements when uttered by a political figure and subsequently propagated through media channels, were matters within the knowledge of the Defendants at the time of publication. ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT.

The principal issues for determination by this Court are as follows:

Whether the impugned words and publications are defamatory of the Plaintiff.

(ii) If the impugned words and publications are found to be defamatory, whether any of the Defendants have established a valid defence, namely justification (truth), fair comment, qualified privilege, or responsible journalism

(iii) Whether the Defendants acted with malice or in reckless disregard of the truth; and

(iv) What remedies are appropriate to vindicate the Plaintiff’s reputation and to compensate for the injury sustained. THE LAW

In my opinion, the law is settled that, in a defamation action, the Plaintiff must establish three elements: I. first, that the words were published to a third party; II. second, that the words referred to the Plaintiff; and III. third, that the words were defamatory in the sense that they tended to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society or exposed the Plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. RAUB AUSTRALIAN GOLD MINING SDN BHD (CREDITORS' VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION) V. HUE SHIEH LEE [2019] 2 MLRA SEEMA ELIZABETH ISOY v. TAN SRI DAVID CHIU TAT-CHEONG [2024] 5 MLRA 682

Once those elements are established, the burden shifts to a Defendant who pleads justification (truth) to prove the substantial truth of the imputations complained thereof. Where a Defendant relies upon public interest defences such as fair comment, qualified privilege, or responsible journalism, it must be demonstrated that the matters published were honestly held opinions, based on facts which were true, and concerned matters of public interest, and that publication was made without malice. The defence of responsible journalism further requires that reasonable steps were taken to verify the accuracy of the material and to obtain comment from those affected. In the present case, publication and reference to the Plaintiff are admitted by the Defendants. Defamatory meaning:

The impugned publications were presented in a manner that suggested improper conduct or motive on the part of the Plaintiff for example, that the Plaintiff deliberately denied housing assistance to the Indian Community and that the Plaintiff was indifferent to the welfare of that needy community and by contextual implication, that the Plaintiff’s conduct was morally blameworthy and politically opportunistic.

The pleadings and the published material demonstrate that the publications had a propensity to expose the Plaintiff to public contempt and to diminish the Plaintiff’s standing and therefore this Court accordingly finds that the publications were defamatory. LIM LIP ENG v. ONG KA CHUAN [2022] 5 MLRA 208 Justification (truth):

The Defendants place primary reliance on the defence of justification and the burden of proof in respect of justification rests squarely upon the Defendants. While the Defence pleads facts said to constitute the background to the published statements, including references to meetings, budget entries, conditions allegedly imposed by the Plaintiff, and communications with third parties, these averments rest in substantial measure upon the First Defendant’s own account.

The Defendants during the trial, did not produce independent existing documents, governmental records, or credible third-party corroboration sufficient to establish the substantial truth of the broader defamatory imputations conveyed to the public. An isolated factual assertion that a proposal was not approved, even if true, does not justify the publication of sweeping allegations or innuendo implying dishonesty, inhumanity, or extreme misconduct without adequate proof. The Court therefore finds that the defence of justification fails in respect of the defamatory meanings pleaded Fair comment:

The Defendants further assert that the statements constituted fair comment on matters of public interest. For the defence of fair comment to succeed, the impugned remarks must be recognisably opinion rather than unsubstantiated assertions of fact, must be based on facts which are true, and honestly held. In this case, the publications intermingled assertions of fact with purported opinion and extended well beyond fair and temperate criticism. The factual bases for the opinions were not shown to be true, and the tone and framing of the publications were accusatory rather than opinion-based. This Court accordingly finds that the defence of fair comment is not established. INTERNATIONAL TIMES & ORS v LEONG HO YUEN [1980] 1 MLRA 438 SYARIKAT BEKALAN AIR SELANGOR SDN BHD v TONY PUA KIAM WEE [2015] 6 MLRA Qualified privilege and responsible journalism:

The Defendants also relied upon qualified privilege and journalistic defences. Qualified privilege may protect communications made in circumstances where the communicator has a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication and the recipient has a corresponding interest in receiving it. However, such privilege is defeasible upon proof of malice. The defence of responsible journalism protects truthful reporting on matters of public interest, but requires that reasonable steps be taken to verify the accuracy of the material and to seek comment from those affected.

In my opinion, the Defendants’ material discloses a political motive and the use of media platforms to amplify allegations that were potentially advantageous in a political context. The Second and Third Defendants, assert that they sought comments from the Plaintiff and received none. However, the record shows that the Plaintiff’s counsel had earlier issued pre-action demands and requests for correction. The Defendants’ response choices demonstrate a deliberate decision to proceed with publication without securing independent corroboration or ensuring proper context within the time frame.

Given the First Defendant’s role as the primary source, and the absence of adequate independent verification disclosed to the Court, the Defendants failed to satisfy the standards of responsible journalism. In addition, where evidence of ill-will, political intent, and persistence in publication despite requests for retraction is present, qualified privilege is defeated. The Court finds that malice is established by the Defendants’ conduct of the republication, persistence despite warnings, and the political context demonstrate reckless disregard for the truth and an intention either to cause reputational harm or to secure political advantage. SYARIKAT BEKALAN AIR SELANGOR SDN BHD v TONY PUA KIAM WEE [2015] 6 MLRA 63 Damages and harm:

The Court accepts that the Plaintiff is a public figure, formerly a Cabinet Minister and presently occupying high public office. A defamatory publication that impugns integrity and fitness for public office causes particular harm to a person in such a position, and its reach is magnified when amplified by media and social networks. The pleadings and evidentiary material establish that the Plaintiff suffered distress, public humiliation, and loss of reputation. Furthermore, the Defendants’ delay in refusal to retract or apologize, and the enduring circulation of the publications, aggravate the injury. The Court will address the appropriate award of damages in the following section dealing with the Plaintiffs appeal on Quantum of damages.

The Court’s conclusion is that the Plaintiff has established the elements of defamation, and the Defendants have failed to establish any of the defences relied upon. These findings reflect the heightened duty of care incumbent upon political figures and the media when publishing allegations that impugn the integrity of public officeholders. For the reasons set out above, the Court finds for the Plaintiff on the claim of defamation and the defences of justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible journalism are rejected. B. PLAINTIFF APPEALS SOLELY AGAINST THE QUANTUM OF

It is pertinent to observe that the Court of Appeal in Chin Choon v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569 determined that, in actions for defamation, damages are to be awarded as a global sum, without demarcation between aggravated, exemplary, and general damages. Guided by that authority, I have allowed the Plaintiff’s claim and awarded a global sum of RM 50,000.00 as damages.

The core of the Plaintiff’s complaint is confined to the allegation that the Defendants published statements imputing misconduct or want of compassion in connection with a government housing initiative. Upon consideration of the pleaded and admitted facts, it is apparent that the impugned statements arose in the context of a political dispute concerning the administration of the Bestari Jaya project. The publications were, in their essence, directed toward a matter of public interest.

In my opinion, an injury to reputation in this circumstances and the Court’s award for any damages recoverable must be modest, proportionate to the diminished harm occasioned, and reflective of the public character of the dispute.

In assessing the quantum of damages, the Court has taken into account the explanations advanced by the Defendants in their respective pleadings and evidence. The following matters are material:

It is an admitted fact background that the project in question was not approved during the tenure of the Plaintiff’s office;

The First Defendant’s statements were comprised of events and recollections arising from dealings with the Plaintiff in an official and political context; and

The Second and Third Defendants, acting in their capacity as media practitioners, published the impugned material subsequent to a reasonable journalistic enquiries.

These circumstances, viewed cumulatively, demonstrate that the Defendants’ conduct was not wholly reckless or malicious, but rather arose from a political and administrative dispute of public significance. In consequence, while liability in defamation is established, the Court is of the view that the compensable harm is moderated by the factual and contextual substratum, thereby warranting a tempered award of damages.

Even assuming liability is established upon certain meanings of the impugned publications, the Court is satisfied that the presence of a substantial factual substratum, coupled with the public-interest context in which the statements were made, it materially diminishes both the necessity for a significant compensatory award and the justification for aggravated or exemplary relief. As I have mentioned earlier, the publications were directed to matters of political and administrative concern, and not to gratuitous or scandalous imputations of private misconduct. In consequence, the compensable injury to reputation is moderated, and the damages awarded must be modest, proportionate, and reflective of the attenuated harm occasioned. Public Figure Considerations

The Plaintiff is a prominent public figure, long engaged in public life. It is well-established that persons who hold high public office necessarily subject themselves to sharper public scrutiny and political criticism. The Court accepts that the Plaintiff’s social standing and established reputation operate as a buffer against reputational injury arising from statements directed to official decisions. Accordingly, the threshold of reputational impairment warranting a substantial quantum of damages is higher for such individuals.

In YB Dato’ Dr Hasan bin Mohamed Ali v YB Mulia Tengku Putra bin Tengku Awang & Ors [2010] 8 MLJ 269, the Court, having undertaken a meticulous examination of the facts and the governing principles of law, awarded the Plaintiff damages in the sum of RM50,000.00 and pronounced as follows: “[15] Saya berpendapat ganti rugi yang dituntut oleh plaintif adalah keterlaluan, mengikut prinsip-prinsip dalam kes-kes yang telah diputuskan iaitu Chin Choon @ ChinTee Fut v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 3 MLJ 494; Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161; Dato’ Musa Hitam v SH Alattas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 dan lain-lain. [16] Dalam kes Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v Chua Jui Meng, hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Gopal Sri Ram (beliau pada masa itu) menyatakan: In our judgment, we should, in defamation cases, maintain the age-old practice of making a global award in order to limit the size of awards. Otherwise, we will have runaway damages once again. Dalam kes LiewYewTiam & Ors v Cheah Cheng Hoc & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 385 sekali lagi Gopal Sri Ram, hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (beliau pada masa itu) menyentuh berkenaan award yang patut diberi dalam kes fitnah dan berkata: In the process of making our assessment we have not overlooked the recent trend in this country of claims and awards in defamation cases running into several million ringgits. No doubt that trend was set by the decision of this court in MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun. It is a decision that has been much misunderstood. The underlying philosophy of that decision is that injury to reputation is as, if not more, important to a member of our society than the loss of a limb. But we think the time has come when we should check the trend set by the case. This is to ensure that an action for defamation is not used as an engine of oppression. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression will be rendered illusory……..” [18] Lagi pun perkataan fitnah itu dikatakan hanya sekali sahaja oleh defendan pertama dan juga disiarkan secara langsung hanya sekali oleh defendan kedua. Tiada bukti yang mengatakan ada siaran ulangan atau ulang tayang majlis itu. Dalam kes Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 Abdul Hamid Mohamad hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (beliau pada masa itu) mengulas berkenaan kes Dr Jenni Ibrahim v S Pakianathan [1986] 2 MLJ 154 dan berkata: In Dr Jenni Ibrahim v S Pakianathan [1986] 2 MLJ 154, the plaintiff, a psychologist who had been doing voluntary work at Pusat Pertolongan sued the defendant for sending copies of letters containing serious allegation of criminal breach of trust to various people. Ajaib Singh J (as he then was) awarded her RM30,000 in damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court reduced the award to RM15,000 as ‘there was libel on one occasion only’

In the present case, the Court is satisfied that a modest award more appropriately reflects the limited incremental harm likely to accrue to a seasoned public figure from contested commentary concerning governmental decision-making. The compensatory relief must be proportionate, tempered, and consistent with the principle that robust political debate, even when critical, is an incident of democratic governance.

In my opinion, the Plaintiff has neither pleaded nor adduced cogent evidence of losses arising from the publications. There is no pleaded loss of clients, business opportunities, contracts, or demonstrable financial detriment attributable to the impugned statements. In the absence of proof of measurable economic damage, the Court is constrained to confine compensatory relief to a more modest some of damages. Such damages must be kept reflective of the limited reputational harm occasioned, and not inflated to compensate for unproven financial claims. Malice, vindictiveness or deliberate degradation

There is insufficient material to establish malice, vindictiveness or a sustained campaign of deliberate degradation. The pleadings and correspondence show disputed positions, a demand or response exchange, and attempts by the media defendants to seek comment. In the absence of clear evidence that the defendants acted with spiteful intent or deliberately fabricated matters to injure the plaintiff, aggravated and exemplary damages are not warranted and general damages should be regulated downward. Scope and reach of publication

The scope and reach of the publication, as pleaded, do not warrant a substantial award of damages. Although the article appeared in a named online outlet and was subsequently reposted on certain social platforms, there is no evidentiary foundation upon which the Court could properly find that the material achieved widespread international circulation or sustained viral republication sufficient to generate pervasive community opprobrium.

Where the publication is regional in character, or limited in intensity and duration, the compensatory quantum must be correspondingly restrained. The Court is therefore satisfied that the proper award is proportionately low, reflective of the confined reach of the impugned material and the absence of evidence of an extensive worldwide reputational harm. Allegations of extreme distress and irreparable reputational damage

The Plaintiff’s pleadings include allegations of extreme distress and irreparable reputational damage. However, the Court notes the absence of supporting particulars evidencing objective consequences, such as related loss of official endorsements, specific incidents of social banishment, or independent third-party statements attesting to reputational collapse.

In my view, it is trite that awards for hurt feelings and wounded pride must be tempered by objective proof. In the absence of such corroborative evidence, the Court is not persuaded that a substantial award is justified. Rather, a modest sum is appropriate, sufficient to vindicate the Plaintiff’s reputation without conferring a windfall or compensating for unproven financial or social claims. Defendants Defences

The Defendants have pleaded the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege. Even if those defences do not wholly succeed, their availability and the reasonable arguability of them serve to mitigate moral condemnation and diminish the necessity for a substantial punitive component in damages.

Where Defendants are able to demonstrate at least some objectively reasonable basis for their words, whether by reference to elements of truth, honest opinion grounded in disclosed facts, or privileged reporting on matters of public interest, I must take into account the public interest in robust political debate. In such circumstances, restraint in the quantum of damages is warranted, ensuring that compensation vindicates reputation without unduly chilling the legitimate commentary on governmental affairs. Mitigation and Corrective Measures

The Court further notes that practical mitigation steps, whether taken or reasonably available, serve to reduce the appropriate quantum of damages. The existence of correspondence, offers to discuss or correct, and the availability of standard media channels for replies or clarifications provided the Plaintiff with avenues by which reputational harm could have been perfected. In the case of Datuk Harris Mohd Salleh v Datuk Mohd Shafie Hj Apdal & Ors [2009] 7 MLJ 371, the court held as follows: - “…. actual fact if the reporting is not fair and accurate, the plaintiff is given the opportunity under s 12(2) of the DA 1957 to request the defendants to correct the report. That too the plaintiff did not do. Further, the plaintiff’s claim for quantum of damages is an unprecedented amount and is not supported by authority. In consequence, I agree with the counsel for the defendants that damages in this case must not be substantial. Taking all factors into consideration, I take the view that a sum of RM50,000 will be a fair sum in respect of damages….”

Where such corrective mechanisms are accessible and not fully exhausted prior to the commencement of proceedings, the Court must adopt a restrained approach to damages. In the present case, the opportunity for prompt correction or reply was available, and the Plaintiff’s failure to pursue further such remedies counsels against a substantial award. A modest sum is therefore appropriate, sufficient to vindicate reputation without extending beyond the bounds of proportionate compensation. Overall Assessment of Quantum

Having regard to the particular facts pleaded, the public-interest context, the Plaintiff’s status as a seasoned public figure, the absence of proven pecuniary loss, the lack of clear malice or persistent malicious conduct, the limited and unproven extent of republication, and the arguable defences available to the Defendants, the Court is satisfied that an award confined to a low quantum of general damages is appropriate.

Such an award fairly vindicates the Plaintiff’s reputation while avoiding the imposition of an excessive penalty upon expression directed to matters of legitimate public concern. The balance struck thereby ensures proportionate compensation without unduly chilling robust political debate. Therefore, this court awards a global sum of RM 50,000.00 as for damages and RM5,000.00 cost to the Plaintiff. Date: 29 April 2026 SGD SHOBA DORAI RAJAH JUDICAL COMMISSIONER SHAH ALAM HIGH COURT Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Manigganden [MESSRS S.N.NAIR & PARTNERS (KUALA LUMPUR] Solicitor for the Defendants: Nizamuddin Hamid [MESSRS ZHARIF NIZAMUDDIN (SUBANG JAYA) .]