where the judgment is based upon a wrong premise of fact or of law (see Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd v. Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 LNS 1416; [2012] 4 MLJ 149).”. [25] In Zone Nine Sdn Bhd (previously known as GBH Ceramics Sdn Bhd) v Kien Wai Plumbing Construction [2024] MLJU 2399, this Court had referred to two judgments of the apex court which had enlightened on the legal principles of appellate intervention as follows: “[24] The learned counsel for the Defendant, Mr. Jeffry Wong cited the decision of the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 for the central feature of appellate intervention, which is to determine whether the trial court had arrived at its finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and established evidence. A decision by the trial court which was arrived at without judicial appreciation of the evidence may be set aside on appeal. In determining whether the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence is sufficient or otherwise, the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial judge i.e. the assessment of the evidence, the weight that was given to the evidence and the reasons for accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence, must be examined. … [26] Gan Yook Chin’s case was among the many case authorities discussed in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC). It is settled law that an appellate court will not intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. If, in arriving at the decision, it could not reasonably be explained or justified and the decision of the trial court is one which no reasonable judge could have reached, the decision is susceptible to appellate intervention. The plainly wrong test is not intended to be used by the appellate court as a means to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts [see pp 81 - 96 of the law report, especially paragraphs 62 - 78; see too, among others, Azman bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 1 (FC, at paragraphs 24 and 25, p 12), Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441 (FC, at paragraph 60, p 464) and MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 428 (CA, at paragraph 17, p 437)].”. [26] In determining each of the grounds of appeal as shall be elaborated in the succeeding part of this judgment, I was guided by the above mentioned legal principles. ANALYSIS & FINDINGS: GROUNDS OF APPEAL IN APPEAL NO. 3 1st Ground: Whether the SCJ had erred when she failed to consider that YESB is entitled to interest, general damages, punitive and/ or exemplary damages for the losses suffered by YESB due to Barcon’s breaches [27] The SCJ in her Grounds of Judgment (‘GoJ’) stated that: “[43] Walaupun Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif di subperenggan 22(a), 22(b) serta kos seperti dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda, Mahkamah tidak membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif yang lain terutamanya mengenai tuntutan ganti rugi kerana Mahkamah mendapati pihak Plaintif gagal membuktikan apa-apa kerugian yang dialami oleh pihak Plaintif. Pihak Plaintif juga gagal mengemukakan keterangan dan dokumen sokongan bagi menyokong tuntutan ganti rugi oleh Plaintif.”. [28] I have scrutinized YESB’s written submissions after the trial before the SCJ and I find that, despite pleading the reliefs for general damages, punitive, exemplary damages and solicitor-client costs in the sum of RM100,000.00 in the Amended Statement of Claim (‘SoC’), YESB did not make any submissions regarding these reliefs. This was conceded by YESB’s counsel during the clarification session. Therefore, YEB must be taken to have abandoned these reliefs. [29] In Nur Farzana Aida Faizal & Ors v Kerajaan Malaysia [2022] 1 CLJ 692, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the High Court in rejecting the plaintiff’s claims for cost of special needs, wheelchair and Botox Injection because the plaintiff failed to submit on these claims and as such it was deemed to have been abandoned. 2nd Ground: Whether the SCJ had erred when she failed to consider that YESB is entitled to solicitor-client costs in the sum of RM100,000.00 incurred by YESB for the suit against Barcon [30] The general rule is that the court is obliged to order party to party costs on a standard basis. O. 59, r. 23(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘RC 2012’) provides on the “Scale of costs for trial in the Subordinate Courts” as follows: “Subject to the provisions hereunder, upon the conclusion and determination of any trial in the Subordinate Courts, the party entitled to costs shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be paid fixed costs in accordance with the following scale: …”. [31] The SCJ allowed YESB’s claim for the sum of RM656,868.93. The award of costs is discretionary and for the sum of claim which was allowed, costs shall not exceed RM40,000.00. In the exercise of her discretion, the SCJ awarded party to party costs of RM20,000.00. The SCJ said: “[54] Bagi isu kos tindakan yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah terhadap Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah telah menggunakan budi bicara Mahkamah untuk memutuskan jumlah kos tersebut. Jika merujuk kepada peruntukkan mengenai skala kos bagi perbicaraan di Mahkamah Rendah dalam Aturan 59 Kaedah 23 KKM 2012, Mahkamah berhak mengarahkan kos dibayar pihak yang berhak kepada kos mengikut skala seperti yang disenaraikan dalam peruntukan ini. Jumlah kos yang diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah dalam kes ini adalah sangat munasabah jika dibandingkan dengan kelayakan yang pihak-pihak berjaya dalam tuntutan mereka.”. [32] Among the reliefs sought by YESB in the SoC are for both solicitor-client costs in the sum of RM100,000.00 and costs. [33] In YESB’s post-trial written submissions, no submission at all was made on the prayer for solicitor-client costs. No invoices issued by YESB’s solicitors to YESB were produced and nor was there any Bill of Costs with the itemised legal fees and disbursements. [34] During the clarification session, YESB’s counsel similarly conceded that no submission was made with regards to this matter. Therefore, YESB is deemed to have abandoned its claim for costs to be paid on solicitor-client basis. 3rd Ground: Whether the SCJ had erred when she failed to consider that Barcon had instructed YESB to do additional works after the original completion date on 19.11.2017 and that all the instructions for the additional works came from Barcon and/ or the owner and was not due to YESB’s fault and/ or failure [35] In the Amended SoC, YESB pleaded the following facts. [36] Based on instructions issued by Barcon, YESB had carried out the following additional works: