that the plaintiff had suffered damages or losses as a result of the lodgment of the private caveat. Given the decision of the Court of Appeal in Luggage Distributors, the fact that the private caveat was wrongfully entered can no longer be disputed. In fact, by seeking to re-open the issue, the defendants were flagrantly circumventing the res judicata doctrine. It must be borne in mind that the defendants did not appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal. In regard to the doctrine of res judicata, I have this to say. A final judicial decision has been pronounced by the Court of Appeal — a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction, over the parties and any other person is estopped in any subsequent litigation from disputing or questioning such decision on the merits (Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1966] 2 All ER 536). The latin maxim appropriate for the S/N dvnZiVEalEGWxlhLxtkuhA occasion would be res judicata pro veritate accipitur. To me, there must be finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions. There must also be individual protection from vexatious multiplication of suits involving the same parties with the same facts. In the words of Lord Maugham LC inNew Brunswick Railway Company v British and French Trust Corporation, Limited [1939] AC 1, at pp 19-20: ‘If an issue has been distinctly raised and decided in an action, in which both parties are represented, it is unjust and unreasonable to permit the same issue to be litigated afresh between the same parties or persons claiming under them; …’ Here, the case had gone through the whole rigmarole. It was heard by NH Chan J (as he then was) and it was then heard on its merits before the Court of Appeal where the parties were represented by counsel. The Court of Appeal in a long and interesting judgment had ploughed through the facts and the submissions of the parties, so to speak, at great length. It was a speaking judgment par excellence. And of pertinence would be this. The parties were happy with the decision of the Court of Appeal because there was no appeal to the Federal Court — our apex court.” [7] In the case of MD Biomedical Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v Goh Yong Khai [2021] 5 MLJ 408, the facts were that this was an appeal against the decision of the High Court which made no award for damages and no order for costs following the appellant’s application for assessment of damages based on an order dated 12th March 2018 obtained to remove the respondent’s caveat which was wrongfully lodged on the respondent’s lands. The appellant had sought to recover the total legal fees and disbursements of RM70,000.00 incurred by it and paid to its advocates and solicitors, as damages against the respondent. On appeal, the only issue was whether the appellant could recover the legal fees and S/N dvnZiVEalEGWxlhLxtkuhA disbursements of RM70,000.00 as damages by way of an indemnity under the assessment of damages proceeding arising from the removal of a private caveat. [8] The Court of Appeal speaking through Lee Heng Cheong JCA stated: “[28] In Lo Foi v Lee Ah Hong & Ors the court there also held ‘damages under s 329(1) of the National Land Code must be assessed in accordance with the principles of the laws of torts and that would be the reasonable foreseeability test’ and ‘damages sought for would only be recoverable if they come within the range of damages recoverable in law and secondly, if they are not too remote’. [9] In the case of Orion Tower Sdn Bhd v Shanghai City Sdn Bhd [2023] 8 MLJ 345, the High Court had ordered the removal of caveat wrongfully entered by the defendant over a piece of land located in Bandar Kuala Lumpur belonging to the plaintiff (‘the land’) and further ordered that assessment of damages be made pursuant to s 329(1) of the National Land Code (‘the NLC’). Pursuant to such an order, the plaintiff had filed the present application for assessment of damages and claimed for the following damages: (a) loss and expenses incurred for the six months period (during the subsistence of the caveat) when its financing facilities were unavailable, and the plaintiff’s contractors were not able to proceed with the development works; (b) the plaintiff’s legal fees and expenses in relation the application to remove the caveat; and (c) general damages. The defendant contended that the damages were not caused by the entry of the caveat and that it would have naturally arisen because of the plaintiff’s project. Further, the defendant argued that these were projection S/N dvnZiVEalEGWxlhLxtkuhA losses on the part of the plaintiff and the plaintiff had not shown actual damages caused by the entry of the said caveat. The defendant had also raised a preliminary objection that there ought to be a trial of the assessment of damages pursuant to O 37 r 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘the ROC’). [10] It was decided by Mohd Arief JC (as he then was) that: “[19] However, I do not agree that the damages claimable are limited to the property damages or diminution in value of a property as suggested by the defendant’s counsel. He suggests that the damages must relate to the loss in value of the property, and this should not extend to any other form of damages that may arise because of the defendant’s caveat. I disagree as the cases referred to earlier and s 329 of the National Land Code, do not state that restriction as suggested by the defendant’s learned counsel. [20] Instead, I opine that if the plaintiff is able to prove that it has suffered damages as a result of the said wrongdoing, and that the said damages are not remote pursuant to the normal rules in tortious claims, the sums claimed ought to be awarded against the defendant.” [11] In the case of Asia Plywood Co Sdn Bhd v Aeon Co (M) Bhd & Anor [2020] 8 MLJ 736, pursuant to a sale and purchase agreement (‘SPA’) for the sale of the plaintiff’s land to the first defendant (‘Aeon’), Aeon entered a private caveat on the land. Due to the non-fulfillment of certain conditions precedent under the SPA, the agreement lapsed but Aeon failed to withdraw its caveat. Aeon only withdrew the caveat on 3 May 2016 — about one year and eight months after the plaintiff had filed the instant originating summons (‘OS’) to remove the caveat. On hearing S/N dvnZiVEalEGWxlhLxtkuhA the OS, the court found that Aeon had no reasonable cause to maintain the caveat after the SPA had lapsed and pursuant to s 329 of the National Land Code ordered Aeon to pay damages to the plaintiff as assessed by the court’s deputy registrar (‘DR’). The Court of Appeal (‘COA’) affirmed the decision and further ordered that damages should be assessed between the period 8 August 2014 and 3 May 2016. After hearing the parties on the assessment of damages, the DR dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on finding that it had not proven any loss or damages suffered by the existence of Aeon’s caveat. The instant proceeding was the plaintiff’s appeal to the judge in chambers against the DR’s decision. The plaintiff submitted that the DR’s decision was wrong because she had no power or jurisdiction to dismiss the application for assessment of damages as that act undermined the High Court judge’s order (as varied by the COA) for the damages to be assessed. The plaintiff also argued that it had adduced sufficient documentary and oral evidence before the DR to prove its claim for RM11,600,634.50 on the basis that, if not for Aeon’s caveat, it would have sold the land to an interested party (‘IPGB’) for RM52,690,560.00 (at RM60.00 per sqft) by 8 August 2014. The plaintiff had tendered in evidence a letter dated 22 July 2014 (‘exh P1’) it received from a real estate agency stating that there was an interested buyer for the land at that price. The plaintiff explained that its claim for the RM11,600,634.50 was made up of: (a) the total interest (RM2,310,805.53) it would have earned at 3.1% pa from placing 98% of the said purchase price on fixed deposit if the sale to IPGB had gone through; (b) the diminution (RM9,190,560.00) in the value of the land between 8 August 2014 and 3 May 2016; and (c) the fees (RM99,269.00) it had paid a registered property valuer for its services. The DR had ruled, inter alia, that: (i) the plaintiff had not produced evidence of any agreement it had signed with a prospective buyer of the land between the period 8 August S/N dvnZiVEalEGWxlhLxtkuhA 2014 and 3 May 2016; that merely tendering exh P1 was insufficient to show the plaintiff had suffered loss; (ii) the plaintiff’s computation of its loss was mere supposition because the category of the land’s use was ‘agriculture’ and IPGB’s witness had testified that IPGB would not have paid RM60.00 per sqft to acquire agricultural land whose market value then was three times lesser than that amount; and (iii) the valuation reports showed that the plaintiff had benefitted from the appreciation in value of the land between 2014 and 2016, yet it did not take steps to sell the land even after Aeon withdrew its caveat. [12] My learned sister Aliza Sulaiman JC (as she then was) decided that: “The plaintiff had produced ample evidence before the DR to prove on balance of probabilities that it had suffered actual damages, which were reasonably foreseeable, in the form of loss of opportunity to sell the land to IPGB because of Aeon’s caveat. The court accepted the plaintiff’s computation that if it had sold the land to IPGB, it would have earned RM2,310,805.53 as interest at 3.1%pa from placing 98% of the purchase price in fixed deposit. Aeon did not rebut the interest rate used by the plaintiff. The RM99,269 the plaintiff had paid Henry Butcher Malaysia (Kedah) Sdn Bhd (exh P5) to obtain a report and valuation of the land was also allowed.” [13] The Court of Appeal’s decision is reported vide Aeon Co (M) Bhd v Asia Plywood Co Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 102 which affirmed the High Court’s decision. [14] In summary, the damage and losses claimed by the Plaintiff were due to the said Caveat which had: S/N dvnZiVEalEGWxlhLxtkuhA i. Caused a loan of RM12,000,000.00 approved by Malayan Banking Bhd to Vistana (the Plaintiff’s joint venture partner) for development of the said Land to be aborted, resulting in the Plaintiff having to pay the difference between the higher interest rate payable by Vistana (to obtain short-term financing of RM12,000,000.00) and the rate offered by Malayan Banking. Vistana had to pay a higher interest rate of 12% p.a to borrow RM12,000,000.00. Maybank’s rate was Base Lending Rate (“BLR”) plus 1% per annum. Maybank’s loan offer letter dated 5th July 2019 stated their BLR was 6.65%. Total interest which Maybank would have charged was therefore 7.65% per annum. Thus, the extra interest payable for the RM12,000,000.00 was 12.00% minus 7.65% = 4.35 per annum; ii. Caused a loan of RM24,000,000.00 approved by RHB Bank to Vistana to be aborted, resulting in the Plaintiff having to pay the difference in interest rate payable by Vistana. Vistana had to pay a higher interest rate of 12% p.a to borrow RM24,000,000.00. RHB Bank’s rate was BLR plus 1.25% per annum. RHB Bank’s loan offer letter dated 15.1.2020 stated their BLR was 6.70%. Total interest which RHB Bank would have charged was 7.95% per annum. Thus, the extra interest payable for the RM24,000,000.00 was 12.00% minus 7.95%= 4.05% per annum; iii. Caused the stamp duty of RM60,000.00, which was paid to Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri to stamp the Charge instrument to Malayan Banking Berhad, to be lost.