Yogita Kishanchand Jethwani (P) v 1. ) Ashvin Jethanand Valiram (WA-33-546-09/2018)

Spousal maintenance – In deciding whether spousal maintenance should be awarded to the Petitioner, the following broad issues were imperative to consider:

The cause of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, namely:

(A) Whether the Petitioner’s allegations of adultery between the Respondent and First and Second Co-Respondents had been established, and whether the Petitioner had found such adultery, if at all, intolerable;

(B) Whether the Petitioner had established the Respondent’s abusive conduct as constituting unreasonable behaviour; and

(C) Whether the Respondent had established that it was the Petitioner’s unreasonable behaviour that had caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.

(ii) Whether the Court had the power to award spousal maintenance by way of a lump-sum; and

(iii) Whether the Petitioner had satisfied the ‘means and needs’ test to justify the amount of spousal maintenance sought. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10

Matrimonial assets – With regard to the matrimonial assets, the issue was whether the Petitioner was entitled to half of the value of the matrimonial assets, which included the property known in this judgment as the STR Apartments; household chattels, corporate assets and Respondent’s shares in ALIR, collection of watches, monies in the Respondent’s accounts and the Respondent’s savings in the Employees’ Provident Fund (“EPF”). [25] During the course of the trial of the Divorce Petition and Cross-Petition, several applications were filed, requiring the Court to make intermediate rulings regarding the admissibility of the following evidence adduced by the Petitioner:

an audio recording and its transcript; and

photographs of emails, text messages and WhatsApp messages. [26] I ruled that the audio recording and its transcript were inadmissible, and hence excluded them. However, regarding the photographs of emails, text messages, and WhatsApp messages, I concluded that all photographs taken by the Petitioner, as well as all emails authored and received by the Petitioner, were admissible as evidence. [27] Nearing the conclusion of the trial, the Respondent filed an application seeking the anonymisation of identities of all parties and details in the proceedings, citing concerns over privacy and potential reputational harm. After considering the circumstances and balancing the interests of open justice with the need for 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 confidentiality of all parties involved in these proceedings, I allowed the application to anonymise. [28] At the conclusion of the trial of the Divorce Petition and Cross-Petition, the reliefs were granted in part, covering the divorce and financial settlements. The Petitioner’s claims for damages against the First and Second Co-Respondents were not allowed. However, the Petitioner was awarded a lump sum of MYR6,720,000 for spousal maintenance, calculated at MYR35,000 per month for 192 months (16 years). Additionally, she received MYR2,000,000 as her share of the matrimonial home and household chattels, MYR1,040,000 in recognition of her contributions to ALIR, MYR450,000 from the Respondent’s EPF account (representing approximately 25% of his balance as at October 2017), and MYR350,000 representing the value of a car to be purchased by the Petitioner herself. [29] In total, the Respondent was ordered to pay MYR10,560,000, with the full amount to be settled in staggered fashion, concluding in December 2027. The following were my reasons. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether the audio recording and its transcript were admissible [30] At the outset, the Court was tasked with determining the admissibility of an audio recording and its transcripts. The recording, secretly made by the Petitioner, captured a meeting held on 26 October 2015 (“the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting”) involving herself, the Respondent, and his mother, who acted as mediator. The Petitioner contended that, during this meeting, the Respondent 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 admitted to having adulterous relationships with the First and Second Respondents, making the recording and transcripts pivotal evidence in the case. [31] Although the Petitioner had maintained that the meeting was not an attempt at reconciliation, a review of the Petitioner’s own witness statement, made it evident that the meeting was, in fact, an effort toward reconciliation, in light of the deterioration of the Parties' marriage. [32] The issue that the Court had to consider was the admissibility of the conversations recorded at the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, containing the Respondent’s purported admission, as well as its transcript, [33] It was an undisputed fact that the conversations captured in the audio recording during the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting were made secretly, without the knowledge or consent of the Respondent or his mother. On this basis, the Respondent argued that both the recording and its transcript should be excluded from evidence, asserting that their covert nature not only raised ethical concerns but also undermined their admissibility and reliability in the proceedings. [34] In response, Counsel for the Petitioner relied on the authority of Kuruma v R [1955] AC 197, asserting that the manner in which the evidence was obtained, whether clandestine or improper, did not in itself determine admissibility. Citing the general principle established in that case, Counsel for the Petitioner argued that regardless of the legality or propriety of its procurement, the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 evidence remained admissible as long as it was relevant, as prescribed by section 136(1) of the Evidence Act 1950 (“Evidence Act”), which reads: Section 136 – Court to decide as to admissibility of evidence

When either party proposes to give evidence of any fact, the court may ask the party proposing to give the evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant; and the court shall admit the evidence if it thinks that the fact, if proved, would be relevant, and not otherwise. … [Emphasis added.] [35] While it is true that the general rule permits the admission of illegally or improperly obtained evidence, the Court retains discretion to exclude such evidence where its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value or where its admission would operate unfairly or oppressively against the party against whom it is used. [36] I acknowledged that the Court’s discretion to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence is more commonly exercised in criminal cases. However, this principle has been recognised in civil proceedings as well, as highlighted in ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522. In that case, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that evidence obtained in violation of a person’s rights or through unlawful means may justifiably be excluded to uphold the rule of law and prevent an abuse of process. [37] In the present case, it was my view that the Petitioner had secretly recorded the conversation with the intention of using it as evidence against the Respondent in Court. Such action undermined the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 fundamental principles of good faith and open communication, particularly in family disputes, where efforts should be made to resolve conflicts amicably rather than escalate them through litigation. Admitting the audio recording and its transcript as evidence would discourage parties in matrimonial disputes from engaging in honest discussions aimed at settlement, ultimately fostering a climate of mistrust and hostility. [38] Even setting aside the fact that the conversations were recorded secretly, the central issue to be determined was whether the audio recording and its corresponding transcript were admissible in light of section 23 of the Evidence Act, which reads: Section 23 – Admissions in civil case when relevant In civil cases no admission is relevant if it is made, either upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances from which the court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given. Explanation - Nothing in this section shall be taken to exempt any advocate from giving evidence of any matter of which he may be compelled to give evidence under section 126. [Emphasis added.] [39] Section 23 of the Evidence Act, grounded in public policy, embodies the without prejudice rule. Its primary aim is to encourage parties in dispute to resolve their differences amicably, rather than resorting to prolonged litigation. The provision creates a protected space for open and honest negotiation, free from the concern that statements made during these discussions will later be used against them in Court. By fostering candid dialogue, it promotes meaningful settlements and helps to reduce unnecessary legal proceedings. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 [40] In Malayan Banking Bhd v Foo See Moi [1981] 2 MLJ 17, the Court established that two essential elements must be present for communications to be considered privileged: (a) there must be a genuine dispute between the parties, prompting them to enter into negotiations, and (b) that the communications exchanged must include proposed terms aimed at resolving the dispute. [41] These principles were further elaborated in Dusun Desaru Sdn Bhd v Wang Ah Yu [1995] 5 MLJ 449, where Abdul Malik Ishak J (as he then was) provided a detailed interpretation of the criteria necessary for privilege to apply: The purpose is to enable parties engaged in an attempt to compromise litigation, to communicate with one another freely and without the embarrassment which the liability of their communications, to be put in evidence subsequently, might impose upon them. To me, without prejudice communications can be said to be privileged or for a better nomenclature privileged communications. Two common features must be present before this privileged communication could be activated: (a) some individuals must be in dispute and that dispute led them to negotiate with one another; and (b) the communication between the parties must contain suggested terms that would finally lead to the settlement of the dispute. …[and] these requirements have been lucidly laid out in two old vintage cases. The first would be the English case of Re Daintry; ex parte Holt [1893] 2 QB 116 at pp 119-120. The second case emanates from Australia, and it is the case of Bentley v Nelson [1963] WAR 89 at p 93. It would be a correct statement of the law to say that if the letter shows an absolute rejection of the claim by the plaintiff, then there is no intention at all to negotiate and, consequently, the privilege will not arise (Nicholson v Southern Star Fire Insurance Co [1927] 28 SR (NSW) 124). Surprisingly though, an apology would be accepted and be protected under the umbrella of without prejudice communication (Healey v Thatcher [1838] 8 C & P 388). Another significant factor to note would be that the communication need not have to contain the classical offer in the context of a contract. Suffice that that communication forms part and parcel of the negotiation towards settlement (South Shropshire District Council v Amos [1987] 1 All ER 340)7. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 [Emphasis added.] [42] The rule however is not absolute. In Rush & Tompkins Ltd v GLC & Anor [1989] AC 1280, it was clarified: The application of the rule is not dependent alone on the use of the phrase ‘without prejudice’ and if it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that the parties were seeking to compromise the action, evidence of the content of those negotiations will, as a general rule, not be admissible at the trial and cannot be used to establish an admission or partial admission. [Emphasis added.] [43] In deciding whether evidence of the purported admissions should be excluded, the Court must consider all relevant facts and circumstances. The presence or absence of a "without prejudice" label is not decisive in establishing the privileged nature of the communication. Instead, the Court must examine the substance and intent behind the exchange. This principle was clarified in Wong Nget Thau v Tay Choo Foo [1994] 4 CLJ 617, where the Court emphasised that the true nature of the discussions takes precedence over any formal designation: The court must in each case, when deciding whether a particular letter marked ‘without prejudice’ is admissible, consider whether the letter was part of a genuine attempt to settle a dispute. [Emphasis added.] [44] In the present case, a reconciliation meeting was in fact held among the Petitioner, Respondent and the Respondent’s mother, with the specific purpose of exploring the possibility of reconciliation between the Parties. Given the breakdown of their relationship, this 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 meeting served as an opportunity for open and honest communication to determine whether their differences could be resolved, thereby potentially avoiding further legal proceedings. [45] Such reconciliation meetings, particularly regarding matrimonial disputes, are inherently personal and sensitive in nature, as they involve discussions about deeply private matters, including the reasons for the marital conflict, emotional grievances, and possible resolutions. It is typically understood, therefore, that any statement, confession, or admission, if at all made during these discussions, are exchanged in confidence, with the intention of fostering an environment where all parties could speak freely without fear of legal repercussions. [46] Given the nature of these discussions, there was an implicit expectation of privacy and confidentiality, meaning that neither party should later use any statements made during the meeting as evidence in legal proceedings. This principle was especially significant in the context of family law, where the Court recognised that reconciliation efforts should be encouraged rather than deterred by concerns that discussions could later be weaponised against a party in litigation. [47] In the present case, the confidentiality of the meeting was particularly relevant, as it raised questions about whether any disclosures or statements made during the discussion should be admissible in Court or whether they should remain protected as part of the reconciliation attempt. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 [48] In my view, and in line with the decision in Indran a/l N Jeganathan v Nithiyani a/p K Kulaveerasingam [2011] 7 MLJ 237, section 23 of the Evidence Act extends to negotiations undertaken with the intent of settling a family dispute. Given these considerations, and in the interest of justice, I ruled that the audio recording and its transcript were inadmissible. [49] However, I deemed it necessary to clarify that while the recording and its transcript were excluded, the Parties remained at liberty to testify regarding the agreement reached during the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, as the agreement itself was not covered by the without prejudice rule. This was clarified by Chang Min Tat FJ in Malayan Banking Bhd v Foo See Moi, in the following passage: But it is also settled law that where the negotiations conducted without prejudice lead to a settlement, then the letters become admissible in evidence of the terms of the agreement, unless of course the agreement has become incorporated in another document which would then be the evidence of the agreement. [Emphasis added.] [50] At this juncture, I must clarify that the ruling to exclude the audio recording and its transcript was rendered on 6 December 2022, following careful consideration of submissions from both Counsel for the Respondent and the Petitioner. However, on 20 December 2022, the Petitioner discharged her previous solicitors and appointed the current ones. When proceedings resumed in March 2023, the Petitioner’s new legal team sought a rehearing on the admissibility of the audio recording and transcript. I dismissed this request, as it was predicated solely on the fact that the Petitioner 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 had switched legal representation and her new solicitors had adopted a different litigation strategy. [51] At this stage, I felt compelled to emphasise that while the Petitioner was entirely within her rights to change solicitors mid-trial, I took strong exception to her claim that she had been prejudiced by her previous Counsel’s submissions regarding the audio recording and its transcript. [52] In my view, it was wholly improper for the Petitioner to cast aspersions on her previous Counsel in an attempt to revisit an already adjudicated issue. Her request amounted to little more than an effort to relitigate a prior ruling, while unfairly attributing blame to her previous Counsel, who was not present to respond to such allegations. [53] For these reasons, the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing on the admissibility of the audio recording and its transcript was dismissed. Whether photographs of emails, text messages, and WhatsApp messages were admissible [54] The Court was also required to make a ruling on the admissibility of specific documents classified as Part C Documents, which included photographs or screenshots of emails, text messages, and WhatsApp conversations. These documents were captured using an iPad, with the Petitioner taking snapshots of the Respondent’s mobile phone screen displaying the emails and messages. [55] To assess the validity and authenticity of these Part C Documents, particularly whether photographs of these emails, text messages, 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 20 and WhatsApp conversations were genuine and unaltered, both Parties engaged their respective forensic experts. The Petitioner engaged PW8, while the Respondent engaged RW1, each of whom was tasked with evaluating the credibility of the digital evidence pursuant to section 45 of the Evidence Act. [56] At this juncture, it was crucial to emphasise that an expert witness, regardless of which party retains him, is duty-bound to assist the Court impartially. Their primary role is to provide objective, unbiased, and scientifically supported analysis rather than advocating for the party who engaged them. This principle is clearly established under Order 40A, rule 2(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”), which mandates that an expert’s overriding duty is to the Court, and not the litigant who hires them. Order 40A, rule 2(1) of the Rules of Court reads: Order 40A – Experts of parties Rule 2 – Expert’s duty to Court

It is the duty of an expert to assist the Court on the matters within his expertise.

This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he has received instructions or by whom he is paid. [Emphasis added] [57] I was guided also by the following observations of Raja Azlan Shah CJ (as he then was) in Wong Swee Chin v. PP [1980] 1 LNS 138, on the role of the expert: Our system of jurisprudence does not, generally speaking, remit the determination of dispute to experts. Some questions are left to the robust good sense of a jury. Others are resolved by the conventional wisdom 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 21 of a judge sitting alone. In the course of elucidating disputed questions, aids in the form of expert opinions are in appropriate cases placed before juries or judges. But, except on purely scientific issues expert evidence is to be used by the court for the purpose of assisting rather than compelling the formulation of the ultimate judgments. In the ultimate analysis it is the tribunal of fact, whether it be a judge or jury, which is required to weigh all the evidence and determine the probabilities. It cannot transfer this task to the expert witness, the court must come to its own opinion. [Emphasis added.] [58] Given the potential for manipulation or alteration of digital evidence, the Court had to carefully scrutinise the methodology used in capturing, storing, and verifying the Part C Documents. The expert witnesses were expected to provide independent, professional assessments to ensure that the evidence was authentic, reliable, and free from tampering. [59] A crucial element of an expert witness’s testimony is the basis upon which their opinion is formed. This requirement is expressly outlined in section 51 of the Evidence Act, which mandates that an expert must provide clear and substantiated grounds for their conclusions. The provision reads: Section 51 - Grounds of opinion when relevant Whenever the opinion of any living person is relevant, the grounds on which his opinion is based are also relevant. [Emphasis added.] [60] The necessity to provide the grounds of opinion was emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Junaidi Bambang v. PP [2011] 3 CLJ 484, [2011] 3 MLJ 141, with reference to earlier cases such as United Asian Bank Bhd. v. Tai Soon Heng Construction Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 22 CLJ 31; [1993] 1 MLJ 182, Lai Yong Koon v. PP [1962] 1 LNS 74, [1962] MLJ 327, PP v. Yiau Swee Tung [1998] 1 LNS 355, [1999] 3 MLJ 353, and Sim Ah Song v. Rex [1951] 1 LNS 83; [1951] 1 MLJ

[61] In Sim Ah Song, the significance of having the grounds provided by the expert was emphasised by Brown A-G CJ, in the following passage: The business of an expert witness is to draw upon the store of his knowledge and experience in order to explain some matter which his experience should qualify him to understand. He is quite entitled to express his opinion, which indeed is the natural corollary of his explanation. But a bare expression of his opinion has no evidential value at all. Unless he gives an explanation, which supplies the understanding of the subject which the Court lacks, the Court is in no better position than it was before to determine the question which it is its duty to determine, and if the Court acts upon a bare expression of the expert opinion the determination of the question becomes that of the expert and not of the Court. [Emphasis added.] [62] Reference was also made to Ku Jia Shiuen (an infant suing through her mother and next friend, Tay Pei Hoon) & Anor v. Government of Malaysia & Ors [2013] 9 CLJ 489; [2012] 1 LNS 916; [2013] 4 MLJ 108, where the duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses were addressed by Vernon Ong J (as he then was) in referring to Expert Evidence — Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy by Ian Freckelton and Hugh Selby (Lawbook Co 2005 (3rd Ed)):

Expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or to content by the exigencies of litigation; 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23

An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of an advocate;

An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions upon which his conclusions is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which could detract from his concluded opinion;

An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise;

If an expert's opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available, then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one. In cases where an expert witness who has prepared a report could not assert that the report contained the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth without some qualification, the qualification should be stated in the report;

If, after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on a material matter having read the other side's expert's report or for any other reason, such change of view should be communicated (through legal representatives) to the other side without delay and where appropriate to the court. [63] Upon careful examination of the expert reports submitted by both Parties, I found that the Petitioner’s expert witness, PW8, had demonstrated a concerning lack of professionalism and diligence in discharging his duties. His conduct throughout the proceedings was particularly unsatisfactory for several reasons. [64] First, PW8 exhibited a blatant disregard for court procedures by failing to appear in Court when summoned, despite having no legitimate impediment. This unexplained absence caused unnecessary delays in the trial, resulting in an inefficient use of judicial resources and undue inconvenience to all Parties involved. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24 [65] Secondly, PW8’s analysis of the documents adduced by the Petitioner was conspicuously superficial. Rather than providing a meticulous and well-reasoned evaluation, PW8’s report appeared hastily prepared, lacking the depth and rigour expected of an expert witness. This raised serious doubts about the credibility and reliability of his conclusions. [66] Given these deficiencies, I was compelled to question both PW8’s competence as an expert and the evidentiary weight that could reasonably be attached to his testimony. His overall performance fell far below the standard expected of an expert witness, whose role was to assist the Court with specialised knowledge through thorough and impartial analysis. [67] In contrast, the Respondent’s expert, RW1, demonstrated a far more meticulous and methodical approach. His examination of the documents was comprehensive, detailed, and well-structured, offering a more credible and reliable assessment. RW1’s testimony provided greater clarity and was instrumental in assisting the Court in evaluating the authenticity of the evidence. [68] Despite my concerns regarding PW8’s conduct as a witness giving expert opinion, a thorough review of both expert reports revealed a crucial consensus, that is, both PW8 and RW1 had agreed that the photographs taken using the Petitioner’s iPad were authentic. This mutual finding confirmed that the photographic evidence adduced by the Petitioner had not been tampered with or altered, providing the Court with the necessary assurance to admit such documents into evidence. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 25 [69] Based on these findings, I ruled that only specific categories of evidence would be admissible. I permitted all photographs taken by the Petitioner to be marked as exhibits, as they were verified as authentic. Additionally, all emails that were authored and received by the Petitioner were also marked as exhibits, ensuring that only verifiable evidence was considered by the Court. [70] It was important to highlight that these Part C Documents were not original records but rather photographic reproductions of the originals. As such, their evidentiary status required consideration under illustration (a) to section 63 of the Evidence Act, which governs the admissibility of secondary evidence. The provision reads: Section 63 – Secondary evidence … Illustrations

A photograph of an original is secondary evidence of its contents, though the two have not been compared, if it is proved that the thing photographed was the original. [Emphasis added.] [71] Secondary evidence is allowed if it complies with at least one of the conditions in section 65 of the Evidence Act, which reads: Section 65 – Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given

Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document admissible in evidence in the following cases: 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 26

when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power-

of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved;

(ii) of any person out of reach of or not subject to the process of the court; or

(iii) of any person legally bound to produce it, [Emphasis added.] [72] In the present case, it was an undisputed fact that the original documents were in the possession of the Respondent. However, the Respondent took a contradictory stance regarding their availability — at times claiming that he did not have them, at other times asserting that the emails in question were no longer stored on the server, and further contending that the mobile phone containing relevant messages was no longer in his possession. [73] Given these circumstances, where the original evidence was inaccessible due to reasons attributed to the Respondent, the Petitioner was justified, pursuant to section 65 of the Evidence Act, in adducing secondary evidence to substantiate her claims. The legal principle that allows secondary evidence in cases where the primary evidence is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable due to reasons beyond the control of the party seeking to rely on it, supports this approach. Therefore, in light of the Respondent’s failure to produce the original documents, the secondary evidence adduced by the Petitioner was rightly deemed admissible. [74] However, I am mindful that the weight of secondary evidence is lower than the best evidence for the following reasons: 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 27

Accuracy and Completeness: Secondary evidence may not capture all details accurately. Copies may omit important information, and second-hand accounts may misrepresent what was originally said or done;

Risk of Alteration: There is a greater risk that secondary evidence has been altered, intentionally or unintentionally. For example, documents could have been modified, or details could have been lost in transmission; and

Credibility: The credibility of secondary evidence depends on the credibility of the source providing it. If the reliability of the source is in question, the secondary evidence they provide would also less trustworthy. [75] Because of these potential issues, such as increased risk of inaccuracy, misinterpretation, or even deliberate fabrication, courts and other decision-making bodies often assign less probative value to secondary evidence compared to primary evidence. The legal principle known as the "best evidence rule" reflects a preference for original, first-hand materials, as they are generally deemed to be the most accurate and reliable sources of information. This ensures that judgments are grounded in the clearest and most trustworthy evidence available. [76] Consequently, when secondary evidence is introduced, such as copies of documents, summaries, or oral accounts of what a document contained, it may still be admissible, but is typically subject to more rigorous scrutiny. It will often require corroboration 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 28 from additional credible sources before it can carry significant weight in influencing a decision. Spousal Maintenance Whether Petitioner was entitled to spousal maintenance of MYR230,000 monthly [77] In determining the issue of maintenance, reference was made to section 77(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act “), which reads: Section 77 – Power of court to order maintenance of spouse

The court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife:

during the course of any matrimonial proceedings;

when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree of divorce or judicial separation;

if, after a decree declaring her presumed to be dead, she is found to be alive. [Emphasis added.] [78] In exercising its discretion to award maintenance to the Petitioner, the Court was guided by the degree of responsibility attributed to each Party for the breakdown of the marriage, alongside the application of the 'means and needs' test. This test, as set out in section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, provides the framework for determining the appropriate quantum of maintenance, ensuring that financial support is awarded in a fair and equitable manner. The relevant provision reads: 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 29 Section 78 – Assessment of maintenance In determining the amount of any maintenance to be paid by a man to his wife or former wife or by a woman to her husband or former husband, the court shall base its assessment primarily on the means and needs of the parties, regardless of the proportion such maintenance bears to the income of the husband or wife as the case may be, but shall have regard to the degree of responsibility which the court apportions to each party for the breakdown of the marriage. [Emphasis added.] [79] There was no dispute that the Respondent would provide spousal maintenance, but the contention was its quantum. The Respondent claimed that all the Petitioner needed was a monthly amount of between MYR15,000 and MYR20,000, whereas the Petitioner insisted that her expenditure was MYR230,000 per month. [80] Although both Parties agreed to the divorce, acknowledging that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, the central issue remained whether the breakdown was attributable to the alleged adultery between the Respondent and the First and Second Co-Respondents, the alleged unreasonable conduct of the Respondent in the form of abuse, or the Petitioner’s alleged unreasonable conduct. This determination was to be made in accordance with sections 53 and 54(1)(a) and (b) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, both of which read: Section 53 – Breakdown of marriage to be sole ground of divorce

Either party to a marriage may petition for a divorce on the ground that the marriage has irretrievably broken down.

The court hearing such petition shall, so far as it reasonably can, inquire into the facts alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 30 the marriage and, if satisfied that the circumstances make it just and reasonable to do so, make a decree for its dissolution. … Section 54 – Proof of breakdown

In its inquiry into the facts and circumstances alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage, the court shall have regard to one or more of the following facts, that is to say-

that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent;

that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent; … [Emphasis added.] [81] In asserting that the Respondent's conduct caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, the Petitioner specifically alleged adulterous relationships between the Respondent and both the First and Second Co-Respondents. Based on these allegations, the Petitioner sought damages against both Co-Respondents pursuant to section 58(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which provides: Section 58 – Damages for adultery may be claimed against co-respondent …

Where damages have been claimed against a co-respondent-

if, after the close of the evidence for the petitioner, the court is of the opinion that there is not sufficient evidence against the co-respondent to justify requiring him or her to reply, the co-respondent shall be discharged from the proceedings; or 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 31

if, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court is satisfied that adultery between the respondent and co-respondent has been proved, the court may award the petitioner such damages as it may think fit, but so that the award shall not include any exemplary or punitive element. [Emphasis added.] Cause of breakdown of the marriage Proving adultery [82] In determining the Petitioner’s burden and standard of proving adultery, the first issue that the Court had to address was the definition or meaning of ‘adultery’. [83] As delineated in the case of Clarkson v. Clarkson [1930] 143 LT 775, 46 TLR 623, adultery is explicitly defined as voluntary sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married to each other, with at least one party being married to someone else. This definition underscores the necessity for evidence of a physical relationship to substantiate claims of adultery, beyond mere suggestive texts or compromising photographs. [84] I also found guidance in several cases from India, namely, Geeta Bai v. Fattu AIR [1966] Madhya Pradesh 130, and D Henderson v. D Henderson AIR [1970] Madras 104, where it was stated that adultery is consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a person of the opposite sex who is not a spouse of the other during the subsistence of the marriage. [85] Hence, the evidence must go beyond establishing suspicion and opportunity to commit adultery, and must be such as to satisfy the Court that from the nature of things, adultery must have been 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 32 committed. Where the evidence is entirely circumstantial, the Court will not draw the inference of fault unless the facts relied on are not reasonably capable of any other explanation. [86] There was no doubt that the Petitioner had the legal burden to prove adultery by virtue of section 103 of the Evidence Act, as it was she who had wanted the Court to believe in the existence of a particular fact. However, the issue that required consideration was the standard of proving adultery. [87] The Respondent contended that the Petitioner was required to meet the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in establishing the alleged adultery. According to the Respondent, the Petitioner had not sufficiently demonstrated that the Respondent engaged in adulterous relationships with both Co-Respondents. [88] Furthermore, even if the Petitioner had succeeded in proving adultery, the Respondent maintained that such conduct was not the cause of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Instead, the Respondent contended that the marriage had already irretrievably broken down before any involvement, if any, with the Co-Respondents had taken place. Therefore, the Respondent’s position was that the alleged acts of adultery, if at all, could not be the basis of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. [89] As far as the standard of proof was concerned, I disagreed with the Respondent, and maintained that the Petitioner was required to prove adultery only on a balance of probabilities, for the following reasons. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33 [90] The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be imposed on criminal offences only. To begin with, as far as non-Muslims are concerned, marital infidelity or adulterous conduct of one spouse is not a crime in Malaysia. At most, adultery used to be known as a matrimonial offence. [91] It was crucial to remember that laws related to marriage and divorce underwent significant changes following the implementation of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act on 1 March 1982. Prior to such date, adultery was considered a matrimonial offence, and for a divorce to be granted, courts typically required proof of adultery beyond a reasonable doubt. [92] However, with the introduction of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, the fundamental basis for divorce shifted from the outdated concept of committing a matrimonial offence to the more modern principle of an irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Consequently, the standard of proof required went through a shift from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to the less stringent "balance of probabilities." [93] It must also be borne in mind that regardless of the allegation made, the Family Court is a civil court and just like any other serious allegation, such as fraud or forgery, the standard of proof should be standardised, that is, on a balance of probabilities. Reference on this point was made to GGC v. CCC [2016] 1 LNS 885, where in alluding to the Federal Court case of Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584; [2015] 5 MLJ 1, it was stated by Lee Swee Seng J (as he then was), in the following passages: 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 34 [99] Based on the cogent arguments of the Federal Court in Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584; [2015] 5 MLJ 1, which has held that fraud in civil cases should be proved on the standard of proof of the balance of probabilities, the time has come for standardisation of proof even in cases of adultery in a divorce petition which is essentially fraud on a spouse in a civil proceeding: it should be henceforth on a balance of probabilities as well. The anomaly has to be realigned. To perpetuate the dichotomy would be to create an artificial distinction devoid of merits. The Federal Court could not have made it clearer when in declaring the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities in civil fraud as follows: [49] With respect, we are inclined to agree with learned counsel for the plaintiff that the correct principle to apply is as explained in In re B (Children). It is this: that at law there are only two standards of proof, namely, beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases while it is on the balance of probabilities for civil cases. As such even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. There is no third standard. And '(N)either the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. [Emphasis added.] [94] Be that as it may, it was pertinent to note that the balance of probabilities standard ranges from merely tipping the scales at more probable than not (or at 51 percent as prescribed by Abang Iskandar Abang Hashim JCA (as he then was) in Unsung Rasad v. PP [2019] 1 LNS 662) to a higher degree of probability, but one which has not reached beyond a reasonable doubt. [95] In this case, it was undeniable that the allegation of adultery was serious in nature. Therefore, although the standard of proof should be on a balance of probabilities, it was my view that a higher degree of such standard had to be considered in light of the seriousness of the allegation. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 35 [96] On this point, I was guided by the case of Bater v. Bater [1950] 2 All ER 458, wherein Lord Denning had, in the following passage, explained the relationship between the seriousness of the allegations made in a civil case and the varying degree of the standard of proof of balance of probabilities: ...So also in civil cases. The case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require a high degree of probability than that which it would require if considering whether negligence was established. [Emphasis added.] [97] Also on point is the Court of Appeal case of Teoh Meng Kee v. PP [2014] 7 CLJ 1034, where in applying the civil standard of proof, reference was made to the Briginshaw sliding scale in Briginshaw v. Briginshaw [1938] 60 CLR 336, where it was held by the High Court of Australia that although the scale is rooted in the civil standard of balance of probabilities, the degree of persuasion needed to convince the Court varies in accordance with the seriousness or gravity of the allegation. Hence, although the balance of probabilities standard is maintained for proving adultery, the sliding scale slants towards the weight and assessment of the evidence required. [98] I also found guidance from the Federal Court case of PP v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 2 MLJ 469, where reference was made to the explanation by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Re H (Minors) [1996] 1 All ER 1 that the standard of proving on a balance of probabilities was a flexible test: 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 36 ... on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probabilities. [Emphasis added.] [99] The pivotal date concerning the issue of adultery was 26 October 2015, when the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting was held, as it marked the occasion when the Petitioner, the Respondent, and the Respondent’s mother convened to discuss the possibility of reconciliation and the future of their marriage This meeting was a critical juncture in the matrimonial dispute, as it had provided an opportunity for both Parties to address underlying grievances and determine whether their marriage could be salvaged. The October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting centred on past transgressions, mutual expectations, and the conditions necessary for rebuilding trust. [100] Although the audio recording and its transcript were ruled inadmissible, the Petitioner was allowed to adduce evidence of the agreement reached during the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting. [101] The Petitioner asserted that during the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, the Respondent had admitted to engaging in adulterous relationships with both the First and Second Co-Respondents. The Respondent, however, refuted these allegations. [102] Despite this fundamental disagreement between the Petitioner and Respondent as to what had transpired during the October 2015 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 37 Reconciliation Meeting, it was undisputed that, under the guidance of the Respondent’s mother, both Parties had agreed to move forward and attempt to salvage the marriage. This commitment was not unconditional; rather, it was contingent upon specific terms aimed at restoring stability and fidelity within the relationship. [103] Given the significance of 26 October 2015, a thorough examination of the Respondent’s relationship with the First and Second Co-Respondents, both before and after this date, was critical in determining whether the Respondent had indeed engaged in adulterous conduct with any of the Co-Respondents, and whether any such conduct persisted beyond the reconciliation attempt in October 2015. The analysis of these interactions would provide a clearer picture of the Respondent’s conduct and its impact on the viability of the Parties’ marriage. Pre-October 2015 – Whether adultery between Respondent and First Co-Respondent had been proved [104] To support the claim of adultery between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent, the Petitioner relied on various incidents and documents, including emails, text messages, and WhatsApp messages, exchanges which took place between 2012 and October

These were adduced by the Petitioner to argue that the alleged adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent had led to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. [105] Instances of intimacy – The Petitioner cited several instances where she claimed to have witnessed moments of closeness between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 38 [106] The first alleged incident allegedly occurred in 2012 at a restaurant within a shopping centre, referred to in this judgment as the POW Restaurant. The Petitioner asserted that she had observed the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent engaging in intimate behaviour. [107] The second allegation centred on an incident that took place during a monthly group dinner meeting. These meetings, attended by the Petitioner, Respondent, and First Co-Respondent, were held regularly. According to the Petitioner, it was during one of these gatherings that the First Co-Respondent openly flirted with the Respondent. [108] Additionally, the Petitioner alleged that she saw the First Co-Respondent partially seated on the Respondent’s lap at another restaurant, identified in this judgment as the ZON Restaurant in Kuala Lumpur. Further, during a festive celebration in 2014 organised by the Respondent’s family, the Petitioner claimed to have witnessed the First Co-Respondent whispering in the Respondent’s ear while intimately fondling it. [109] Secret encounters abroad – The Petitioner also relied on what she described as secret encounters abroad to support her claim that the Respondent and First Co-Respondent had arranged clandestine meetings away from the public eye. She alleged that in 2013, the Respondent and First Co-Respondent secretly rendezvoused at the prestigious Watch and Jewellery Exhibition in Basel, Switzerland. According to the Petitioner, the purpose of this meeting was to conceal the alleged adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 39 [110] To further substantiate her claims, the Petitioner adduced photographs taken later that year in Marrakesh, Morocco, capturing moments between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent, having dinner. The Petitioner contended that these photographs served as undeniable proof of an adulterous relationship that was unfolding far from prying eyes, reinforcing her assertion of adultery. [111] Personal messages – The Petitioner sought to rely on various personal messages exchanged between the First Co-Respondent and the Respondent as evidence supporting her claim of adultery. These communications included discussions about dinner plans, arrangements to visit the gym together, updates about each other's whereabouts, making plans for drinks, and notifications about available times to meet. One particularly notable message from the First Co-Respondent to the Respondent stated: "I know work is a priority in your life, but sometimes I too should be a priority in yours." [112] The Petitioner argued that the content and nature of these messages, particularly those that appeared to exclude the First Co-Respondent's husband, demonstrated a relationship that extended beyond ordinary friendship and indicated an improper intimacy between them. The Petitioner also argued that the frequency and personal nature of these communications revealed an emotional connection inconsistent with a purely platonic relationship. She emphasised that messages arranging private meetings, expressing expectations of priority in each other's lives, and maintaining regular contact about daily activities all pointed toward an adulterous affair. The absence of the First Co-Respondent's husband in many of these exchanges was adduced as further evidence of secrecy and 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 40 inappropriate closeness between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent. [113] Exchange of private information – The Petitioner averred that the Respondent had shared proprietary business details and financial matters, with the First Co-Respondent, asserting that such disclosures pointed to an intimate relationship. [114] Additionally, the Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had purchased high-denomination Singaporean notes (SGD10,000 each) from the First Co-Respondent, suggesting that this was either payment for an adulterous relationship, or money laundering. [115] Admission of adultery – Sometime during the last week of November 2015, over a span of several days, the Petitioner had sent multiple messages to the First Co-Respondent, confronting her about the alleged adulterous relationship with the Respondent. In one of her responses to the Petitioner, the First Co-Respondent had written: You are very angry with me. No matter what I say, you won’t believe me because I have not given you any reason to. I’m sorry for hurting all of you. I’m completely done. [116] The Petitioner interpreted the First Co-Respondent’s apology as an admission of guilt, asserting that it served as further proof of an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent. [117] After carefully examining all the evidence presented by the Petitioner in detail, I concluded that it was insufficient to establish, 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41 on a balance of probabilities, that there existed an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent, for the following reasons. [118] The alleged instances of intimacy between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent, as cited by the Petitioner, did not, whether viewed individually or collectively, constitute sufficient proof of adultery. At most, these interactions reflect the harmless familiarity of close friends and fall far short of establishing a sexual relationship between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent. [119] Mere displays of affection or physical proximity, especially in public settings, cannot be conflated with adultery in the absence of evidence of an improper relationship. Notably, it was never disputed that the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent shared a longstanding and close friendship. In fact, during cross-examination, the Respondent himself clarified that their relationship was not only platonic but also familial in nature, describing the First Co-Respondent as a distant relative. [120] Thus, the Petitioner’s reliance on these interactions as proof of adultery between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent was baseless and unsubstantiated. [121] The Petitioner’s claim regarding the incident at the POW Restaurant in 2012 was vague and lacked specificity. While she asserted that the Respondent and First Co-Respondent were engaged in intimate conduct, there was no indication of what this entailed. Public interactions between friends, even if warm or affectionate, do not automatically suggest a romantic or adulterous relationship. Without 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 42 further corroboration of the Petitioner’s averments, such allegation remained baseless and unsubstantiated. [122] Similarly, the claim that the First Co-Respondent flirted with the Respondent during the monthly group dinners attended by several people including the Petitioner, was subjective and open to interpretation. Social banter and playful exchanges among friends are common and do not automatically indicate impropriety. What one perceives as flirtation may simply be friendly interaction, and the presence of multiple individuals at these gatherings further undermined the suggestion by the Petitioner of secrecy or illicit behaviour between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent. [123] The Petitioner had also alleged that the First Co-Respondent was seen half-seated on the Respondent’s lap at the ZON Restaurant. Even if this incident occurred as described, it did not necessarily imply an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent. Physical gestures between friends, particularly in a casual or celebratory setting, do not automatically equate to an adulterous relationship. Without evidence that such an act was intended to be intimate in a romantic or sexual sense, this claim by the Petitioner remained insufficient to support an allegation of adultery. [124] The Petitioner’s allegation that during a 2014 festive function organised by the Respondent’s family, the First Co-Respondent whispered in the Respondent’s ear and touched it, was, by itself, insufficient to substantiate the existence of an adulterous relationship. Such conduct, even if proved, reflected nothing more than fleeting familiarity in a social setting. Without corroborating 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 43 evidence demonstrating an improper relationship, this claim amounted to speculation rather than proof of adultery. After all, close friends often share light-hearted or familiar gestures without any romantic implication. Whispering, particularly in a noisy environment, is not inherently inappropriate, and physical gestures can easily be misinterpreted when viewed outside their intended context. [125] While the Petitioner’s distress over the closeness between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent was understandable, leaping to the conclusion that their relationship was adulterous was an unfounded exaggeration, and which transformed minor interactions into grave allegations without substantive proof. [126] The allegations of a clandestine meeting overseas did not, on their own or even viewed holistically, establish adultery, as both Respondent and First Co-Respondent had legitimate professional reasons for attending these events. The fact that both Respondent and First Co-Respondent were present in the same location, or even dined together, did not inherently imply an improper relationship. Business engagements, particularly those involving international travel, often bring colleagues, industry peers, and associates together in both formal and informal settings. Without additional evidence of inappropriate conduct, mere proximity between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent did not amount to proof of an adulterous relationship. [127] Furthermore, there was no evidence to suggest that the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent cohabited during these trips. There were no hotel receipts, credit card transactions, or other 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 44 documentation linking them to a shared stay. In the absence of such proof, allegations based solely on their presence in the same destinations remain speculative. [128] The photographs adduced by the Petitioner had not substantiated allegations of adultery, as they merely depicted the Respondent and First Co-Respondent seated together without any indication of sexual impropriety. Of particular note was the Petitioner’s assertion that one photograph showed the First Co-Respondent’s hand on the Respondent’s inner thigh, a claim unsupported by the actual image. This discrepancy underscored a pattern of the Petitioner inflating innocuous interactions into scandalous allegations through exaggeration and creative interpretation. [129] The evidentiary value of the Petitioner's claims suffered a fatal blow when she acknowledged during cross-examination that she had no direct knowledge of the Respondent and First Co-Respondent's conduct during these trips, having not been present herself. This fundamental gap in her first-hand knowledge rendered her allegations speculative at best. [130] The Petitioner proceeded to rely on a message from the First Co-Respondent to the Respondent stating, “I know work is a priority in your life, but sometimes I too should be a priority in yours,” as evidence of adultery. However, as the message did not contain any sexual content, in my view, such statement could be interpreted in various ways, including as an expression of close friendship or a professional connection, rather than an indication of an intimate relationship. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 45 [131] Furthermore, the Petitioner did not adduce the full conversation between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent, leaving the message without proper context and open to multiple interpretations. A single statement, without supporting evidence of a sexual relationship, was insufficient to establish adultery. In the absence of clear proof demonstrating an adulterous relationship, the Petitioner’s claim remained speculative and inconclusive. [132] The Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent had shared confidential business and personal information with the First Co-Respondent was also baseless and unsubstantiated. Even if the exchange was deemed inappropriate in a professional or personal sense, it did not amount to adultery. The Petitioner had not demonstrated that this interaction between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent was indicative of an adulterous relationship, rather than a business or social relationship, rendering the allegation of adultery unsubstantiated. [133] Similarly, the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent’s purchase of two SGD10,000 notes from the First Co-Respondent was linked to an adulterous relationship between the two was unfounded. There was no evidence to suggest that the money was exchanged as payment for an illicit relationship. Additionally, the Petitioner failed to prove that the notes even belonged to the First Co-Respondent, further weakening her claim. [134] With regard to the exchange of messages between the Petitioner and the First Co-Respondent, a review of them showed that the First Co-Respondent had consistently denied any allegations of adultery, 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 46 maintaining that her interactions with the Respondent were strictly professional. [135] In fact, the apology by the First Co-Respondent that the Petitioner had harped on, was, in fact, an expression of regret by the First Co-Respondent for the emotional distress caused by her close friendship with the Respondent. While the relationship between the First Co-Respondent and Respondent may not have been entirely devoid of personal closeness, there was no indication that it crossed the threshold into adultery. The First Co-Respondent’s words reflected an acknowledgment of the Petitioner’s feelings rather than a concession of wrongdoing, and as such, they did not constitute proof of an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent. [136] A review of the numerous messages exchanged between the Petitioner and the First Co-Respondent revealed that it was, in fact, the Petitioner who had actively sought to extract an admission of adultery from the First Co-Respondent. The Petitioner’s persistent efforts to obtain such admission indicated the lack of actual evidence and suggest a determined attempt by the Petitioner to support an unsubstantiated allegation. [137] In fact, the Petitioner’s messages could be seen as a form of harassment towards the First Co-Respondent, as they included attempts to threaten and blackmail her into making an admission. This behaviour further underscored the absence of any solid proof of adultery between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent. Instead, it appeared that the Petitioner was trying to force an 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 47 admission from the First Co-Respondent to use to her advantage, likely in anticipation of a divorce that had not yet occurred. [138] Additionally, the Petitioner’s interpretations of various phrases exchanged in emails between the Respondent and both Co-Respondents appeared to be exaggerated and embellished. A striking example was the Petitioner’s claim that the phrase "pulling out a rabbit from the hat," used between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent, was a euphemism implying that the Respondent intended to expose himself. This assertion was not only unfounded but also an affront to logic and common sense. Such interpretations illustrated the extent of the Petitioner’s inclination to dramatise and overstate events, which had undermined the credibility of her allegations pertaining to the relationship between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent. [139] In conclusion, none of the incidents mentioned by the Petitioner provided proof of adultery on a balance of probabilities between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent. At most, it reflected an extremely close friendship between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent, which did not meet the legal threshold for establishing an adulterous relationship. [140] Having said that, although my finding was that there was no adultery between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent, in my view, their relationship nonetheless revealed a form of infidelity. [141] While often used interchangeably, the terms "infidelity" and "adultery" are distinct in meaning and implications. At this stage, it was important to distinguish between the two. Infidelity 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 48 encompasses any breach of trust or violation of the agreed-upon terms of a relationship or marriage. This may take many forms, including emotional affairs, physical affairs, flirting, ‘sexting’, or any other intimate interaction outside the established relationship. [142] Adultery, on the other hand, specifically refers to engaging in sexual intercourse with someone other than one's spouse while being married. While adultery is a form of infidelity, not all acts of infidelity amount to adultery. In the context of section 54(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, this distinction is crucial, as adultery requires cogent evidence of a physical relationship, whereas infidelity can manifest in more subtle but still significant ways. [143] The evidence adduced, while it fell short of proving adultery, demonstrated a close and emotional bond between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent, which in my view constituted infidelity. [144] I took note of the testimony given by the First Co-Respondent’s husband (“CRW1”) on her behalf, who unequivocally denied any adulterous relationship between his wife and the Respondent. [145] CRW1 emphasised that he and the Respondent were good friends and that both the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent worked in the same industry, often serving the same clientele. According to CRW1, the professional overlap between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent necessitated frequent communication and the exchange of information related to watches and jewellery, which he firmly believed was strictly work-related. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 49 [146] While I acknowledged CRW1’s testimony that there was no adultery between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent, given the absence of evidence of sexual intercourse, whether direct or circumstantial, I did not fully agree with his assertion that the relationship between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent was purely professional. [147] The Court observed that CRW1 was extremely defensive during his testimony, often displaying an abrasive and dismissive demeanour, particularly when addressing the Petitioner’s counsel. He repeatedly interrupted the Petitioner’s counsel, refusing to allow her to complete her questions and frequently pre-empting them with unsolicited answers. His conduct disrupted the flow of cross-examination, prompting the Court to intervene and issue a reprimand. [148] Given the circumstances, such a reaction was understandable, as both he and the First Co-Respondent had their reputations to protect. As her husband, CRW1 was placed in a difficult position. Admitting that his wife preferred the company of another man, even in the absence of a sexual relationship, would be personally humiliating and difficult to accept. Such an acknowledgment would not only impact his self-esteem and pride but could also carry significant social consequences, particularly within their closely-knit community. His defensiveness, therefore, appeared to be a natural response to protect his dignity in what was already a highly scrutinised and emotionally charged situation. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 50 [149] The truth of the matter was that the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent shared a bond that transcended mere friendship, and their connection seemed to go beyond the platonic. This was particularly evident considering that the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent had more in common with each other than the Respondent did with the Petitioner, a fact that understandably caused the Petitioner to feel a surge of jealousy and frustration. [150] While the Petitioner’s emotional reaction to the Respondent’s relationship with the First Co-Respondent was entirely understandable, despite the evident emotional connection and perhaps inappropriate conduct between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent, the absence of proof of a sexual relationship meant that the Court could not legally categorise the relationship between the Respondent and First Co-Respondent as adultery within section 54(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act. Pre-October 2015 – Whether adultery between Respondent and Second Co-Respondent had been proved [151] In an effort to prove adultery between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent, the Petitioner relied on various forms of evidence, including screenshots of photographs, emails, WhatsApp messages, and text messages. [152] The issue before the Court, therefore, was whether these photographs, emails, and messages were sufficient to prove on a balance of probabilities, an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent prior to October 2015. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 51 [153] Luxury Trips and Intimate Experiences – The evidence adduced clearly indicated that the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent had engaged in a series of luxury getaways, which lent significant weight to the assertion that their relationship was of an intimate nature. One such trip was to a well-known island resort in Malaysia, famed for its romantic setting. During this trip, they were photographed in close proximity aboard a private yacht, appearing relaxed and affectionate — circumstances that were inconsistent with a purely platonic or professional connection. [154] Photographic evidence adduced by the Petitioner further confirmed that the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent were alone at the resort, with no indication of the presence of family, friends or employees of ALIR in any of the images. Several photographs captured the pair in poses that could reasonably be described as intimate, directly undermining the Respondent’s assertion that the Second Co-Respondent’s husband had accompanied them. Notably, the Respondent failed to produce any evidence to support this claim. [155] Although the Second Co-Respondent had included a photograph of herself with her husband in the bundle of documents filed in Court, this was nothing but an attempt to imply his presence during the trip. However, given that the Second Co-Respondent was considered the maker of the photograph but failed to appear as a witness to verify it, any reliance on or reference to the photograph was disregarded. [156] Further evidence revealed that the Respondent had taken deliberate and personal steps to arrange luxury accommodations for 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 52 the Second Co-Respondent during her stay in Singapore, and had also extended to her the use of his privileged hotel membership card while in Sydney. These gestures went well beyond the bounds of ordinary professional courtesy and were more indicative of a personal relationship marked by familiarity and intimacy. Such benefits, typically reserved for close family members or romantic partners, were inconsistent with the Respondent’s claims of a merely professional or platonic association. [157] The Respondent’s direct involvement in orchestrating these exclusive arrangements, when considered alongside the documented exchanges between him and the Second Co-Respondent, many of which contained flirtatious language and sexually suggestive content, served to reinforce the Petitioner’s allegations. Taken together, this pattern of conduct provided compelling support for the assertion that the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent were engaged in an adulterous affair, rather than maintaining a purely collegial or innocuous relationship. [158] Exchange of suggestive emails and messages – The exchanges between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent prior to October 2015 were highly suggestive, revealing a relationship that far exceeded the boundaries of a typical employer-employee dynamic. [159] In one particularly explicit message, the Second Co-Respondent wrote, “Your club is happening, try getting laid,” to which the Respondent provocatively replied, “Baby, without you, I can’t get laid. You are my killer.” This exchange was not only vulgar, it was overtly sexual, demonstrating not only flirtation but also a clear 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 53 emotional and physical dependence on the Second Co-Respondent for intimacy. [160] The Respondent frequently addressed the Second Co-Respondent with affectionate names such as "honey bunny" and "baby." When questioned in Court, he attempted to dismiss this as common practice, claiming he used similar terms for all employees. However, he failed to provide a single instance where he had addressed other staff members in the same manner. [161] In another strikingly suggestive email, the Respondent described the idea of “having breakfast served on him”— a statement laden with sexual innuendo and wholly inappropriate in a professional setting. [162] Further exchanges reinforced the intimate nature of their relationship. In one instance, the Second Co-Respondent teasingly asked, “When are you going on paternity leave? Your baby wants another baby,” to which the Respondent eagerly responded, “Really, we can take lots of time off next year.” The flirtatious tone, coupled with the suggestive language, strongly indicated a relationship that extended well beyond the bounds of professional conduct. This exchange not only highlighted the emotional closeness between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent, but also pointed to a sexual relationship. More significantly, it lent weight to the Petitioner’s growing suspicion that the Respondent may have fathered one of the Second Co-Respondent’s children, and that the pair were actively contemplating having another. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 54 [163] The Respondent also engaged in sexually suggestive wordplay, including a message to the Second Co-Respondent that read: “You’re the breast.” While it may have been a typographical slip for “You’re the best,” the choice of words — whether deliberate or subconscious — introduced a clear sexual connotation into their exchanges. [164] Moreover, the messages between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent had frequently conveyed an undertone of secrecy and the need for discretion. In one particularly revealing exchange, the Respondent asked about the possibility of a Skype call. The Second Co-Respondent replied cryptically, “Can’t, he is here”— the “he” in question referring to her husband. This brief yet telling response underscored the clandestine nature of their communication and suggested an awareness that their interactions would be deemed inappropriate, if not outright compromising. [165] Taken collectively with the other evidence adduced by the Petitioner, these exchanges established a pattern of intimate and inappropriate communication, crossing professional boundaries and leaving little doubt that the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent were, in fact, engaged in not just a romantic relationship but an adulterous one. [166] In his defence, the Respondent wavered between two conflicting claims. He first claimed that the Petitioner was not the one who took the screenshots, and subsequently insisted that the Petitioner had tampered with the evidence to fit her narrative. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 55 [167] Regarding the allegation of tampering, the Respondent contended that the Petitioner had manipulated the emails before capturing their screenshots. However, both forensic digital experts, PW8 and RW1 had confirmed the authenticity of the photographs themselves. The Respondent’s argument was, therefore, purely speculative, relying on unsubstantiated claims rather than verifiable evidence. If the Respondent sought to establish that the Petitioner had manipulated the emails and messages, it was incumbent upon him to adduce expert testimony to substantiate his allegations. However, he failed to do so. In the absence of any credible evidence, the only reasonable conclusion was that the photographs were genuine. [168] The Respondent had even gone as far as tendering his passport in evidence in an attempt to discredit the Petitioner’s claim that she had taken the screenshots in question, during a period when the Parties and the Children were on a trip to the United States (“US”). The Respondent sought to counter this by pointing to immigration stamps in his passport, suggesting that he was not physically present in the US at the relevant time and, therefore, could not have been the one who took the photographs. [169] Despite this, I was not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument. To begin with, his line of defence was introduced abruptly and without prior notice, which raised concerns about its credibility. Moreover, in presenting this defence, the Respondent relied heavily on a specific passport stamp as proof of his absence. However, it was brought to the Court’s attention by the Petitioner’s Counsel that this particular stamp had not been visible or even present when the Respondent initially produced the passport earlier in the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 56 proceedings. This discrepancy significantly undermined the reliability of the passport as supporting evidence. [170] Furthermore, there was no credible evidence to support the notion that anyone other than the Petitioner had taken the screenshots. The device used to capture them was the Petitioner’s personal iPad, and there was nothing before the Court to suggest that it had been accessed or used by any other individual during the relevant period when the Parties and the Children were in the US. In the absence of any such indication, the Respondent’s assertion that someone else might have taken the screenshots remained speculative and unsubstantiated. Accordingly, his argument in this regard was found to be wholly unconvincing. [171] Cash transfers – The Respondent had transferred significant sums of money to the Second Co-Respondent on multiple occasions. When confronted during cross-examination, the Respondent attempted to justify these payments by claiming they were partial refunds of an alleged MYR100,000 investment made by the Second Co-Respondent. However, the Respondent had failed to produce any supporting evidence, such as bank statements, agreements, or transaction records, to substantiate this claim. The lack of documentation and the implausibility of his explanation rendered his justification highly questionable, unsubstantiated, and improbable, further reinforcing the inference that these payments were personal in nature rather than legitimate financial dealings. [172] Admission in writing – The Petitioner had also adduced as evidence, handwritten notes by the Respondent, in which he referred to the Second Co-Respondent using her initials. These 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 57 notes offered significant insights into his actions and mindset throughout the trial, revealing a pattern of behaviour consistent with the Petitioner’s allegations. They provided a glimpse into the Respondent’s internal thoughts, emotions, and strategic considerations, shedding light on his approach to the marital conflict, his relationship with the Second Co-Respondent, and his attempts to manage the fallout. [173] One of the most critical statements found in the notes was "We did have an affair." When questioned, the Respondent claimed that he wrote this based on the Petitioner’s statements rather than as a personal admission. However, the Petitioner contended that these words were the Respondent’s own reflections, acknowledging his adulterous relationship with the Second Co-Respondent. [174] Another note read "Support her financially," which the Petitioner claimed was linked to a MYR30,000 payment made to the Second Co-Respondent. This financial connection further reinforced allegations of an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent. [175] In a separate note, the Respondent had expressed guilt and emotional distress, writing, "I’ve been terrible to ruin our lives, I ask for your mercy not to ruin anymore lives that we need to for the sake of our karma." The Petitioner interpreted this as an acknowledgment of the Respondent’s role in the collapse of their marriage. [176] The Respondent also appeared willing to make amends, as seen in the note stating, "If there is anything I can do to make you feel better, let me know, I will." The Petitioner argued that this statement 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 58 suggested the Respondent’s readiness to go to extreme lengths to appease her, possibly in an effort to prevent further legal or personal consequences. [177] Another concerning entry in the notes was "Discuss open relationship," which the Petitioner claimed indicated that the Respondent had wanted to continue his adulterous relationship with the Second Co-Respondent while maintaining his marriage. [178] Additionally, the Respondent’s notes referenced the children of the Second Co-Respondent, with the statement, "Can you accept her two daughters as yours?" The Petitioner asserted that this showed that the Respondent had acknowledged a deeper personal responsibility toward the children of the Second Co-Respondent, reinforcing the argument that the relationship between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent had gone beyond mere friendship. [179] The handwritten notes also revealed the Respondent’s concerns about exposure to the Children, particularly with statements such as "(Daughter’s name) has no father figure" and "Age of technology. Hard to hide." The Petitioner linked these remarks to the Respondent’s anxiety over his adulterous relationship being uncovered. [180] Finally, one of the most telling statements was "If she accuses, deny it all the way." The Petitioner argued that this reflected the Respondent’s deliberate strategy to cover up his adulterous relationship with the Second Co-Respondent and to avoid accountability. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 59 [181] The Respondent sought to defend himself against the handwritten notes through a variety of strategies, aiming to minimise their significance and offer alternative interpretations of their content. He first averred that writing notes was a habitual practice for him, which allowed him to reflect on his thoughts the following day. He argued that the notes were not admissions of wrongdoing but rather personal reflections or ideas recorded in the context of various discussions. This, he claimed, explained why certain phrases appeared incriminating when taken out of context. [182] When confronted with the note stating, “We did have an affair,” the Respondent claimed he had written this based on statements made by the Petitioner during a conversation rather than as his own admission. [183] I found this contention somewhat perplexing. If the Respondent was merely reiterating the Petitioner’s allegations, the use of the term “we” was incongruous, as it suggested a level of personal involvement rather than a detached repetition of the Petitioner’s claims. In context, the phrasing appeared more akin to an admission than a mere echoing of allegations. Moreover, I found the Respondent’s explanation to be inconsistent with the overall tone and content of the handwritten notes, which, when read in their entirety, pointed to an acknowledgment of his own actions rather than a simple recounting of what the Petitioner had alleged. [184] Regarding the note “Support her financially,” which was linked to a MYR30,000 payment to the Second Co-Respondent, the Respondent denied that it referred to financial support for her. However, the Respondent failed to produce any documentary or 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 60 corroborative evidence to challenge or disprove the claim, thereby significantly weakening his position. In the absence of such evidence, the handwritten note remained open to interpretation, and could reasonably be read as an implicit acknowledgment of his financial involvement with the Second Co-Respondent. The lack of a clear alternative explanation only served to reinforce this inference. [185] This, in turn, gave rise to a critical and compelling question: what reason would the Respondent have to provide financial support to the Second Co-Respondent if their relationship were purely platonic or professional, as he claimed? In the context of the Petitioner’s allegations, the offer of financial assistance took on a more suggestive tone, lending credence to the assertion that there was, in fact, a sexual relationship between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent. The Respondent's failure to address this point convincingly or provide a plausible explanation further undermined the credibility of his denial. [186] The Respondent had also attempted to explain away the phrase “Discuss open relationship” by claiming that it was a topic raised during an Entrepreneur’s Organisation (EO) meeting that the Respondent had regularly attended, where someone else had shared their thoughts on relationships. [187] In my view, the Respondent presented a narrative that was convoluted and inherently flawed. His explanation that the handwritten notes were taken at the EO meeting, discussing another member's problems lacked coherence and logic, making it difficult to follow or believe. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 61 [188] When asked about the phrase “Can you accept her two daughters as yours?”, the Respondent claimed it referred to another person’s children and not those of the Second Co-Respondent. However, this explanation defied logic and common sense as such a personal and emotionally charged question would be unlikely to appear in a handwritten note unless it concerned someone of particular significance to the writer. Moreover, the inference that the Respondent was in fact referring to the Second Co-Respondent was both compelling and difficult to ignore, especially given the coincidental but notable fact that she has two daughters. [189] One of the most incriminating notes read, “If she accuses, deny it all the way.” The Respondent sought to minimise the significance of this statement by claiming it had been taken out of context. However, I found the Petitioner’s interpretation more persuasive— that this note reflected the Respondent’s deliberate strategy to conceal his adulterous relationship with the Second Co-Respondent from the outset. [190] The Respondent further alleged that the Petitioner could have tampered with the handwriting on the personal notes, suggesting that the authenticity of the notes was questionable. However, in my assessment, this allegation amounted to nothing more than a bare assertion, lacking any concrete or credible evidence to support it. The Respondent failed to provide substantial proof, such as expert handwriting analysis or corroborative testimony, to substantiate his claim of tampering. Without such evidence, the allegation remained speculative and unconvincing, serving more as an attempt to cast doubt rather than a substantiated defence. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 62 [191] In my view, when considered alongside the broader body of circumstantial evidence presented, these handwritten notes played a pivotal role in the trial. They not only substantiated the claims of adultery and financial entanglements between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent, but also exposed the Respondent’s deliberate efforts to obscure the truth, and that he and the Second Co-Respondent were, in fact, in an adulterous relationship prior to October 2015. [192] The Settlement – It was undisputed that the Second Co-Respondent had in fact left the employment of ALIR after being given a settlement. The Petitioner contended that the settlement included a MYR1 million pay-out to the Second Co-Respondent to fund her business venture, which she was to establish with the assistance of the Respondent. In support of this claim, the Petitioner adduced a draft settlement agreement, which the Respondent dismissed as a forgery. [193] Although I was of the view that the Petitioner had failed to prove the exact details of the settlement between ALIR and the Second Co-Respondent, it remained undisputed that a settlement had indeed taken place. While the Respondent denied the specifics of the agreement, he conceded that a settlement occurred in January 2016, following which the Second Co-Respondent had left the employment of ALIR in February 2016. The Respondent further asserted that he was unaware of the details, as the settlement was handled by ALIR’s Human Resources Department. However, he failed to produce any documentation to substantiate this claim. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 63 [194] In my view, even if the exact terms of the settlement were not definitively established, one crucial fact remained clear: the Second Co-Respondent was asked to leave the employment of ALIR, making a settlement necessary. This raised the fundamental question of why she was required to leave in the first place. The answer lay in the events of the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, where it became apparent that the Second Co-Respondent’s departure was a condition imposed by the Petitioner. This stipulation arose as a direct consequence of the adulterous relationship between the Second Co-Respondent and the Respondent. Thus, while the precise details of the settlement may be uncertain, the reason behind the Second Co-Respondent’s exit from the employment of ALIR was rooted in the Petitioner’s response to the adulterous relationship between the Second Co-Respondent and Respondent. [195] Overall, the Respondent’s defence was significantly weakened by his inability to provide evidence in support of his assertions. He shifted positions inconsistently, arguing at times that the documents adduced by the Petitioner held no weight because the originals were not produced, then contending that they were taken out of context, written by someone else, or even tampered with by the Petitioner. These contradictions, coupled with the weight of the documents themselves, ultimately undermined his credibility and reinforced the strength of the Petitioner’s case. [196] I was mindful that the documents adduced by the Petitioner were not original. For instance, the Respondent argued that the Petitioner had failed to produce the original handwritten notes, instead 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 64 submitting only copies in Court. In fact, throughout his testimony, the Respondent maintained that because the documents tendered by the Petitioner were merely photographs and not the originals, the Court should not place any reliance on them. [197] While I acknowledged the Respondent’s argument that the evidence constituted secondary evidence, as noted earlier in this judgment, secondary evidence is not devoid of probative value and may still carry significant weight. [198] Regarding the non-original documents, the Petitioner was compelled to rely on secondary evidence because the original documents were in the Respondent’s possession, as alluded to earlier. [199] In the final analysis, I found the Respondent to be exceedingly economical with the truth. The documentary evidence, considered in its entirety, strongly indicated that the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent were indeed engaged in an adulterous relationship prior to October 2015. [200] Refusal to Testify and Adverse Inference – At the close of the Petitioner’s case, the Second Co-Respondent elected to make a submission of no case to answer, invoking section 58(3)(a) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 58 – Damages for adultery may be claimed against co-respondent …

Where damages have been claimed against a co-respondent- 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 65

if, after the close of the evidence for the petitioner, the court is of the opinion that there is not sufficient evidence against the co-respondent to justify requiring him or her to reply, the co-respondent shall be discharged from the proceedings; or … [Emphasis added.] [201] In a civil trial, the law relating to no case to answer was explained in the Supreme Court case of Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693, where it was stated that once a defendant in civil proceedings makes a submission of no case to answer and elects not to call evidence, then all the evidence led by the plaintiff must be assumed to be correct. Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) explained this in the following passage: The procedure adopted by the trial judge at the end of the appellant's case did not appear to meet the requirement of adjectival law. The first respondent being away from the country and therefore being unable to testify was a fact and like any other fact, it had to be established by calling evidence, in the absence of an agreement between counsel. It is only after such evidence was led that counsel would be entitled to inform the court that he was not calling any evidence. Once he had done this, the trial judge must put the counsel to his election, namely, that if he did not call evidence, he would stand or fall with his submissions. Such rule of procedure is not a mere formality but one of essential justice. For once a defendant in civil proceedings elects not to give evidence, then all the evidence led by the plaintiff must be assumed to be true. [Emphasis added.] [202] The Supreme Court decision of Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor was followed by the Court of Appeal in Yoong Sze Fatt v Pengkalan Securities Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 MLJ 85, Mohd Nor 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 66 Afandi Mohamed Junus v. Rahman Shah Alang Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 2 CLJ 369, CA, and Meccilect Sdn Bhd v Petrosab Petroleum Engineering Sdn Bhd & Anor [2023] 2 CLJ 255. [203] In Meccilect Sdn Bhd v Petrosab Petroleum Engineering Sdn Bhd & Anor, the Court of Appeal, through Mariana Yahya JCA, explained with clarity the implications of no case to answer in the following passages: [23] The defendant can discharge this burden, first by way of cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses in the course of the plaintiff's case; or second, by way of giving evidence himself or calling witnesses in the course of the defendants' case; or as is most often the case, a combination of the different method. However, if the defendants find at the close of the plaintiff's case that:

the plaintiff has failed to lead evidence to prove his case; or

(ii) the evidence led by the plaintiff to proof his case is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that it fails to discharge the burden of prove, he may submit that he has 'no case to answer'. This was explained in Mohd Nor Afandi Mohamed Junus v. Rahman Shah Alang Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 2 CLJ 369, CA. [24] In this case, when the defendants submit that they have no case to answer, they are in effect making an election to proceed with their submission without giving evidence themselves or calling witnesses for their case. The discharge of their evidential burden (if any) is thus limited to the degradation of the plaintiff's and/or the plaintiff's witnesses' evidence through cross-examination. [Emphasis added.] [204] Since the Second Co-Respondent had elected to submit a no-case-to-answer, she proceeded accordingly with her submission of the same. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 67 [205] It must be borne in mind that a submission of no-case-to-answer is not always a suitable course of action for a defendant or respondent, particularly when multiple defendants or respondents are involved in the proceedings. This principle was explained in Ng Neoh Ha & Ors v Maniam s/o Suppiah & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 434, where, in reference to Lipman v Fox and London General Omnibus Co [1911] 46 LJ 746, and Hummerstone v Leary [1921] 2 KB 664, KC Vohrah J (as he then was) acknowledged the complexities that arise when more than one defendant or respondent is involved. In such cases, the Court must carefully assess the evidence adduced by each party before reaching a conclusion. [206] In the present case, the allegation of adultery involved both the Second Co-Respondent and the Respondent. Given the nature of the accusation, it was appropriate and necessary to allow the Respondent to testify before reaching a conclusion on whether adultery had, in fact, occurred. The Respondent’s testimony was crucial in assessing the credibility of the claim and determining the extent of his involvement with the Second Co-Respondent. [207] Consequently, I found myself unable to agree with Counsel for the Second Co-Respondent’s argument that she should be discharged from the proceedings due to a purported lack of evidence against her. The intertwined nature of the allegations involving both the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent required a thorough examination of the Respondent’s evidence first, before any such determination could be made. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 68 [208] As previously mentioned in this judgment, I found the Respondent’s testimony regarding his relationship with the Second Co-Respondent to be unpersuasive. His account of his relationship with the Second Co-Respondent lacked credibility and failed to dispel the inferences raised by the evidence adduced. His narrative was riddled with inconsistencies, contradictions, and vague explanations, which only served to deepen the Court’s doubts regarding the veracity of his claims. Given the significance of these concerns, it became all the more essential to conduct a meticulous and thorough evaluation of the evidence presented before the Court to ensure a just and fair determination of the matter. [209] Accordingly, the Petitioner, citing illustration (g) to section 114 of the Evidence Act, urged the Court to draw an adverse inference against the Second Co-Respondent due to her failure to testify or adduce any evidence. Illustration (g) to section 114 of the Evidence Act states: Section 114 - Court may presume existence of certain fact The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. ILLUSTRATIONS The court may presume: ...

that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it; [Emphasis added] 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 69 [210] As stated by the Supreme Court in Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221; [1987] 1 CLJ 250 [1987] 1 MLJ 492, evidence that is referred to in illustration (g) to section 114 of the Evidence Act must not only be relevant, it must be material. [211] On this note, reference was made to the case of Sabah Shell Petroleum Co Ltd & Anor v. The Owners Of And/Or Any Other Persons Interested In The Ship Or Vessel The 'Borcos Takdir' [2012] CLJU 1116; [2012] 1 LNS 1116; [2012] 5 MLJ 515, where it was stated by Nallini Pathmanathan J (now FCJ): ... The person best placed to explain fully the events of the day would have been the Master but the Defendant failed to call the master as witness. Stating that he was uncooperative. Given the importance of this witness' evidence, the defendant's failure to subpoena him led this court to conclude that the master's evidence if produced, would affect the defendant adversely. This was a fit and proper case for this court to draw an adverse inference under s. 114(g) against the defendant. [Emphasis added] [212] Another key aspect of the evidence referenced in illustration (g) to section 114 of the Evidence Act is that an adverse inference is drawn only when evidence is deliberately withheld. Such deliberate withholding is inferred when there is no reasonable explanation for the failure to present the evidence: Adel Muhd El-Dabbah v. AG of Palestine [1944] AC 156, Murugan v. Lew Chu Cheong [1980] CLJU 49; [1980] 1 LNS 49; [1980] 2 MLJ 139, and Marappan Muthusamy v. R Sivam Ramasamy [2013] CLJU 1381; [2013] 1 LNS 1381; [2014] 4 MLJ 428. [213] In the present case, no explanation was provided for the Second Co-Respondent's failure to testify or to call any witness to 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 70 corroborate her denial of the alleged adulterous relationship with the Respondent. This omission was particularly glaring, as one would reasonably expect a party accused of such serious misconduct to adduce credible evidence, if available. [214] I also had to take into account the procedural steps taken by the Second Co-Respondent in relation to her defence. Notably, she had filed her list of witnesses on 17 November 2023, indicating her intention to call a total of five witnesses, in addition to herself, to testify on her behalf. Furthermore, both she and her husband had filed their witness statements earlier, on 30 November 2022, which demonstrated their initial commitment to actively participating in the proceedings and presenting evidence in their defence. [215] However, despite these prior filings, the Second Co-Respondent later altered her approach to the case. On 10 August 2023, she informed the Court, through her Counsel, of her decision to elect a no-case-to-answer stance, effectively asserting that the evidence adduced by the Petitioner was insufficient to require her to mount a defence. This position was further reinforced when, on 19 September 2023, the Second Co-Respondent’s Counsel made a submission of no-case-to-answer. [216] After carefully considering the circumstances and the arguments presented, I ultimately ruled that there was insufficient basis to discharge the Second Co-Respondent from these matrimonial proceedings. The mere assertion of a no-case-to-answer submission did not, in itself, negate the need for a thorough judicial assessment of the available evidence. Given the gravity of the allegations and the evidence thus far adduced, it was necessary to 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 71 proceed with a full evaluation before determining her culpability or exoneration. [217] Consequently, I found merit in the Petitioner’s argument that the Second Co-Respondent’s refusal to testify not only gave rise to an adverse inference against her but also tacitly suggested an inability to effectively refute the allegations. The Second Co-Respondent’s silence, in effect, functioned as an implicit admission that she could not mount a substantive challenge to the claims brought against her. [218] I remained mindful that the evidence presented by the Petitioner was circumstantial in nature. Indeed, the Respondent sought to capitalise on this, arguing that there was no direct proof of adultery between himself and any of the Co-Respondents, for that matter. [219] At this juncture, it is necessary to recognise the evidentiary realities that often accompany allegations of adultery. In the vast majority of instances, direct evidence of the alleged misconduct is either unavailable or unattainable. Indeed, unless there exists unequivocal and irrefutable proof, such as the birth of a child conclusively linked to the alleged adulterous relationship, a voluntary and unambiguous admission by one of the parties, or a genuine and authenticated video recording depicting the act in flagrante delicto, the evidence presented will almost invariably be circumstantial in nature. [220] However, the absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of adultery. In law, circumstantial evidence is not inherently inferior to direct evidence, provided it is cogent, consistent, and compelling. Courts are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from a constellation of facts and circumstances that, when viewed 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 72 collectively, point persuasively toward the conclusion that adultery had occurred. Accordingly, where circumstantial evidence meets the requisite threshold of proof, on a balance of probabilities, in civil proceedings, it may be sufficient to ground a finding of adultery. [221] In this regard, I took guidance from Yew Yin Lai v. Teo Meng Hai & Anor [2007] CLJU 127; [2007] 1 LNS 127; [2013] 8 MLJ 787, where it was affirmed that circumstantial evidence, depending on the specific facts and circumstances of a case, may be adequate to substantiate a claim of adultery. [222] In the final analysis, the cumulative weight of the documentary evidence, witness testimonies, and circumstantial proof painted a clear and compelling picture of the Respondent’s adulterous relationship with the Second Co-Respondent. The various strands of evidence, each reinforcing the other, formed a coherent narrative that was difficult to dismiss. The consistency and credibility of the Petitioner’s case stood in stark contrast to the Respondent’s evasiveness, his shifting explanations, and his failure to provide any substantive rebuttal. Taken together, these factors strongly supported the conclusion that an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent had, in fact, occurred prior to October 2015. Whether the Petitioner had found the adultery intolerable [223] A key turning point was the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, where the Petitioner, the Respondent, and the Respondent’s mother had met. That meeting was significant as it was presented as a reconciliation attempt initiated by the Petitioner, who believed the marriage had reached a breaking point. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 73 [224] During this meeting, the Petitioner laid out the following three conditions for continuing the marriage, namely, that: a) The Respondent must immediately cease all physical and mental abuse, ensuring that no further emotional, psychological, or physical harm was inflicted on her; b) The Respondent must end all affairs and communication with any alleged mistresses in order to rebuild trust in the marriage; and c) The Respondent must provide financial security for their children, guaranteeing their well-being and stability. [225] While the Respondent did not dispute that the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting had taken place, he denied ever admitting to any adulterous relationship. [226] Following the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, two key issues arose for determination: (a) whether the Petitioner had found the Respondent’s adultery to be intolerable; and (b) whether there was evidence indicating that the adulterous relationship with any of the Co-Respondents had continued beyond October 2015. [227] Since it was my finding that there was an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent prior to October 2015, the issue, therefore, was whether the Petitioner had found such adultery intolerable, as outlined in section 54(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which stipulates: 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 74 Section 54 – Proof of breakdown

In its inquiry into the facts and circumstances alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage, the court shall have regard to one or more of the following facts, that is to say-

that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent; … [Emphasis added.] [228] At this stage, it was crucial to understand the concept of ‘tolerance’ in the context of adultery. [229] Tolerating adultery means enduring or accepting its existence without necessarily approving or forgiving it. A spouse who tolerates adultery may be aware of the adultery but refrains from taking immediate action for personal, emotional, or practical reasons. For instance, if a spouse remains in the matrimonial home after discovering an adulterous relationship but continues to express dissatisfaction, he or she may have tolerated the adultery. [230] On the basis of tolerance, it was imperative to emphasise that allowing an individual to use adultery as grounds for divorce after years of inaction would contradict principles of justice and accountability. [231] Counsel for the Petitioner posed the question of how much time should pass before a spouse's continued tolerance of adultery is no longer reasonable and it is instead deemed intolerable. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 75 [232] While the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act does not prescribe a time limit, the Singapore’s Women’s Charter 1961, in section 95(5), stipulates that a spouse cannot seek divorce on grounds of adultery if they continue living with the adulterous spouse for six months or more after discovering the affair. This provision encourages timely decision-making and prevents the ‘weaponising’ of adultery in matrimonial disputes. [233] Unfortunately, the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act lacks such a limitation, which can lead to prolonged uncertainty, potential manipulation, and complications in legal proceedings due to outdated evidence. Introducing similar provisions would promote prompt action, prevent abuse of process, and enhance legal efficiency. Although no statutory limitation exists under section 58 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act for claims against third parties, the Court cannot condone undue delay by litigants. [234] In the present case, the issue was whether the Petitioner had tolerated the adultery. In my view, she had, for the following reasons. [235] It was undisputed that the Petitioner was aware of the Respondent’s adulterous relationship with the Second Co-Respondent. It was also accepted that a meeting took place in October 2015 involving the Parties and the Respondent’s mother. Although the Petitioner denied that this meeting constituted a reconciliation, I had previously found that it did, in fact, amount to one. [236] In my view, there was no doubt that the Petitioner’s actions amounted to tolerance of the adulterous relationship between the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 76 Respondent and Second Co-Respondent. Despite claiming to have discovered the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent, she continued living with the Respondent, engaged in marital relations as part of her conjugal obligations, and even travelled overseas with him until he eventually moved out of the PGA Penthouse in October 2017 after the Recorded Incident. [237] Evidence revealed that in February 2016, several months after the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, both Parties took steps to reconcile by attending counselling sessions with a marriage and family therapist, who was subpoenaed to testify as PW4. This joint effort to seek professional help indicated a willingness on both Parties, particularly the Petitioner, to salvage the marriage despite knowledge of the adultery between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent. Such an action implied a degree of forgiveness or at least a conditional acceptance of the Respondent’s prior conduct, which bore directly on the legal interpretation of whether the Petitioner truly found the affair intolerable. [238] In light of these efforts at reconciliation, it was my view that the Petitioner did not find the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent to be intolerable, within the legal meaning of section 54(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act. Her decision to remain in the marriage and participate in therapy after learning of the adultery weakened her claim to have been irreparably harmed or unable to continue in the marital relationship. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 77 [239] Nevertheless, while the Petitioner’s claim for damages was denied due to her tolerance of the adulterous conduct between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent, I declined to award costs to the Second Co-Respondent. Although she was ultimately not held liable for damages, her conduct during the proceedings warranted judicial censure. She had submitted various documents and witness statements indicating her intent to participate in the trial, but later refused to testify. This refusal, despite being an active party to the proceedings, contributed to inefficiencies and unnecessary delays. In my view, her actions amounted to a waste of judicial time and did not merit the award of legal costs in her favour. [240] Given the Petitioner’s decision to remain in the marriage under specific terms after discovering the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent, the subsequent issue was whether credible evidence existed to suggest that this adulterous relationship continued beyond October 2015. Additionally, it was necessary to consider whether there was any evidence of adultery between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent post October 2015. If such evidence existed, it would be essential to determine whether fresh acts of adultery had occurred, acts that may not have been tolerated, in order to properly evaluate the merits of the Petitioner’s claims. Post October 2015 – Whether adultery between Respondent and Co-Respondents had been proved [241] I had already concluded that the relationship between the First Co-Respondent and the Respondent pre-October 2015 was not adulterous, although it was not purely platonic. However, the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 78 Petitioner insisted that the Respondent continued to maintain contact with the First Co-Respondent, implying that this ongoing communication played a role in the breakdown of the marriage. [242] I was unable to agree with the Petitioner’s insistence due to several reasons. [243] First and foremost, there was no evidence at all of adultery between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent after the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting. [244] The mere act of maintaining communication with the First Co-Respondent, if at all, did not, in itself, amount to adultery. For an allegation of adultery to be substantiated, there must be clear and convincing evidence of a sexual relationship between the parties involved. Mere contact or continued association, without more, was insufficient to establish the existence of an adulterous relationship. [245] Interestingly, as I had alluded to earlier in this judgment, sometime in November 2015, over several days, a series of messages were exchanged between the Petitioner and the First Co-Respondent. A review of these communications, particularly the numerous emails sent by the Petitioner, strongly suggested that she was actively trying to elicit an admission of adultery from the First Co-Respondent. The persistence with which the Petitioner sought such an admission further reinforced my view that there was no tangible evidence to support the claim that adultery had occurred between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent, either before or after October 2015. It was apparent that the Petitioner, lacking direct 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 79 proof, went to considerable lengths in an attempt to obtain corroboration for her allegations. [246] With respect to the Second Co-Respondent, a careful examination of the available evidence led me to also conclude that there was no basis for the Petitioner’s assertion that the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent was ongoing post-October 2015. [247] In her attempts to gather evidence of the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent, the Petitioner enlisted the help of a friend, who herself is an advocate and solicitor, and subpoenaed by the Respondent as RW6. RW6 had facilitated contact between the Petitioner and a self-proclaimed private investigator, who was also subpoenaed by the Respondent as RW2. [248] The discussions between the Petitioner and RW2 revolved around the use of a device known as a "rubber ducky," which had the capability to extract information from old electronic devices. There were also indications that the Petitioner had sought RW2's assistance to access specific company systems, including an attempt to hack a computer to retrieve information related to ALIR. The Petitioner’s conduct appeared to be part of a broader legal strategy employed to obtain evidence to bolster her case in the proceedings of the matrimonial dispute. [249] During cross-examination, the Petitioner conceded that she had engaged RW2 to procure certain documents related to the island resort where the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent had 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 80 taken a trip together. She further admitted to paying MYR250 as a consultancy fee for his services. Furthermore, messages exchanged between the Petitioner and RW2 indicated that some of the requested services had not been fulfilled, leading her to inquire about recovering old WhatsApp messages between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent that might contain relevant information. [250] Although the engagement of RW2 for his services had not yielded any fruitful results for the Petitioner, it became apparent that the Petitioner was actively attempting to collect evidence post-October 2015 to establish that the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent was ongoing. However, her reliance on external assistance for gathering such evidence reinforced the conclusion that the Petitioner had lacked evidence, to begin with, to substantiate her claims. [251] The main evidence adduced by the Petitioner to support her claim that the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent was ongoing post-October 2015 consisted of the alleged SHU Agreement and the settlement between the Second Co-Respondent and ALIR. However, upon careful evaluation, these documents were found to be insufficient to conclusively prove that the adulterous relationship continued beyond October 2015, for the following reasons. [252] The Petitioner submitted that it was in April 2017 when she first discovered the alleged "SHU Agreement," which she interpreted as the Respondent's attempt to assist the Second Co-Respondent in launching SHU, a company she claimed was in competition with an 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 81 ALIR enterprise. The Petitioner further asserted that the SHU Agreement served as evidence of the ongoing adulterous relationship between the Respondent and Second Co-Respondent, citing it as the cause of the Recorded Incident. [253] I found the Petitioner’s contention untenable as the original SHU Agreement, if at all, was not tendered as evidence in these proceedings. Moreover, the Respondent denied its existence entirely, and it remained something the Petitioner merely claimed to have seen. [254] Even if the Petitioner’s account of the SHU Agreement were to be accepted, it would still fall short of establishing that the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent continued beyond October 2015. [255] Furthermore, even assuming, however implausibly, that the SHU Agreement had indicated the continuation of an adulterous relationship, it raised the question of why the Petitioner had waited until September 2018 to file the Divorce Petition, having allegedly discovered the agreement in April 2017. [256] The delay not only suggested the Petitioner's tolerance of the adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent, but also portrayed her as an indolent litigant. In assessing this indolence, it was instructive to consider the following remarks of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223: 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 82 It is a cardinal principle of law, that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant. In all cases in which delay in approaching the court is in issue, the burden is upon the litigant who has delayed to render a satisfactory explanation for it. [Emphasis added.] [257] While I acknowledged that Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd is not a matrimonial case, the principle that the Court will not assist an indolent litigant is a general one and is equally applicable to matrimonial proceedings [258] In conclusion, while I found that the Petitioner had adduced sufficient evidence to establish an adulterous relationship between the Respondent and the Second Co-Respondent prior to October 2015, she had failed to produce any evidence indicating that this relationship continued beyond that date. As for the alleged adultery between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent, there was no evidence to support the claim, either before or after October 2015. [259] Moreover, the Petitioner’s decision to remain in the marriage after discovering the alleged adultery suggested that, at the material time, she did not find the adultery to be intolerable. [260] Accordingly, it could not be established that the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage was caused by the Respondent’s alleged adultery, or that such adultery was of a nature that the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 83 Petitioner found it intolerable to live with the Respondent as a result thereof. Unreasonable behaviour [261] A further ground relied upon by the Petitioner was that the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage was caused by the Respondent’s alleged unreasonable behaviour, which the Petitioner could not reasonably be expected to endure. This is stipulated under section 54(1)(b) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which provides: Section 54 – Proof of breakdown

In its inquiry into the facts and circumstances alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage, the court shall have regard to one or more of the following facts, that is to say- …

that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent; … [Emphasis added.] Whether irretrievable breakdown of the marriage was caused by abuse by Respondent [262] In invoking section 54(1)(b) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, the Petitioner alleged that she had endured physical, mental, and emotional abuse throughout the course of the marriage. [263] In support of her allegations of physical abuse, the Petitioner referred to specific incidents of abuse, including an event at a party in Malta, an altercation at a law firm (referred to in this judgment as CSK), and the Recorded Incident at the premises of ALIR. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 84 [264] With regard to the alleged abuse in Malta, the Petitioner contended that the incident took place during a family trip attended by friends, including the First Co-Respondent. The Petitioner claimed that the Respondent had hit her with a hanger during this trip. The Respondent, however, denied the allegation and explained that he had used the hanger to hit the bed, and not the Petitioner. [265] During cross-examination, the Petitioner admitted that photographs taken during the same trip did not show any visible injuries, bruises, or marks that would substantiate her claim of being hit. She further acknowledged that the photographs adduced in Court depicted her appearing happy and engaged during the trip, which was inconsistent with her claims of being abused at that time. [266] The allegations of physical abuse in Malta were unsubstantiated and relied solely on the Petitioner’s testimony in Court. Given her inclination to exaggerate and embellish her narratives, I was unable to agree with her that the Respondent had physically abused her in Malta. [267] The incident at CSK, as contended by the Petitioner, involved a physical altercation between the Petitioner and the Respondent in October 2017. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had kicked her in the stomach, causing her to fall backward against a door. She further claimed that the Respondent had proceeded to destroy her mobile phone. When the proprietor of CSK (referred to in this judgment as RW8), attempted to collect the broken pieces of the phone, including the SIM card, the Respondent allegedly pushed RW8 away to prevent her from retrieving them. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 85 [268] According to the Petitioner, the altercation with the Respondent at CSK stemmed from the Respondent’s extreme concern over the contents of the Petitioner’s phone, leading him to create a scene at the premises of CSK, in an attempt to recover it. [269] The Respondent admitted that an altercation had occurred but denied all other aspects of the Petitioner’s version of events. [270] During the trial, it was noted that no video footage of the incident existed, nor were any police reports filed in relation to it. Although RW8 had testified that an altercation had taken place, she admitted that she had not personally witnessed it, but had only heard loud screaming and shouting. [271] Given the lack of evidence, the Court was unable to conclude that the incident amounted to physical abuse by the Respondent, as it appeared that both Parties had engaged in the altercation. [272] The confrontation at the premises of CSK later escalated to the Recorded Incident, where the Petitioner had barged into the premises of ALIR, leading to another confrontation. During the Recorded Incident, the Petitioner claimed that the Respondent had physically abused her. However, the footage did not support the Petitioner’s narrative. [273] The Respondent asserted that he was merely attempting to retrieve a bag that the Petitioner had in her possession, which he claimed contained documents belonging to ALIR. [274] Upon reviewing the Recorded Incident and considering the testimonies of three eyewitnesses, namely, PW2 and PW7, who 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 86 were subpoenaed, as well as RW11, the Respondent’s driver, it became clear that the Petitioner was the primary instigator of the incident. [275] Witnesses had consistently testified that the Petitioner had involved the Children in the altercation. The Son was observed to have physically obstructed the Respondent from entering his office, while the Daughter was the one who had recorded the unfolding events. Based on the totality of the evidence, the Court found that the Respondent’s conduct, as depicted in the video, had not constituted abuse. [276] Upon careful analysis, there was no evidence to substantiate the Petitioner’s claims of physical abuse in any manner whatsoever by the Respondent. The allegations made by the Petitioner were uncorroborated, as there were no police reports or medical evidence to support her testimony. Aside from the Recorded Incident, which did not align with her claims, the Petitioner had not adduced any tangible proof of abuse. The Court found that the Petitioner had placed herself in the situation by forcefully entering the Respondent’s office to retrieve documents from a bag she claimed was hers, but which the Respondent insisted belonged to ALIR. [277] The Recorded Incident ultimately demonstrated the Petitioner’s difficulty in controlling her anger, even in the presence of the Children. During the altercation at the Respondent’s office, she lost her composure, escalating the situation into a chaotic confrontation. I had also observed that the Petitioner was aggressive in both conduct and language as her conversation with the Respondent was littered with profanities. This was another indication of the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 87 Petitioner’s uncontrolled rage and fury which had contributed to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. [278] Witnesses, including office staff, attempted to de-escalate her outburst, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Instead of calming down, the Petitioner continued to rage, causing a disruption that not only unsettled the workplace but also directly involved the Children in the conflict. In my view, drawing the Children into a physical altercation with their own father was the worst possible way to weaponise them. [279] In fact, I found it particularly troubling that the Petitioner had actively involved the Children in the dispute. Although the Petitioner had disputed it, it was undeniable that she had instructed the Daughter, who was only 13 years old that the time, to record the incident, and had used the Son, then aged 15, to physically block the Respondent from retrieving the bag. In my view, the Petitioner’s actions contradicted the impression she had attempted to give in Court, namely, that she always had the best interests of the Children at heart. [280] The Petitioner further alleged that the Respondent had subjected her to emotional and mental abuse by initiating a Defamation Suit in August 2018, and by the manner in which he obtained evidence, specifically, that he allegedly accessed the Petitioner’s computer without authorisation and engaged in online harassment. [281] I found the Petitioner’s contention untenable for the following reasons. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 88 [282] First and foremost, the notion that defamation lawsuits amount to abuse is a fallacy that undermines the integrity of defamation laws and the rights of individuals to protect their reputation. Defamation lawsuits are a legitimate recourse for those unjustly harmed by false accusations, serving to uphold accountability, deter defamation, and preserve the integrity of public discourse. It was essential, therefore, to dispel misconceptions surrounding defamation lawsuits and to reaffirm their pivotal role in safeguarding the rights and dignity of individuals in society. [283] The Respondent’s decision to initiate the Defamation Suit was based on his claim that the Petitioner had been spreading falsehoods about him on social media. Given the potential damage to his personal and professional reputation, the Respondent had every right to take legal action to protect himself. Defamation can have serious consequences, and from a legal standpoint, pursuing such a suit was a justifiable course of action. [284] In any event, the Defamation Suit was eventually settled in October 2023, resulting in a consent judgment. This indicated that both Parties had reached an agreement, bringing the matter to a close without further litigation. [285] The Petitioner also alleged that the mental and emotional abuse she suffered had led to health issues such as alopecia (hair loss) and migraines. The Petitioner submitted a medical report detailing chronic, long-standing stress, which she claimed was linked to abdominal issues, low energy, and mood swings. According to the Petitioner, such stress was compounded by the Respondent’s 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 89 neglect, particularly during instances when she was hospitalised for severe migraines and vomiting. [286] I found the Petitioner’s claims untenable and unconvincing as there was no direct link between the Petitioner’s medical condition and the Respondent’s conduct. In fact, during cross-examination, the Petitioner admitted that she had been unable to gather evidence of emotional abuse, which was allegedly inflicted by the Respondent between 2015 and 2017, to support the Divorce Petition which was filed in 2018. This lack of substantiating proof further weakened the Petitioner’s claims. [287] In the final analysis, the Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof that the Respondent had engaged in any form of abusive conduct, whether physical, mental, or emotional. Moreover, even if any instance of alleged abuse had occurred, the Petitioner had failed to establish a causal link between such conduct and the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Whether irretrievable breakdown of the marriage was caused by Petitioner’s unreasonable behaviour [288] The Respondent, however, argued that it was the Petitioner’s unreasonable behaviour that caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The Respondent claimed that the Petitioner’s behaviour became intolerable, culminating in the Recorded Incident, and ultimately compelling the Respondent to leave the matrimonial home in October 2017. [289] According to the Respondent, over the course of several years, the Petitioner had engaged in a series of actions that, in my view, 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 90 substantially contributed to the collapse of the marriage, as detailed in the Respondent’s submissions. She notably acquired documents from the Respondent, as well as materials belonging to ALIR, including some containing confidential business information, and had used them in the divorce proceedings. [290] As referred to earlier in this judgment, the Petitioner had secretly recorded conversations and sought out confidential materials not in good faith, but rather as part of a strategic effort to gain leverage in the marital dispute. She had attempted to hire RW2 to unlawfully access the systems of ALIR, and, most concerning of all, had influenced the Children to turn against the Respondent. [291] I found merit in the Respondent’s claims, as the evidence adduced and the testimonies of witnesses regarding the Petitioner and her conduct towards the Respondent reinforced my view that the Petitioner did, in fact, play a significant role in the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. [292] The marriage and family therapist, PW4, who had conducted counselling sessions with both the Petitioner and the Respondent around 2016, had testified that the Petitioner had been unhappy from the very beginning and that the marriage was fraught with difficulties. In his opinion, the Petitioner was someone who might never be satisfied, even with the best that life had to offer. Her increasing dissatisfaction only pushed the Respondent further away, exacerbating their emotional disconnect. [293] Based on the professional assessment of PW4, it was the Petitioner who had displayed significant anger management issues. Over 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 91 time, her inability to control her emotions had reportedly intensified, negatively impacting her marital relationship and the broader family dynamic. The Recorded Incident further supported the observations of PW4, illustrating that her anger was not an isolated incident but part of a persistent behavioural pattern. [294] The testimony of PW4, whom I found reliable and credible, indicated that the issues within the marriage were not solely attributable to the Respondent’s actions but were also influenced by the Petitioner’s expectations and personal struggles. [295] The Petitioner had also attempted to implicate the Respondent in the 1MDB scandal by reaching out to journalists and authorities, which further damaged his public reputation. [296] The Recorded Incident was the final straw, as the Respondent left the PGA Penthouse following such incident and never returned to the Petitioner. In fact, the Recorded Incident escalated matters further, with the Petitioner subsequently airing her grievances on Facebook to friends and acquaintances, which ultimately led to the filing of the Defamation Suit. [297] On the Petitioner’s conduct during the Recorded Incident, I also relied on the testimony of two eye-witnesses, PW2 and PW7, who were acquaintances of the Parties. [298] The testimony of PW2 was as follows: All I can recall is that there was, there’s something very abnormal that was… I saw one of the kids, like physically, I think handling the father, …. I remember also the daughter having a handphone recording something, which again, so we were, like I said, all of us who were not… 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 92 who were just there for a meeting, I think all of us we are just probably quite stunned, to be honest. … I remember when the son was pinning him down. I think that part was the most traumatic one, even for all of us, hard to forget that. On the other parts, by watching those videos, now I remember, that there was a conversation going on. A few of us were trying very hard to talk to CHAN and SHAN to calm down the situation for the sake of these two children who were there. [Emphasis added] [299] As per PW7’s testimony: My Lady, in the clips shown to me and from my recollection, the Respondent was all the time trying to get hold of that bag and did not behave aggressively towards the Petitioner. It was not the Petitioner he was trying to be aggressive towards. He was always just wanting to protect the property or whatever was in that bag. I would say he’s trying to restrain his father from trying to get at the bag. If I may explain, My Lady? The reason I say there’s no aggression towards the Petitioner per se is because when I was there and having watched these clips, he was always trying to get the bag. At no point in time did he hit or try to hit the Petitioner. He was always trying to hold the bag in the clip we’ve just seen. You see the Petitioner holding the bag very closely. [Emphasis added] [300] What was particularly alarming about the Recorded Incident was the level of violence directed by the Son towards his father, the Respondent, a situation made even more disturbing by the fact that the Petitioner appeared to have actively encouraged or condoned the behaviour. Rather than de-escalating the conflict or protecting the Children from becoming involved in such a volatile exchange, the Petitioner’s actions seemed to fuel the aggression, raising 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 93 serious concerns about her judgment and the emotional environment in which the Children were being raised. [301] Although I found that the Petitioner had played a significant role in contributing to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the Respondent was entirely without fault. The evidence indicated that both Parties bore some degree of responsibility for the deterioration of the marriage. The actual cause of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage [302] Following the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, the Petitioner chose to remain in the marriage. However, the trust between the Parties had already been severely compromised. The discovery of the Respondent’s adulterous relationship with the Second Co-Respondent, coupled with his continued closeness to the First Co-Respondent, left the Petitioner feeling deeply insecure and emotionally destabilised. Whatever remnants of trust had survived were, at that point, irreparably shattered. [303] Although the Respondent had denied any continued involvement with either Co-Respondent, the Second Co-Respondent’s subsequent appointment as Director of SHU further fuelled the Petitioner’s suspicions and deepened her sense of betrayal. While she ultimately failed to produce conclusive evidence of a valid SHU Agreement, the surrounding circumstances made it unreasonable to expect her to simply move on despite the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting. Her mistrust was not without context, as it stemmed from patterns of the Respondent’s behaviour that 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 94 continued to undermine her sense of emotional safety in the marriage. [304] The Respondent, for his part, testified that the Petitioner’s frustrations were rooted in his refusal to involve her in his business affairs. Although the Respondent had denied the existence of the SHU Agreement, he interpreted the Petitioner’s reaction as a manifestation of this resentment. From the Petitioner’s perspective, however, the Respondent’s apparent support for the Second Co-Respondent’s business venture was not merely a business decision, but rather a final and unforgivable act of disloyalty. This perceived betrayal significantly escalated tensions and served as a precursor to the highly contentious Recorded Incident that would later unfold. [305] Although no direct evidence was adduced to establish that the Respondent continued an adulterous relationship with either Co-Respondent subsequent to October 2015, his sustained contact with the First Co-Respondent, particularly in light of the past extra marital relationship with the Second Co-Respondent, eroded any prospect of rebuilding trust. His failure to take meaningful steps towards reconciliation only deepened the Petitioner’s distress. Instead of working to repair the damage, the Respondent appeared to minimise the Petitioner’s concerns, maintaining a level of interaction with the First Co-Respondent that the Petitioner perceived as deeply disrespectful and inconsistent with any genuine attempt at marital restoration. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 95 [306] The continued presence of the First Co-Respondent in their lives cast a long and inescapable shadow over the marriage. Whether the involvement of the First Co-Respondent was actively encouraged or passively tolerated, the emotional toll on the Petitioner was evident. The spectre of the Respondent’s past adultery loomed large, preventing the Petitioner from achieving any semblance of emotional closure. Even in the absence of cogent evidence of renewed adultery, the perception of ongoing involvement further eroded whatever fragile hope of reconciliation remained. Repeated confrontations with the First Co-Respondent, following the October 2015 Reconciliation Meeting, further demonstrated the extent to which the foundational elements of trust and commitment had been compromised. [307] However, despite her profound unhappiness with the Respondent, the Petitioner elected not to end the marriage. It became apparent that the Petitioner’s decision was driven less by love or hope for reconciliation, and more by a desire to maintain the social standing and privileges associated with her role as the Respondent’s wife. Photographic evidence showed her appearing alongside celebrities such as designer Michael Kors, actress Kate Hudson, and members of the Kardashian family, as well as attending prestigious events like the Cannes Film Festival. These glimpses into her public life suggested that the Petitioner valued the status and lifestyle afforded by her marriage more than the relationship itself. The Petitioner’s insistence on maintaining the marriage, despite its evident breakdown, appeared to be driven more by a desire to preserve certain external benefits than by any sincere intention to reconcile or restore the marital relationship. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 96 [308] In a nut-shell, the Petitioner had white-knuckled a marriage that had long since lost its vitality, holding on to the illusion of a marriage that no longer served either Party. [309] The Respondent, on the other hand, remained disengaged, content with a stagnant marriage, yet unwilling to take meaningful steps to either repair or respectfully conclude it. His passivity allowed the relationship to exist in a state of inertia, devoid of growth or purpose. [310] Rather than permitting the marriage to end with the dignity and finality it rightfully warranted, the Parties, instead, prolonged its existence unnaturally, akin to maintaining a patient on life support, despite the absence of any real hope of recovery, whilst leaving the marriage suspended in a prolonged state of uncertainty. This conscious decision had only extended the emotional suffering of both Parties, depriving them of the closure necessary to begin healing and move forward with their lives. “Means and Needs” test Whether Petitioner had satisfied the ‘means and needs’ test [311] It was undisputed that the Respondent was willing to provide spousal maintenance to the Petitioner. However, the contention lay in the appropriate amount. The Respondent asserted that a monthly sum between MYR15,000 and MYR20,000 would suffice, while the Petitioner maintained that her monthly expenses amounted to MYR230,000. [312] After careful consideration, I determined that a monthly sum of MYR35,000 was reasonable and sufficient for spousal maintenance, for the following reasons. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 97 [313] In determining the issue of maintenance, reference was made to section 77(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 77 – Power of court to order maintenance of spouse

The court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife:

during the course of any matrimonial proceedings;

when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree of divorce or judicial separation;

if, after a decree declaring her presumed to be dead, she is found to be alive. [Emphasis added.] [314] In exercising its discretion to award maintenance to the Petitioner, the Court is governed by both the fault principle and the 'means and needs' test, outlined by section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 78 – Assessment of maintenance In determining the amount of any maintenance to be paid by a man to his wife or former wife or by a woman to her husband or former husband, the court shall base its assessment primarily on the means and needs of the parties, regardless of the proportion such maintenance bears to the income of the husband or wife as the case may be, but shall have regard to the degree of responsibility which the court apportions to each party for the breakdown of the marriage. [Emphasis added.] [315] In my evaluation of whether the Petitioner was deserving of maintenance that she claimed, I found guidance in established legal 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 98 precedents, specifically the cases of Dr Shameni Pillai PB Rajedran v Dr S Arulselvam Sanggilly & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 782, and V Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Velentine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474. These cases underscore the importance of considering several key factors, such as the following:

the income, earning capacity, property, or financial resources that each Party presently possesses or is likely to possess in the foreseeable future;

the financial needs, obligations, and responsibilities that each Party currently or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

the standard of living enjoyed by the family prior to the breakdown of the marriage;

the age of each Party;

any existing health, physical, or mental disability of the

the respective contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family; and

the duration of the marriage. [316] Since I had already made a finding that both the Petitioner and Respondent were equally responsible for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, the issue at hand now was whether the means and needs of the Parties justified the MYR230,000 monthly maintenance that the Petitioner was seeking. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 99 [317] I found the Petitioner’s claim for MYR230,000 in monthly maintenance to be excessive, unjustifiable, and unreasonable. It was important, at this juncture, to remind the Petitioner, in particular, that divorce is not a lottery, nor is it a revenue-generating exercise. It is not a tool for vindication or a means to exact revenge. At its core, divorce is a legal and emotional process intended to bring closure to a broken relationship, not to serve personal gain or punishment. Treating it otherwise would only prolong pain, fuel unnecessary conflict, and undermine the dignity of everyone involved. The goal should be fairness, healing, and the respectful separation of lives once joined, and not personal profit or retribution. [318] While the Court would undeniably endeavour to ensure fairness, it cannot deliver uniform outcomes across all cases. What the Court must safeguard is that the spouse receiving maintenance does not suffer a drastic decline in living conditions, particularly where the marriage was of considerable duration. [319] The Petitioner sought to justify her claim for MYR230,000 in monthly maintenance by meticulously detailing her expenditures during the marriage in an effort to demonstrate the lifestyle she wished to maintain. While the Respondent did not dispute the documentary evidence presented, he contended that the expenses were not incurred solely for the Petitioner. He further asserted that the source of these funds was not exclusively him, but at times included contributions from his father, as well as funds channelled through ALIR. [320] Furthermore, the rationale behind the law imposing a duty on a man to maintain his former wife is to even out any financial inequalities 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 100 between the spouses, taking into account any economic prejudice suffered by the wife during marriage, as explained in the Singapore cases of Tan Sue-Ann Melissa v Lim Siang Bok Dennis [2004] 3 SLR(R) 376, and Quek Lee Tiam v Ho Kim Swee (alias Ho Kian Guan) [1995] SGHC 23. [321] It was undisputed that the Petitioner’s rich and famous lifestyle was hinged on her status as the Respondent’s wife. Her trips overseas were most of the time tied to the Respondent’s business trips. On numerous occasions, the holidays were sponsored by the Respondent’s father. It was important to recognise that these privileges and benefits were tied to the marriage. Once that marriage ceased, it was given that the financial support and lifestyle afforded by the Respondent’s wealth would also change significantly. Adjusting to this new reality would require a shift in expectations and a focus on building independence and self-sufficiency. [322] I was mindful of the case of Re Borthwick (Deceased); Borthwick & Anor v. Beauvais & Ors [1949] 1 Ch 395, which has been cited in numerous Malaysian cases. The following is the oft-quoted passage by Harman J: It is said that maintenance is the only thing you can look at. What does that mean? It does not mean you can only give the dependant just enough to put a little jam on his bread and butter. It has been already held that what is reasonable for one may not be reasonable for another. It must depend on the circumstances of the case. It certainly depends to some extent on the circumstances of the widow, but I think it may also depend on the circumstances of the testator, that is to say, whether he died a rich man or not, because a rich man may be supposed to have made better provision for his wife's maintenance than a poor one. Maintenance does not only mean the food she puts in her mouth it means the clothes on her back, the house in which she lives, and the money which she has to have in her pocket, all of which vary according 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 101 to the means of the man who leaves a wife behind him. I think that must be so. Maintenance cannot mean only mere subsistence. [Emphasis added.] [323] In revisiting Re Borthwick (Deceased); Borthwick & Anor v. Beauvais & Ors (“Re Borthwick”), it was important to address a common misconception stemming from its frequent misinterpretation. This landmark decision, rendered 75 years ago, has been invoked in various contexts that occasionally stretch beyond its original purview. The core dispute revolved around the financial entitlement of the testator’s wife following a significant change in their marital and financial circumstances. [324] Initially, the couple in Re Borthwick faced financial hardship, leading to the testator's bankruptcy. This economic downturn prompted the wife to move back with her parents. Despite these challenging times, the testator managed to provide his wife with a weekly allowance of GBP3 – a commitment he upheld even after his fortunes took a dramatic turn for the better, elevating him from financial distress to considerable wealth. The crux of the legal issue in Re Borthwick was not simply the amount of financial support the wife had received, but rather the appropriateness of this support, given the drastic improvement in the testator’s financial situation. The court in Re Borthwick ultimately determined that the wife's entitlement extended far beyond the symbolic GBP3 per week, recognising the need to reflect the changed economic status in her financial maintenance. [325] Re Borthwick exemplifies the effort by the judicial system to ensure fairness and equity in financial arrangements post-divorce, particularly in light of significant changes in a party's financial 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 102 capacity. It serves as a poignant reminder of the court's role in adapting legal outcomes to the realities of life's unpredictable economic shifts, rather than rigidly adhering to arrangements that no longer reflect current circumstances. [326] In my analysis, I drew valuable insights from the Singaporean legal precedents set forth in the cases of Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow [2012] 2 SLR 506, ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2, and VPU v VPT [2021] SGCA. These cases, being of a more contemporary nature, provide a pragmatic perspective on the issue of spousal maintenance post-divorce, particularly concerning the wife's entitlement. [327] In modern divorces, the notion that a woman must be permanently supported by her ex-husband is increasingly challenged. While financial fairness is essential, it does not mean the continuation of luxury at the expense of the other spouse’s ability to build a new life. A post-divorce reality often involves adjustments in spending habits, living arrangements, and expectations of financial dependence. The Court, therefore has to adopt for a "common-sense holistic approach" that acknowledges the altered financial landscape following a divorce. [328] The Petitioner, in attempting to justify the amount of MYR230,000 monthly, testified that she sacrificed everything for the sake of the marriage, claiming that she gave up her own opportunities and identity, which left her with nothing to rebuild her life after its collapse. This narrative is often seen in disputes where one party emphasises emotional and personal loss as justification for claiming a disproportionate share of assets or compensation. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 103 [329] In contrast, the Respondent’s argument challenged that testimony by emphasising that the Petitioner, as the wife of a wealthy entrepreneur, experienced significant material benefits throughout the marriage. These benefits included a luxurious, jet-setting lifestyle and a range of privileges that are typically not accessible to someone without such financial backing. The key contention is that her lifestyle during the marriage provided evidence that she was far from destitute or disadvantaged. [330] The Petitioner’s narrative also raised a critical question: Would the Petitioner have been better off had she not entered into the marriage at all? The underlying assertion is that the material advantages and social standing she enjoyed could, in fact, have been lost if the marriage had not taken place. In other words, rather than suffering a net loss, she might have actually been financially and socially better positioned within the marital setup. [331] In summary, while the Petitioner’s narrative centred on personal sacrifice and loss, the opposing perspective stressed the undeniable benefits she enjoyed as part of a wealthy household. This dichotomy not only questioned the veracity of the Petitioner’s claims but also invited a deeper reflection on how one evaluates sacrifices versus benefits in marital relationships. [332] Hence, while the aim was to avoid a drastic decline in the Petitioner’s standard of living, the expectation of replicating the exact standard of living during the subsistence of the marriage was both unrealistic and impractical. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 104 [333] Furthermore, the Petitioner had, at no point, applied to vary the Interim Maintenance Order, which had awarded her a monthly sum of MYR35,000, in addition to the continued provision of a car, a driver, and domestic assistance. The Interim Maintenance Order, granted in December 2019, had remained intact and operative throughout the proceedings. Despite the passage of several years, during which the Petitioner was fully entitled to seek a variation of the Interim Maintenance Order should she have found the amount insufficient or her circumstances changed, no such application was made on her part. [334] The only attempts to vary the Interim Maintenance Order came from the Respondent, who had not only filed an application seeking a reduction but also appealed against the Court’s decision to maintain the existing arrangement. The Petitioner's inaction in this regard suggested a tacit acceptance of the adequacy of the sum granted by the Interim Maintenance Order, which undermined her current assertion that a significantly higher amount was necessary to sustain her lifestyle. [335] I must also emphasise that the Petitioner's financial capability, in the context of assessing her 'means and needs,' cannot be overlooked. [336] In a claim for spousal maintenance, the term "means" is not confined to the financial resources that the Petitioner currently has, but includes both actual resources and potential earning ability. Specifically, it would include current and anticipated earnings from employment or other sources; assets; earning capacity; and access to resources. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 105 [337] In the present case, it was undisputed that the Petitioner holds a law degree — an academic qualification that, in itself, suggests a high level of competence and professional potential. Furthermore, throughout the proceedings, the Petitioner repeatedly emphasised her involvement in various business and creative capacities. These include her role as a director of ALIR, her position as brand manager of one of the many stores that was operated by ALIR, known in this judgment as the BOT Stores, and her work designing the interiors of the STR Apartments. Such roles reflected not only a diverse skill set but also a strong level of engagement in professional and entrepreneurial activities. [338] Taken together, these qualifications and experiences clearly demonstrated that the Petitioner possessed marketable and transferable skills, which would reasonably enable her to re-enter the workforce or establish independent income-generating ventures. Given this, it was not unreasonable to expect that the Petitioner was capable of securing gainful employment, or at the very least, generating supplemental income. This earning potential would allow her to contribute toward her own financial upkeep and, in turn, complement the spousal maintenance award of MYR35,000. Accordingly, this financial support, combined with her capacity to earn, would equip the Petitioner to maintain, within reason, a lifestyle of her choosing, independent of full reliance on the Respondent. [339] In arriving at the decision of MYR35,000 as monthly spousal maintenance, I gave due consideration to my finding that the Petitioner had contributed equally to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The evidence clearly established that the dissolution 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 106 of the marital relationship was not attributable solely to the conduct of the Respondent, but rather stemmed from mutual failings and actions on both sides. Given this shared responsibility, it would be neither fair nor reasonable to grant the Petitioner the substantial monthly maintenance of MYR230,000 as claimed. Such an award would not reflect the realities of the Parties’ respective contributions to the breakdown, nor would it be consistent with principles of equity and justice that guide the exercise of the Court’s discretion in matrimonial proceedings. [340] The Respondent, on the other hand, proposed an unreasonably low sum of MYR15,000 per month, asserting that this amount was sufficient for the Petitioner’s maintenance. Notably, this was the same figure put forward in his second variation application pursuant to section 96 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which I had previously dismissed. [341] The Interim Maintenance Order issued by the Court had, in effect, granted the Petitioner a substantial monthly maintenance sum of MYR35,000. This financial provision was not the entirety of the Respondent's obligations under the Interim Maintenance Order. In addition to the monthly monetary payment, the Respondent was expressly required to ensure that the Petitioner was provided with a car for her use. Furthermore, the Respondent was mandated to employ and fund the services of both a driver and a domestic maid for the Petitioner’s benefit. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 107 Whether Court had power to award lump-sum spousal maintenance [342] Although it was my decision that a monthly sum of MYR35,000 should be sufficient for spousal maintenance, the Petitioner argued that a lump-sum payment would be more appropriate in this case. The Respondent, however, objected, asserting that he lacked the financial means to make such a payment. [343] I am mindful that the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act does not currently encompass a provision for the disbursement of spousal maintenance in the form of lump-sum payments unless agreed upon by the Parties and approved by the Court pursuant to section 80 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 80 – Compounding of maintenance An agreement for the payment, in money or other property, of a capital sum in settlement of all future claims to maintenance, shall not be effective until it has been approved, or approved subject to conditions, by the court, but when so approved shall be a good defence to any claim for maintenance. [344] However, it has been established by case law such as Chaw Anui v. Tan Kim Chai [2004] CLJU 260; [2004] 1 LNS 260; [2004] 4 MLJ 272; [2004] 5 AMR 671, where Low Hop Bing J (as he then was) after referring to the situation in the United Kingdom and Singapore, held that Courts in Malaysia may make an award of spousal maintenance by way of lump-sum payment in specific situations. In the following passages, his Lordship clarified:

At this stage, it is appropriate to consider the power of the courts in the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Malaysia in making a maintenance order by way of a lump-sum payment. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 108

In the United Kingdom, the power to order a lump-sum payment is contained in s. 2(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970; and has been ordered, eg in Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 1 All ER 829; Preston v. Preston [1982] 2 All ER 41 (CA); and Minton v. Minton [1979] AC 593.

In Singapore, s. 109(1) of the Women's Charter provides that a maintenance order may provide for the payment of a lump-sum or such periodical payment as the court may determine, and so awards of a lump-sum payment have been made, eg in Jacqueline Bey v. Edmond Lee Yok Lung [1988] 2 CLJ Rep 760; [1988] 2 MLJ 335 per Chua J; Louis Pius Gilbert v. Louis Anne Lise [2000] 1 SLR 274 per Goh Joon Seng J; Koh Kim Lian Angela v. Choong Kian Haw [1994] 1 SLR 22 Singapore (CA), per Karthigesu JA; and Lee Puey Hwa v. Tay Cheow Seng [1991] 4 CLJ Rep 545; [1991 ] 3 MLJ 1 (CA) per Yong Pung How CJ.

In Malaysia, under s. 77(1)(a), our High Court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife during the course of any proceedings under the Act. In my view, the power to make such an order is not confined to the award of maintenance by periodical payments only. Section 77(1)(a) contains no restrictive or prohibitive words to support the contention for the husband. The discretionary power of the court under s. 77(1)(a) is unfettered in the sense that our court is empowered to make an award of maintenance by way of a lump-sum payment having regard to the facts and circumstances prevailing in a particular case and established judicial principles.

Such lump-sum payments have been made, eg: • in SS v. HJK [1991] CLJU 99; [1991] 1 LNS 99 per Mahadev Shankar J (later JCA) by way of a 'clean break'; • Leow Kooi Wah v. Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor [1997] CLJU 419; [1997] 3 MLJ 133 per Mahadev Shankar J (later JCA) to assist the wife to maintain herself and the children of the family and not as a separate head of entitlement, but a different method of providing for the immediate requirements of the deserving spouse and the children where the circumstances so require; • v. Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Veletine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474 per Faiza Tamby Chik J by applying the 'clean break' principle; and • Tham Yin Kee (P) v. Lim Hee Peng [2002] CLJU 9; [2002] 1 LNS 9 per Rahman Hussain J (now FCJ). 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 109

Hence, there are abundant authorities to the effect that the courts in England, Singapore and our country may make an award of maintenance by way of a lump-sum payment. [Emphasis added.] [345] In my view, a lump-sum payment for spousal maintenance for the Petitioner was justified in the present case, for the following reasons. [346] Petitioner’s status as a foreign citizen – As a foreign citizen, the Petitioner, although a permanent resident, may face unique challenges after divorce. Visa and immigration uncertainties may force her to leave the country or apply for a new visa, requiring immediate financial support. Awarding a lump-sum spousal maintenance was, therefore, essential for her financial security and stability. [347] Additionally, enforcing monthly maintenance across borders can be legally complex and expensive, making a lump-sum spousal maintenance the more practical option. Being a foreign citizen, the Petitioner may also face work restrictions, limiting her ability to earn a living immediately after the divorce. [348] Notice to vacate the PGA Penthouse – Securing stable housing presents another significant challenge, as landlords and financial institutions typically require evidence of long-term income to approve leases or mortgages. [349] In the present case, the PGA Penthouse, where the Petitioner had been residing, belonged to the Respondent’s brother. During the trial of the Divorce Petition and Cross-Petition, the Petitioner informed the Court that she had received a notice from the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 110 Respondent’s brother requesting that she vacate the PGA Penthouse — a fact that the Respondent did not dispute. In light of this, a lump-sum payment would offer the Petitioner a measure of financial security, enabling her to secure permanent housing and ensure that she has a stable roof over her head. [350] Respondent’s conduct regarding the Interim Maintenance Order – The Respondent's failure to provide timely payments had not only caused financial strain but has also created unnecessary hardships for the Petitioner. His delays in covering car-related expenses had forced the Petitioner to resort to alternative transportation, such as engaging e-hailing services, which was both inconvenient and avoidable. This reflected a clear disregard for the Petitioner’s well-being and financial stability. By making the Petitioner repeatedly return to Court over essential expenses like credit card bills, and car maintenance, the Respondent had demonstrated an unwillingness to fulfill his obligations responsibly, pursuant to the Interim Maintenance Order. [351] Given this persistent pattern, a lump-sum payment after divorce was not just important but necessary. It would ensure the Petitioner’s financial security, free her from ongoing legal battles, and protect her from further manipulations or delays by the Respondent in receiving what she is rightfully entitled to, pursuant to the Interim Maintenance Order. [352] I also noted that the Respondent’s repeated attempts to vary the Interim Maintenance Order caused considerable distress to the Petitioner, creating a prolonged sense of financial uncertainty and instability. These ongoing challenges had not only disrupted her 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 111 ability to plan for her immediate and long-term needs but had also underscored the emotional and psychological toll that drawn-out maintenance disputes can inflict. This pattern of conduct further reinforced my view that spousal maintenance in this case would be more appropriately addressed through a lump-sum payment, which would provide the Petitioner with a sense of finality and financial security, free from the anxiety of future variation applications. [353] Petitioner’s conduct regarding the Interim Maintenance Order – The Petitioner’s conduct had also provided grounds for ordering a lump-sum payment for spousal maintenance. Her persistent complaints regarding the terms of the Interim Maintenance Order, specifically concerning the car, maid, driver, and non-functional credit card, had burdened the Court and wasted judicial time. Rather than addressing these issues constructively, the Petitioner repeatedly sought the Court's intervention to address her dissatisfaction with how the terms of the Interim Maintenance Order were being implemented. [354] As a result, I decided that the Respondent would no longer be obligated to provide a driver or a maid. The Petitioner would now be responsible for managing these matters herself, with the hope that this would reduce her ongoing complaints about the quality of service she felt was below her expectations. [355] Regarding the car, I decided that the Respondent's obligation would be limited to providing an amount equivalent to the value of a reasonable vehicle. The Petitioner would then use her maintenance money to maintain the car. This decision was influenced by the numerous occasions on which the Petitioner appeared in Court, 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 112 expecting the Court to ensure that the car provided under the Interim Maintenance Order met her specific expectations. [356] Furthermore, in light of the Respondent's allegations that the Petitioner’s handling of the car had contributed to its unroadworthy condition, I decided that it would be in the Petitioner’s best interest to bear the responsibility for maintaining her own vehicle. This would encourage her to take better care of the car in future. Hence, it was crucial for the Petitioner to receive a lump-sum spousal maintenance. [357] The calculation of the lump-sum maintenance was done in the following manner: (*68 – *52) x *12 x *MYR35,000 = MYR6,720,000 *68 being the middle point between the retirement age in Malaysia (60) and the life expectancy of an ethnic Indian female in Malaysia (76) *52 being the Petitioner’s age at the time the decision was delivered *12 being the number of months in a year *MYR35,000 being the monthly sum that the Court would have ordered the Respondent to pay the Petitioner as spousal maintenance [358] The age of 68 was selected as it represented the midpoint between the standard retirement age in Malaysia (60) as mandated by the Minimum Retirement Age Act 2012, and the life expectancy of an ethnic Indian female in Malaysia (76) as indicated by the Department of Statistics of Malaysia. This average was used to account for the duration of spousal maintenance, which, according 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 113 to section 82 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, continues until death or remarriage. Matrimonial assets Whether assets should be divided equally [359] The Petitioner asserted a claim to fifty percent of the value of the following assets: a) STR Apartments; b) Chattels (which included household items and furniture); c) Corporate assets and shares; d) Rolex watches; e) Monies in the Respondent’s accounts; and f) Respondent’s savings in the EPF. [360] The task of dividing matrimonial assets is prescribed by section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 76 – Power of court to order division of matrimonial assets

The court shall have power, when granting a decree of divorce or judicial separation, to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired by them during the marriage or the sale of any such assets and the division between the parties of the proceeds of sale.

In exercising the power conferred by subsection (1) the court shall have regard to-

the extent of the contributions made by each party in money, property or work towards the acquiring of the assets or payment of expenses for the benefit of the family; (aa) the extent of the contributions made by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looking after the home or caring for the family; 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 114

any debts owing by either party which were contracted for their joint benefit;

the needs of the minor children, if any, of the marriage;

the duration of the marriage, and subject to those considerations, the court shall incline towards equality of division. …

For the purposes of this section, references to assets acquired during a marriage include assets owned before the marriage by one party which have been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by their joint efforts. [Emphasis added] [361] At the outset, it was crucial to bear in mind that classification of assets as matrimonial cannot solely be determined by registered ownership. Drawing insight from the pertinent case of Ching Seng Woah v Lim Shook Lin [1997] 1 MLJ 109, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) provided a definition of ‘matrimonial assets’. In that case, he outlined the concept beyond mere ownership, emphasising factors that contribute to the marital estate. The following passage from the case serves as a guiding principle in understanding the broader scope of matrimonial assets: The Act does not define what matrimonial assets are. We think that during the subsistence of a marriage the expression refers to the matrimonial home and everything which is put into it by either spouse with the intention that their home and chattels should be a continuing resource for the spouses and their children to be used jointly and severally for the benefit of the family as a whole. It matters not in this context whether the asset is acquired solely by the one party or the other or by their joint efforts. Whilst the marriage subsists these assets are matrimonial assets. Such assets could be capital assets. The earning power of each spouse is also an asset. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 115 [Emphasis added] The STR Apartments [362] The STR Apartments, registered in the Respondent’s name, comprise the following: a) Unit A, purchased for MYR18,279,800 (where the Respondent’s mother currently resides); b) Unit B, purchased for MYR18,279,800 (where the Respondent currently resides); and c) Unit C, purchased for MYR9,356,600 (intended as an investment property). [363] Although all three units of the STR Apartments were registered in the Respondent’s name, he asserted that his legal ownership was merely nominal. The Respondent claimed that the three units of the STR Apartments were, in fact, beneficially owned by a company known as EE Enterprise, allegedly established under the direction of his late father. [364] According to the Respondent, EE Enterprise was the true beneficial owner, and his name appeared on the title deeds purely as a matter of form. The Respondent further submitted that it was his late father’s estate that financed both the loan repayments and the renovation works carried out on the STR Apartments. [365] The Petitioner, who claimed entitlement to half the value of all three units of the STR Apartments, disputed this narrative. She contended that although EE Enterprise may have funded the properties, the apartments were both legally and beneficially owned by the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 116 Respondent. The Petitioner argued that she was entitled to a share of their value, particularly as one of the units, currently occupied by the Respondent, would have been her matrimonial home had the Parties not separated in October 2017. [366] In my view, I had agreed that the Respondent was both the legal and beneficial owner of the STR Apartments for the following reasons. [367] Firstly, the Respondent’s name appeared on the title deeds of all three units of the STR Apartments. While it was not disputed that EE Enterprise had issued cheques for loan repayments, renovations, and fittings, the Respondent failed to produce any credible evidence to support his contention that these payments were made on behalf of his late father, and not for the Respondent’s own benefit. [368] Secondly, the Petitioner drew the Court’s attention to a will executed by the Respondent in November 2014 (“the 2014 Will”). The key dispositions under the 2014 Will were as follows: a) Unit A was bequeathed to the Respondent’s parents, while Units B and C were left to the Petitioner; b) The Respondent’s watch collection was to pass to his son; and c) The Petitioner was named as a beneficiary under an insurance policy. [369] The Respondent did not dispute the creation of the 2014 Will, as the solicitor who prepared it, PW3, had testified to having drafted the document. However, the Respondent sought to distance himself from the contents of the 2014 Will by asserting that its provisions 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 117 were not of his own volition but were instead the result of the Petitioner's suggestions. [370] According to the Respondent, the Petitioner had urged him to make a will following a series of flight disasters in 2014, which had heightened her anxiety given the Respondent’s frequent air travel for business and personal reasons. The Respondent further contended that it was the Petitioner who had taken the initiative to instruct PW3 to prepare the 2014 Will. In support of his position, the Respondent also claimed that he had not paid close attention to the specifics or the detailed terms of the 2014 Will, implying that he had a limited understanding or involvement in its actual drafting and execution. [371] I found the Respondent’s explanation unpersuasive for the following reasons. [372] The introduction of the 2014 Will as evidence served to support the Petitioner’s case, that the Respondent considered the STR Apartments to be his own property at the time. Had the Respondent not believed himself to be the owner, he would not have included them in his testamentary dispositions. Notably, the 2014 Will was executed during a period of marital stability, with no indication of imminent disputes that might have prompted any misrepresentation of ownership. [373] Furthermore, a careful review of the evidentiary record revealed that the Respondent exercised effective control and ownership over the properties. Additionally, the fact that EE Enterprise made loan repayments on the properties appeared consistent with a broader 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 118 pattern of financial management within the Respondent’s family, where high-value assets were often held and administered through corporate vehicles for ease of consolidation and control. [374] That said, however, I disagreed with the Petitioner’s claim that she was entitled to a division of the value of the STR Apartments for the following reasons. [375] Throughout the proceedings, the Petitioner kept referring to Unit B of the STR Apartments as the matrimonial home, which in my view, was a misnomer. The truth of the matter was that the Parties had never owned a matrimonial home. For the first ten years of their marriage, they lived in the Respondent’s parents’ residence. They subsequently moved to the PGA Penthouse, a property owned by the Respondent’s brother, where they remained for eight years until the Respondent's departure in October 2017. [376] The STR Apartments were acquired in 2012, with construction reaching completion in 2017, followed by substantial renovation and interior fit-out works in 2019. It was undisputed that the Petitioner had never resided in any of the units of the STR Apartments at any point in time. More significantly, the Parties' marriage had irretrievably broken down by October 2017, well before any of the units were fit for occupation. As such, there was no period during which the STR Apartments, including Unit B, served as the matrimonial home of the Parties. The intention for Unit B of the STR Apartments to become the matrimonial home, while perhaps present at an earlier stage, was never fulfilled in reality. [377] Accordingly, the STR Apartments could not be characterised as the matrimonial home in any meaningful legal or practical sense. At 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 119 most, they might have been described as a notional matrimonial home, that is, representing a prospective living arrangement that was contemplated, but ultimately never materialised due to the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. [378] The Petitioner contended that she was entitled to a share of the value of the STR Apartments on the basis that she had made substantial contributions towards their development. In particular, she claimed to have liaised with the developer, legal counsel, and the interior designer. [379] To support her claim, the Petitioner submitted email correspondences purporting to show that she had coordinated meetings, arranged site visits, discussed construction details and fittings, and managed quotations and variation orders. [380] In my view, and based on the evidence of the actual interior designer engaged by the Respondent, who testified as PW5, the Petitioner’s involvement was largely confined to the selection of fittings and furnishings, most of which took place well before the renovation and completion of the STR Apartments. [381] My conclusion regarding the absence of the Petitioner’s contribution to the STR Apartments, in particular Unit B, was further reinforced by her lack of familiarity with the final state of the interior works. By the time the renovations were underway, the marriage had already irretrievably broken down. [382] Notably, during the trial, the Petitioner sought an order compelling the Respondent to grant her access to the STR Apartments for inspection, a request that was ultimately denied. The mere 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 120 necessity of such an application strongly suggested that the Petitioner had lacked any meaningful familiarity with the completed state of the units of the STR Apartments. This lack of knowledge had cast serious doubt on the Petitioner’s assertion that she had contributed to the development or enhancement of the STR Apartments. In these circumstances, it was difficult to reconcile the Petitioner’s claim of substantial involvement in the interior design of the STR Apartments, with the clear evidence that she had neither oversight nor awareness of the final renovations and fittings. [383] Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial established that the Respondent had engaged professional contractors and interior designers to undertake the renovation and interior works. This reflected a significant personal investment of time, effort, and financial resources by the Respondent, with no corresponding contribution from the Petitioner. [384] Crucially, the STR Apartments were also heavily encumbered as stated below. The Respondent had secured significant loans in order to finance their acquisition, further underscoring the following financial commitments he had undertaken in relation to the properties. a) Unit A: MYR16,452,000 b) Unit B: MYR16,452,000 c) Unit C: MYR6,550,000 [385] The Respondent had also borne significant ongoing costs related to servicing, maintenance, and upkeep of these units. While the Petitioner alleged that no evidence of such expenses was presented, it remained undisputed that she made no financial 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 121 contributions towards the STR Apartments. The substantial financial burden assumed solely by the Respondent underscored the inequity of the Petitioner’s claim for a division of these assets. Given these considerations, I found it neither just nor equitable for the Petitioner to seek any share of the value of any of the units of the STR Apartments. [386] While it was undisputed that the Petitioner had made no contribution, whether financial or non-financial, to the STR Apartments, it was equally undisputed that she would have resided there had the marriage not irretrievably broken down. [387] The Respondent submitted that, as the Parties had never owned a home during their marriage, the Petitioner was not entitled to any share in the value of a matrimonial home. The Respondent further contended that it was not uncommon for married couples to reside in rented or leased premises rather than to own a matrimonial home. [388] I was, however, unable to accept the Respondent’s position on this issue. While the Parties did not own a matrimonial home during the marriage, they had intended to relocate to Unit B of the STR Apartments, and the Respondent had, in fact, done so. In these circumstances, I found it appropriate to award the Petitioner a portion of the value of a matrimonial home, not based on the STR Apartments per se, but rather on the value of the PGA Penthouse and her contributions in relation to that property. This approach was justified, as the Parties had cohabited in the PGA Penthouse for approximately half the duration of their marriage, notwithstanding that the PGA Penthouse was legally owned by the Respondent’s brother. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 122 [389] During the proceedings, the Parties had initially agreed that the PGA Penthouse was valued at MYR3.75 million. However, towards the conclusion of the trial, the Respondent sought to challenge this valuation, arguing that the PGA Penthouse was worth less. As a result, I applied the principle of averaging and arrived at a valuation of MYR3.6 million. In my view, the Petitioner was, therefore, entitled to half that value for her entitlement towards the matrimonial home, amounting to MYR1.8 million. [390] To this MYR1.8 million, I added MYR200,000 for chattels and household items, which the Petitioner had requested. Throughout the proceedings, I had repeatedly urged both Parties to engage a valuer to assess the household items, but to no avail. The acrimony between them was such that they could not agree on even the most fundamental matters, let alone appoint a valuer to assess and divide the household items. In light of these circumstances, I found it necessary to apply the principle of 'rough justice' and concluded that the Petitioner was entitled to receive MYR2 million from the Respondent, representing the value of the matrimonial home and its household contents. [391] During the delivery of this decision, the Respondent informed the Court of his intention to appeal it and stated that, in the interim, he would permit the Petitioner to remain in the PGA Penthouse. I found the Respondent’s offer to be highly disingenuous, for several reasons. [392] First and foremost, under the Interim Maintenance Order, the Petitioner was entitled to reside in the PGA Penthouse only until the final disposal of the Divorce Petition. Since the Divorce Petition was 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 123 now disposed, it was both appropriate and necessary for the Respondent to ensure that the Petitioner continued to have a roof over her head. [393] Secondly, the PGA Penthouse did not belong to the Respondent, but was owned by his brother. During the trial, in January 2024, the Petitioner informed the Court that she had been notified by the Respondent’s brother of his intention to sell the PGA Penthouse. She was further informed that she would need to accommodate potential buyers seeking to view the PGA Penthouse. [394] In light of these developments, I found it highly questionable that the Respondent was offering the Petitioner continued residence in the PGA Penthouse, a property he did not own, particularly when the true owner had already indicated his intention to sell it. The offer by the Respondent, therefore, appeared disingenuous and lacked any real security for the Petitioner, as the Respondent had no legal authority to guarantee her continued occupation of the PGA Penthouse. [395] Furthermore, it was particularly insensitive for the Respondent to suggest that the Petitioner remain in the PGA Penthouse, a property to which she held no legal title, while he continued to reside in Unit B of the STR Apartments, valued at approximately MYR18 million. The disparity in their respective living conditions was stark and difficult to justify. [396] It must also be borne in mind that the maintenance awarded to the Petitioner was calculated based on a monthly sum of MYR35,000, although it was ultimately awarded as a lump-sum. Importantly, this 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 124 amount did not include any provision for accommodation, as the Petitioner had been residing rent-free in the PGA Penthouse during the marriage. This arrangement had the effect of reducing her financial needs on paper, though not in reality, as the accommodation was contingent upon the continuation of the marriage. [397] If I were to accept the Respondent’s submission that the Petitioner was not entitled to any sum representing the value of a matrimonial home, whether because the Parties never owned one or because the STR Apartments were never jointly occupied, it would logically follow that the Respondent ought to bear the cost of the Petitioner’s post-separation housing needs. In other words, if the Petitioner was not to be compensated for the value or use of the former matrimonial home, then an allowance for rent must be considered. [398] Based on a conservative estimate, if I consider a reasonable monthly rental of MYR10,000, which reflected the Petitioner’s previous standard of living, over a period of 192 months (the term used to calculate the lump sum maintenance in this case), the total would amount to MYR 1.92 million. Notably, this figure would closely align with the MYR2 million that I had decided that the Petitioner should receive as her share of what had served as the matrimonial home together with household chattels. [399] Accordingly, whether the sum is viewed as compensation for the loss of housing or as a notional share in the value of a matrimonial home, recognising the substance of the arrangement rather than its strict legal form, the amount awarded to the Petitioner was, in my 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 125 view, fair, reasonable, and proportionate in light of the overall circumstances of the case. [400] In this context, I concluded that the Respondent ought to pay the Petitioner a lump sum of MYR2 million to enable her to secure suitable and comparable accommodation, consistent with the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Division of the value of Respondent’s shares in ALIR [401] The Petitioner also sought 50% of the value of the Respondent’s shares in ALIR, which accounted for 20% of the total shareholding in the company which the Respondent held. She argued that these shares were acquired during the marriage and should therefore be considered matrimonial assets. According to her, as at 28 December 2018, the Respondent held a 20% shareholding in ALIR amounting to 30 million shares. In addition, she requested a court-ordered valuation of the shares to determine their exact worth before any distribution. [402] In response, the Respondent claimed that his shares in ALIR were not acquired through purchase but were either gifted to him or held in trust as part of his late father’s wishes. He initially asserted that the 720,000 shares in EE Enterprise were a gift from his father. The Respondent further stated that, using his accumulated shares in EE Enterprise, along with shares in other related companies, he later acquired shares in ALIR through a share swap. Under this arrangement, the Respondent claimed that his holdings in these companies were transferred in exchange for 20% of shares in ALIR. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 126 [403] Regarding the reduction in his ALIR shareholding, the Respondent contended that, in 2015, his alleged involvement in the 1MDB scandal led banks to threaten the withdrawal of financial support to ALIR. As a result, the Respondent’s claimed that his father had compelled him to surrender 80% of the Respondent’s portion of the ALIR shares. As such, the Respondent claimed that he had transferred 80% of his portion of the ALIR shares to his mother in accordance with his late father’s wishes, with the transfer officially registered on 28 December 2018. [404] In support of his contention, the Respondent called RW12, the company secretary, to testify on his behalf. Much was argued by the Petitioner’s Counsel regarding RW12’s testimony, suggesting that she might be inclined to favour the Respondent, given her position as company secretary of ALIR. [405] In my assessment, there was no automatic presumption that the entirety of RW12’s testimony should be disregarded merely due to her professional association with the Respondent. As with any witness, the credibility of the testimony of RW12 must be evaluated in light of the surrounding circumstances and documentary evidence. I found certain portions of the testimony of RW12 to be credible, while others were less so, as they did not align with the documentary evidence adduced. [406] It was important to emphasise that there is no rigid rule requiring a judge to wholly accept or reject a witness’s testimony. A judge may, based on the evidence and demeanour of the witness, elect to believe all, part, or none of the testimony, and accordingly assign different weight to different aspects of the evidence. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 127 [407] With regard to the issue of whether the EE shares were a gift from the Respondent’s father, I found no reason to disbelieve RW12’s evidence. Taking into account her testimony and the broader circumstances surrounding the transfer of the EE shares, I was satisfied that the initial allotment of 720,000 shares in EE Enterprise was indeed a gift from the Respondent’s father, as contended. [408] The legal principle concerning gifts in the context of matrimonial proceedings is well-established. Cases such as Tay Chong Yew & Anor v Onn Kim Muah [2016] 2 CLJ 579, and GGC v CCC & Anor [2016] MLJU 377, both of which drew from the foundational decision in White v White [2000] 2 FLR 98, confirm that gifts, inheritances, or transfers made purely out of love and affection do not form part of the matrimonial pool and are generally excluded from division. [409] However, an important exception to this rule must be noted, that is, when a gift is subsequently mixed with marital property or used in a manner that integrates it into the marital estate, for example, through reinvestment, joint use, or restructuring, then it may lose its distinct identity as a separate asset and become subject to division. [410] In the present case, although the initial EE shares may have originated as a gift to the Respondent from his father, it was undisputed that these shares had undergone a series of transactions and transformations, ultimately leading to the acquisition of the Respondent’s shares in ALIR. This chain of events suggested that the ALIR shares were acquired through a series of deliberate business decisions and asset restructuring, rather than as a mere passive retention of a gifted asset. Accordingly, this raised serious doubts about the Respondent’s claim that the ALIR 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 128 shares should be excluded from the matrimonial asset pool. The evidence pointed instead to an active involvement in growing and restructuring the business, which indicated that these shares had become interwoven with the Parties’ marital estate. [411] Secondly, the transfer of ALIR shares from the Respondent to his mother was officially registered on 28 December 2018, although he claimed that the transfer forms were executed on 22 October 2017. He maintained that this transfer was merely an act of fulfilling his late father’s wishes and that he had never truly owned the shares. However, the evidence suggested otherwise. [412] If the shares had never belonged to the Respondent, the transfer should have occurred much earlier, particularly while his father was still alive. Instead, the delay in such transfer raised concerns that the transaction was strategically executed to protect his assets from the divorce. [413] This concern was further compounded by the legal requirement that share transfers be registered within 14 days of execution of the share transfer agreement. [414] Hence, if the transfer forms were indeed executed in October 2017, it begged the question of why they were not registered earlier. The delay in registration raised concerns that the forms may have been backdated to deliberately support the Respondent’s contention that the transfer was in accordance with his late father’s wishes. Moreover, if the transfer of these shares was prompted by the 1MDB scandal, another crucial question arises: why did the transfer take place only in 2017, which was two years after the alleged banking 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 129 threats and after the Respondent’s father had passed away? These inconsistencies had cast further doubt on the legitimacy of the Respondent’s explanation. [415] On this note, even the testimony of RW12 was not entirely convincing. Despite her position as the company secretary of ALIR, she failed to provide clear and satisfactory answers to several pertinent questions posed by the Petitioner’s Counsel. RW12’s inability to adequately address these inquiries, particularly those falling within her expected scope of knowledge and responsibility, undermined the reliability of her evidence and raised concerns about the completeness of her account on the transfer of the Respondent’s shares to his mother. [416] The Respondent further argued that he was simply returning the shares to his mother pursuant to his father’s instructions, yet official records from the Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri (LHDN) documented the transaction as a sale rather than a gift. If the transfer had truly been an act of compliance with his father’s wishes, there would have been no need for a monetary transaction of this magnitude. The presence of financial consideration strongly undermined the Respondent’s claim that he was merely holding the shares in trust and was obligated to return them. Instead, it indicated that this was a calculated financial move rather than a fulfilment of any familial duty. [417] Throughout these proceedings, the Respondent’s explanations shifted multiple times, further casting doubt on his credibility. Initially, he claimed that the shares were a gift from his father. Later, he altered his position and stated that he was merely holding the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 130 shares in trust. Eventually, he presented yet another version, stating that the shares were a conditional gift, implying certain obligations attached to them. This series of contradictions suggested that the Respondent was adapting his defence to serve his legal position rather than presenting a consistent, truthful account. A genuinely gifted asset would not require such varying justifications, and his ever-changing explanations only reinforced the suspicion that the transfer was orchestrated for strategic reasons. This supported the conclusion that the transfer was a deliberate attempt to shield assets. [418] Taken together, the suspicious timing of the transfer, the MYR24 million consideration, the Respondent’s inconsistent statements, his pre-emptive asset protection strategies, and the procedural irregularities, all pointed to the conclusion that this was not a genuine fulfillment of the Respondent’s late father’s wishes. Instead, it appeared to have been a calculated effort to restructure ownership in a way that would shield assets from division. [419] That said, I also acknowledged the Respondent’s argument that ALIR has always been and is a family-run enterprise, where financial matters, ownership structures, and corporate dealings are closely intertwined among family members. Documents revealed that significant financial transactions, including property and business dealings, were often conducted under the names of family-owned companies rather than individual members. This pattern of conducting business through family-owned entities illustrated how financial matters within the Respondent’s family were systematically structured to reflect collective rather than individual ownership, to the exclusion of others. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 131 [420] However, since the Respondent’s shares in ALIR were acquired during the marriage, the issue then shifted to determining the Petitioner’s contribution to ALIR and what she was entitled to. [421] The Petitioner asserted that she had contributed to ALIR by serving as a Director and overseeing the launch of specific stores, notably the BOT Stores, as referred to earlier in this judgment. In support of this claim, the Petitioner adduced over 400 pages of email correspondence to show her direct participation in merchandising, logistics, store construction, marketing, budgeting, PR, store locations, staff management, and contract amendments. [422] The Respondent alleged that the emails were tampered with, but no proof was provided. I was unable to accept this ‘tampering’ argument, as the Respondent’s own witnesses testified to the authenticity of these emails, even though they disputed the extent of her role in the BOT Stores. [423] The undisputed fact remained that the Respondent allowed the Petitioner to use the title of ‘Director’, and documentary evidence showed that she held herself out as Director from 2014 to 2017. Undisputed oral evidence further suggested that her involvement began even earlier. [424] Although it was contended that the Petitioner made no meaningful contribution to the BOT Stores or any other ventures of ALIR, and that her influence stemmed solely from her position as the Respondent’s wife, I found that her role could not be disregarded. While most employees of BOT who testified, described the Petitioner as overbearing and interfering, they also admitted they 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 132 were unaware of the internal dynamics between the Petitioner and the Respondent. [425] Furthermore, a key witness, PW9, herself a senior personnel at BOT, corroborated the Petitioner’s involvement in the BOT brand. She confirmed that the Petitioner played an active and significant role within the organisation, regularly engaging with brand managers and contributing meaningfully to various aspects of the company’s business operations. PW9’s testimony provided independent support for the Petitioner’s claim of substantive involvement and influence in the development and management of the BOT brand. [426] Given that the Respondent had exercised control over the BOT Stores, he possessed the authority to define the extent of the Petitioner’s involvement. Notably, he did not prevent the Petitioner from participating in ALIR’s ventures, particularly the BOT Stores, where she presented herself as Brand Manager. In fact, during cross-examination, the Respondent admitted that he had appointed the Petitioner as a Director, albeit while expressing regret over that decision. However, in my view, hindsight does not negate factual reality. The Respondent’s retrospective regret did not diminish the Petitioner’s role as a Director of ALIR or her active involvement as the Brand Manager of the BOT Stores. [427] In light of this, I was of the view that the Petitioner’s claims regarding her contributions to ALIR through the BOT Stores could not be dismissed. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 133 [428] The next consideration was the duration for which the Petitioner’s contribution should be assessed. The undisputed evidence indicated that as early as 2007, she was given the title of Director, albeit as a nominee director of another enterprise of ALIR, referred to in this judgment as MAK. While her role in MAK may have been nominal, her involvement in the Respondent’s business and public image remained significant throughout the marriage. [429] Given the Respondent’s prominent role in the retail and luxury brand industry, maintaining an impeccable personal and family image was not merely desirable, it was essential to his professional identity and the success of his ventures. From the very beginning, the Petitioner played a crucial role in upholding and reinforcing this image. She consistently presented herself as a gracious, poised, and supportive wife, embodying the values and aesthetics that complemented the Respondent’s public persona. Her presence at numerous overseas business functions and events added to the brand’s prestige, subtly but effectively enhancing its high-profile appeal. In doing so, she helped project an image of stability, sophistication, and success, qualities that were integral to the Respondent’s brand. This active participation and representation formed a meaningful part of the Petitioner’s contribution toward the acquisition, preservation, and enhancement of the Respondent’s shares in ALIR. [430] While I acknowledged the Petitioner’s non-monetary contributions to ALIR, I was of the considered view that awarding her a portion of the value of the shares in ALIR would not be appropriate, given ALIR’s character as a closely held family enterprise, and the level of the Petitioner’s contribution towards ALIR. Instead, I found it more fitting that the Petitioner be compensated based on the 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 134 remuneration she might reasonably have earned had she been formally engaged as Director or Brand Manager. [431] During cross-examination, the Respondent himself acknowledged that positions of this nature typically command salaries ranging between MYR12,000 and MYR15,000 per month. This range reflected the expected salary for full-time professional engagement. However, it was important to note that the Petitioner’s involvement in ALIR was not on a full-time basis, but rather, her contributions were rendered on an “as and when” required basis, without the consistency or intensity of a standard employment arrangement. Taking this into account, I assessed that a fair and reasonable monthly value of her contribution would be MYR8,000, reflecting the part-time and ad-hoc nature of her role while still recognising the value she brought to the enterprise. [432] Since there was no dispute regarding the Petitioner’s involvement in ALIR, I decided that her contributions should be assessed over a period of 130 months, covering the duration from 2007 until October 2017, when the marriage irretrievably broke down. I chose to begin the calculation from 2007 not only because of her formal role as a nominee director but also due to the broader, more nuanced contributions she made during this time. It was necessary to take into account the role the Petitioner played in enhancing the Respondent’s personal and professional image, an effort that extended beyond official titles or positions. [433] Applying this rate across a span of 130 months, I concluded that the Petitioner’s total entitlement in respect of her contribution to ALIR should amount to MYR1,040,000 (MYR8,000 x 130 months). 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 135 Whether Petitioner was entitled to half the monies in EPF, and other accounts [434] The Petitioner sought half the funds held in the Respondent’s EPF and bank accounts. [435] With regard to the Respondent’s EPF, I was mindful that the continuous contributions towards such fund made throughout the marriage classified the monies in this fund as matrimonial asset. This is based on trite principles expounded in the cases of Ching Seng Woah v Lim Shook Lin [1997] 1 CLJ 375 and Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 133. [436] As such, the Respondent’s EPF was subject to division in accordance with section 53A of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 (“EPF Act”), which recognises the joint financial partnership inherent in a matrimonial relationship. The provision reads: Section 53A – Transfer of credit of a member of the Fund in accordance with the division of matrimonial assets order

Notwithstanding section 51, when an order is issued by a court that part of the sums of money standing to the credit of a member of the Fund is matrimonial asset, the Board may, after being served with the sealed order, transfer the sum of money as ordered by the court from the account of a member of the Fund into the account of the receiver named in the order subject to any terms and conditions as prescribed by the Board. [Emphasis added.] [437] The EPF scheme is designed to accumulate savings through regular contributions from both the employee and employer, ensuring a portion of the employee's earnings is set aside for future financial stability. It was crucial to ensure that the Respondent’s 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 136 access to these funds was not so significantly diminished that it would jeopardise his ability to sustain himself post-retirement. [438] Given that he was already required to fulfill obligations for spousal maintenance, and was continuing to pay for the Children’s education, health and living expenses, the Court needed to strike a fair balance that allowed him a measure of financial security in his later years. [439] Accordingly, I found that the Petitioner was entitled to only a 25% share of the Respondent’s EPF as they stood in October 2017, when the marriage had irretrievably broken down. [440] Based on the Respondent’s own disclosure, his EPF at that time amounted to approximately MYR1.8 million, making 25% of that sum MYR450,000. [441] To avoid unnecessary complications or confusion, I decided that rather than requiring the Petitioner to present this Court Order to EPF officers, the amount of MYR450,000 should be paid directly by the Respondent. This approach would ensure a straightforward resolution without burdening the Petitioner with procedural formalities under section 53A of the EPF Act. [442] With regard to the monies in the bank accounts belonging to the Respondent, it was my view that the Petitioner was not entitled to any portion of those monies for the following reasons. [443] First, the Respondent’s financial affairs were deeply intertwined with the operations of multiple companies managed by the five shareholders, who were his parents and brothers. The corporate 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 137 structure within ALIR was highly intricate, comprising numerous interrelated entities with complex financial arrangements, shared banking facilities, and overlapping cash flows. [444] Due to this convoluted structure, there was no clear distinction between the Respondent’s personal funds and the finances of the companies that were within the ALIR group of companies. Transactions appeared to move fluidly between personal and business accounts, blurring the line between individual and company expenditures. Personal expenses were frequently and regularly covered through corporate accounts, while business revenues and assets were used to supplement the Respondent’s financial obligations. [445] This financial entanglement created significant challenges in tracing the true origin and purpose of various transactions, making it difficult to distinguish between business expenditures and personal withdrawals. [446] Secondly, throughout the marriage, the Respondent assumed full financial responsibility, covering all household expenses, including those related to the Children. The Petitioner had not contributed financially to these costs, yet she had benefitted from the lifestyle and privileges that came with being married to the Respondent. While the Petitioner expressed regret over sacrificing a potential legal career to be a stay-at-home mother, it was pertinent to note that she always had the support of domestic helpers and drivers who undertook many of the duties typically associated with such a role. I, therefore, found it inequitable for the Petitioner to now seek a share of the funds held in the Respondent’s bank accounts. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 138 [447] Given this dynamic, it would be inequitable to disregard the Respondent’s sole financial responsibility over the years when determining the division of assets and maintenance. [448] Furthermore, as requested by the Petitioner, the Respondent has now been ordered to make a lump-sum payment to the Petitioner for spousal maintenance in the amount of MYR6,720,000. This substantial financial obligation had already accounted for her entitlements post-divorce. Hence, to require the Respondent to also part with additional sums from his personal bank accounts would place an undue financial strain on him. Such an order would not only be disproportionate but would also fail to consider his need for financial stability as he moves forward after the divorce. [449] It was essential for the Court to ensure a fair and reasonable outcome, one that acknowledged the Petitioner’s rightful claims while also allowing the Respondent the financial means to continue his life post-divorce. Given that I had ordered for spousal maintenance to be settled through a lump-sum payment, further depleting the Respondent’s financial resources by awarding the Petitioner a portion of his bank account funds would not be justifiable. Whether Petitioner was entitled to Rolex watches and a car valued at MYR420,000 [450] With regard to the Respondent’s collection of Rolex watches, the Petitioner contended that it was matrimonial assets and hence she was entitled to the half the value of all the watches. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 139 [451] I was of the view that Parties should individually retain any watches and jewellery they had purchased or received as gifts throughout their marriage. Each Party had accumulated their own collection of valuable items, and it would be unreasonable to demand further division of such personal assets. [452] In fact, it was undisputed that the Petitioner herself had amassed, over the years, an extensive collection of jewellery worth millions of ringgit. Furthermore, she did not deny retaining a ruby ring valued at MYR450,000, which the Respondent claimed was a matrimonial asset rather than a personal gift to her. Additionally, it was not contested that the Petitioner had also retained certain luxury items belonging to the Respondent, including a Patek Philippe watch, which she had refused to return. [453] Considering the substantial collection of jewellery, luxury handbags, and designer clothing that the Petitioner had accumulated during the course of the marriage, I found it excessive, unreasonable, and avaricious for her to make a claim against the Respondent’s collection of Rolex watches. [454] Accordingly, I disallowed the Petitioner’s claim for the Respondent’s Rolex watches and other personal possessions, as it was neither justified nor necessary in the context of the overall division of matrimonial assets. [455] The Petitioner also demanded to be provided with a new Mercedes-Benz of a specific model, which costs close to MYR420,000. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 140 [456] In my opinion, this demand was unreasonable—particularly given that a brand-new version of the same model the Petitioner currently drives is priced lower at MYR 350,000. [457] The Petitioner was reminded that the Court's role was to assist her in moving forward post-divorce, ensuring she had the necessary resources to maintain a reasonable standard of living. However, she would no longer be the Respondent’s wife and, therefore, had no need to uphold any particular image that may have been expected of her during the marriage. Moreover, the pursuit of expensive assets from a former spouse post-divorce would detract from the principles of financial independence and self-reliance. Such demands could impede personal progress and the cultivation of a self-sufficient and healthy life post-separation. [458] Given this context, I found the Petitioner’s request for a MYR420,000 car to be unjustified. [459] The Respondent, on the other hand, contended that she should only receive a car valued at MYR200,000, which I found was very much lower than the standard of a vehicle that the Petitioner was accustomed to. [460] In my view, the Petitioner should be entitled to a vehicle valued at up to MYR350,000, which reflected the value of the car she had been provided with pursuant to the Interim Maintenance Order. Although her current vehicle had depreciated significantly over time, it would be reasonable and equitable to allow her to replace it with a vehicle of comparable value. This approach recognised the standard of living she previously enjoyed and ensured a fair 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 141 outcome without granting her more than what was previously afforded. [461] Accordingly, instead of compelling the Respondent to provide a specific make or model of vehicle, he was required to make a one-off payment of MYR350,000 to the Petitioner. This would give her the autonomy to select and purchase a vehicle of her own choosing, according to her preference and need. It was important to emphasise that this payment was final, and no further vehicles will be provided by the Respondent thereafter. The Petitioner would also bear full responsibility for all future costs associated with the vehicle, including maintenance, insurance, and upkeep. [462] The rationale for this arrangement was to ensure a clean and definitive break between the Parties. As previously noted, the relationship between them had become acrimonious to such an extent that even minor disagreements, including those concerning the car, required the Court’s intervention. In light of this tension, it was no longer feasible for the Parties to remain entangled in ongoing disputes over shared assets. This solution served to minimise further conflict between the Parties, and to bring necessary finality to this aspect of their separation. [463] Throughout the course of these proceedings, including during oral submissions, the Respondent persistently asserted that he lacked the financial capacity to comply with the Court's decision for him to pay the Petitioner the lump-sum spousal maintenance as well as the Petitioner’s entitlement to the division of matrimonial assets. He repeatedly invoked financial hardship as a defence, contending that 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 142 his income was insufficient to meet the obligations imposed by the Court. [464] The Court, however, found the Respondent’s protestations of financial distress to be wholly unconvincing and without merit for the following reasons. [465] First, the total amount that I ordered the Respondent to pay the Petitioner, comprising both maintenance and division of assets, was significantly less than the sum the Petitioner had originally claimed. On that basis alone, the Respondent had little ground to object to the final figure. He should, instead, approach the matter with a readiness to comply, recognising that financial compromise is an inevitable aspect of divorce. It would be unrealistic, and indeed unreasonable for the Respondent to expect that he could dissolve a marriage of this nature without bearing any material consequences. Divorce, by its very nature, involves a reallocation of shared responsibilities and resources, and it was only fair that both Parties shoulder their respective burdens in that process. [466] Secondly, the Respondent’s alleged lack of financial resources was starkly contradicted by the evidence adduced, which clearly demonstrated his substantial wealth and financial capabilities. His claims were fundamentally inconsistent with the opulent lifestyle he maintained and the extensive portfolio of assets under his control. [467] The Respondent was identified as a prominent figure within ALIR, a major luxury retail conglomerate in the Asia-Pacific region, which operates more than 400 retail outlets across several countries and represents in excess of 200 high-end brands. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 143 [468] Thirdly, the Court observed that the Respondent originally held 30 million shares in ALIR. Although he later transferred 24 million of these shares to his mother, I was of the view that this transfer was a sham, carried out with the intent to avoid the equitable distribution of matrimonial assets. Therefore, I was of the opinion that if the Respondent was truly unable to pay the amount owed to the Petitioner, he should liquidate his shares in ALIR, or any other assets, to meet his financial obligations to the Petitioner. [469] Fourthly, I also took note of the fact that during the trial, the Respondent declined to produce several key financial documents, most significantly the Director’s Ledger. This document was a critical accounting record that would ordinarily provide detailed insight into a director’s remuneration, including salary, bonuses, dividends, and other financial benefits. In this instance, the Director’s Ledger was expected to reveal the Respondent’s actual income and financial entitlements from ALIR. His refusal to tender this document raised serious concerns regarding his transparency and credibility in financial disclosures. [470] Despite repeated requests from both the Court and the Petitioner’s Counsel, the Respondent persistently refused to produce the Director’s Ledger. In response, Counsel for the Respondent argued that there was no obligation to produce the document, asserting that if the Petitioner considered it essential, she should have filed an application for discovery well before the commencement of trial proceedings. [471] I found this argument wholly untenable for several reasons. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 144 [472] First, the issue of the Director’s Ledger only came to the fore during the Respondent’s cross-examination, when he himself had referred to it without producing or offering to produce the document. It was, therefore, disingenuous to claim that the Petitioner ought to have anticipated the existence or relevance of a document that was not previously disclosed, and which emerged only through the Respondent’s own testimony. [473] Secondly, it was imperative to distinguish between the legal concepts of disclosure and discovery, particularly in the context of matrimonial proceedings involving financial issues such as divorce or child support. These are not interchangeable processes but rather distinct stages in the obligation to provide financial transparency. [474] Disclosure constitutes the initial and mandatory phase in matrimonial proceedings. It requires both parties to proactively, fully, and frankly disclose all relevant financial information, including but not limited to assets, liabilities, income, and expenditures. The purpose of disclosure is to allow each party, and the Court, to understand the true financial circumstances of the other, thereby facilitating just and equitable outcomes. Crucially, this duty is not conditional upon request; it is an affirmative obligation that must be fulfilled at the outset. [475] By contrast, discovery is a subsequent, reactive process triggered when one party believes the other has failed to comply with their disclosure obligations. It often entails formal requests for specific documents or court orders compelling production. Discovery is not 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 145 a substitute for disclosure; it is a remedial measure employed where voluntary transparency has failed. [476] In the present case, the obligation rested squarely on the Respondent to disclose all relevant financial documents, including the Director’s Ledger, as part of his initial disclosure. It was unacceptable for him to evade that obligation and attempt to shift the procedural burden onto the Petitioner by suggesting she should have initiated discovery. This was particularly untenable given that the existence and potential relevance of the Director’s Ledger were only revealed through the Respondent’s own testimony during trial. His refusal to produce the document, despite direct reference to it and multiple requests, is indicative of a lack of candour and a failure to comply with the fundamental duty of full and frank disclosure. [477] The Respondent’s refusal to disclose the Director’s Ledger was particularly egregious in light of his assertion that he earned a mere MYR30,000 per month, a claim patently at odds with evidence of his ownership of an MYR18 million luxury apartment and other significant assets. The disparity between his claimed income and his known lifestyle rendered his explanations implausible and self-serving. [478] Consequently, the Court invoked section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, and drew an adverse inference against the Respondent. This legal presumption permitted the Court to conclude that the withheld Director’s Ledger, if produced, would likely have contained information detrimental to the Respondent’s case. His persistent refusal to provide full and frank financial disclosure led the Court to the inevitable conclusion that he was actively concealing his true 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 146 financial position in an effort to avoid his legal obligations towards the Petitioner. [479] In support of his case, the Respondent sought to rely on the testimony of RW14, a chartered accountant who, incidentally, happened to be related to RW12. The purpose of RW14’s evidence was to establish the Respondent’s financial standing or net worth, which the Respondent contended was insufficient to support the lavish lifestyle that the Petitioner was demanding post-divorce. [480] While the Court did not find RW14 to be an untrustworthy or non-credible witness, it placed limited weight on her testimony because the financial information she based her analysis on was incomplete. [481] Specifically, the Court noted that the Respondent had withheld certain critical financial documents, such as the Director’s Ledger — a document that typically shows the financial transactions between a director and their company, including drawings, loans, payments, and other personal financial benefits or liabilities. Without access to this, RW14’s financial assessment lacked important context. [482] As a result, although RW14 gave her evidence to the best of her ability based on the documents available to her, her conclusions about the Respondent’s true net worth or financial capacity were inherently incomplete and potentially inaccurate. This diminished the evidential value of her testimony in the eyes of the Court. Credibility of witnesses [483] In family proceedings, assessing witnesses is vital, as oral evidence often holds greater significance than documentary evidence, 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 147 particularly in sensitive matters. Written records can be sparse or fail to capture the full context, making witness testimony a key source for understanding complex family relationships and evaluating credibility. Careful examination of witnesses would ensure that the Court's decision is grounded in reliable and consistent accounts, safeguarding the best interests of the child and promoting a just outcome for everyone involved. [484] There are numerous cases that are instructive on how a witness should be assessed and evaluated. I found guidance in the cases of Sean Thornton (a minor by his mother and next friend) v. Northern Ireland Housing Executive [2010] NIQB 4 and McAllister v. Campbell [2014] NIQB 24, where the following factors in assessing and evaluating a witness were considered: a) The inherent probability or improbability of representations of fact; b) The presence of independent evidence tending to corroborate or undermine any given statement of fact; c) The presence of contemporaneous records; d) The demeanour of witnesses; e) The frailty of the population at large in accurately recollecting and describing events in the distant past; f) Whether the witness takes refuge in wild speculation or uncorroborated allegations of fabrication; and g) Whether the witness had a motive for misleading the court. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 148 [485] 'Judicial appreciation is concerned with the process of evaluating the evidence for the purpose of discovering where the truth lies in a particular case. It includes, but is not limited to, identifying the nature and quality of the evidence, assigning such weight to it as the trier of fact deems appropriate, testing the credibility of oral evidence against contemporaneous documents as well as the probabilities of the case and assessing the demeanour of witnesses': per Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Boonsom Boonyanit v. Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 62. [486] In the present case, although a total of 26 witnesses were called to testify, the testimonies of both Petitioner and Respondent warranted comments. [487] I found that, most of the time, neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent were credible witnesses, and this lack of credibility significantly affected the reliability of their respective accounts and claims. [488] The Petitioner took a scorched-earth approach toward the Respondent, consistently targeting his character and even attacking the credibility of witnesses who testified in his support. [489] Throughout the proceedings, it also became apparent that the Petitioner was intent on maximising her financial gain from the divorce, often presenting her narrative in a way that exaggerated the Respondent’s misconduct and downplayed her own decisions and complicity. The Petitioner’s approach appeared calculated and driven by the objective of extracting as much as possible from the Respondent, whether through maintenance, division of assets, or 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 149 other financial reliefs. This perception was further strengthened by inconsistencies and embellishments in the Petitioner’s testimony, as well as her tendency to portray events selectively to bolster her claims. [490] The Petitioner was so clouded by her rage that she stopped at nothing, even if it meant using the Children. This was evident by her own conduct. Although the Petitioner claimed to be acting in the best interests of the Children, her conduct suggested otherwise, as she had effectively drawn the Children into the heart of the conflict. This was evident not only from the Recorded Incident but also from the troubling fact that the Parties’ son had posted disparaging remarks about the Second Co-Respondent on social media. The situation escalated to the point where the Second Co-Respondent felt compelled to lodge a police report against the Son, a development that underscored the damaging impact of the ongoing dispute on the Children. [491] While this specific incident was not formally raised as an issue in the matrimonial proceedings, it nonetheless served as a telling reflection of the Petitioner’s approach to the matrimonial dispute. It revealed a pattern of behaviour in which the Petitioner appeared willing to involve the Children, directly or indirectly, in efforts to tarnish the Respondent’s reputation. Such actions not only undermined the Petitioner’s claim of prioritising the Children's welfare, but also raised concerns about the long-term emotional and psychological consequences for them. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 150 [492] The Respondent was similarly uncooperative, albeit in a different manner. He was often evasive and selectively truthful, particularly when the questions posed to him elicited unfavourable answers. [493] The Respondent made concerted efforts to minimise his financial obligations toward the Petitioner, often adopting evasive and defensive positions when questioned about his income, assets, and actions during the marriage. His conduct throughout the trial suggested a clear intention to avoid parting with any significant financial resources, even when fairness and legal obligations dictated otherwise. [494] In sum, both Parties came across as self-serving and disingenuous, each pursuing their own financial interests with little regard for truthfulness or the spirit of the proceedings. [495] Since both Parties were found to be lacking in credibility, owing to inconsistencies in their testimonies, selective recollection of events, and a tendency to portray themselves in a favourable light, I was compelled to place limited weight on their oral evidence. In light of this, I was required to turn to the documentary evidence adduced during the proceedings, which provided a more objective and reliable account of the relevant events. [496] Additionally, I considered the testimonies of the witnesses called on behalf of the Parties, assessing their credibility independently and in conjunction with the documentary record. Most of these witnesses, being somewhat removed from the emotional complexities of the dispute, were in a better position to offer more impartial insights. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 151 [497] Together, the documentary evidence and the testimony of the supporting witnesses formed the primary basis upon which the facts of the case were established, allowing the Court to reach a reasoned and balanced conclusion despite the deficiencies in the evidence of the Parties. Anonymity Whether the application to anonymise should be allowed [498] In September 2024, just a couple of weeks before the conclusion of these proceedings, the Respondent filed an application for anonymisation in enclosure 503, seeking broad and extensive reliefs. [499] After hearing submissions by Counsel, I found that the Respondent’s application for anonymisation was primarily motivated by concerns over what had been revealed during the trial. It was evident that the Respondent’s primary interest was in protecting himself rather than upholding broader principles of privacy or safeguarding other involved parties. The timing of the application, made so close to the conclusion of the trial, and a full six years after the divorce petition was filed, strongly suggested that it was an afterthought. It was only when the trial was concluding, and the Respondent realised that the sordid details of his previous adulterous relationship with the Second Co-Respondent would become public, that he sought anonymity. In my view, if he had genuinely been concerned about privacy and sensitivity of the issues, he would have made the application much earlier in the proceedings. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 152 [500] Further undermining the Respondent’s claim was the fact that the Respondent had never sought anonymity in the Defamation Suit that he had commenced against the Petitioner in a separate court. This inconsistency suggested that the Respondent’s application to anonymise in the present case was disingenuous. [501] I acknowledge that open justice is a fundamental principle in many legal systems, rooted in the idea that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, as reflected in section 15(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (“Courts of Judicature Act”), which reads: Section 15 – Courts to be open and public

The place in which any Court is held for the purpose of trying any cause or matter, civil or criminal, shall be deemed an open and public court to which the public generally may have access. [Emphasis added.] [502] The concept of open justice was powerfully articulated by Toulson LJ in the landmark case of R (Guardian News and Media Limited) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWCA Civ 420, in the following often-cited passage: In a democracy, where power depends on the consent of the people governed, the answer must lie in the transparency of the legal process. Open justice lets in the light and allows the public to scrutinise the workings of the law, for better or for worse. Jeremy Bentham said in a well-known passage quoted by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in Scott v Scott [1913] AC 407, 477: Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial. [Emphasis added.] 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 153 [503] I am also aware of the recent English case of Tickle & Anor v The BBC & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 42, where it was stated that the principles of open justice and transparency were as much applicable in family as in other proceedings. [504] The principle of ‘open justice’ serves to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice by ensuring that legal proceedings are conducted transparently and are subject to scrutiny. In this context, anonymisation, while intended to protect individual privacy, may inadvertently undermine the integrity of open justice. By concealing the identities of key parties or redacting pertinent details, anonymisation may obscure critical facts, impede the identification of systemic patterns or trends, and hinder meaningful analysis by the public, media, and legal community. Furthermore, it may unintentionally shield individuals or entities, such as public officials, government agencies, or corporations, from legitimate public accountability, thereby weakening democratic oversight and public trust. [505] I also recognise that in the digital era, the effectiveness of anonymisation is increasingly challenged. Advances in data analytics, machine learning, and the widespread availability of auxiliary data sets mean that de-identified information can often be re-identified through cross-referencing or inference techniques. As such, anonymisation may offer only an illusory sense of privacy, particularly when robust safeguards are not in place. This raises significant concerns about the sufficiency of anonymisation as a standalone measure for privacy protection and calls for a more nuanced and technologically informed approach to data governance in legal contexts. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 154 [506] Nonetheless, well-established exceptions exist to the general principle of open justice, and matrimonial proceedings are a prime example. In such cases, courts routinely recognise the need to strike a careful balance between the principle of transparency and the equally important need to protect the privacy of the parties involved. This is particularly so where the proceedings entail the disclosure of highly personal, sensitive, or potentially embarrassing information. Protecting the anonymity of the parties in these circumstances serves not only their individual interests but also the broader public interest in ensuring that parties feel safe to engage in full and honest disclosure — something that lies at the heart of effective family justice. [507] Anonymity in family proceedings is typically preserved unless both parties expressly waive it, or in cases where there is an established history of proceedings being conducted without anonymity. An exception also arises where the Family Court is dealing with contempt of court proceedings, which, due to their quasi-criminal nature, attract different considerations regarding openness and identification. [508] In resisting the Respondent’s application to anonymise, the Petitioner contended that anonymity was unnecessary, given that the Children were above 18 years old, and as such, there was no longer a compelling reason to protect their identities. [509] I was unable to agree with the Petitioner as in my view, the ages of the Children in the present case did not diminish the importance of safeguarding their privacy. Just because the Children are above the age of 18, did not mean that their emotional and psychological well- 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 155 being should be disregarded or deemed less worthy of protection. Adulthood in law does not automatically translate to immunity from harm, especially harm of an emotional or reputational nature. In this case, deeply personal and distressing information regarding the Petitioner and Respondent was revealed through emails and WhatsApp messages — information that was not only private but also potentially traumatising for the Children. These sordid details, now part of the Court record, have already inflicted significant emotional strain. [510] The last thing this Court should do is exacerbate that trauma by unnecessarily revisiting or publicising these matters. Doing so would only serve to reopen old wounds, inflicting fresh psychological damage on individuals who have already been unwillingly thrust into the spotlight. [511] It must be underscored that the Petitioner was the one who drew the Children into this matrimonial dispute, effectively placing them in the line of fire. That being the case, it was now the solemn responsibility of the Court to ensure that their suffering is not prolonged. The dignity, privacy, and mental well-being of the Children deserve ongoing protection, irrespective of their legal status as adults. Accordingly, every effort must be made to minimise further harm, and that includes the Court’s careful handling of all evidence and testimonies involving them. [512] Hence, I decided that anonymisation was necessary pursuant to section 15 (2) of the Courts of Judicature Act, which reads: 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 156 Section 15 – Courts to be open and public ...

A Court may at any time order that no person shall publish the name, address or photograph of any witness in any cause or matter or any part thereof tried or held or to be tried or held before it, or any evidence or any other thing likely to lead to the identification of any such witness; and any person who acts in contravention of any such order shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both. [Emphasis added.] [513] My decision to allow the application to anonymise was also due to the involvement of the First and Second Co-Respondents and their respective families. Although it was my finding that the Second Co-Respondent and the Respondent had, in fact, embarked on an adulterous relationship prior to October 2015, I found that neither the First nor the Second Co-Respondent had contributed to the breakdown of the marriage. In light of this, exposing their identities would have been both unfair and unwarranted, as it would subject them and their families to unnecessary public scrutiny and potential harm. Maintaining their anonymity was essential to ensure that they did not suffer reputational damage or emotional distress, especially given that they were not to be blamed for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage of the Parties. Anonymisation, therefore, served as a protective measure to preserve their dignity and privacy. [514] Anonymisation was not only in the interests of the Respondent and the Co-Respondents, but it may, in fact, serve the Petitioner’s interests as well. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 157 [515] The proceedings had been conducted in a manner that was, in many respects, "no holds barred". The intense scrutiny and unfiltered disclosures, without anonymisation, could lead to significant personal embarrassment and humiliation for the Petitioner as well. [516] The Petitioner must recognise that attempting to publicly name and shame the Respondent and others involved could ultimately backfire. In sensitive family law matters, especially those involving intimate details, emotional trauma, and competing narratives of blame, the public's perception is not always predictable or sympathetic. [517] There was a very real possibility that the public, when exposed to the full facts, may not view the Petitioner solely as a victim. Given the complexities of the relationship and the Petitioner’s own conduct and contribution to the breakdown of the marriage, as evidenced in the material disclosed, the narrative may shift from one of sympathy to one of scrutiny or even criticism. The attempt to position oneself as the wronged party in the public eye can unravel quickly if the facts reveal a more nuanced or contested picture. [518] Moreover, in our digital age, the consequences of public exposure are neither brief nor contained. Once identities are revealed and reputations are tarnished, the impact would not be limited to a single news cycle; it could linger indefinitely in the public domain. This not only risks reputational harm to the Respondent and Co-Respondents, but also to the Petitioner herself, whose private life may be subject to unwelcome public examination and judgment. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 158 [519] Thus, anonymisation was a safeguard not just for the Respondent and third parties, but also for the Petitioner. It would preserve dignity, prevent irreversible damage to personal and professional reputations, and allow the legal process to focus on resolution rather than sensationalism. In short, seeking public vindication through exposure may seem empowering in the moment, but it would carry long-term risks that far outweigh any short-term emotional gratification. Protecting all parties through anonymisation would ensure that justice is administered with fairness, discretion, and humanity. [520] For this reason, and to avoid any form of ‘jigsaw identification’, I decided to anonymise not only the names of all parties to the matrimonial dispute, but also all witnesses, companies and restaurants mentioned. This approach was taken to ensure that innocent third parties did not suffer undue consequences due to their association with the proceedings. [521] It was crucial to add that all cause papers related to the matrimonial dispute are strictly prohibited from being disseminated or published in any form. However, this restriction does not extend to the publication of this judgment itself, as it constitutes an official court document intended for public access. Given that this judgment is to be made publicly available, the media and other interested parties are permitted to report on the case, provided such reporting is fair, accurate, and adheres to all applicable legal and ethical standards. Crucially, this includes strict compliance with the Court’s directive to preserve the anonymity of all parties to these proceedings, at all times. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 159 Costs [522] On the issue of court costs, the trial lasted a total of 80 days. The Petitioner utilised 38 days, while the Respondent took 40 days. The First Co-Respondent, by contrast, only required 2 days. This distribution indicated that the Petitioner and Respondent were almost equally responsible for the duration of the proceedings, contributing significantly to the length and complexity of the trial. [523] I, therefore, made reference to Order 59 rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which read: Order 59 – Costs Rule 8 – Special matters to be taken into account in exercising discretion The Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account-

any offer of contribution or offer of settlement under Order 22B;

the conduct of all the parties, including conduct before and during the proceedings;

the conduct of the parties in relation to any attempt at resolving the cause or matter by mediation or any other means of dispute resolution; and

in particular, the extent to which the parties have followed any relevant pre-action protocol or practice direction for the time being issued by the Registrar. [Emphasis added.] [524] Having considered the circumstances, I ordered both the Petitioner and the Respondent to pay costs. This decision was based on several key factors that justified an equal apportionment of financial responsibility between the two parties. 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 160 [525] Firstly, I was of the view that both Parties had contributed to the breakdown of the marriage. Taking into account their respective claims, it was evident that neither Party could be considered the sole aggrieved party, nor was there a clear "winner" in the case. In fact, they were both “losers” in this dispute. Given this mutual responsibility, it would have been inequitable to impose the burden of costs on only one Party. Instead, fairness dictated that both should bear the consequences of their actions. [526] Secondly, both the Petitioner and the Respondent exhibited unreasonable conduct throughout the litigation process. Their actions extended beyond an ordinary matrimonial dispute and escalated into a series of unnecessary allegations against each other. This resulted in an excessive number of witnesses, namely, 26 in total, being called to either substantiate or disprove claims made. The sheer volume of witnesses prolonged the proceedings unnecessarily, increasing costs and consuming significant judicial resources. [527] The proceedings faced multiple delays and disruptions due to various factors, including the conduct of both Parties and their solicitors. One of the primary causes of delay in the proceedings was the Petitioner’s expert witness, PW8, who failed to attend Court as scheduled. He was originally expected to appear on 7 December 2022, but his repeated excuses for non-attendance necessitated the issuance of an “unless order” and resulted in a significant postponement of the trial. [528] Another source of delay was the Petitioner’s decision to change solicitors after the trial had already begun. This change in legal 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 161 representation significantly disrupted the flow of proceedings, as time had to be allocated for her new legal team to familiarise themselves with the case. This transition had inevitably wasted time that could have been used to progress the trial. [529] The Respondent, on the other hand, contributed to delays through his evasive and obstructive behaviour. Instead of answering questions directly, he frequently made unsubstantiated allegations of "tampering", which forced the Petitioner’s Counsel to repeatedly ask the same questions in an effort to obtain clear responses. This tactic not only prolonged the trial unnecessarily but also frustrated the legal process, consuming judicial time. [530] I was also compelled to state at this juncture that the nature of the matrimonial dispute itself was such that it could have been resolved out of court. This case primarily revolved around financial matters, with no contested issues regarding their Children. As such, it was a matter that could have been resolved through settlement negotiations. However, both Parties displayed stubbornness, either by refusing to make reasonable offers or by rejecting potential settlements outright. Their unwillingness to engage in meaningful compromise further extended the trial, making it clear that both were responsible for the prolonged litigation. In such circumstances, it would be unjust for only one Party to bear the financial burden of the case. [531] For these reasons, I found it appropriate to order both the Petitioner and the Respondent to pay costs. Their mutual contributions to the breakdown of the marriage, their unreasonable conduct during the litigation, and their failure to settle financial issues all justified an 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 162 equitable distribution of costs between them. Accordingly, the Respondent was ordered to pay costs in the amount of MYR 5,000 per day for 40 days, totaling MYR200,000 (subject to allocatur), whilst the Petitioner was ordered to pay costs of MYR 5,000 per day for 38 days, amounting to MYR190,000 (subject to allocatur). [532] The Petitioner was also ordered to pay the First Co-Respondent costs. This decision was based on the Petitioner’s failure to substantiate allegations of adultery between the Respondent and the First Co-Respondent. Furthermore, throughout the trial, the Petitioner persistently sought to tarnish the reputation of the First Co-Respondent with baseless and highly damaging accusations. [533] For instance, the Petitioner sought to cast suspicion on the Respondent by alleging that his purchase of two SGD10,000 notes from the First Co-Respondent was connected to money laundering. The Petitioner further claimed to have seen "cash money stashed in body bags," attempting to paint a picture of illicit financial dealings. [534] The Petitioner’s unfounded and speculative accusations against the First Co-Respondent also compelled the Respondent’s Counsel to call a witness, RW10, a serving police officer (Inspector), to testify and affirm that the First Co-Respondent had no involvement in any money-laundering activities whatsoever. [535] Beyond financial allegations, the Petitioner also attacked the character of the First Co-Respondent, accusing her of promiscuous behaviour and implying involvement in prostitution by stating that she "sleeps around" with other men besides the Respondent. Building on these claims, the Petitioner further alleged that it was 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 163 widely known within their community that the First Co-Respondent had multiple sexual relationships. [536] However, when cross-examined by the First Co-Respondent’s counsel about any evidence to support this assertion, the Petitioner admitted that she had none. She merely claimed to have "witnessed it" but failed to provide any details such as names, incidents, locations, or corroborating testimony from independent witnesses. [537] In my view, even if the First Co-Respondent had engaged in intimate relationships with multiple partners, that remained entirely within her personal autonomy and was, as a matter of principle, her prerogative. The private choices of any party to these proceedings were not subject to moral judgment by the Petitioner or this Court, particularly where they did not bear directly on the legal issues under consideration. The Court’s role was not to scrutinise or pass judgment on any party’s general sexual conduct, but was to determine specific legal questions grounded in evidence and relevance. What was legally and factually material in this context was not the First Co-Respondent’s private life in general, but whether she had engaged in an adulterous relationship with the Respondent. It was only that alleged relationship that fell within the scope of these proceedings and had potential bearing on the issues before the Court. [538] As such, I took a particularly critical view of the Petitioner’s conduct throughout the proceedings. Rather than confining herself to the legitimate presentation of her case, her approach devolved into what can only be described as a sustained personal attack on the First Co-Respondent. Her actions crossed professional boundaries 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 164 and appeared intended to malign the character of the First Co-Respondent, showing a reckless disregard for the fact that the First Co-Respondent has a family who were indirectly, yet unfairly, drawn into what was fundamentally a dispute between the Petitioner and the Respondent. [539] In light of this conduct, I ordered the Petitioner to pay the First Co-Respondent costs in the amount of MYR120,000 for the unnecessary financial burden that the First Co-Respondent was forced to bear. [540] No costs were awarded to the Second Co-Respondent. At a critical stage in the proceedings, she chose not to testify, a decision that significantly altered the evidentiary landscape. Her sudden withdrawal from the witness stand meant that she did not materially contribute to the proceedings, nor did she incur legal costs of a nature or extent that would justify an award. Conclusion [541] In the interest of justice, and after careful scrutiny and judicious consideration of all the evidence before this Court, including the written and oral submissions of all parties, the divorce was pronounced and decree nisi was made absolute immediately. [542] The Petitioner was ordered to pay the following: a) Costs to the Respondent in the amount of MYR190,000 (subject to allocatur) within 14 days from 28 February 2025 (which was the date the decision was delivered); 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 165 b) Costs to the First Co-Respondent of MYR120,000 (subject to allocatur) within three months from 28 February 2025 (which was the date the decision was delivered). [543] The Respondent was ordered to pay the following: a) MYR6,720,000 as lump-sum spousal maintenance; b) MYR350,000 for value of the car; c) MYR1,040,000 for value of Petitioner's contribution to ALIR; d) MYR450,000 as 25% of part of the Respondent’s EPF; e) MYR2,000,000 as value for the home that the Respondent had to provide the Petitioner with; and f) MYR200,000 (subject to allocatur) as costs to the Petitioner. [544] The payments were to be made according to the following timelines in Table B below: TImeline Action Within 14 days from 28 February 2025 Petitioner and Respondent to pay costs to each other in the amount of MYR190,000 and MYR200,000 respectively (subject to allocatur). By 31 May 2025 Petitioner to pay costs to the First Co-Respondent in the amount of MYR120,000 (subject to allocatur). By 31 May 2025 Respondent to pay Petitioner MYR1.56 million. After this payment is made, the Interim Maintenance Order will cease and car provided must be returned 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 166 By 31 August 2025 Respondent to pay Petitioner MYR1 million. By 30 November 2025 Petitioner to vacate PGA Penthouse. By 28 February 2026 Respondent to pay Petitioner MYR2 million. By 31 May 2026 Respondent to pay Petitioner MYR1 million. By 30 September 2026 Respondent to pay Petitioner MYR1 million. By 31 January 2027 Respondent to pay Petitioner MYR1 million. By 31 May 2027 Respondent to pay Petitioner MYR1 million. By 31 December 2027 Respondent to pay Petitioner MYR1 million. [545] I wish to conclude by thanking both current and former Counsel, as well as solicitors representing all parties in these proceedings, for their exceptional assistance, unwavering diligence, and exemplary professionalism and competence throughout the course of this trial. Date: 25 May 2025 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge 25 May 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 167 High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Petitioner – Vasanthi Sathasivam and Subatra KS Nathan; Messrs K Sugu & Associates For the Respondent – Chris Lim Su Heng, Sumita Gnanarajah, Agnes Loo Tse Ching, Rachel Chua Yun Wen, Bhagewesini Morgan Dasi, Hirasini Mahandran; Messrs Chris Lim Su Heng For the First Co-Respondent – Tan Jee Hian and Jessica Jublin; Messrs Jublin Tan & Tey For the Second Co-Respondent – Yoges Verasuntharam and Sivajothi Ganason; Messrs Chambers of Yoges For the Intervener – Khaw Eng Koon - Messrs Chin-Jen & Associates; Gopal Sreenevasan - Messrs Sreenevasan Young; and Michelle Chew - Messrs Michelle Chew.