Yong Tshu Khin v Dahan Cipta Sdn Bhd (BA-24NCvC-2469-10/2025)

This judgment concerns two applications before the Court, the first, filed by the 1st and 2nd Defendants (“D1 and D2”) under Enclosure 9, seeking to strike out the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons dated 29 October 2025, Enclosure 1, on the grounds that it has no reasonable cause of action, it is procedurally defective, legally unsustainable, and amounts to an abuse of process.

The second, is the Plaintiff’s application, under Enclosure 15 seeking to invalidate all documents filed on behalf of the late Letchumanan’s estate, to restrain Dahan Cipta Sdn. Bhd. from acting for the deceased or his estate, and to declare the solicitor’s appointment invalid. In addition, the Plaintiff requests an injunction to prevent any dealings S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA with the subject land until the pending appeal and second review proceedings in the Federal Court are concluded, with the overall aim of preserving the status quo and safeguarding the integrity of the proceedings.

This Court will first determine Enclosure 9, as the validity, of the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons forms the foundation of these proceedings. If the OS is defective or unsustainable, the subsequent applications and reliefs sought would be rendered academic. In considering Enclosure 9, this Court will examine the mandatory procedural requirements under Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012, as to a reasonable cause of action, and whether it amounts to an abuse of process.

The facts of this case have a long and extended history and for easiness, this Court will summarize the essential facts and issues necessary for determination. This litigation concerns a parcel of land (“the Property”) held under Title GRN 48236, Lot No. 623 (formerly CT No. 22358, Lot No. 623), Mukim Kajang, District of Hulu Langat, State of Selangor. S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA

The Property has been the subject of extended disputes spanning several decades. The First Defendant, Dahan Cipta Sdn. Bhd., together with the Plaintiff and one Annie Quah Lay Nah, have been involved in multiple legal proceedings relating to the Property. These proceedings include: • Originating Summons No. R8-24-70-1990 (“the 1990 Suit”) • Suit No. MT5-22-81-1992 (“the 1992 Suit”) • Suit No. MT3-22-356-2008 (“the 2008 Suit”)

By order of the Court, all these actions were consolidated under one suit, and for easy reference, I refer to it as the 1992 Suit, whereby the parties’ rights and obligations in respect of the Property have been litigated. In summary, after a full trial on 22 March 2012, the High Court allowed the 1992 Suit and granted specific performance of the sale and purchase agreement between the Plaintiffs and the First Defendant for the Property. The Court then directed the First Defendant to enforce the Consent Arbitration Award and complete the sale, ordered the Senior Assistant Registrar to deliver the Issued Document of Title to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, and instructed the Land authorities to withdraw all caveats over the Property. S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA

Hence the First Defendant was required to withdraw its private caveat immediately, while the Fourth and Fifth Defendants in the 1992 Suit, were ordered to sign the Memorandum of Transfer within seven days, failing which the Deputy Registrar was empowered to execute the transfer documents to ensure registration of the Property in favor of the Plaintiffs.

In short, arising from the High Court’s decision in the 1992 Suit, four appeals were filed to the Court of Appeal but all were dismissed. Subsequently, three appeals were brought before the Federal Court, which set aside the High Court’s orders of 22 March 2012 and the Court of Appeal’s orders of 21 January 2016, and consequently directed that the issue document of title for the Property be released to Dahan Cipta Sdn. Bhd., and an order for the removal of caveats lodged by Plaintiff and Annie Quah Lay Nah.

The Federal Court further directed that the compensation of RM549,150.00 paid by the Selangor State Government to be remitted to Dahan Cipta, and that Plaintiff and Annie Quah Lay Nah, be refunded RM40,000.00 paid to MMCE Properties Sdn. Bhd., and that damages for breach of contract be assessed and paid by MMCE to Yong and Annie. Additionally, the Consent Judgment and Memorandum of Transfer executed pursuant thereto were set aside, and the Consent Judgment dated 2 March 1999 was declared void, S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA with RM180,000.00 paid under it to be refunded to Plaintiff and Annie Quah Lay Nah. This summary reflects that the Federal Court overturned the prior decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal, reconfigured the legal rights of the parties, and restored Dahan Cipta Sdn. Bhd. as the lawful holder of the property title.

The Plaintiffs’ application before this court now, seeks to invalidate and strike out all affidavits, pleadings, and documents filed on behalf of the late Letchumanan, including those by Dahan Cipta Sdn. Bhd., on grounds that they are void and of no legal effect. Additionally, the Plaintiffs request this Court to declare the “Notice of Appointment of Solicitors” dated 21 November 2025 as null, void, unconstitutional, and void ab initio.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff demands that Dahan Cipta Sdn. Bhd. be restrained from representing or acting on behalf of Letchumanan seeking an interlocutory injunction to prevent the Defendants, their agents, nominees, solicitors, or the Land Office from dealing with the subject land, whether by sale, transfer, mortgage, encumbrance, or registration until the conclusion of the present action and or the resolution of the pending appeal in the Court of Appeal and review proceedings in the Federal Court. S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA

The key issues for determination are as follows: -

(a) Whether there is a reasonable cause of action against D1 and D2 and does the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons comply with the mandatory procedural requirements under Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012?

(b) Whether the Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the principles of finality, res judicata, or issue estoppel arising from prior final decisions?

(c) Whether statutory provisions regulating administration of estates including the relevant provisions of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 or the Powers of Attorney Act 1949 operate to render the striking-out application improper or to sustain Enclosure 15?

These questions go to the heart of the Plaintiff’s entitlement to pursue the reliefs sought, as the Court must be satisfied that the claims are S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA properly grounded in law and not precluded by earlier adjudications that have conclusively resolved the matters in dispute. Courts Findings Is there a reasonable cause of action against D1 and D2?

A claim may be struck out under Order 18 rule 19(1) where, on the face of the pleadings, it is plain and obvious that the claim is unsustainable, frivolous, vexatious, scandalous or constitutes an abuse of process. Where earlier proceedings between the same parties have produced final judgments, the requirements of finality in litigation and public policy preclude re-litigation of the same cause of action or issues which were, or could and should have been, decided previously. The court must guard against multiplicity of proceedings, piecemeal litigation and collateral attacks on final judgments.

Based on the facts of this case and in my opinion, the pleadings show that the present claim arises from the same factual background and the same subject-matter as the earlier concluded proceedings in the 1992 Suit. The Plaintiff’s pleaded case repeats allegations and seeks reliefs that were within, or could have been raised in, those earlier S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA proceedings. There is therefore a clear overlap in parties and cause of action engaging a second contestation as well as failing to adhere to the principles of finality.

On the pleadings as they presently stand, the Plaintiff fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action against D1 and D2 and reads as an attempt to re-open issues of ownership, title and entitlement which have been the subject of final determinations by the Federal Court. The core of Plaintiffs case, purports to attack the authority of persons who acted in relation to the property and to impugn instruments relied upon by the defendants. The origin and substance of the plaintiff’s claims are essentially claims for declarations and remedies that depend upon re-litigating questions already concluded.

Those prior adjudications were competent determinations affecting the same subject-matter and rights now sought to be questioned in the present originating summons, in substance and effect, seeks a second determination of the same questions. Allowing re-litigation would permit litigation by instalments and a second bite at matters that were finally determined. Consequently, on the pleadings, the plaintiff’s action is barred by principles of S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA finality and issue estoppel insofar as it seeks to revisit those determinations.

Referring to the case of Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJJ clarified the principles guiding the court’s discretion under Order 18 rule 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court. He emphasized that striking out pleadings is a summary process that should only be invoked in plain and obvious cases. The court must be able to see clearly that a claim or defence is “obviously unsustainable” on its face, without resorting to a minute examination of documents or facts. This is affirmed in the Federal Court case of Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1,

The Plaintiff bears the burden of showing a reasonable cause of action. The material before the Court plainly discloses that the only plausible purpose of these proceedings is to harass, embarrass and generate further litigation against the Defendants rather than to vindicate a bona fide unresolved legal right and that discretionary considerations and the suitability of summary disposal. S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA

The Court observes that the Originating Summons and its supporting affidavits adopt what may be described as a rolled-up pleading technique, whereby allegations are collectively levelled against both Defendants without the requisite particularisation. Such an approach is procedurally defective, as it leaves the Defendants uncertain as to the precise case they are required to meet. Pleadings must serve the fundamental purpose of defining issues with clarity so that each party knows the specific allegations and legal basis upon which relief is sought.

In the present instance, the pleadings, on their face, contain allegations that are vague, conclusory, and in certain respects scandalous. This manner of pleading is impermissible, particularly in circumstances where a party seeks substantive relief against multiple defendants, each of whom is entitled to be apprised of the distinct case alleged against them. The failure to provide necessary particularisation undermines the fairness of the proceedings and renders the pleadings susceptible to being struck out. Res judicata, or issue estoppel arising from prior final decisions

The Plaintiff’s case raises issues which were determined in the earlier final judgments and seeks effectively the same determinations. Whether framed as a new cause of action or as new questions of law, S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA in my view the pleaded matters here are either identical to or plainly stemming from the earlier litigation. The Plaintiff cannot be permitted a second bite at the cherry by reframing previously determined matters as fresh claims in a distinct procedure.

The Plaintiff has already received the substantive remedies available in relation to the contested issues. The declared rights now sought in Enclosure 1 duplicate some of the reliefs already granted and attempts to reopen questions conclusively resolved. There is no ongoing justiciable controversy requiring the Court’s intervention in favour of the Plaintiff against these Defendants. Standing and the relevance of probate authority

The Plaintiff’s submissions that the Defendants’ procedural actions are rendered unlawful by reason of the absence of a grant of probate or letters of administration is, in the Court’s view, fundamentally misconceived, when considered against the nature of the present striking-out application. This application does not concern the administration, management, or disposition of estate assets by a duly appointed personal representative, but rather addresses the threshold question of whether the Plaintiff’s suit is maintainable in law. S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA

In my view, the pleadings, as they stand, fail to disclose any factual basis upon which it could be said that the Defendants have dealt with estate property in contravention of statutory prohibitions so as to invalidate their procedural conduct. Even if disputes exist between private parties as to the validity of powers of attorney or the authority conferred by a grant, such matters do not, on the pleadings, confer standing upon the Plaintiff to re-open or re-litigate issues of title and entitlement that have already been conclusively determined. The Plaintiff’s reliance on probate formalities, therefore, does not advance the case and cannot sustain the present action against these Defendants.

The Court must protect the finality of litigation, prevent multiplicity and guard against collateral challenges to prior final judgments. Allowing the present action to proceed would be prejudicial to those principles and would unfairly discriminate the Defendants. The plain and obvious character of the defects in the Plaintiff’s case justifies the summary disposal ordered above.

For the foregoing reasons: a) The Defendants’ strike-out application (Enclosure 9) is allowed. S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA b) The Plaintiff’s Originating Summons in Enclosure 1 is struck out under Order 18 rule 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous and vexatious, constitutes an abuse of the Court’s process and is, on its face, scandalous and lacking in sufficient particularity rendering Enclosure 15 academic. c) Cost of this application are to be paid by the Plaintiff to the First and Second Defendants. Date : 4th June 2026 SGD SHOBA DORAI RAJAH JUDICAL COMMISSIONER SHAH ALAM HIGH COURT S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Yong Tshu Khin hadir sendiri Solicitor for the Defendant 1,2: Sajanea Sukumaran [MESSRS VILASINY GAN & CO. (PETALING JAYA).] Solicitor for the Defendant 3,4: Namirah Hanum [MESSRS Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (SHAH ALAM) ] S/N ltHxwchGSkm652pC/dOrtA