if a ground is established, whether relief should be granted in the exercise of the Court's discretion and, if so, upon what terms and in what form; and if it is not established, what course should be taken. D. GOVERNING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK [15] The statutory architecture has been examined at length in this Court's three earlier decisions, and I set out here only what the present matter requires. Section 352 imposes the duty to lodge the prescribed particulars of a registrable charge within thirty days of its creation, the duty arising where a company "creates a charge over its property or any of its undertakings". Section 357 requires the Registrar to keep and maintain the register of charges and, by subsection (3), renders the certificate of registration conclusive evidence that the requirements of the Act as to registration have been complied with. Section 359 governs, separately, the variation of the terms of a registered charge. Two further matters should be added here, since they determine what may and what may not be placed before the Court on an application of this kind. The register which the Registrar keeps under section 357 is not a register which a party may search: the Act contains no provision opening it to inspection, and the right conferred by section 601(2) extends only to the inspection of documents filed or lodged with the Registrar and to certified copies of or extracts from those documents. The register of charges which section 362(4) opens to inspection is the different register which section 362(3) requires the company itself to keep at its registered office. The Court therefore proceeds, as it must, upon the form as lodged and upon the certificate issued upon its registration, from which the Registrar's entries under section 357(2) are taken; and the absence of an extract of the Registrar's register is not a deficiency in an applicant's proof. [16] Section 361 confers the corrective jurisdiction. The section is headed "Extension of time and rectification of register of charges". The Court, on being satisfied that the omission or misstatement of any particular with respect to a charge was accidental or due to inadvertence or to some other sufficient cause, or is not of a nature to prejudice the position of creditors or shareholders, or that on other grounds it is just and equitable to grant relief, may — on the application of the company or any person interested, and on such terms and conditions as seem just and expedient order that the omission or misstatement be rectified. The three grounds are disjunctive: any one suffices, though in practice inadvertence and absence of prejudice frequently coincide (Dream Station, at [17]; Lolla Industries, at [15]). The jurisdiction is discretionary; satisfaction of a ground opens the door but does not compel relief (Dream Station, at [17]). [17] Two boundaries settled by the earlier decisions frame the inquiry. First, section 361 corrects the register so that it records what was in fact created; it does not permit the registered security to be enlarged or improved after the event, a matter for which Parliament provided separately in section 359 (Sing Kwung, at [2], [27] - [29]). Secondly, the interests the section protects are those of "creditors or shareholders" third parties who may have ordered their affairs by reference to the public state of the register and not those of the chargor and chargee, who are ordinarily aligned in seeking corrective relief (Lolla Industries, at [17]; Sing Kwung, at [33]). E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Whether the Application Is Properly Constituted and Within the Corrective Jurisdiction [18] The first issue is a threshold one and may be shortly resolved. Section 361 permits the application to be made by the company or by any person interested. The plaintiff is the chargor company, and its standing to invoke the jurisdiction is beyond question. That the chargee, Maybank Islamic Berhad, is not a party is no defect: in Lolla Industries and Dream Station the company alone applied and the chargee was not joined. Nonjoinder of the chargee does not touch the competence of the application, though the chargee's position is relevant to prejudice, a matter to which I return. [19] Nor is there any difficulty in the choice of the curial, rather than the administrative, route. As this Court observed in Sing Kwung (at [17] and [37]), paragraph 16 of Practice Note No. 6/2019 (issued on 05.11.2019 and revised on 31.12.2020 and on 24.01.2022) ("the Practice Note") states that that Practice Note which clarifies the procedure for the administrative rectification of the register by the Registrar under section 602, upon the grounds set out in subsection 602(1), namely that an entry contains matter contrary to law, contains matter which in a material particular is false or misleading, has by reason of an omission or misdescription not been duly completed, or is incorrect or erroneous is not applicable to rectification in respect of any documents relating to charges which have been lodged with the Registrar, and that any such rectification must strictly comply with the provisions of Subdivision 1 of Division 7 of Part III of the Act. The point should be stated with precision, because a practice note issued under section 20C is guidance and not law: it can neither confer jurisdiction nor withdraw it. It is therefore not paragraph 16 which removes charge documents from the administrative route; it is the statute. Within Subdivision 1 of Division 7 of Part III the code which Parliament enacted for the registration of charges the only power to correct an omission or misstatement in the registered particulars of a charge is the power which section 361 confers upon the Court; no corresponding power is conferred upon the Registrar. Paragraph 16 declares that allocation; it does not create it. A correction to a particular in a registered charge is therefore a matter for the Court under section 361. While Dream Station (at [28]) left open precisely where the line falls between corrections that may be effected administratively and those that require an order of the Court, that question does not arise here: a correction to a lodged Statement of Particulars of a registered charge lies, on any view, within the curial route. The application is properly before this Court. It follows equally and the point governs the form of the amended document considered at [28] below that the requirements of the general Practice Note, including the phrase prescribed by its paragraph 13(c) and the underlining of corrections prescribed by its paragraph 13(b), are not to be imported into this class of application by default: paragraph 16 of that Practice Note excludes rectification in respect of documents relating to charges from its scope, and it is the Registrar's separate, charge-specific guidance under section 361 which supplies the applicable formal requirements. [20] The Registrar's separate, charge-specific guidelines the guidelines on applications for extension of time for registration of charges and for the correction or amendment of charge particulars (including the cancellation of charges) under section 361 of the Companies Act 2016, dated 30.09.2020 ("the section 361 guidelines"), and issued, as their opening recital states, pursuant to section 20C of the Companies Commission of Malaysia Act 2001 are consistent with that allocation. They state that where a correction or amendment is to be made to the particulars of a registered charge, an order of the High Court under section 361 must be obtained (paragraph 7); that the Registrar is to be named as defendant, the cause papers being served upon the Registrar so that it may consider whether it objects (paragraph 8); and that the application is to be commenced by originating summons supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds and the evidence relied upon (paragraph 10). What was said at [19] of the Practice Note applies to these guidelines equally: they are guidance and not law, and they neither enlarge nor confine the jurisdiction which section 361 confers or the conditions which the section itself lays down for its exercise. But they are the published practice of the office which must give effect to the Court's order, and they are of real assistance upon two questions which arise later in these grounds: the form in which the order should be drawn, and the form in which the corrected document must be lodged if the order is to be carried into effect. [21] One matter of constitution must, however, be recorded. The cause papers describe the plaintiff throughout as "YST TYRE AND BATTERY SDN. BHD." The Registrar's records describe it as "YST TYRE & BATTERY SDN. BHD." That is the form appearing on the prelodgement collection slip generated by the Registrar's own system, on the Statement of Particulars as lodged, and on the Certificate of Registration of Charge; it is also the form used in the sale and purchase agreement and on the plaintiff's company stamp. The discrepancy is not cosmetic. The Registrar has required in terms that the name of the chargor be accurate in the summons and in the order so that the correction may be registered, and the Registrar acts upon the sealed order according to its terms. Nor is the requirement the letter's alone: paragraph 13 of the section 361 guidelines requires the intitulement and the prayers of the originating summons to state clearly the names of the parties to the charge, the new and former registration numbers of the companies concerned, the date of the form to be amended and the charge registration number. Until the registered name is verified and, if it differs, the cause papers amended, an order drawn in the present intitulement may not be capable of being given effect. Whether the Correction Is Corrective or Substantive [22] The question of substance, and the one on which Sing Kwung turned, is whether what is sought is truly the rectification of a misstatement or is in substance an alteration of the scope of the registered security after the event (Sing Kwung, at [2], [18]). That question is answered by comparing the existing registered text with the proposed text. In Sing Kwung the applicant sought to move from a defined stock of financed vehicles to "all present and future stock", an enlargement of the charged property which engaged section 359 territory and the public-notice function of the register, and the application failed (Sing Kwung, at [21]). [23] The present case lies at the opposite pole. The only change sought is from "76450" to "75200" in the postcode of the postal address. That change narrows nothing and enlarges nothing. The charged property is identified in item 8 by its registered leasehold title Pajakan Mukim No. Hakmilik 575, Lot 2826, Mukim Bertam which fixes its identity with precision for the purposes of the register and which the correction leaves wholly untouched. The postal address is a subsidiary descriptor appended to those title particulars, and the misstatement is confined to a single element of it. The registered security is neither widened nor improved. This is a correction of the plainest corrective kind. [24] The public-notice function of the register is not engaged because no person consulting the register could be misled as to the identity of the charged property, which is defined by its title particulars and not by its postcode. [25] Two limbs of section 361 must nevertheless be kept apart, and the earlier decision does not do the work which a first reading might suggest. Dream Station was concerned with an omission: item 8 there recorded the postal address of each property but omitted the registered title under which it was held, and the test formulated in that case whether the entry answers what the prescribed field requires was expressly directed to omission, and expressly not to the question "whether the entry in fact made is false" (Dream Station, at [23]). The present case is the converse. The prescribed field is answered: item 8 states the registered title, and states it correctly. What is complained of is that one element of the description which was in fact given is false. The application therefore engages the misstatement limb, upon which no authority has yet been placed before the Court. That does not narrow the jurisdiction, for the section speaks of "the omission or misstatement of any particular" and treats the two alike. But it means that the elements of the misstatement limb must be established in their own right, and that the passages relied upon in the earlier decision which concerned an amendment that added the registered title to a description already substantially accurate do not answer the question which arises here. Whether the Papers Are in a Condition in Which an Order May Safely Be Drawn [26] A party who invokes the jurisdiction to correct a public record must bring to that exercise instruments which are themselves accurate, for an order founded upon an inaccurate prayer propagates the very kind of error it is invoked to remove (Dream Station, at [27]). Three matters must be attended to before any order is drawn. [27] First, the "from" and "to" texts in the principal prayer are not symmetrical. The existing text is prefixed with the item number ("8. A short description of the property affected: ..."); the substituted text is not ("A short description of the property affected: ..."). In each the opening quotation mark is unclosed. Read literally, an order in that form would direct the deletion of the item number as well as the substitution of the postcode. Precision in this respect is not a matter of taste: the Registrar's guidance itself requires the applicant to state, in detail, the particular to be amended and the terms from which and to which the amendment is to be made. [28] Secondly, the proposed corrected form exhibited to the supporting affidavit calls for a word. In that exhibit the figures "76450" are struck through and the figures "75200" are written on the line below, falling beneath the deletion and to the left of the word "Melaka" — that is to say, in the place of the figures struck out. Read in that way the corrected description ends "... Taman Gadong Perdana, Bertam, 75200 Melaka", which is precisely what the prayer seeks, and I record that upon examination the exhibit and the prayer are at one. The matter which remains is a different and narrower one. What is exhibited is a copy of the form as it was lodged, altered by hand after it had been completed, lodged and registered. I should not be understood as saying that the form itself is out of date. The form used is the form which the Registrar presently prescribes for the purposes of sections 352(1), 354 and 356(1), and it corresponds, item for item, with the form in the cause papers. The defect is one of format, not of vintage. What is exhibited is a marked-up copy of a document already on the register; it is not an amended form prepared for lodgement. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Registrar's guidance under section 361 require an amended Statement of Particulars to be prepared for lodgement together with the sealed order; to bear at the top right-hand corner the notation "Filed by way of amendment to item ... of the Statement of Particulars to be Lodged with Charge dated ... by way of Court Order dated ..."; and to bear the current date at the time of lodgement. The exhibited document has none of those features, and a form lodged in that condition may be refused at the counter notwithstanding an order of this Court. It should be noted that the differently worded formula in paragraph 13(c) of the Practice Note has no application here, that Practice Note being excluded by its own paragraph 16 from documents relating to charges. The exclusion has practical content. The formula which paragraph 13(c) prescribes — "This is filed by way of amendment to the Form ... dated ... which is erroneous" — identifies neither the item amended nor the order of the Court under which the amendment is made, and the underlining of the corrected information which paragraph 13(b) requires forms no part of the charge-specific regime; to adopt either upon the amended Statement would misdescribe the basis upon which the correction is effected. A freshly engrossed form in the prescribed format is therefore required, carrying the corrected particular as printed text together with the notation and the date which the guidance requires; and that is in any event what the Registrar has asked for. [29] Thirdly, and for the same reason, the operative words of any order are better confined to the substitution itself than expressed as a recital of the whole of item 8. To re-recite an entire description is to certify the whole of it. One element of this description is not wholly free from question on the present material: it locates the property in "Bertam", while the plaintiff's own business premises on the same road are described in the sale and purchase agreement as being in "Pulau Gadong". The assessment record supports "Bertam" for the holding in question and I say nothing against that element. The inconsistency is in all probability harmless, but it remains an internal geographical inconsistency within the plaintiff's own documents. But where the correction sought is the substitution of five figures for five others, there is no reason for the Court to assume the burden of certifying anything more. [30] The evidential standard for this class of application is settled by the contrast between Sing Kwung and Lolla Industries. A bare assertion of clerical error does not, of itself, establish inadvertence; the affidavit should explain the mechanism of the mistake, and the Court will test the assertion against the documents (Sing Kwung, at [22]-[23]). In Lolla Industries that standard was met because the deponent was the clerk who completed the forms, who identified precisely how the date of stamping came to be entered in place of the date of execution, corroborated by the underlying instruments (Lolla Industries, at [23]). [31] Measured against that standard, the supporting affidavit here is thin. It deposes to the discovery of the error and to the correct postcode, but it does not explain the mechanism by which the wrong postcode came to be entered, and it is affirmed not by the person who prepared the Statement but by a solicitor of the firm having conduct of the matter. The deponent's own role is, moreover, left ambiguous. The Statement of Particulars names the firm, and not the deponent personally, as the lodger, and nothing before the Court establishes that this solicitor prepared item 8 or has first-hand knowledge of how it came to be completed. Preparation, review, lodgement and the source of the figures are distinct questions: who prepared the form, who reviewed or approved it, who lodged it, and from what source "76450" was copied must each be answered, and answered by a person able to speak to the matter of his or her own knowledge. On its face this resembles the kind of unelaborated assertion which, in Sing Kwung, was found wanting. [32] It may be said that the resemblance is superficial: that the evidential concern in Sing Kwung was not thinness for its own sake but that, the amendment there being a substantive enlargement and the charging instrument not having been exhibited, the Court could not verify whether the registered wording had failed to reflect the security as it was in fact created (Sing Kwung, at [23]-[24]); that no such question arises where a postcode is in issue; and that where the nature of the error is self-evident and the corrected particular is independently corroborated by a public record, the absence of a narrative of the manner in which the error was made should not be fatal. There is force in that view, and I have considered it carefully. On a full examination of the material I am not able to act upon it, for three reasons. [33] First, inadvertence is a statutory condition, and satisfaction of it is a finding of fact. The section requires the Court to be satisfied that the misstatement "was accidental or due to inadvertence or to some other sufficient cause". That is not established by the deponent's own characterisation of the event, nor by the triviality of the error. Triviality may make inadvertence probable; it does not prove it, and a Court which treats the two as the same thing dispenses with the condition rather than applies it. The affidavit does not identify who prepared item 8, how the figures came to be entered, or how the error came to light on 27.06.2026, and the deponent is not shown to have first-hand knowledge of the preparation of the form. [34] Secondly, the exhibits suggest an explanation which, if established, would be more favourable to the plaintiff than anything presently before me — and which cannot be adopted on the material as it stands. The property is described as "76450 Melaka" in the sale and purchase agreement as executed on 04.09.2025 and in the stamp certificate issued upon its adjudication on 11.09.2025. The inference available is that the erroneous postcode originated in the conveyancing documents and was transcribed into item 8 when the statutory form was prepared, which would show the carrying forward of a preexisting error rather than carelessness at the point of lodgement. But that inference depends upon the sequence in which the documents were made and altered, and the manuscript alteration by which the description in the agreement was corrected is undated, unexplained, and apparently later than the stamping. The alteration is, further, unauthenticated in every respect in which authentication might be looked for: it bears no initials or signatures of the contracting parties; it is supported by no solicitor's confirmation and by no instrument of variation; and there is no evidence whether it was made before or after execution and stamping. Since the stamp certificate retained "76450", the altered agreement cannot safely be treated as primary proof of the correct postcode; that work must be done by the assessment record, which stands independent of the parties. An inference which turns upon chronology cannot be drawn where the chronology is not in evidence. The deponent, and not the Court, must do this work. [35] Thirdly, the second limb is not addressed at all. There is no averment that the charge and the facility it secures subsist; none that no creditor, shareholder or other person has dealt, or could have dealt, with the plaintiff on the faith of the misstated particular; and none directed to prejudice in any form. I accept at once that the risk is small: the charged land is identified by a registered title which the correction leaves untouched, and no person could sensibly take a postcode as the measure of a security. But the absence of prejudice is a statutory gateway, not a presumption, and a gateway is passed through upon evidence. The point is the more important because the grounds are disjunctive: where the first limb is not made out, the second is not a makeweight but the alternative foundation of the jurisdiction, and it cannot be supplied by the Court's own impression of the case. [36] There is a further evidential gap, and it concerns the security itself. The Statement of Particulars refers on its face to the instrument of charge and to the letter of offer and supplementary letter of offer under which the secured facility was granted. None of the three has been exhibited. Without the instrument of charge the Court cannot independently confirm the property that was in law charged; whether the description of that property in the security documents carried the postcode 76450 or 75200; the date on which the charge was in fact created; the plaintiff's capacity to grant it; or the matter at the heart of the misstatement limb that the correction sought does no more than make the register reflect the security as it was originally created. It was the absence of the charging instrument which, in Sing Kwung (at [23]-[24]), prevented the Court from verifying that the registered wording had failed to reflect the security as created, and the same disability, in lesser degree, attends the present record. The offer letters bear upon the same questions so far as they contain the description of the property, and upon the subsistence of the facility. The production of these documents is directed below. The omission is, moreover, a departure from the published requirements themselves: paragraph 13 of the section 361 guidelines requires evidence showing the creation of the charge between the parties the charge agreement, the Form 16A or other like proof to be exhibited in the supporting affidavit. [37] A further matter must be recorded, since it bears upon the same conclusion. The issue document of title to Pajakan Mukim No. Hakmilik 575, Lot 2826 has not been produced, and no land search has been exhibited; the plaintiff's proprietorship of the land it is said to have charged is therefore not established on this record. The material does not merely leave the question open; it invites it. Section 352(1) imposes the lodgement duty upon a company "that creates a charge over its property or any of its undertakings", so that the premise of the lodgement is that the land charged was the plaintiff's. Yet the agreement under which the plaintiff purchased was expressly conditional upon the obtaining of an order for sale in respect of the one-third undivided share held under the estate of a deceased proprietor, and upon receipt of the State Authority's approval of consent to transfer, within six months of 04.09.2025 or such further period as the parties might agree in writing. That six-month period expired on 04.03.2026, some two months before the charge is said to have been created on 07.05.2026, and no written extension is in evidence. The title carries a restriction in interest under which the land may not be transferred or leased without the consent of the State Authority. And the assessment bill, though issued on 07.07.2026, remains in the names of the vendors. [38] I state plainly what does and does not follow. The validity of the charge is not in issue on an application of this kind, and I decide nothing about it. Assessment records commonly lag behind registration, and nothing adverse follows from that alone. The certificate issued under section 357(3) is conclusive evidence that the requirements of the Act as to registration have been complied with; but it is conclusive of that and of nothing else, and it does not establish the plaintiff's title to the land, nor the plaintiff's capacity to have charged it, nor the efficacy of the security. What the Court is asked to do is to certify the accuracy of a description of land in a public register, and it should do that upon a record which shows what the land is and in whom it was vested when the charge was created. In Dream Station the certified issue documents of title were before the Court and were used for precisely that purpose. A current land search will ordinarily answer the whole of this, since it will show the registered proprietor and the registration of the charge together with the date of that registration, and it is a document readily and inexpensively obtained. It is only if the search does not show the plaintiff as proprietor at the material date that anything further will be needed. [39] Against all of this, the correctness of the substituted figure is not in doubt. The assessment bill of the Majlis Bandaraya Melaka Bersejarah for account no. 1200-5000-0009 identifies the holding assessed at No. 18 and 18-1, Jalan GP 1, Taman Gadong Perdana, Bertam as bearing the postcode 75200. That is the record of a public authority and it does not depend upon the plaintiff's assertion. The plaintiff's own business address on the same road is likewise given as 75200. Nothing in these grounds is to be read as casting doubt upon the figure. At the same time, the limits of the bill must be kept in view. Issued on 07.07.2026 after both the creation and the registration of the charge and standing in the names of the vendors, it proves the postcode of the holding and nothing more; it does not establish that the plaintiff owned the land on 07.05.2026, a matter addressed at [37] and [38] above. The difficulty is not what the correct postcode is. It is that the statutory conditions upon which the power to substitute it depends have not been established. [40] The chargee, Maybank Islamic Berhad, is not a party, and no written confirmation from it appears on the record; there is nothing to show that it is aware of the application at all. The better practice, as this Court has observed in the earlier decisions of this class, is for the chargee's confirmation to be placed on the record, since it is evidence both of the accuracy of the correction and of the absence of prejudice. It is, moreover, more than a matter of better practice. The Registrar's guidance under section 361, in the model papers appended to it (Lampiran B) for an application of precisely this kind, lists among the documents to be exhibited to the supporting affidavit the letter of consent of the chargee together with the related security documents. Of the documents so listed, the plaintiff has exhibited the form as lodged, the Certificate of Registration and a proposed amended form; the letter of consent and the security documents are absent. Its omission is therefore a departure from the very practice which the office charged with giving effect to the order has published. Its absence would not by itself defeat the application, for the correction leaves the security untouched and is on its face to the chargee's advantage. But where the second limb of the section has not otherwise been addressed on oath, the confirmation of the person whose security the register describes is the most direct evidence available upon it, and it should be obtained. Bare consent, if given, will not by itself carry the weight now required of it. The confirmation to be obtained should state that the facility and the charge subsist; that the property described in the chargee's security documents is the land held under Pajakan Mukim No. Hakmilik 575, Lot 2826, Mukim Bertam; that the correct postcode of that property is 75200; that the chargee consents to the rectification operating from the date of registration of the charge; and that it is aware of no intervening interest and of no prejudice to any person. The Position of the Registrar [41] The Registrar's letter requires a word, because it is capable of being read for more than it says. It records that the Registrar does not object. It is not a verification. It does not confirm from the Registrar's records that the substituted postcode is correct, and it does not say that the Registrar has itself checked anything; on the contrary, it places upon the plaintiff, in terms, the responsibility for ensuring that the particulars in the summons, in the order and in the form are accurate so that the correction may be registered. That is consistent with the office the Registrar occupies on such an application: its published guidance describes the purpose of service upon it as being to enable it to consider whether it has any objection, and not to verify the applicant's material. Nor does the letter state that any search of the Registrar's records was made; that no subsequent lodgement or dealing concerning charge no. 001 has occurred since registration; or that no third-party interest has arisen between registration and the present. The register kept under section 357 not being open to search by a party (see [15] above), evidence upon those matters, if it is to come at all, must come from the Registrar or from the chargee; and the gap which the letter leaves a gap touching both prejudice and the retrospective operation of the correction is among the reasons for the course taken below. Non-objection is in any event not a ground for relief. The power to rectify is conferred upon the Court by section 361, and the conditions for its exercise must be found by the Court upon the evidence; they cannot be supplied by the consent, or the silence, of the office whose record is to be corrected (Sing Kwung, at [36]----[38]; Dream Station, at [26]). An unopposed application of this character is not, for being unopposed, a self-proving one. Discretion, the Form of the Order, and Temporal Operation [42] A ground not having been established, the occasion for the exercise of the discretion does not presently arise. The form of any order is not settled by these grounds, and is a matter to be determined if and when the application is allowed. It is nevertheless necessary to address certain matters bearing upon the framing of the relief the sense in which the principal prayer seeks leave, the manner in which a correction under section 361 is carried to the register, and the date from which any rectification would operate both so that the plaintiff may know what is required of it and so that the Registrar may know what to expect at the counter. [43] The principal prayer is framed as one for leave to the plaintiff to amend the lodged Statement. On a first view that formula may be thought to misdescribe the relief which section 361 provides, since the section empowers the Court to order that the misstatement be rectified, and it is the Registrar and not the company which alters the public record. On examination, however, the criticism cannot be sustained, and I record that expressly. The prayer follows almost word for word the model supplied by Lampiran B to the Registrar's guidance under section 361, which prescribes a prayer that the plaintiff be granted leave ("kebenaran") to amend the stated item of the Statement of Particulars, followed by the "from" and "to" texts ("dari" and "kepada"), and which contemplates the plaintiff lodging the amended form after the order has been obtained while the Registrar gives effect to it. The plaintiff's remaining prayers track the model equally: lodgement of the amended form together with the sealed order within thirty days, and payment of the administrative cost of RM300.00 within the same period the conditions which paragraphs 15 and 16 of the section 361 guidelines prescribe, the latter of which paragraph 16 requires to be sought as a prayer in the summons, as it has been. The plaintiff has done what the regulator's published model directs. The order made in Dream Station was likewise expressed as a grant of leave to amend item 8, and it follows that the present prayer is unobjectionable in substance and is not to be criticised. [44] Since the formula recurs in every application of this class, the sense in which "leave" is used should be made plain, so that the prayer, the order and the step taken at the Registrar's counter are each understood for what they are. "Leave" is no more than the permission of the Court for a step which cannot otherwise be taken; it is not itself the operative act of correction. Under section 361 the operative act is the order of the Court that the omission or misstatement be rectified. The public record is then altered by the Registrar, and by the Registrar alone, in giving effect to that order. The company cannot itself amend a document which has been lodged and registered. Nor, where a charge is concerned, is the lodgement of an amended document of itself a corrective act. Under the general regime the position is otherwise: paragraph 13(a) of the Practice Note requires the amended document to be lodged in order to correct the errors in the document earlier lodged or registered, and it is the Registrar who then rectifies the register in exercise of the power conferred by section 602. For documents relating to charges that mechanism is withdrawn and, for the reasons given at [19], the correction is authorised by the order of the Court under section 361 alone; the lodgement of the amended Statement is no more than the step by which the order is carried to the register. What the Registrar's charge-specific guidance contemplates is the lodgement of a fresh, amended Statement of Particulars together with the sealed order, and it is that step — the preparation and lodgement of the amended form — for which the Court's leave is granted. The formula "leave to amend" — which appears nowhere in the Practice Note, and which enters this class of application only through the model prayer in the guidance under section 361 considered at [43] above — therefore comprises two distinct elements: first, the substantive order of rectification, which alone supplies the Registrar's authority to correct the register; and secondly, the consequential permission to the applicant to prepare and lodge the amended form by which the correction is carried to the counter. The section 361 guidelines place the point beyond doubt in two respects. The word which the model prayer uses is "kebenaran" permission which is precisely the sense described above; and paragraph 8 of the guidelines states in terms that it is the Registrar who is responsible for giving effect to the order to be granted by the Court. The Court orders; the company is permitted to lodge; the Registrar executes. The architecture of the general regime, though it does not apply to charges, confirms the analysis: paragraph 11 of the Practice Note provides that where, upon an appeal from the Registrar's refusal of an application under section 602, the Court orders rectification, the order of the Court is itself lodged with the Registrar within the time frame the Court prescribes or, in default, fourteen (14) days of the order and no further application under subsection 602(1) is required. There, as here, the operative instrument is the order of the Court; lodgement merely gives it effect. Two misconceptions are thereby avoided. The first is that a grant of "leave" authorises the company to alter the register for itself: it does not, for the register is the Registrar's, and it is corrected only under and in accordance with the order. The second is that "leave to amend" in this context imports the jurisdiction to amend cause papers under the Rules of Court: it does not, for that jurisdiction governs the amendment of pleadings and other documents in the proceedings themselves, and has nothing to do with the register of charges. The form of the order which gives effect to both elements is dealt with at [45] below. [45] For precision only, and not by way of correction of the plaintiff, the operative words of any order allowing the application should be expressed as a direction that the misstatement in item 8 be rectified by the substitution of the figures, that being the language of section 361 itself and the language which identifies the authority under which a public register is altered; and any such order should require the plaintiff to lodge with the sealed order an amended Statement of Particulars complying with paragraphs 14 and 15 of the guidance. The substance sought would thereby be granted, in the form given at [29] above. [46] As to temporal operation, the natural consequence of correcting a misstated particular is that the register reads, from the outset, as it would have read had the error never been made (Lolla Industries, at [29]). The summons does not, however, state the date from which the correction is to operate whether from the creation of the charge on 07.05.2026, from its registration on 15.05.2026, or only from the making of the order and that omission is one which the sealed order should cure in terms, for uncertainty as to the temporal effect of the register is precisely what an order under section 361 exists to remove. Registration, and not creation, is the correct anchor: it is the register, and not the instrument, which is corrected. Any order allowing the application should therefore state expressly that the rectification takes effect as from 15.05.2026, the date of registration of the charge, so that the register is read from that date as though the corrected particular had been entered upon registration. No interest acquired in reliance on the register between registration on 15.05.2026 and the date of any order is shown, and the period is short; no formal saving need be inserted, though I would include liberty to apply as a prudent term against the possibility, however remote, that such an interest should later emerge. [47] The conditions attaching to any order would follow the settled practice: lodgement of the amended Statement together with the sealed order within thirty days, and payment of the administrative cost of RM300.00 to the Registrar within the same period, that sum reflecting the plaintiff's own offer in its prayers (as to the ordering of costs in accordance with the applicant's own offer, see Lolla Industries). Those two conditions correspond exactly with paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Registrar's guidance under section 361, and there is every reason to keep the Court's order and the regulator's published requirements in step. The Registrar's letter of 20.07.2026 is, moreover, specific as to the mode of payment: the administrative cost is to be paid through the collection account stated in that letter, with proof of payment furnished. Any order should therefore direct payment in the manner the Registrar has stipulated and the delivery of proof of that payment to the Registrar together with the amended Statement, rather than merely record that RM300.00 is payable. To those conditions I would add that what is lodged must be a freshly engrossed form in the prescribed format, bearing the notation and the current date required by paragraph 14 and paragraph 15 of that guidance, and not the marked-up copy presently exhibited. F. CONCLUSION [48] The application is properly constituted and within the corrective jurisdiction of the Court. The correction sought is the rectification of a misstatement and not a substantive alteration of the registered security: the charged land is identified in item 8 by a registered title which the correction leaves untouched, and no person consulting the register could be misled as to the identity of the security by reason of a postcode. The correctness of the substituted figure is independently supported by the assessment record of the local authority, and I have no doubt that 75200 is the true postcode of the property. The form of the principal prayer is not open to objection, following as it does the model published by the Registrar, and the sense in which it grants "leave" is explained at [44] above. [49] The application nevertheless cannot be granted as it stands. The papers are not in a condition in which an order may safely be drawn: the plaintiff is named in the cause papers otherwise than as it is named in the Registrar's records; the two texts in the principal prayer are not symmetrical; and what is exhibited as the corrected form is a marked-up copy of the form already lodged and registered, which bears neither the notation nor the current date required of an amended form. And a ground under section 361(1) is not made out on the present evidence: inadvertence is asserted but its mechanism is nowhere deposed to, and the deponent is not shown to have prepared the form or to speak from personal knowledge; the alteration relied upon in the underlying agreement is unexplained, unauthenticated and appears to post-date the stamping of that agreement; the instrument of charge and the offer letters to which the Statement of Particulars refers are not exhibited; the second limb is not addressed at all; the title to the land in question, and with it the plaintiff's capacity to have charged that land on 07.05.2026, is not before the Court; and the position of the chargee is unknown, although the letter of consent of a chargee is among the documents which the Registrar's own guidance requires to be exhibited. [50] None of this is irremediable. Every one of the deficiencies is capable of being cured by a short affidavit and a small number of documents, and on the material as it stands the probability is that it will be cured without difficulty. It would be wrong to dismiss an application of this character for want of evidence which can readily be supplied, and it would be equally wrong to grant it upon assumptions which the record does not support the more so in a recurring class of application in which the practice of this Court is being settled, and in which what is done once will be relied upon as the measure of what is required thereafter. The proper course is to stand the application over upon directions. I therefore make no order upon the substantive prayers at this stage. G. DIRECTIONS OF THE COURT [51] In the course of the hearing, the plaintiff applied orally for leave to amend the intitulement and the company name in the cause papers. The amendment is formal in character, corrects the manner in which the proceedings are constituted, and occasions no conceivable prejudice. I allowed the application, and the directions which follow proceed on the footing of the amended intitulement. [52] I give the following directions: